Daily Archives: 03/07/2011

Ένα πολύ καλό κριτικό άρθρο του Π.Μελά για τον Ισημερινό και το ζήτημα του «απεχθούς χρέους»

Η έννοια του Odious Debt και η περίπτωση του Ισημερινού. Γιατί τόσος θόρυβος;

Πηγή: monthly review
Του ΚΩΣΤΑ ΜΕΛΑ
1. Ο Ισημερινός από το 1826 έως το 2010 έχει οδηγηθεί σε αδυναμία πληρωμής (defaulted) 109 φορές τουλάχιστον στα τελευταία 184 χρόνια. Ο Ισημερινός (οι κυβερνήσεις του) μετά από πολλές και διάφορες αναχρηματοδοτήσεις και αναβολές στην καταβολή των υποχρεώσεών του στις ξένες εμπορικές τράπεζες (συσσώρευση σημαντικών καθυστερήσεων στην καταβολή των τόκων μεταξύ 1987–1994) συμφώνησε τελικά σε μια κατανοητή μείωση (διαγραφή) του χρέους και σε συμφωνία αναχρηματοδότησης το 1995 σύμφωνα με το Σχέδιο Brady [1].

Η συμφωνία αυτή προέβλεπε την αποδοχή από τους πιστωτές hair-cut ύψους 45,0% έναντι 35,0% που είχαν επιτύχει οι υπόλοιπες χώρες της Λατινικής Αμερικής. Παρά τη συμφωνία του 1995, το 1999 βρέθηκε σε πολύ σοβαρή δημοσιονομική κρίση, λόγω της μείωσης των τιμών πετρελαίου, καταστροφών στις υποδομές και στην αγροτική παραγωγή λόγω του φαινομένου El Nino, μείωση των εισροών κεφαλαίου λόγω της κρίσης των χωρών της ΝΑ Ασίας και στη συνέχεια της Ρωσίας καθώς και λανθασμένων κινήσεων στη δημοσιονομική και νομισματική πολιτική εκ μέρους των κυβερνήσεων.

Κατά τη διάρκεια του δεύτερου εξαμήνου του 1999, ο Ισημερινός ήταν η πρώτη χώρα στον κόσμο που προέβηκε σε αθέτηση πληρωμών των υποχρεώσεών της όπως αυτές είχαν αναδιαρθρωθεί σύμφωνα με το Σχέδιο Brady το 1995.

Ο Ισημερινός «αθέτησε την πληρωμή» δύο Eurobonds τα οποία είχε εκδώσει το 1997 (σε καλύτερες ημέρες) καθώς και σε ορισμένα βραχυπρόθεσμα εγχώρια χρεόγραφα σε ρήτρα δολαρίου.

Σε μια κίνηση απελπισίας, η κυβέρνηση του προέδρου Χαμίλ Μαχουάντ τον Ιανουάριο του 2000 συνέδεσε το νόμισμά της με το δολάριο προσπαθώντας να αντιμετωπίσει την τρέχουσα οικονομική κρίση [2]. Αμέσως μετά όμως και έπειτα από ταραχές ο Μαχουάντ απομακρύνθηκε από την εξουσία και τον διαδέχθηκε ο αντιπρόεδρος Γκουστάβο Νομπόα.

Τον Απρίλιο του 2000 το ΔΝΤ προσέφερε χρηματοοικονομική υποστήριξη με στόχο την επίτευξη δημοσιονομικής σταθερότητας μέσω εφαρμογής «των γνωστών μακροοικονομικών πολιτικών του», υποστηρίζοντας παράλληλα ότι η χώρα χρειάζεται ουσιαστικό «ξαλάφρωμα» τόσο του συνολικού χρέους όσο και των ροών καταβολής τόκων [3].

Τον Ιούλιο του 2000, με τη βοήθεια του ΔΝΤ, η κυβέρνηση του Ισημερινού επεδίωξε και επέτυχε έναν ακόμη γύρο «μείωσης των υποχρεώσεών της» προς τους πιστωτές της (ομολογιούχοι), η οποία υπολογίζεται περίπου στο 40,0% της ονομαστικής αξίας των ομολόγων.

Παρουσιάστηκε στους ομολογιούχους μια πρόταση της μορφής «δέχομαι ή απορρίπτω» η οποία περιελάμβανε τους παρακάτω όρους: οι ομολογιούχοι καλούνταν να ανταλλάξουν τα παλαιά ομόλογα που κατείχαν (σύμφωνα με το σχέδιο Brady και είχαν ήδη υποστεί «κούρεμα» τα οποία όμως είχαν την εγγύηση του Αμερικανικού Δημοσίου) με νέα μη εγγυημένα ομόλογα που θα έληγαν το 2030 με πολύ χαμηλότερο επιτόκιο στην αρχή της νέας τους ζωής. Το ίδιο αφορούσε στα βραχυπρόθεσμα Eurobonds (στα οποία δεν είχαν υποστεί κανένα κούρεμα μέχρι τώρα). Εάν οι ομολογιούχοι αποφάσιζαν να κρατήσουν τα παλαιά ομόλογα που έληγαν το 2012, τότε θα εφαρμοζόταν επί αυτών ένα ακόμη «κούρεμα» ύψους 35,0%.

Περίπου 97,0% των ομολογιούχων αποδέχτηκαν την προσφορά ανταλλαγής. Με τον τρόπο αυτό μειώθηκε ουσιαστικά το συσσωρευμένο χρέος και μειώθηκαν και οι ταμειακές εκροές της χώρας.

2. Στο τέλος Δεκεμβρίου του 2008 η Κυβέρνηση του Προέδρου Rafael Correa δήλωσε αδυναμία πληρωμής για τα ομόλογα 2012 και 2030 ακολουθώντας στο σημείο αυτό τις προτάσεις της Επιτροπής για το Odious Debt [4] που ο ίδιος είχε συστήσει και στην οποία συμμετείχαν πρόσωπα προσκείμενα στο καθεστώς όπως είθισται σε αυτές τις περιπτώσεις. Σύμφωνα με την Επιτροπή, αυτές οι εκδόσεις ομολόγων (αλλά και σχεδόν ολόκληρο το ΔΧ του Ισημερινού) αποτελούν ανήθικες και παράνομες υποχρεώσεις (immoral and illegitimate obligations). Ο πρόεδρος R. Correa απέφυγε συστηματικά να χαρακτηρίσει ως παράνομα τα ομόλογα, τις υποχρεώσεις των οποίων αρνήθηκε να εξυπηρετήσει. Ενώ στην πολιτική ρητορεία χρησιμοποιούσε ευρέως την ορολογία του Odious Debt ως μέσου για την άρνηση του ΔΧ, αλλά στην πράξη απέφυγε να την επικαλεσθεί αλλά κυρίως να τη χρησιμοποίηση πρακτικά. Πρέπει να υπογραμμισθεί ότι παρά την εντατική συζήτηση στην πολιτική και την ακαδημαϊκή σφαίρα το δόγμα του Odious Debt δεν έχει ποτέ χρησιμοποιηθεί σε ένα Διεθνές Δικαστήριο [5].

3. Θα αναφέρουμε την ιστορική εξέλιξη των γεγονότων.
Τη 15η Δεκεμβρίου 2008 [6] ένα τοκομερίδιο (coupon) ύψους 30,5 εκατ. δολαρίων των δεκαετών ομολόγων έκδοσης Δεκεμβρίου 2005 και λήξης 2015, ανακοινώθηκε ότι δεν θα πληρωθεί. Με το πέρασμα του χρόνου, η αθέτηση πληρωμών έγινε επιλεκτική και με διακρίσεις (indiscriminate). Δεν οδήγησε σε άρνηση των υποχρεώσεων του χρέους ως μισητό (repudiation of obligations as odious) ή σε άλλες βάσεις, ούτε σε μια διαπραγμάτευση ή ακόμα σε μια μονόπλευρη ανταλλαγή χρέους (όπως η Αργεντινή) με στόχο να επιτευχθεί μαζική απάλειψη χρέους.

Στις 20 Δεκεμβρίου, ο πρόεδρος Rafael Correa δήλωσε ότι όλες οι επίσημες διμερείς και πολυμερείς υποχρεώσεις που έχει αναλάβει η κυβέρνηση του Ισημερινού θα εξυπηρετούνται κανονικά και τούτο παρότι σύμφωνα με την Έκθεση της Επιτροπής CAIC όποιο χρέος έχει θεωρηθεί παράνομο [7] θα πρέπει πάραυτα να «αναθεωρηθεί». Επίσης, ο πρόεδρος μαζί με την υπουργό Οικονομικών Maria Elsa Viteri υποστήριξαν ότι η αθέτηση πληρωμών θα περιοριζόταν μόνο στο «εμπορικό χρέος», εννοώντας τις τρεις συγκεκριμένες εκδόσεις ομολόγων με ημερομηνία λήξης 2012, 2015 και 2030.

Στα μέσα του Ιανουαρίου 2009 πάντως, η κυβέρνηση ξαφνικά αποφάσισε να πληρώσει το τοκομερίδιο του Ομολόγου 2015 (παρότι η Επιτροπή το είχε θεωρήσει και αυτό ως μισητό (odious). Τον Φεβρουάριο του 2009 έγινε φανερό ότι ο πρόεδρος Rafael Correa είχε επικεντρώσει την προσοχή του μόνο στα δύο συγκεκριμένα ομόλογα με ημερομηνία λήξης το 2012 και το 2030 [8].

Η κυβέρνηση του Ισημερινού άρχισε την επαναγορά των Ομολόγων το 2012 στη δευτερογενή αγορά μετά την κατάρρευση των τιμών που ακολούθησε την απόφαση του Δεκεμβρίου 2008 να προβεί σε αθέτηση πληρωμών. Στις 20 Απριλίου 2009, η κυβέρνηση ανακοίνωσε μια προσφορά–πρόταση επαναγοράς των ομολόγων με ημερομηνία λήξης το 2012 και το 2030 μέσω μιας τροποποιημένης Δημοπρασίας Ολλανδικού Τύπου [9] με τιμή βάσης (εκκίνησης) 30 cents του δολαρίου. Κυκλοφόρησε το κείμενο της συμφωνίας από τον διευθύνοντα σύμβουλο της LAZARD [10], Freres, με ημερομηνία λήξης της προσφοράς την 15η Μαΐου, για όλες τις συμπεριλαμβανόμενες προτάσεις. Με τον τρόπο αυτό αγοράστηκαν περίπου το 91,0% των ομολόγων με προεξόφληση (discount) μεταξύ 65,0% και 70,0%%, δηλαδή εξαγοράστηκαν ομόλογα ονομαστικής αξίας 3 δις δολαρίων έναντι 900 εκατ. δολαρίων. Επίσης μια ακόμη επαναγορά έγινε τον Νοέμβριο του 2009. Στο τέλος του 2009 είχαν επαναγοραστεί περίπου το 95,0% των ομολόγων με ημερομηνία λήξης 2012 και 2030 [11].

4.Συμπεράσματα

Ο πρόεδρος Rafael Correa μόνο ρητορικά χρησιμοποίησε τον όρο odious debt. Στην πράξη προχώρησε σε μια επαναγορά από τη δευτερογενή αγορά τις εκδόσεις δύο συγκεκριμένων ομολόγων, αφού προηγουμένως απείλησε και φόβισε τους ιδιώτες κατόχους τους [12].

Δεν έγινε καμία χρήση της νομικής έννοιας του όρου odious debt διότι απλούστατα δεν υφίσταται τέτοια έννοια [13]. Ο πρόεδρος Rafael Correa δεν προσέφυγε σε κανένα Διεθνές Δικαστήριο για να δικαιωθεί. Επομένως, τα συμπεράσματα της Επιτροπής Ελέγχου δεν αφορούν, προς το παρόν, τη Διεθνή Έννομη Τάξη. Μπορεί να αφορούν το λαό του Ισημερινού και μπορεί να οδηγήσουν σε ποινικά ή άλλα μέτρα ενάντια των υπευθύνων. Και σωστά να τιμωρηθούν οι υπεύθυνοι όμως δεν εξασφαλίζει νομική βάση στη διεθνή έννομη τάξη για άρνηση ή για τι άλλο του χρέους. Η πολιτική διερεύνηση και στη συνέχεια η εσωτερική ποινική διευθέτηση υφιστάμενων παρανομιών και καταχρήσεων αποτελεί μέλημα των εγχωρίων αρχών. Δεν σημαίνει ότι με αυτό τον τρόπο συγκροτείται νομική βάση για διεθνείς διευθετήσεις.

Ο πρόεδρος Rafael Correa μπόρεσε να επαναγοράσει τα συγκεκριμένα ομόλογα με πόρους που ανήκαν στο κράτος του Ισημερινού λόγω των πλεονασμάτων που εν τω μεταξύ είχαν δημιουργηθεί μέσα από την παραγωγική διαδικασία. Δηλαδή προχώρησε σε μια μορφή αναδιάρθρωσης του χρέους όπως τόσες άλλες. Γιατί λοιπόν τόσος θόρυβος;
Υποσημειώσεις:

[1] Μεταξύ του 1993–1994 αυξήθηκε εκ νέου το δημοσιονομικό έλλειμμα στην οικονομία του Ισημερινού κυρίως λόγω της αύξησης των αμυντικών δαπανών με αφορμή τον πολέμου με το Περού, γεγονός που είχε ως αποτέλεσμα την αύξηση του ξένου δανεισμού.

[2] Ο Ισημερινός δεν προέβηκε σε υποτίμηση του νομίσματός του από τότε.

[3] Stanley Fisher, «Ecuador and the IMF», 19/5/2000, διαθέσιμο στο http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/051900.htm

[4] Internal Auditing Commission for Public Credit of Equador, Οκτώβριος 2008. Βλ. επίσης, Naomi Mastone & David Oakley, «Ecuador Hints at Default over “illegitimate” Debt», Financial Times, 18/11/2008.

[5] Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, «Is there a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debt?», 32 NCJ.INT’L LGCOM.RFG,749 (2006) όπου υποστηρίζεται ότι ένα νομικό δόγμα του Odious Debt δεν υπάρχει.

[6] Το Εξωτερικό Χρέος του Ισημερινού στο τέλος του 2008 ανήρχετο στο 19,0% του ΑΕΠ, δηλαδή υπολογιζόταν σε περίπου 3,5 δις δολάρια.

[7] Σύμφωνα με τα συμπεράσματα της Επιτροπής Ελέγχου σχεδόν το σύνολο του χρέους ήταν παράνομο και ανήθικο.

[8] Η εξήγηση για αυτή τη στοχοποίηση θα πρέπει να αναζητηθεί ιστορικά στην «κόντρα» μεταξύ του Correa ως υπουργού Οικονομικών επί Προεδρίας Alfredo Palacio (Απρίλιος 2005) και των ΔΝΤ και Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας, αλλά κυρίως του προέδρου της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας, Paul Wolfowitz σχετικά με τον τρόπο που έγινε η αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους το 2000 και αφορούσε τα συγκεκριμένα δύο ομόλογα. Μετά από 106 ημέρες ως υπουργός Οικονομικών παραιτήθηκε και το 2007 κέρδισε τις προεδρικές εκλογές διαδεχόμενος τον Alfredo Palacio. Θα πρέπει να σημειωθεί εδώ, ότι ο Alfredo Palacio ήταν αντιπρόεδρος του προέδρου Lucio Gutierrez ο οποίος απομακρύνθηκε από την εξουσία (καθαιρέθηκε για λόγους διαφθοράς) και έτσι ο Alfredo Palacio έγινε πρόεδρος. Ο Alfredo Palacio όταν ήταν αντιπρόεδρος είχε επιλέξει τον Rafael Correa ως οικονομικό του σύμβουλο.

[9] Βλ. Κ. Μελάς, Εισαγωγή στην Τραπεζική Χρηματοοικονομική, Β’ Έκδοση, Εξάντας 2009, σ.105-107.

[10] Σύμβουλος του προέδρου Rafael Correa ήταν η γνωστή χρηματοοικονομική εταιρία Lazard, η οποία ειρήσθω εν παρόδω συμβουλεύει για τα ίδια ζητήματα και την κυβέρνηση Γ.Α. Παπανδρέου.

[11] Arturo C. Porzecanski, «When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case Of Ecuador», διαθέσιμο στο http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp).

[12] Το αν έπραξε σωστά ή όχι δεν αξιολογείται στη συγκεκριμένη παρουσίαση. Άλλωστε η αξιολόγηση εμπεριέχει απεριόριστη υποκειμενικότητα αλλά και την ιδεολογική σκοπιά που φαίνονται τα γεγονότα.

[13] UN, «The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law», No 185, Ιούλιος 2007. Βλ. επίσης, Κ. Μελάς & Ν. Μπινιάρης, «Δημόσιο χρέος: αθέτηση πληρωμών, αναδιάρθρωση ή τι άλλο;», Monthly Review, τεύχ. 69.

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CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE: The data from GREECE

CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE: The data from GREECE

 

Mavroudeas Stavros

Syriopoulos Costas

Department of Economic Studies

University of Macedonia

Journal of Applied Business Research vol.14 no.1

 

ABSTRACT

            The convergence hypothesis is a popular tenet in modern discussions in macroeconomics and regional economics. It derives from the very fundamental properties of the neoclassical single-sector growth model, and its assumption of diminishing returns to scale. Following this theoretical framework a number of empirical tests (σ or unconditional β or conditional β-convergence) has been developed. This paper tests unconditional and conditional β-convergence for the Greek economy. Three issues are being considered: (i)if there is regional convergence, (ii) if there is a North-Southern divide, (iii) if Greece is converging with the other economies taking part in the European integration project. Our empirical results reject the convergence hypothesis in all cases. These findings, together with similar findings for many other economies, pose significant problems for the theoretical assumptions of the neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical change.

 

 

1. Introduction: theory and evidence

            The convergence hypothesis is a popular tenet in modern discussions in macro and regional economics. It contends that there is a negative relationship  – after controlling for some set of variables – between initial income level and growth rate. Therefore, poor countries or regions tend to grow faster than developed ones and, subsequently, a convergence process is operating leading to similar levels of development. This hypothesis is derived, usually, from the very fundamental properties of the Solowian neoclassical single-sector growth model, and its typical assumptions of diminishing returns to capital, exogenous technological progress, full employment, a fixed relation between the labour force and population and exogenous growth of population. The neoclassical growth model for closed economies, as presented by Solow (1956), suggests that the per capita growth rates tend to be inversely related to the starting level of output or income per capita. Hence, if economies are similar with respect to preferences and technology, then poor economies grow faster than rich ones, promoting convergence in levels of per capita product and income. This thesis has been extended for the case of open economies. In the case of a closed economy convergence among its regions derives from (a) the diminishing returns to capital, (b) the mobility of capital and labour across regions and, (c) the gradual spread of technology. All these hypotheses can be easily justified on the basis of stylised facts for a single economy and for the long-run period[1]. The crucial assumption is the first, since it represents one of the very fundamental properties of the neoclassical growth model, whereas the others are being added as second grade – not necessary – assumptions. Because of the diminishing returns to capital – and given similar determinants of the steady state (capital accumulation rate, population growth rate, preferences etc.) – regions with a lower level of capital and output exhibit a greater rate of growth so as to catch up the more advanced regions (exhibiting smaller rates) and to converge to the steady state values. Put it simply, as capital accumulates its marginal product falls and so does the incentive to invest. Assuming capital mobility, capital flows to the less developed regions and the growth rate in the developed regions falls as the capital-labour ratio falls. The extension of the convergence hypothesis for different economies requires additional assumptions securing the open character of these economies. Therefore, the mobility of factors of production and the diffusion of technologies should be accounted for. This version of the convergence hypothesis has been branded by Baumol (1994) the “common forces” model.

The same convergence thesis has been advanced also within the context of the Technological Catching Up Hypothesis (Baumol (1986) or “contagion” model (Baumol (1994), i.e. that economies that are technologically backward may experience large jumps in productivity by adopting already-existing advanced technology. It should be noted that in this case the theoretical framework changes. Institutional (eg.education) and discrete technological (e.g. different technological policies) factors play a more significant role. Furthermore, Baumol (1986) recognises different clusters of countries and different results with regards to convergence (convergence clubs etc.)[2]. The three clusters of the industrialised, intermediate and centrally planned countries exhibited, for the period 1950-80, a convergence trend. However, the cluster of poorer less underdeveloped countries did not exhibited such a trend. Additionally, there has been little convergence among the groups.

The empirical procedures used to test the convergence hypothesis are almost the same for both the two beforementioned theoretical frameworks. Based on the Solowian single-sector growth model, three types of convergence have been recognized.

(1) Sigma convergence (σ-convergence) studies the cross section dispersion of per capita income (or productivity) levels. If the dispersion decreases over time, then per capita income levels tend to converge. This test has been criticised as crude and not conforming fully with the theoretical properties of the neoclassical growth model.

(2) Absolute beta convergence (β-convergence) is a cross section regression of time averaged growth rates on initial levels of per capita GDP. If there is a negative regression coefficient on the initial income level then a process of convergence is operating. This test takes into account the initial levels of growth. However, it does not account fully for the determinants of the steady state.

(3) Finally, conditional β-convergence looks at the cross section regression coefficient of time averaged growth rates on initial incomes but also of a number of additional explanatory variables, such as the capital accumulation rate and the population growth rate. Conditional β-convergence is considered a more appropriate test for the neoclassical growth model.

Following the formalisation introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), in order to test for β-convergence the following non-linear regression is used:

(1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i – ln y0,i) = c – (1/T) (1-eβt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i                                                          (1)

where ln y0+T,i – ln y0,i  is economy ‘s GDP per capita between 0 and T, ln y0,i  is the logarithm of economy ‘s GDP per capita at time 0, or the initial level of per capita GDP, t is a linear time trend and e0+T,i  is the disturbance term.

According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), conditional β-convergence should be distinguished from absolute β-convergence. A set of economies displays conditional β-convergence, if the partial correlation between growth and initial income is negative. In other words, if we run a cross-sectional regression of growth of initial income holding constant a number of additional variables, and we find that the coefficient of initial income level is positive, then the economies in the data display conditional β-convergence. If the coefficient of initial income is positive in a univariate regression -like regression (1)- then we say that the data set displays unconditional or absolute β-convergence. For conditional β-convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) propose the estimation of the following regression:

(1/T) (ln y0+t,i – lny0,i) = c – (1-eβt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                                    (2)

where Χit   is a vector of variables that proxy for, and hold constant, the steady state. The only difference with (1), which tests for unconditional or absolute convergence, is the presence of the steady state vector Χit .

Although the neoclassical economic theory predicts convergence, the empirical evidence has been a subject for debate. Baumol (1986) was the first who examined and conclude in favour of convergence, De Long (1988) contradicted Baumol’s results, and after them a large body of literature appeared (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) etc.).

Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) employ equation (2), which is in accordance with the neoclassical framework of analysis, in order to test empirically the existence or not of convergence. The overall evidence of their analysis weighs heavily in favor of convergence, suggesting that the results of the neoclassical growth models are valid. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) evidence, indicates that, when holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts. Finally, other recent studies upon the subject of convergence support the theory of the neoclassical model (Coulombe and Lee 1995 for the case of Canada and Cashin 1995 for Austalia) .

On the other hand, Mauro and Podrecca (1994) examined empirically the convergence hypothesis for the case of Italian regions. Their findings opposed those of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Also, Pagano (1993) studying productivity or income convergence in the European Community countries suggests that the process of convergence stops or even reverse with the oil shocks of 1970’s. Neven and Gouyete (1994) suggest that there exist dualism between Southern and Northeastern regions of the European Community, and Button and Pentecost (1995) testing the convergence in the European Union regional economies find no significant convergence across those regions in the 1980’s.

 

 

2. Issues of convergence in the economy of Greece

            This paper tests unconditional and conditional β-convergence for the Greek economy. Three issues are being considered. Firstly, whether there is a regional convergence in the Greek economy. Secondly, given the interest in the possibility of a north-south divide in Greece, whether there is convergence between Southern and Northern Greece. Finally, whether the Greek economy is converging with the other European economies taking part in the European integration project.

The first issue is straightforward: it begs the question whether the Greek economy exhibits the properties and the results hypothesized by the neoclassical growth model.

The second issue refers to a nowadays popular debate in Greece. After the collapse of the Eastern block and the liberalisation of the other Balkan economies it has been voiced from many sides that there is a structural change in the Greek economy. Before, the South – mainly represented by the Athens area (the so-called economic and industrial polypus of Athens) – was the economic heartland of the country. The northern areas were basically dedicated to agriculture. Now – the argument maintains – after the crisis of the ‘70s the economic and industrial basis of the South has become aged and deindustrialisation (because of the crisis) is taking its toll. On the other hand, the northern areas – boosted also by opportunities in the newly-opened northern neighbouring countries – tend to become the new economic centre.

The third question considers the relationship with the European integration project. Greece takes part in that project with the expectation of converging with the more advanced Western European countries. This assumption – i.e. convergence of the European economies – has been supported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). However, all present day debates focus upon the real divergence among European economies. This fact has been contrasted to the Maastricht treaty requirements which emphasise nominal convergence. The problem is more grave since the EEC – and now the EU – has created specific funds in order to support the less developed mostly Southern European countries to improve their infrastructure and productive basis. These resources did not represent a significant amount in European terms – and after all the EEC’s budget is extremely limited – but they do represent significant resources in terms of the particular targeted economies. Greece has received from European Union resources equivalent to 5% of the GDP over 6 years (Community Support Framework I) and funds equivalent to 6%-7% of the Gross Regional Product (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes). It is also estimated that the second Community Support Framework will contribute resources equivalent to 5%-6% of the annual Greek GDP over 6 years (1994-1996). However, these resources seem to fail to produce the expected outcome. So, the second issue refers to the convergence or divergence of Greece with the other European economies.

 

 

3. Empirical Results

            In our empirical analysis we estimate regressions (1), (2) to test for the different types of β-convergence across the Greek regions.

 

4.1 Testing for unconditional β-convergence

As a first step, we investigate whether there exist “Barro and Sala-i-Martin type” of unconditional β-convergence across Greek regions. For this purpose we estimate empirically, using the technique of non-linear least squares, the (1) regression (Table 1). We estimated this regression for the sub periods before the entrance of Greece in the European Community (EC),  after the entrance of Greece in the EC, and for the whole period.

[TABLE 1]

The  β coefficient, although is positive, is never statistically significant different from zero. In the same table we present the results of the estimation of the same basic equation (1) with the addition of two explanatory variables, the shares of GDP in the manufacturing and industrial sector for each region (meti and indi respectively). These two explanatory variables are used on the grounds that this should help to stabilize the β coefficient across the different sub-periods, by holding constant the shocks which might affect groups of regions in common, or those correlated with initial per capita income. In our estimation the inclusion of these additional variables does not  improve our estimates and thus does not appear to play a significant role.

Looking for a possible north-south divide, we estimate again regression (1), this time including an additional North/South dummy variable (N/S) on the right hand side. This dummy variable takes the values of 1 for Southern regions and 0 for Northern regions as a proxy for different steady state values of per capita income between North and South. Thus, a positive estimate of the β coefficient in this case would indicate that there exist β-convergence within each area, rather than convergence across all Greek regions of convergence between North and South (Table 2).

[TABLE 2]

The estimates show little improvement with respect to the previous results, even if we add structural variables as before. The results are not conclusive because we do not have statistically significant estimates for the coefficient of convergence as the values of t-statistics reveals. Thus, the hypothesis of absolute β-convergence across Greek regions is clearly rejected.

 

4.2 Testing for conditional β-convergence.

The poor statistical performance of the previous statistical regressions (tables 1 and 2) might be due to the fact that we have not explicitly controlled for the cross-regional variations of the steady states towards which each region is supposed to converge. In other words we have not tested for conditional β-convergence.

The concept of conditional β-convergence, suggests the estimation of a multiple regression like (2). In our empirical analysis as steady state proxy variable we initially use the share of investment on GDP, which is the most important factor that can lead the Greek regions to convergence (Tables 3,4)

[TABLE  3, 4]

The coefficient of convergence β is always positive as the neoclassical theory predicts but it is never significantly different from zero, with the exception of the last case and specifically for the period after the introduction of Greece in the EC (1981-1996). The latter result implies conditional convergence within the Northern and the Southern part of Greece separately, supporting the popular view prevailing in Greece about the divergence between North and South. Thus, our results do not support the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. Finally, maybe the most important thing is that the coefficient of the share of investment on GDP is negative, probably implying ineffective investment planning for Greece.

 

 

5. Concluding Remarks

            The present paper examines the issue of convergence across Greek regions, following the theoretical basis of the neoclassical model of economic growth. Our empirical results are not in accordance with the neoclassical model. In all three issues under examination the hypotheses of the model are being negated. This rejection has both theoretical and empirical connotations. We contend that it is the model – and the theory underlying it – that cannot grasp reality.

On the theoretical aspect, both the “common forces” and the “contagion” model set out to verify a theoretically presupposed convergence. This is stronger in the case of the first model – deriving from the constitutive properties of the neoclassical growth model. These properties have been rightly criticised as erroneous. The Cambridge, UK critique (Garegnani (1970) etc.) has proved that the neoclassical theory of distribution, and thereby the aggregate production function, are invalid[3]. Consequently, the use of the latter in studying convergence brings potential bias to the analysis. Additionally, the diminishing returns to capital assumption has been also criticised as invalid. In the case of the “contagion” model the same theoretical criticisms apply.

Regarding the empirical reality, both models fail to explain why a vast number of countries fail to not only converge but even to follow the more developed ones. This failure is less forceful in the case of the “contagion” model since it can accept the existence of such a host – or hosts – of countries; but it cannot explain why. So absolute convergence is contradicted by the failure of poorer countries (and regions) to converge. But even conditional convergence does not always occur, since it comes about within some, but not all “clubs” of countries (Baumol, 1986). Additionally, even when convergence applies, it holds for some periods and not for others. Finally,  the convergence theory cannot explain why the productivity ranking of the follower countries has changed over time even when they converge toward the productivity level of the leader.

All these point out to the fundamental limitations of both convergence models. In the case of the typical Solovian model the assumption of non-interdependence between advanced and backward economies lead to treat them as being driven by the same common forces towards a common steady state. The rate of growth of the former appear not to affect the latter. Moreover, trade relations, obstacles to the technological innovation and world economic hierarchies are absent making the model extremely unrealistic. Finally the exogeneity of technical progress is a well known deficiency of this theory.

In the case of the contagion model the unrealistic assumption of common forces (in the form of common technology) is dropped. In advanced countries growth is led by technological innovation, whereas in backward countries it is led by imitation. Convergence depends upon the rate of technological transfer from advanced to backward countries. However, contrary to the theory, convergence is not a certainty but a potentiality. As Abramovitz (1994) admits, the existence of a process of convergence is not automatic but depends upon social capabilities (factors limiting the diffusion of knowledge, rate of structural change, institutional forms etc.). Despite its greater sophistication, the contagion model fails to incorporate properly all these factors.

Last, but not the least, the convergence thesis cannot address the concerns of policy-makers interested in regional development. Traditional cross-section regressions on the convergence equation cannot solve issues such as that of the nature of interactions between different countries (regions). Or, if currently leading economies are always the first to innovate technologically and whether new technology filters passively to poorer economies. Also, it fails to understand agglomeration processes and the institutional and transactions costs’ dimension of regional development.

The abovementioned theoretical limitations of the convergence thesis are verified by the particular characteristics of the Greek economy. Neither the common forces nor the contagion mechanism seem to operate. Economic activity was unevenly distributed throughout the post-WW.II era, being primarily concentrated in the prefectures of Athens and Piraeus, and to a lesser extent Thessaloniki (Kottis (1980)). This is verified by the strong urbanisation trends that began in the 1950s and continue to exist. Furthermore, it is telling that there is no convergence neither in periods of robust development (1960-73) nor in periods of recession (1973-1996) and despite significant sectoral transformations of the economic structure. Developed regions seems to offer undeniable advantages with regard to infrastructure. Another well-documented reason is state’s infamous overcentralisation. Economic activities closer to the seat of government enjoyed better relations with the state machine. Additionally, regional policies towards a more even spatial distribution of economic activities proved to be ineffective. Their incentives system was characterised by innate weaknesses and contradictions (related to vested interests)4.

The same considerations hold for the two main developmental poles of the Greek economy, Southern and Northern Greece. Despite recent developments and the increased economic significance of Northern Greece, the Southern area exhibits a more or less steady lead, since it represents those regions that were developed first and foremost the Athens area. On the other hand aspirations for a more ambitious role for Northern Greece (and particularly the Thessaloniki area), because of the opening of the Balkan economies have not been vindicated.

Historical evidence shows that in economies, instead of convergence, divergence and stratification reigns. The issue of both cross-national and regional convergence or divergence can be studied more properly from the premises of an “uneven development” model. Such an approach should incorporate the historical and social dimension and could explain patterns of development both within the Greek economy as well as between Greece and the other European countries. Within this perspective technical change should be theorised as endogenous and subject to – but also a means of – competition. This field is open for future research.

 

 

6. Suggestions for future research

            Having presented the theoretical and methodological critique of the convergence hypothesis, there is still room for further testing it in future research. The definitions of Bernard and Durlauf (1995) lead naturally to the use of cointegration techniques in testing this hypothesis. Therefore, it would be interesting to compare our present results with those derived from the use of time series. Moreover, since the division of Greece in regions is merely administrative, it might be useful to test the convergence hypothesis in relation to the prefectures of the country.

 

ENDNOTES

1.         For example, there is an extensive literature – not only in heterodox (institutionalist etc.) traditions about the segmentation of labour markets, local labour markets and, hence, a relative immobility of labour. However, in the longer long-run – and from the premises of a single-sector model (i.e. not accounting for different types of capital and labour) – it can be assumed that any such immobility can be smoothed down.

2.         Baumol’s concept of b-convergence has been criticised (see Romer (1986, 1989) for depending heavily upon the particular sample used and, thus, holding only for group of economies with similar steady state determinants.

3.         The neoclassical model is inconsistent because it neglects the interdependence of income distribution and the value of the capital stock. In this model the value of the capital stock cannot be known until the profit rate is known, but the profit rate (equal to the marginal product of capital) is unknowable without knowing the value of the (aggregate) capital stock. It has been shown that because of this circularity, the aggregate production function is valid only in a one-commodity world or when the capital-labour ratios and technologies are equal in all sectors.

4.         For a detailed analysis, with emphasis on industry, see Labrianidis-Papamichos (1990).

 

REFERENCES

  1. Abramovitz M., “Catc-up and convergence in the postwar growth boom and after”, in Baumol et al., “Convergence of productivity; Cross-national studies and historical evidence”, Oxford University Press, 1994
  2. Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin, “Convergence Across States and Regions”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no.1, pp. 107-182, 1991.
  3. Baumol, W., “Productivity, Growth, Convergence and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show”, American Economic Review, 76, 5, pp. 1872-1085, 1986.
  4. Baumol W., “Multivariate growth patterns: contagion and common forces as possible sources of convergence” in Baumol W. et al. (eds.), “Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence”, Oxford University Press, 1994
  5. Bernard and Durlauf (1995)
  6. Button K. and E. Pentecost, “Testing for Convergence of the EU Regional Economies”, Economic Inquiry, 33, (4), pp. 664-671, 1995.
  7. Cashin P., “Economic Growth and Convergence Across the Seven Colonies of Australia: 1861-1991”, Economic Record, 71, (213), pp. 132-144, 1995.
  8. Coulombe S. and F. Lee, “Convergence Across Canadian Provinces, 1961 to 1991”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 28 (4a), pp. 886-898, 1995.
  9. De Long B., “Productivity, Growth, Convergence  and Welfare: Comment” American Economic Review, Vol. 78, n. 5, pp. 1138-1154, 1988.

10. Kottis G., «Industrial decentralisation and regional development», Institute of Economic and Industrial Research, Athens

11. Labrianidis L., Papamichos N., «Regional distribution of industry and the role of the state in Greece», Environment and Planning C, vol.8, 1990.

12. Mankiw N.G., D. Romer and D.N. Weil, “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, pp. 407-437, 1992.

13. Mauro L. and Podrecca E., “The Case of Italian Regions: Convergence or Dualism?”, Economic Notes, 23 (3), pp. 447-472, 1994.

14. Neven D. and Gouyette C., “Regional Convergence in the European Community”, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques,  No. 9311, Working Paper, Universite de Lausanne, 1994.

15. Pagano P., “On Productivity Convergence in the European Community Countries: 1950-1988”, Giornali degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 52 (7-9), pp. 389-401, 1993.

16. Romer P.M., “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”, Journal of Political Economy, vol.94 no.5, pp.1002-10037, 1986.

17. Romer P.M., “Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long-Run Growth”, in Barro R.J. ed., “Modern Business Cycle Theory”, Harvard University Press, 1989.

18. Solow R., “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, pp. 65-94, 1956.


TABLES

 

Table 1: Testing for Conditional Convergence

Model : (1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i – ln y0,i) = c – (1/T) (1-eβt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i

           

Basic Equation

Basic Equation with Structural Variables

         

period

β

R2

β

met

ind

R2

 

1971

1981

0,0006

(0,8)

0,05

0,0002

(0,5)

-0,02

(-2,8)

0,001

(0,09)

0,51

 

1981

1996

0,0006

(0,5)

0,02

0,001

(1,3)

-0,02

(-4,6)

-0,02

(-3,7)

0,76

 

1971

1996

0,001

(0,7)

0,05

0,001

(0,8)

-0,04

(-3,18)

-0,02

(-1,12)

0,55

 

 

 

 

Table 2 : Testing for Conditional Convergence with N/S dummy

Model : (1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i – ln y0,i) = c – (1/T) (1-eβt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i

Basic Equation

Basic Equation with Structural Variables

period

β

N/S

R2

β

met

ind

N/S

R2

1971

1981

-0,0006

(-0,4)

0,009

(0,9)

0,12

0,0002

(0,19)

-0,02

(-3,57)

-0,02

(-3,4)

0,00

(0,00)

0,76

1981

1996

-0,002

(-0,9)

0,02

(1,35)

0,17

0,001

(0,54)

-0,02

(-2,28)

0,001

(0,09)

0,00

(0,00)

0,51

1971

1996

-0,003

(-0,92)

0,02

(1,45)

0,21

0,0007

(0,18)

-0,04

(-2,3)

-0,02

(-1,0)

0,003

(0,14)

0,55

 

 

 

 

Table 3 : Testing for Conditional Convergence

Model : (1/T) (ln y0+t,i – lny0,i) = c – (1-eβt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                                    

Basic Equation

Basic Equation with Structural Variables

period

β

si

R2

β

si

met

ind

R2

1971

1981

0,0007

(0,82)

-0,0002

(-0,6)

0,09

0,0002

(0,41)

-0,001

(-0,41)

-0,01

(-2,9)

-0,02

(-3,0)

0,76

1981

1996

0,0008

(0,86)

-0,001

(-2,8)

0,46

0,0009

(0,96)

-0,008

(-1,63)

-0,01

(-1,7)

-0,01

(-0,7)

063

1971

1996

0,001

(1,08)

-0,001

(-2,1)

0,35

0,0006

(0,48)

-0,001

(-1,8)

-0,02

(-1,3)

0,046

(-2,1)

0,68

 

 

 

Table 4: Testing for Conditional Convergence with N/S dummy

Model : (1/T) (ln y0+t,i – lny0,i) = c – (1-eβt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                                   

Basic Equation with Structural Variables with N/S dummy

period

β

si

met

ind

N/S

R2

1971

1981

0,0005

(0,35)

-0,0002

(-0,49)

-0,01

(-2,7)

-0,02

(-2,8)

-0,002

(-0,2)

0,77

1981

1996

0,004

(1,65)

-0,001

(-2,22)

-0,01

(-2,14

-0,01

(-1,18)

-0,022

(-1,41)

063

1971

1996

0,0033

(0,91)

-0,001

(-1,9)

-0,02

(-1,4)

0,048

(-2,1)

-0,017

(-0,8)

0,68

 

 

 


[1]

 

 

Οικονομικές πολιτικές στην Αργεντινή μετά τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο

ΘΕΣΕΙΣ

τ.54

Ιανουάριος – Μάρτιος 1996

 

Οικονομικές πολιτικές στην Αργεντινή μετά τον Β1 Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο

του Σταύρου Δ. Μαυρουδέα

L Πρόλογος

Σκοπός της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η κριτική επισκόπηση των οικονομικών πολιτικών που εφαρμόστηκαν στην Αργεντινή μετά τον Β’ Παγκ. Πόλεμο, με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση στην πολιτική που εφαρμόστηκε στην διάρκεια της επταετίας 19761982. Ιδιαίτερη προσοχή δίνεται στον βιομηχανικό τομέα, και γενικότερα στην παραγωγική βάση της οικονομίας, και στις επιπτώσεις των πολιτικών αυτών επάνω του. Η επιλογή της περιόδου αυτής και της χώρας δεν είναι ούτε τυχαία, ούτε αυθαίρετη. Η Αργεντινή είναι ένα σχεδόν τυπικό παράδειγμα μιας κατηγορίας χωρών που θεωρούνταν προηγουμένως υπανάπτυκτες και που εισήλθαν σε πλήρη κεφαλαιοκρατική ανάπτυξη σχετικά πρόσφατα. Παρόλα αυτά, από τότε και για μια σημαντική περίοδο στις δεκαετίες 1950 και 1960, οι χώρες αυτές παρουσίασαν αξιοσημείωτους ρυθμούς οικονομικής μεγέθυνσης. Σε αυτό το επίπεδο η Αργεντινή επιδεικνύει μία ενδιαφέρουσα  –  αν και παραπλανητική  –  ομοιότητα με την Ελλάδα. Αυτή η ομοιότητα, συνδυασμένη με το υποτιθέμενο κοινό χαρακτηριστικό της επικράτησης «λαϊκιστικών» πολιτικών (π.χ. Περονισμός), οδήγησε ορισμένους συγγραφείς (π.χ. Μουζέλης 1987)1 στο να υποθέσουν ότι η Ελλάδα και η Αργεντινή ανήκουν στην ίδια κατηγορία κεφαλαιοκρατικών κοινωνικοοικονομικών σχηματισμών. Παρόλο που αυτό το ζήτημα δεν είναι το αντικείμενο της παρούσας μελέτης, θα πρέπει να σημειωθεί in passim ότι πρόκειται για μία εσφαλμένη θέση επειδή πρωταρχικοποιεί εκλεκτικιστικά ορισμένα επιφανειακά  –  και επιπόλαια  –  χαρακτηριστικά και παραγνωρίζει τους θεμελιακούς προσδιοριστικούς παράγοντες. Με αυτή την έννοια, στην μελέτη των μεταπολεμικών οικονομικών πολιτικών στην Αργεντινή εμφανίζονται έμμεσα τόσο οι ομοιότητες όσο και οι βασικές διαφορές μεταξύ των δύο χωρών.

Όσον αφορά την επιλογή της χρονικής περιόδου, καλύπτει το σύνολο των εξελίξεων μετά την Κρίση του 1930 και τον Β1 Παγκ. Πόλεμο. Όμως αυτό που έχει ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι φαίνεται ότι μία σειρά Λατινοαμερικανικών χωρών αποτέλεσαν κυριολεκτικά το πεδίο δοκιμών των μεταπολεμικών οικονομικών πολιτικών ανάπτυξης, πριν την γενικευμένη εισαγωγή τους. Αυτό εμφανίζεται ιδιαίτερα καθαρά όσον αφορά την περίοδο 197682. Πρόκειται για την περίοδο εφαρμογής της δεύτερης γενεάς νεοφιλελεύθερων πολιτικών που εκπήγαζαν από την Νομισματική Προσέγγιση του Ισοζυγίου Πληρωμών (Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments)2 και οδηγούσαν στο άνοιγμα (διεθνοποίηση) της οικονομίας και που επιβλήθηκαν υπό την αιγίδα της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας (World Bank) και του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου (ΔΝΤIMF).

Η Αργεντινή αποτελεί μία υποδειγματική περίπτωση του προαναφερθέντος ρεύματος. Περίπου κατά την ίδια χρονική περίοδο ανάλογα πειράματα εφαρμόζονταν και σε μία σειρά άλλες Λατινοαμερικανικές χώρες. Γενικά, έχει παρατηρηθεί μία σχετική ομοιότητα στις πολιτικές που υλοποιούνταν στα διάφορα κράτη της Νότιας Αμερικής σε αυτήν αλλά και σε προηγούμενες περιόδους. Παραδείγματος χάριν, το πρώτο μονεταριστικό πείραμα στην Αργεντινή στην τριετία 195962, συμπίπτει χονδρικά με ανάλογα πειράματα στην Χιλή (195658), στην Βολιβία (1956), στο Περού (1959) και στην Ουρουγουάη (195962). Οι πολιτικές αυτές απέτυχαν και τις διεδέχθησαν εξίσου ομοιόμορφα, και εξίσου αποτυχημένα, μία σειρά Δομιστικές πολιτικές. Τέλος, οι τελευταίες με την σειρά τους αντικαταστάθηκαν από νεοφιλελεύθερες πολιτικές δεύτερης γενεάς.

Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η Κρίση του ’30 εξώθησε την Αργεντινή στην υιοθέτηση πολιτικών εκβιομηχάνισης. Ο πρώτος τύπος τέτοιων πολιτικών, που εφαρμόσθηκαν στην περίοδο 193050, ήταν η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Εκβιομηχάνιση (Import Substituting Industrialisation  –  ISI). Με το πέρας της δεύτερης δεκαετίας το μοντέλο αυτό εκδήλωσε σοβαρά προβλήματα και ξέσπασε μία έντονη διαμάχη όσον αφορά την αποτελεσματικότητα του. Δύο οικονομικά ρεύματα αντιμάχονταν για την μορφή της διάδοχης οικονομικής πολιτικής: η Λατινοαμερικανική σχολή του Δομισμού και ο Μονεταρισμός. Υπήρξε μία περίοδος διαδοχικής εφαρμογής και των δύο αυτών στρατηγικών: στα 195962 εφαρμόζεται το πρώτο Μονεταριστικό πείραμα, ακολουθούμενο (κατά την περίοδο διακυβέρνησης των Ριζοσπαστών στα 196366 αλλά και κατά την Περονιστική κυβέρνηση του 197376) από ένα μακρύ Δομιστικό πείραμα. Και τα δύο εμφάνισαν προβλήματα. Συνεπώς, μετά το στρατιωτικό πραξικόπημα του 1976 εμφανίσθηκε ένας νέος υποψήφιος οικονομικής πολιτικής: η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση στο Ισοζύγιο Πληρωμών ή Παγκόσμιος Μονεταρισμός. Υπήρξε μία συστηματική εφαρμογή του μοντέλου αυτού στην περίοδο 197682.

Στο πρώτο μέρος της μελέτης γίνεται μία σκιαγράφηση των προηγούμενων πολιτικών που εφαρμόστηκαν και της εξέλιξης της οικονομίας της Αργεντινής, πριν το 1976. Το δεύτερο μέρος εξετάζει τις ριζοσπαστικές νεοσυντηρητικές πολιτικές της περιόδου 197682 και αποτιμά τα αποτελέσματα τους.

  . Η Κρίση τον ’30 και η Υποκαθιστούσα Εξαγωγές Εκβιομηχάνιση

Η βιομηχανοποίηση ως μία συγκεκριμένη στρατηγική ανάπτυξης, στην Αργεντινή, χρονολογείται από την έναρξη της Μεγάλης Κρίσης (192930). Αυτό βέβαια δεν σημαίνει ότι δεν προϋπήρχαν σημαντικές εγχώριες μεταποιητικές δραστηριότητες. Αντίθετα, ήδη από την αρχή του 20ου αιώνα περίπου το 20% της εργατικής δύναμης εργαζόταν στην μεταποίηση, στην οποία αναλογούσε το 10 με 15% του συνολικού Ακαθάριστου Εγχώριου Προϊόντος. Η Αργεντινή είχε ήδη από εκείνη την περίοδο φθάσει ένα βαθμό εκβιομηχάνισης που η «μεσαία» αναπτυσσόμενη χώρα δεν έφθασε παρά μόνον μετά τον Β’ Παγκ. Πόλεμο3. Ο πιο σημαντικός κλάδος, στην περίοδο αυτή, ήταν τα τρόφιμα και ποτά (σύμφωνα με την απογραφή βιομηχανίας του 1914, λίγο πάνω από το 50% της ακαθάριστης αξίας της βιομηχανικής παραγωγής προερχόταν από αυτό τον κλάδο). Η σχετική σημασία και η δομή του βιομηχανικού τομέα παρέμεινε βασικά αναλλοίωτη μέχρι το 1930: το συνολικό ΑΕΠ, η μεταποίηση και το εξωτερικό εμπόριο παρουσίαζαν παραπλήσιους ρυθμούς μεγέθυνσης (μεταξύ 4,5 και 5,5% ανά έτος) και η αξία των εισαγωγών παρέμεινε περίπου στο 25% του ΑΕΠ (μετρημένου σε τιμές του 1950).

Μετά την κρίση του 1930 η Αργεντινή «υποχρεώθηκε» να εκβιομηχανισθεί και ο ρυθμός μεγέθυνσης και η δομή της βιομηχανίας άλλαξαν ριζικά. Στα τριάντα χρόνια, που ακολούθησαν την περίοδο 192529, υπολογίζεται ότι ο όγκος των εισαγωγών μειώθηκε απόλυτα κατά το ένα τέταρτο και σχετικά στο 8% του ΑΕΠ (επίσης σε τιμές του 1950). Κατά τον ίδιο χρόνο η προστιθέμενη αξία στην μεταποίηση αυξήθηκε με ένα ρυθμό κατά 40% ταχύτερο από το συνολικό ΑΕΠ, ώστε κατά το τέλος της δεκαετίας του 1950 ο κλάδος αυτός είχε αυξήσει το μερίδιο του στο συνολικό ακαθάριστο προϊόν τουλάχιστον κατά 50% (από 14% στο 21% με τιμές του 1935 και από 19% στο 30% με τιμές του 1960). Παρόλα αυτά, αυτή η εντυπωσιακή απογείωση ήταν σταθερά γειωμένη στην προϋπάρχουσα βιομηχανική βάση: σύμφωνα με την απογραφή βιομηχανίας του 1948, πάνω από το 60% της παραγωγής εξακολουθούσε να παράγεται από επιχειρήσεις ιδρυμένες πριν το 1930.

Όμως ο νέος παράγοντας ο οποίος εμφανίσθηκε στην περίοδο μετά την Μεγάλη Κρίση και έπαιξε καθοριστικό ρόλο στις μετέπειτα εξελίξεις ήταν η εξέλιξη της εκβιομηχάνισης σε μία συγκεκριμένη στρατηγική ανάπτυξης προωθούμενης από ισχυρά προστατευτικά μέτρα, ειδικά κίνητρα και άμεσες κρατικές ενέργειες. Βέβαια, στοιχεία μίας μεθοδευμένης προσπάθειας εκβιομηχάνισης ήταν ήδη παρόντα, όμως δεν στοιχειοθετούσαν μία συγκροτημένη στρατηγική. Για παράδειγμα, μία τέτοια περίπτωση ήταν το ταπεινωτικό σύμφωνο Roca Runciman, το οποίο παρείχε μία προνομιακή δασμολογική μεταχείριση για τις εισαγωγές από την Μεγάλη Βρετανία. Αυτή η πολιτική διακρίσεων έδωσε ένα επιπλέον κίνητρο για την εγκατάσταση στην Αργεντινή ξένων επιχειρήσεων για να υπερπηδήσουν τους δασμούς (tariff jumping), εφόσον διαφορετικά θα αποκόβονταν από την εγχώρια αγορά. Τέτοιες περιπτώσεις ήταν η Standard Electric και η Siemens, οι οποίες εγκαταστάθηκαν στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1930.

Η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση, βασισμένη στην επέκταση της εσωτερικής αγοράς, ήταν μία πολιτική η οποία επιβλήθηκε ως η μόνη διέξοδος μετά την κρίση του 1930 και τον Β’ Παγκ. Πόλεμο. Μετά το 1946, και αντιμέτωπη με την προοπτική μίας επανέναρξης των εισαγωγών αγαθών και κεφαλαίου και τον κίνδυνο ενός τρίτου πολέμου (λόγω του Ψυχρού Πολέμου), η κυβέρνηση μετέτρεψε την προστασία της βιομηχανίας σε ένα εργαλείο μακροπρόθεσμης πολιτικής εκβιομηχάνισης. Προηγουμένως, όπως στις περισσότερες εκβιομηχανιζόμενες χώρες, η δομή των προστατευτικών μέτρων κλιμακωνόταν παραδοσιακά με βάση δύο κριτήρια: α) την προστασία ήδη υφιστάμενων εγχώριων δραστηριοτήτων (συνήθως σε μία ad hoc βάση και υπό την πίεση ενδιαφερομένων ομάδων συμφερόντων), και β) την προνομιακή μεταχείριση των λεγομένων «αναγκαίων» εισαγωγών σε σχέση με τις «μη αναγκαίες» (ιδιαίτερα σε περιόδους προβλημάτων στο Ισοζύγιο Πληρωμών).

Μία από τις πρώτες πράξεις της πολιτικής Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης ήταν το διάταγμα νόμος 14630 του 1944 που παρείχε την δυνατότητα στην κυβέρνηση να αποδίδει ειδικές πιστώσεις, φορολογικά και εισαγωγικά προνόμια (για εισαγωγές ειδικών μηχανημάτων και πρώτων υλών) σε δραστηριότητες που χαρακτηρίζονταν «εθνικού ενδιαφέροντος». Τα τρία βασικά κριτήρια που έκριναν τις δραστηριότητες αυτές ήταν ότι έπρεπε: α) να παράγουν «αναγκαία» αγαθά για την εγχώρια αγορά, β) να συνεισφέρουν στην εθνική άμυνα, και γ) να χρησιμοποιούν κύρια εγχώριες εισροές. Αυτό το πρώτο μέτρο δεν ήταν ιδιαίτερα επιτυχές. Εν μέρει εξαιτίας αυτών των περιορισμών και εν μέρει γιατί η πρωτοβουλία για την ανάληψη των κινήτρων αυτών είχε αφεθεί ολοκληρωτικά στην ιδιωτική πρωτοβουλία, ο νόμος δεν οδήγησε σε σημαντικές αλλαγές στην δομή της βιομηχανικής παραγωγής. Μόνον 40 επιχειρήσεις ευνοήθηκαν από τον νόμο αυτό, αν και ορισμένες από αυτές παρήγαγαν αρκετά περίπλοκα προϊόντα όπως ηλεκτρικές μπαταρίες, αντιβιοτικά, φωτογραφικό υλικό, εκρηκτικά και ψυγεία. Μετέπειτα μέτρα εναπέθεσαν την ευθύνη για την ανάπτυξη μεγάλης κλίμακας και υψηλής τεχνολογίας επιχειρήσεων κυρίως σε ειδικά συγκροτημένες μικτές ή κρατικές εταιρείες. Ο βασικός φορέας δεν ήταν μία αναπτυξιακή επιχείρηση, όπως στις περισσότερες άλλες χώρες, αλλά ένας οργανισμός στρατιωτικών εργοστασίων, οι Fabricaciones Militates. Οι σημαντικές βιομηχανικές δραστηριότητες που εναποτέθηκαν στην στρατιωτική πρωτοβουλία και διαχείριση ήταν εφαρμογή του νόμου Savio του 1947, ο οποίος προέβλεπε την ίδρυση μίας μικτής επιχείρησης, ονόματι SOMISA, στην οποία οι ιδιώτες επενδυτές ποτέ δεν κατείχαν περισσότερο από 1% του μετοχικού κεφαλαίου.

Ένα άλλο μέτρο ήταν η δημιουργία μίας σειράς επιτροπών με στόχο την βελτίωση των εξαγωγών. Ο μεταποιητικός τομέας ήταν ήδη αρκετά προσανατολισμένος προς τις εξαγωγές από πριν το 1930 (15% με 29% της ακαθάριστης αξίας της βιομηχανικής παραγωγής εξαγόταν, κύρια με την μορφή επεξεργασμένων ειδών διατροφής). Κατά την διάρκεια του Β’ Παγκ. Πολέμου οι εξαγωγές βιομηχανικών ειδών έγιναν πιο διαφοροποιημένες  –  παρόλο ότι η υφαντουργία κατείχε έναν ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό ρόλο  –  όταν οι παραδοσιακές πηγές προμήθειας άλλων Λατινοαμερικανικών χωρών διακόπηκαν. Σε εκείνη την φάση τα βιομηχανικά προϊόντα αντιπροσώπευαν πάνω από το 13% των εξαγωγών. Μεταπολεμικά όμως, ο ανανεωμένος ανταγωνισμός από τους παραδοσιακούς προμηθευτές και η αύξουσα υπερτίμηση του πέσο περιέκοψαν σημαντικά τις βιομηχανικές εξαγωγές. Η επίσημη ανησυχία για την τροπή των πραγμάτων κατέληξε στην δημιουργία μίας «Επιτροπής για την Προώθηση των Εξαγωγών» το 1952, η οποία ακολουθήθηκε από μία άλλη «Επιτροπή για την Διάδοση των Αργεντινών Προϊόντων» και τέλος από τις εμφατικές συστάσεις για ενθάρρυνση των μη παραδοσιακών εξαγωγών της Εκθεσης Prebisch προς την προσωρινή κυβέρνηση το 1956.

Ο Canitrot (1980) έχει χαρακτηρίσει την οικονομία της Αργεντινής υπό συνθήκες Υποκαθιστούσας Εξαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης ως περίπτωση ημικλειστής βιομηχανοποίησης (semiclosed industrialisation). Προτείνει δε ως πλαίσιο ανάλυσης ένα διτομεακό μοντέλο αποτελούμενο από έναν αγροτικό τομέα που παράγει καταναλωτικά αγαθά τόσο για εξαγωγές όσο και για την εγχώρια αγορά και έναν βιομηχανικό τομέα που χρησιμοποιεί εισαγόμενα μηχανήματα και άλλες εισαγωγές για να παράγει αγαθά κατανάλωσης και κεφαλαίου προοριζόμενα αποκλειστικά για την εσωτερική αγορά. Στο μοντέλο αυτό ο αγροτικός τομέας λειτουργεί πάντοτε σε επίπεδο πλήρους αποδοτικότητας ενώ το επίπεδο του βιομηχανικού τομέα κυμαίνεται ανάλογα με το μέγεθος της εγχώριας ζήτησης.

Στην πρώτη περίοδο λειτουργίας του  –  το διάστημα 194659  –  το μοντέλο αυτό υιοθέτησε μέτρα που άλλαζαν τις σχετικές τιμές μεταξύ των δύο τομέων. Η πολιτική των προστατευτικών δασμών για την βιομηχανία, απέναντι σε ξένους ανταγωνιστές, επέτρεπε στις επιχειρήσεις να απορροφούν επικερδώς υψηλά εργατικά κόστη. Έτσι, οι βιομηχανικοί μισθοί και τιμές αυξάνονταν σε σχέση με τις αγροτικές τιμές ή, με άλλα λόγια, η αύξηση των μισθών σε σχέση με τις αγροτικές τιμές έδωσε στους εργάτες στα αστικά κέντρα επιπλέον αγοραστική δύναμη. Το αποτέλεσμα αυτού του μετασχηματισμού ήταν ότι η ζήτηση για βιομηχανικά αγαθά τονωνόταν παρέχοντας έτσι την βασική ατμομηχανή της ανάπτυξης. Παράλληλα, οι μέθοδοι που χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για να μειωθούν οι αγροτικές τιμές (εξαγωγικοί φόροι κλπ.) σηματοδοτούσαν μία μεταφορά από τα αγροτικά εισοδήματα στην αστική δημόσια δαπάνη. Όλα αυτά συνοδεύονταν από μία πολιτική δημοσίου ελλείμματος. Φυσικά, υπήρχε ένα ανώτατο όριο στην ικανότητα της οικονομίας να συντηρεί τέτοια ελλείμματα. Στην πράξη, αυτό το ανώτατο όριο ξεπεράστηκε σε διάφορες περιπτώσεις και για διάφορους λόγους κάνοντας αναπόφευκτη την υιοθέτηση συσταλτικών σταθεροποιητικών σχεδίων.

Στην δεύτερη περίοδο εφαρμογής του μοντέλου της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης, στο διάστημα 195970, ακολουθήθηκε ένας διαφορετικός δρόμος4 . Ως εναλλακτική λύση στην οδηγούμενη από τους μισθούς ζήτηση για βιομηχανικά αγαθά, εφαρμόστηκε μία πολιτική η οποία στόχευε στην τόνωση της ζήτησης επενδύσεων ή της ζήτησης δημόσιων δαπανών ή της καταναλωτικής ζήτησης των μη μισθωτών. Οι πραγματικοί μισθοί έπεσαν απότομα το 1959, στην διάρκεια του πρώτου μονεταριστικού πειράματος της στρατιωτικής κυβέρνησης του στρατηγού Ognania. Αυτό απάλυνε την πίεση της εσωτερικής ζήτησης, διασφαλίζοντας πόρους για μία ισχυρή αύξηση των εξαγωγών, έτσι ώστε το πρόβλημα του Ισοζυγίου Πληρωμών απαλύνθηκε. Οι παραδοσιακές βιομηχανίες που απασχολούνταν στην παραγωγή αγαθών για μισθωτούς συρρικνώθηκαν, όμως υπήρχε μία γρήγορη ανάπτυξη νέων επιχειρήσεων που παρήγαγαν οχήματα και βασικές εισροές. Στο δεύτερο ήμισυ της δεκαετίας του 1960  –  το οποίο συμπίπτει με την Δομιστική πολιτική της κυβέρνησης Ριζοσπαστών του Frondizi  –  αυτή η τόνωση ενισχύθηκε από ένα δραστήριο πρόγραμμα δημοσίων επενδύσεων.

Αυτή η δεύτερη περίοδος Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης χαρακτηριζόταν από σημαντική ανάπτυξη αλλά και από επίμονη αστάθεια. Η βασική αιτία αυτής της αστάθειας είναι το γεγονός ότι αυτός ακριβώς ο τύπος πολιτικής απαιτεί αυξημένα περιθώρια κέρδους στον βιομηχανικό τομέα. Σε μία οικονομία χωρίς σημαντικά αποθέματα εργατικού δυναμικού και με ένα εξαιρετικά ενεργό και καλοοργανωμένο εργατικό κίνημα (ιδιαίτερα μετά τον Peron), είναι αρκετά δύσκολο να επιβληθεί μία τέτοια πολιτική. Τρεις τρόποι υπάρχουν για να πραγματοποιηθεί κάτι τέτοιο: α) μέσω μίας πολιτικής συμφωνίας στην βάση της οποίας οι μισθωτοί, περισσότερο η λιγότερο εκούσια, θα συμφωνούσαν να παραδώσουν ένα μέρος, των εισοδημάτων τους, β) μέσω ενός πληθωρισμού στον οποίο οι ρυθμοί αύξησης των τιμών ξεπερνούν τους αντίστοιχους ρυθμούς των μισθών, ή γ) με την προσφυγή σε αυταρχικές πολιτικές λύσεις. Όμως, όλες αυτές οι μέθοδοι είχαν δοκιμαστεί (στο πρώτο ήμισυ της δεκαετίας του 1960 οι δύο πρώτες, στο δεύτερο ήμισυ η τρίτη μέθοδος) και υπήρχε πολιτική δυσκολία στο να διατηρηθεί οποιαδήποτε από αυτές τις τρεις πολιτικές για περισσότερο από τρία ή τέσσερα χρόνια, γεγονός αναγκαίο για την επίτευξη οικονομικής σταθερότητας.

Η εικόνα που δίνουν τα στατιστικά στοιχεία για την περίοδο της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης είναι αποκαλυπτική. Έχει υπολογιστεί ότι οι εισαγωγές βιομηχανικών προϊόντων έπεσαν από το 45% της συνολικής εγχώριας προσφοράς βιομηχανικών αγαθών το 1929 σε μόλις 15% το 1950. Αυτό είναι ένα από τα μικρότερα μερίδια, για εκείνη την εποχή, για όλες τις μεσαίου μεγέθους χώρες εκτός του Ανατολικού μπλοκ.

Οι συντελεστές αυτοί παραμορφώνονται τόσο από την γενική υπερτίμηση του πέσο το 1950 όσο και από την ύπαρξη πολλαπλών συναλλαγματικών ισοδυναμιών, αλλά θεωρείται ότι αντανακλούν τις τάσεις με σχετική ακρίβεια. Οι περίοδοι της Μεγάλης Ύφεσης (193034) και του Β’ Παγκ. Πολέμου  –  περίοδοι διεθνούς αστάθειες και σημαντικών αναταράξεων  –  έχουν εξαιρεθεί.

Αυτό το οποίο μπορούμε να δούμε από αυτό τον πίνακα κατηγοριών εμπορευμάτων τελικής χρήσης είναι ότι παρά το ότι η υποκατάσταση εισαγωγών ήταν σημαντική στα τελικά καταναλωτικά αγαθά, ήταν επίσης σημαντική στα αγαθά κεφαλαίου και στα ενδιάμεσα αγαθά ‘

Ο πίνακας 2 αφορά τις ομάδες προϊόντων και δείχνει τις αλλαγές στην δομή της βιομηχανίας και την υποκατάσταση εισαγωγών. Η σύνθεση του βιομηχανικού ΑΕΠ δίνεται ξεχωριστά για τις περιόδους 1925 29, 1948 50 και 1967 69. Η πρώτη περίοδος σηματοδοτεί την περίοδο πριν την εφαρμογή πολιτικών Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης, η δεύτερη την περίοδο καθαρών τέτοιων πολιτικών και η τρίτη την περίοδο Δομιστικών πειραμάτων. Μπορούμε να δούμε ότι υπάρχει μία κάθετη πτώση του ποσοστού της πρώτης ομάδας (ελαφρά βιομηχανία) και μία άνοδος της σημασίας της κλωστοϋφαντουργίας και της βαριάς βιομηχανίας. Ειδικά όσον αφορά την κλωστοϋφαντουργία, παρατηρείται μία αξιοσημείωτη άνοδος στην διάρκεια της δεύτερης περιόδου εξαιτίας της επανάστασης στην δομή και την λειτουργία της η οποία μείωσε τις εισαγωγές κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων από πάνω από 25% της συνολικής αξίας των εισαγωγών το 192829 σε λιγότερο από 10% μετά το 1950.

Η έκταση της εκβιομηχάνισης στην περίοδο των καθαρών πολιτικών Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης παρουσιάζεται στον πίνακα 3 όπου αναλύεται περαιτέρω η σύνθεση των εκροών και υποδιαιρείται η χρονοπερίοδος. Το μεγάλο άλμα στην βιομηχανία μηχανών, συσκευών και ηλεκτρικού εξοπλισμού έλαβε χωρά στην δεκαετία του 1950 όταν οι εισαγωγές διαρκών καταναλωτικών ειδών αντικαταστάθηκαν ταχύτατα από την εγχώρια παραγωγή. Όταν αυτός ο μετασχηματισμός ολοκληρώθηκε, η εντόπια παραγωγή σταθεροποιήθηκε ή και μειώθηκε. Για παράδειγμα, επιτεύχθηκε το ζενίθ της παραγωγής για πλυντήρια το 1957, για μηχανές ραψίματος το 1959, για ποδήλατα και μοτοσυκλέτες το 1960, για τηλεοπτικές συσκευές το 1961, για σιδηροδρομικά υλικά και αγροτικά μηχανήματα και εξοπλισμό το 1960. Κατά την διάρκεια της επομένης περιόδου η παραγωγή των υποτομέων  –  με σημαντική εξαίρεση την αυτοκινητοβιομηχανία  –  αναπτύχθηκε με αισθητά μικρότερους ρυθμούς από τον συνολικό δείκτη βιομηχανικής παραγωγής. Οι ταχύτερα αναπτυσσόμενες βιομηχανίες στην δεκαετία του 1960 ήταν βασικά μέταλλα (κύρια σίδηρος και χάλυβας), χημικά προϊόντα (όπως βιομηχανικά χημικά, συνθετικές ίνες και ρητίνη, πετρελαϊκά παράγωγα) και μηχανήματα και υλικά εξοπλισμού (ειδικά μηχανές εσωτερικής καύσης, εργαλεία μετρήσεων και επιστημονικού ελέγχου, η ζήτηση για τα οποία πριμοδοτήθηκε από την υποχρέωση της επεκτεινόμενης αυτοκινητοβιομηχανίας να χρησιμοποιεί ένα αυξανόμενο μερίδιο εγχώρια κατασκευασμένων εξαρτημάτων). Η συνεχόμενη ανάπτυξη της αυτοκινητοβιομηχανίας, και μετά το 1960, είναι επίσης ο βασικός παράγοντας για την επέκταση των υποτομέων αυτών στην διάρκεια και της επομένης περιόδου.

Οι βιομηχανίες «μεγέθυνσης» που απαριθμούνται στον πίνακα 3  –  και οι οποίες από το 1965 αντιπροσώπευαν περίπου το ήμισυ του συνολικού βιομηχανικού ΑΕΠ, σε σύγκριση με μόλις το 25% το 1950  –  έχουν ορισμένα κοινά χαρακτηριστικά:

1) Οι περισσότερες από τις βιομηχανίες αυτές απαιτούν πιο σύγχρονη τεχνολογία από ό,τι οι «παραδοσιακές» αργεντίνικες βιομηχανίες. Επειδή, επιπλέον, η τεχνολογία αυτή δεν ήταν διαθέσιμη μέσα στην Αργεντινή, εισάχθηκε από ξένες εταιρείες. Για τον λόγο αυτό οι ξένες εταιρείες έγιναν ένας σταδιακά όλο και σημαντικότερος παράγοντας στην διάρκεια της περιόδου αυτής και μάλιστα ειδικά για την αυτοκινητοβιομηχανία, έναν αριθμό βιομηχανιών διαρκών καταναλωτικών ειδών, την βιομηχανία εξαρτημάτων, τα βιομηχανικά χημικά και, σε μικρότερο βαθμό, για τα βασικά μέταλλα.

2) Πολλές από τις νέες βιομηχανίες ευνοήθηκαν από αύξουσες αποδόσεις κλίμακας. Αυτό είναι διεθνής τάση για τα βασικά μέταλλα και τα χημικά, αλλά θα πρέπει, επιπλέον, να γίνει κατανοητό ότι λειτούργησε σε αναφορά με το πολύ μικρό μέγεθος επιχειρήσεων που κατά μέσον όρο προϋπήρχε στην Αργεντινή. Η ανάγκη των νέων βιομηχανιών για παραγωγή σε μεγαλύτερη κλίμακα προωθούσε την τάση συγκέντρωσης σε ένα μικρότερο αριθμό επιχειρήσεων.

3) Οι νέες βιομηχανίες «μεγέθυνσης» έτειναν να είναι περισσότερο έντασης κεφαλαίου ή και έντασης ειδικευμένης εργασίας. Αυτές οι επιχειρήσεις αντιπροσώπευαν πάνω από το 50% της συνολικής βιομηχανικής προστιθέμενης αξίας, αλλά απασχολούσαν μόλις το 37% της βιομηχανικής εργατικής δύναμης το 1969, ένδειξη μίας σημαντικής διαφοράς. Αντίθετα, το 1950, αυτά τα μερίδια ήταν περίπου όμοια. Το δεδομένο αυτό γίνεται ακόμη πιο σημαντικό από το γεγονός ότι η υπόλοιπη βιομηχανία της Αργεντινής έτεινε να γίνει λιγότερο έντασης εργασίας. Όπως φαίνεται και από τον παρακάτω πίνακα (πίνακας 4), στο διάστημα 195059, οι «παραδοσιακές» βιομηχανίες αύξησαν κατά πάνω από 50% τις συνολικές εκροές τους με μία σχεδόν ασήμαντη αύξηση της απασχόλησης.

Τέλος, οφείλουμε να επισημάνουμε δύο άλλους σημαντικούς παράγοντες της περιόδου της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης.

Ο πρώτος είναι ο βασικός ρόλος των ξένων επιχειρήσεων. Υπήρξε ένα άνοιγμα της οικονομίας σε μαζικές ξένες επενδύσεις και σχεδόν απεριόριστες εισαγωγές αγαθών κεφαλαίου και οι κυβερνήσεις ήταν διατεθειμένες να συνάψουν ειδικές συμφωνίες με επιμέρους επιχειρήσεις ή για ειδικά προϊόντα. Η πολιτική αυτή εγκαινιάσθηκε από τον Peron όταν άρχισε να αίρει τους ελέγχους

στις ξένες επενδύσεις και διαπραγματεύθηκε ειδικές συμφωνίες για τρακτέρ, αυτοκίνητα και τηλεοράσεις με ξένες εταιρείες. Στην συνέχεια, ενισχύθηκε από τον Frondizi όταν αφαίρεσε τους εναπομείναντες περιορισμούς στο ξένο κεφάλαιο και έδωσε ισχυρά νέα κίνητρα για την συνολική ανανέωση του εγχώριου βιομηχανικού μηχανολογικού εξοπλισμού. Το κύριο εργαλείο πολιτικής για τον σκοπό αυτό ήταν οι φορολογικές απαλλαγές για επανεπένδυση μέχρι 100%, οι απεριόριστες επίσημες τραπεζικές εγγυήσεις για πιστώσεις από το εξωτερικό και ελεύθερη εισαγωγή ολόκληρων γραμμών παραγωγής και πολλών επιμέρους κομματιών μηχανισμών και εξοπλισμού τα οποία δεν παράγονταν εγχώρια. Επομένως, ένα μεγάλο μέρος των αγαθών κεφαλαίου καθώς και άλλες βιομηχανικές εισροές τελούσαν κάτω από ειδικά προωθητικά καθεστώτα. Έτσι, ανάμεσα στο 1959 και το 1963, πάνω από το 50% των εισαγωγών έγινε χωρίς εισαγωγικές επιβαρύνσεις. Αυτά τα γενικά μέτρα συμπληρώνονταν από ειδικές συμφωνίες που στόχευαν στην προστασία του μεριδίου της αγοράς των νέων βιομηχανιών, οι οποίες δεν μπορούσαν να καλύψουν όλη την υπάρχουσα εγχώρια ζήτηση, και τον εξαναγκασμό τους στο να βασίζονται προοδευτικά σε εγχώριες πηγές για τις εισροές τους. Παραδείγματα τέτοιων μέτρων είναι οι περίπλοκοι διακανονισμοί με βάση τους οποίους η παραγωγή και οι τιμές του εργοστασίου χάλυβος της SOMISA δεν επιτράπηκε να επηρεαστούν αρνητικά από τον ανταγωνισμό από συμπληρωματικές εισαγωγές καθώς και τα ειδικά μέτρα που υποχρέωναν τους καταναλωτές λάστιχου να προμηθεύονται ένα αυξανόμενο μερίδιο των εισροών τους από το πρόσφατα εγκατεστημένο εργοστάσιο συνθετικών, το οποίο σταδιακά έφθανε σε πλήρη αποδοτικότητα. Επίσης, χαρακτηριστικές είναι οι εισαγωγικές δασμολογικές ελαφρύνσεις πάνω σε εξαρτήματα και μηχανικά μέρη που δόθηκαν στην αυτοκινητοβιομηχανία και την βιομηχανία τρακτέρ με στόχο το να ωθηθούν στο να παίξουν ένα δραστήριο ρόλο στην ανάπτυξη εγχώριων προμηθευτών. Ο επεκτεινόμενος ρόλος των ξένων εταιρειών φαίνεται αρκετά καθαρά στα στατιστικά στοιχεία. Παραδείγματος χάριν, οι ιδιωτικές επενδύσεις από τις ΗΠΑ στην βιομηχανία της Αργεντινής ήταν σχεδόν μισό δισεκατομμύριο δολάρια μεταξύ 1956 και 1966 και ξεπερνούσε κάθε άλλο αντίστοιχο κονδύλι στις υπόλοιπες Λατινοαμερικανικές χώρες. Με το τέλος της δεκαετίας του 1960 οι ελεγχόμενες από ξένους επιχειρήσεις αντιπροσώπευαν το 25% με 30% της αγοράς για εγχώρια προϊόντα μεταποίησης και από τις δέκα πιο μεγάλες επιχειρήσεις (που αντιπροσώπευαν περίπου το 10% της συνολικής βιομηχανικής παραγωγής) οι επτά ήταν θυγατρικές ξένων εταιρειών. Ο δεύτερος παράγοντας είναι οι κρατικές επιχειρήσεις και ειδικά οι στρατιωτικές βιομηχανίες5. Οι επιχειρήσεις αυτές διεδραμάτισαν ένα καθοριστικό ρόλο  –  παρέχοντας ειδικευμένη εκπαίδευση στην εργατική δύναμη, αλλά και με άλλους τρόπους6  –  στην προετοιμασία του εδάφους για την μετέπειτα γρήγορη ανάπτυξη μεγάλης κλίμακας, τεχνολογικά σύνθετων βιομηχανιών. Όμως, όλες αυτές οι βιομηχανίες  –  με λίγες εξαιρέσεις  –  ποτέ δεν αύξησαν την παραγωγή τους σε μία μεγάλη κλίμακα.

Η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση περιέπεσε σε προβλήματα στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1960. Επειδή οι μηχανισμοί οι οποίοι χρησιμοποιήθηκαν είχαν εξαντλήσει τον δυναμισμό τους και είχαν γίνει υπερβολικά δαπανηροί και αναποτελεσματικοί. Η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση εφαρμόσθηκε υπό μία συγκεκριμένη διεθνή οικονομική συγκυρία και εδραζόταν επάνω σε συγκεκριμένο συσχετισμό εσωτερικών οικονομικών και κοινωνικών παραγόντων. Η πρώτη επέτρεπε, και περίπου επέβαλλε, την πρωταρχικοποίηση της εθνικής διάστασης της κεφαλαιοκρατικής συσσώρευσης και την υιοθέτηση προστατευτικών μέτρων7. Ο εσωτερικός συσχετισμός αντιστοιχούσε στην ειδική μορφή των κοινωνικών σχέσεων (και πάνω από όλα της σχέσης κεφαλαίου εργασίας) που προέκυψε ως λύση του αδιεξόδου της πριν από την Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση περιόδου. Το αδιέξοδο αυτής της προηγούμενης περιόδου βασιζόταν σε μία υπερσυσσώρευση κεφαλαίου μη δυνάμενου να χρησιμοποιηθεί επαρκώς κερδοφόρα υπό τις υπάρχουσες σχέσεις τόσο στην άμεση διαδικασία παραγωγής όσο και στο συνολικό κύκλωμα του κεφαλαίου (παραγωγή κυκλοφορία ανταλλαγή διανομή)8. Το μοντέλο της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης αναδιαμόρφωσε τόσο την μορφή της άμεσης διαδικασίας της παραγωγής όσο και το συνολικό κύκλωμα του κεφαλαίου, επιλύοντας έτσι την κρίση υπερσυσσώρευσης.

Όμως, μετά από μία αρκετά μακρά περίοδο, η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση εξάντλησε επίσης τα όρια της. Η χρήση των σχετικών τιμών ως μέσου χρηματοδότησης της εκβιομηχάνισης, η υψηλή προστασία της βιομηχανίας σε σχέση με τον αγροτικό τομέα, η υπερτίμηση του πέσο και οι έλεγχοι εισαγωγών μετέφεραν πόρους από τον πρωτογενή τομέα στην μεταποίηση και ενίσχυαν, με τον τρόπο αυτό, την εκβιομηχάνιση. Συγχρόνως όμως, τα περιοδικά προβλήματα του ισοζυγίου πληρωμών και ο πληθωρισμός έγιναν ένα μόνιμο χαρακτηριστικό. Η κυβέρνηση, μέσω πληθωριστικών δημόσιων όαπανών, έπαιρνε πόρους χωρίς να προσφεύγει σε φορολογία και οι πόροι αυτοί χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για να χρηματοδοτήσουν βιομηχανικά σχέδια ή την παροχή υποδομής και κοινωνικών υπηρεσιών που ήταν αναγκαίες για την εκβιομηχάνιση. Το οικονομικό και κοινωνικό βάρος της εργατικής τάξης έπαιξε επίσης έναν καθοριστικό ρόλο. Σε χώρες με έναν σχετικά υστερούντα δευτερογενή τομέα και μία σχετικά περιορισμένη βιομηχανική εργατική τάξη προωθήθηκε, με το μοντέλο της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης, μία συστηματική και μαζική εκβιομηχάνιση. Αυτό απαιτούσε κάποιο επίπεδο  –  ακούσιας ή εν μέρει εκούσιας  –  ενσωμάτωσης και συνεργασίας του κόσμου της εργασίας ώστε να μπει σε τροχιά η Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση, αναμορφώνοντας τις προηγούμενες κοινωνικές σχέσεις. Ο Περονισμός (με τον αυταρχικό λαϊκισμό του) αλλά και σχεδόν όλες οι υπόλοιπες κυβερνήσεις της περιόδου προώθησαν μία σχετική αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος, κυρίως προς την πλευρά της βιομηχανικής εργατικής τάξης (καλυπτόμενη όμως, κατά βάση, από την αύξηση τόσο του ποσοστού όσο και της μάζας της υπεραξίας). Επομένως, οι ελλειμματικοί προϋπολογισμοί και η αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος ήταν βασικά χαρακτηριστικά αυτού του μοντέλου.

Όμως, τα ελλείμματα  –  και ο πληθωρισμός  –  είναι μία απαίτηση σε μέλλουσα παραγωγή. Όσο ο ρυθμός ανάπτυξης την καλύπτει εγκαίρως  –  δεδομένων των χρονικών υστερήσεων στην εκπλήρωση της απαίτησης  –  δεν παρουσιάζονται προβλήματα. Όταν όμως τόσο η παραγωγική δομή (δηλαδή η συγκεκριμένη μορφή υπό την οποία η εργασία υπάγεται στο κεφάλαιο) όσο και η μορφή του συνολικού κυκλώματος του κεφαλαίου (και ιδιαίτερα η συγκεκριμένη μορφή των σχέσεων μεταξύ των βασικών μερίδων του κεφαλαίου) εξαντλήσουν τα όρια τους, τότε η επίτευξη του αναγκαίου ποσοστού κερδοφορίας αποτυγχάνει και προβλήματα αξιοποίησης εμφανίζονται σχεδόν μονίμως. Αυτά παίρνουν την μορφή προβλημάτων του ισοζυγίου πληρωμών (εκφράζοντας μία μειωμένη ανταγωνιστικότητα σε σχέση με ξένους ανταγωνιστές) και έναν επιταχυνόμενο πληθωρισμό (καθώς οι κυβερνήσεις προσφεύγουν στις συνταγές παλιών επιτυχιών). Δεδομένης της επιβράδυνσης της μεγέθυνσης και του υψηλότερου πληθωρισμού, η αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος έγινε δύσκολη. Ως συνεπακόλουθο, οι προηγουμένως υπολανθάνοντες ταξικοί ανταγωνισμοί επανήλθαν στο προσκήνιο: λιγότερο ανταγωνιστικοί «εθνικοί αναπτυξιακοί» στόχοι αντικαταστάθηκαν από τους αλληλοαποκλειόμενους εισοδηματικούς στόχους των διαφόρων κοινωνικών τάξεων.

Από τα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1960 η «χρυσή εποχή» της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης είχε τελειώσει και η αργεντίνικη οικονομία ήταν σε αναβρασμό.

   . Η στροφή στα ριζοσπαστικά νεοσυντηρητικά οικονομικά

Οι σημαντικές αλλαγές στην διεθνή οικονομία που έλαβαν χώρα μετά τα 1960 συγκρότησαν το έδαφος για την στροφή σε έναν «Μονεταρισμό ανοικτής οικονομίας». Η δεκαετία του ’60 ήταν μία περίοδος παρατεταμένης ανάπτυξης, επεκτεινόμενου εμπορίου (στο διάστημα 196573 το διεθνές εμπόριο αύξανε με έναν ετήσιο ρυθμό 9%), με σχετικά εύτακτες διεθνείς χρηματοοικονομικές ροές. Επομένως, διευκολύνθηκε η γρήγορη αύξηση των εξαγωγών των αναπτυσσόμενων χωρών  –  βασικά Ασιατικών και Λατινοαμερικανικών χωρών  –  με έναν ρυθμό 6,4% ετησίως. Οι εξωστρεφείς, προσανατολισμένες στις εξαγωγές αναπτυξιακές στρατηγικές (συνήθως ονομαζόμενες ως Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές  – Διαφοροποιούσα Εξαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση) αποδείχθηκαν δεόντως επιτυχείς.

Στην δεκαετία του ’70  –  με την έκρηξη της κεφαλαιοκρατικής κρίσης υπερσυσσώρευσης σε παγκόσμια κλίμακα  –  η διεθνής οικονομία χαρακτηρίσθηκε από βραδύτερους ρυθμούς ανάπτυξης για τις βιομηχανικές χώρες, υψηλό παγκόσμιο πληθωρισμό, συχνά shocks τιμών, υψηλότερη ανεργία, υποαπασχόληση της παραγωγικής δομής, περιορισμένες εμπορικές δυνατότητες και ασταθή ισοζύγια πληρωμών για τις περισσότερες χώρες. Είναι χαρακτηριστικό ότι ο όγκος του διεθνούς εμπορίου αυξήθηκε με ρυθμό 4% ετησίως και αυτός των Λιγότερο Αναπτυγμένων Χωρών με 3,6%. Οι βασικές αιτίες αυτής της αλλαγής υπήρξαν, στην αρχή του ’70, η παγκόσμια ύφεση, η συνεπακόλουθη αστάθεια των συναλλαγματικών ισοτιμιών και των ισοζυγίων πληρωμών και τα πληθαίνοντα προστατευτικά μέτρα από τις Αναπτυγμένες Χώρες9. Επιπλέον, η πολιτική υψηλών επιτοκίων των δεύτερων  –  υπό την καθοδήγηση των μονεταριστικών συνταγών περί μείωσης της κυκλοφορίας του χρήματος και αντιμετώπισης του πληθωρισμού ως ενός νομισματικού φαινομένου  –  επιδείνωσε την κρίση χρεών των Λιγότερο Αναπτυγμένων Χωρών.

Στην Λατινική Αμερική, κατά το ’60, η σχετική σημασία του εξωτερικού πληθωρισμού, σε σύγκριση με τον εσωτερικό, ήταν πολύ μικρότερη από ό,τι το ’70 και οι πηγές του σχετικά προβλέψιμες. Το ’70, αντιμετωπίζοντας την προαναφερθείσα κατάσταση, οι περισσότερες Λατινοαμερικανικές χώρες προσπάθησαν να ακολουθήσουν προσανατολισμένες στο εμπόριο αναπτυξιακές πολιτικές  –  καθώς η γοητεία των επιτυχιών του ’60 ήταν ακόμη νωπή. Όμως εμποδίσθηκαν τόσο από την εσωτερική τους κρίση (την εξάντληση της συγκεκριμένης σχέσης κεφαλαίου εργασίας αλλά και των ενδοκεφαλαιοκρατικών σχέσεων να λειτουργούν επαρκώς κερδοφόρα) όσο και από την ένταση του διεθνούς ανταγωνισμού (είτε με την μορφή υπερπαραγωγής εμπορευμάτων διαθέσιμων στην αγορά (υπερπροσφορά), είτε με την μορφή προστατευτικών μέτρων).

Δύο ρεύματα διεκδίκησαν την λύση στα προβλήματα που είχαν δημιουργηθεί και ιδιαίτερα στο πρόβλημα του πληθωρισμού: ο Δομισμός και ο Μονεταρισμός.

Η Λατινοαμερικανική Δομιστική Πρροσέγγιση είναι μία σχολή συγγενική προς την Αγγλοσαξωνική θεωρία του πληθωρισμού κόστους, θεωρεί ότι οι ρίζες του πληθωρισμού βρίσκονται στην οικονομική δομή και κύρια σε παράγοντες όπως η μη κινητικότητα των πόρων, ο κατακερματισμός της αγοράς και οι ανισορροπίες ανάμεσα στην τομεακή προσφορά και ζήτηση. Όσο προχωρεί η ανάπτυξη τόσο πιο εκτεταμένα «μποτιλιαρίσματα» (bottlenecks) παρουσιάζονται, επειδή οι αλλαγές στην ζήτηση  –  οι οποίες σχετίζονται με υψηλότερα επίπεδα εισοδήματος  –  δεν ακολουθούνται από μία επαρκή απάντηση της προσφοράς10 . Επομένως, η σταθεροποιητική πολιτική είναι αναγκαία ώστε να αποφραχθούν τα «μποτιλιαρίσματα» τα οποία ωθούν την οικονομία σε πληθωριστικούς κύκλους. Με αυτή την έννοια, η Δομιστική πολιτική είναι μία μακροχρόνια πολιτική εφόσον οι δομικές ανισορροπίες μπορούν να εξαλειφθούν μόνο μέσω μίας επανακατανομής των επενδύσεων, μία μακρόχρονη και σταδιακή διαδικασία. Επιπλέον, οι Δομιστικές πολιτικές είναι συνήθως μέρος ενός μεταρρυθμιστικού προγράμματος το οποίο προχωρεί σε μία σειρά θεσμικές αλλαγές (όπως αναδασμούς, φορολογικές αλλαγές, κρατικό παρεμβατισμό κλπ.). Όλα αυτά έχουν αρνητικό αντίκτυπο πάνω στο εισόδημα των κατόχων αυτών των σπανιζόντων πόρων από όπου προκύπτουν τα «μποτιλιαρίσματα» (π.χ. γαιοκτήμονες, ιδιοκτήτες κομβικών πρώτων υλών). Οι πόροι που αφαιρούνται από αυτούς διοχετεύονται στο κράτος και συγκροτούν την βάση για συνεχόμενες αυξήσεις της παραγωγικότητας και αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος στα αργοπορούντα και φτωχότερα τμήματα της οικονομίας και, συνεπακόλουθα, σε μία προοδευτική μακροπρόθεσμη αναδιανομή του εισοδήματος. Εν κατακλείδι, η Λατινοαμερικανική Δομιστική σχολή θεωρεί ότι ο πληθωρισμός είναι κατά βάσει ένα μη νομισματικό φαινόμενο και υποβαθμίζει τις επιπτώσεις που έχει η χρηματοδόση μέσω ελλειμμάτων και νομισματικής επέκτασης πάνω στις τιμές.

Αντίθετα, ο Μονεταρισμός θεωρεί ότι ο πληθωρισμός είναι πάντοτε ένα νομισματικό φαινόμενο. Ακολουθώντας  –  και αναπροσαρμόζοντας, εν μέρει, την Κλασική Διχοτόμηση  –  θεωρεί ότι ο νομισματικός τομέας καθορίζει το ονομαστικό εισόδημα και ο πραγματικός τομέας το πραγματικό εισόδημα. Η συνδυασμένη επίπτωση των δύο αυτών τομέων προσδιορίζει το επίπεδο τιμών. Μακροχρόνια, το χρήμα δεν επηρεάζει καθόλου το πραγματικό εισόδημα και η μόνη επίπτωση του είναι στο ονομαστικό εισόδημα. Τέλος, η υπερβάλλουσα συνολική ζήτηση καθορίζει το επίπεδο του πληθωρισμού. Κατά τον Μονεταρισμό, οι πολιτικές πρέπει να είναι βραχυχρόνιες και να αποσκοπούν σε μία γρήγορη αντιμετώπιση του πληθωρισμού, επειδή ο τελευταίος θεωρείται ως ο βασικός ανασταλτικός παράγοντας για αποδοτική ανάπτυξη. Ως συνέπεια, προτείνονται σταθεροποιητικές πολιτικές τύπου «θεραπείας σοκ». Τα βασικά εργαλεία πολιτικής είναι ο έλεγχος της ποσότητας του χρήματος, η μείωση των δημόσιων δαπανών, η υποτίμηση της συναλλαγματικής ισοτιμίας (όποτε είναι αναγκαίο), η απελευθέρωση των τιμών και η εξάλειψη των επιδοτήσεων. Όλα αυτά τα μέτρα θεωρείται ότι λειτουργούν στην βάση του ενιαίου κανόνα (uniform rule) για όλους τους οικονομικούς παράγοντες, έχουν ουδέτερες διανεμητικές επιπτώσεις και συμβάλλουν στην λειτουργία μίας ελεύθερης και χωρίς παραμορφωτικές παρεμβάσεις οικονομίας, της αγοράς.

Ο Μονεταρισμός  –  ή οι νεοφιλελεύθερες πολιτικές πρώτης γενεάς  –  αντιπροσώπευαν την αρχική και πιο πρωτόγονη προσπάθεια ενός δραστικού μετασχηματισμού. Η πρωταρχικοποίηση των νομισματικών σχέσεων (εφόσον ο πληθωρισμός εθεωρείτο ως ένα καθαρά νομισματικό φαινόμενο) και η αποχώρηση του κράτους από την οικονομία (εξαιτίας της υποτιθέμενης αναποτελεσματικότητας της δημοσιονομικής πολιτικής) είχε δύο πρακτικά αποτελέσματα. Πρώτον, ξεκαθαρίζεται ότι επεκτατικές πολιτικές βασισμένες στους προηγούμενους μηχανισμούς δεν ήταν πλέον εφικτές. Δεύτερον, ότι η πειθαρχία θα έπρεπε να εμπεδωθεί τόσο στον δημόσιο όσο και στον ιδιωτικό τομέα, φυσικά με την προτεραιοποίηση του δεύτερου. Από την άλλη ο Μονεταρισμός είχε ορισμένα εξαιρετικά προβληματικά ελαττώματα. Κατ’ αρχήν κατανοούσε την κεφαλαιοκρατική κρίση μέσω του παραμορφωτικού πρίσματος των νομισματικών σχέσεων (δηλαδή της σφαίρας της ανταλλαγής) και όχι ως ένα πρόβλημα εκπηγάζον από την σφαίρα της παραγωγής. Συνεπώς θεωρούσε ότι η νομισματική πειθαρχία και η ελεύθερη λειτουργία των δυνάμεων της αγοράς θα αναμόρφωνε τις σχέσεις και τις δομές της παραγωγής σχεδόν αυτόματα και, εν πάσει περιπτώσει, αποτελεσματικά και αναπόφευκτα. Αφετέρου, πίστευε ότι η εισοδηματική αναδιανομή προς όφελος του κεφαλαίου (δηλαδή η βάρβαρη μείωση του κονδυλίου των μισθών [wage fund]) από μόνη της θα βελτίωνε την κεφαλαιοκρατική κερδοφορία. Συνεπώς, παραγνώριζε το ότι η κεφαλαιοκρατική κερδοφορία δεν βασίζεται μόνον στην σφαίρα της διανομής αλλά πρώτα και κύρια στην σφαίρα της παραγωγής (δηλαδή εξαρτάται όχι μόνον από το μερίδιο της εργασίας αλλά και από το πόσο παραγωγική είναι η εργασία). Τέλος, η μονεταριστική οπτική περιοριζόταν στα όρια του εθνικού κράτους, αγνοώντας ότι ο καπιταλισμός έμπαινε σε μία περίοδο πρωτόγνωρης διεθνοποίησης.

Και οι δύο αυτές προσεγγίσεις δοκιμάστηκαν διαδοχικά σε πολλές Λατινοαμερικανικές χώρες, στην περίοδο που ακολούθησε το τέλος της εποχής της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης, με απογοητευτικά αποτελέσματα. Η αποτυχία τους άνοιξε τον δρόμο για την δεύτερη γενεά νεοφιλελεύθερων πολιτικών.

Υπάρχει μία ουσιαστική διαφορά μεταξύ των μονεταριστικών πολιτικών της πρώτης γενεάς και των νεοφιλελεύθερων συνταγών του δεύτερου κύματος  –  που ο Foxley (1985) τις χαρακτηρίζει ως Ριζοσπαστικό νεοσυντηρητισμό. Οι δεύτερες εμπεριέχουν μία νέα και ισχυρή έμφαση σε μακροπρόθεσμες δομικές και θεσμικές αλλαγές, όπως το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας στο διεθνές εμπόριο και στις ροές κεφαλαίου, την ανάπτυξη ενός ιδιωτικού χρηματοδοτικού τομέα, την δραστική μείωση του ρόλου του κράτους και την ιδιωτικοποίηση του κρατικού τομέα, την αλλαγή της εργατικής νομοθεσίας και τον περιορισμό της δύναμης των συνδικάτων κλπ. Με τον τρόπο αυτό θεωρείται ότι «επανεκπαιδεύονται» οι οικονομικοί φορείς στο να δρουν με βάση την απρόσκοπτη λειτουργία των κανόνων της οικονομίας της αγοράς και αλλάζει θεμελιακά η λειτουργία της οικονομίας». Το ισχυρό μακροπρόθεσμο στοιχείο των νέων πολιτικών αποτελεί προϋπόθεση για την σταθερότητα του επίπεδου τιμών και την καταπολέμηση του πληθωρισμού. Το συμπέρασμα αυτό έχει μία αξιοσημείωτη ομοιότητα με τον Δομισμό. Ο πληθωρισμός παύει να θεωρείται απλά ένα νομισματικό φαινόμενο. Αντίθετα, μία οικονομία με πληθωρισμό είναι μία οικονομία με προβληματικές δομές. Στην ουσία πρόκειται για Δομισμό σε μονεταριστική βάση.

Το θεωρητικό υπόβαθρο για αυτή την στροφή από τις πεπαλαιωμένες, παραδοσιακές Μονεταριστικές Πολιτικές στα ριζοσπαστικά νεοσυντηρητικά πειράματα ήταν η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση στο Ισοζύγιο Πληρωμών. Η κεντρική κατεύθυνση της θεωρίας αυτής είναι το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας στο διεθνές εμπόριο, θεωρείται ότι το βασικό θεωρητικό έλλειμμα του Μονεταρισμού ήταν η παραγνώριση των εξωτερικών ροών, οι οποίες ανέτρεπαν τις εσωτερικές αντιπληθωριστικές πολιτικές. Η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση θεωρεί ότι σε μία ανοικτή οικονομία ο έλεγχος της ποσότητας του χρήματος (και ειδικότερα του ΜΙ) είναι αναποτελεσματικός, επειδή η προσφορά χρήματος γίνεται πια ενδογενής12.

Ένας από τους βασικούς προσδιοριστικούς παράγοντες της είναι η διαφορά διεθνών και εγχώριων επιτοκίων, η οποία καθορίζει τις ροές κεφαλαίων. Έτσι στην περίπτωση που εφαρμοστεί μία αντιπληθωριστική πολιτική πιστωτικού περιορισμού, και με δεδομένη την συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία, το αποτέλεσμα θα είναι αντίθετο από το αναμενόμενο. Η μείωση της πιστωτικής επέκτασης θα προκαλέσει μείωση της προσφοράς χρήματος και, υπό την υπόθεση ότι η ζήτηση Χρήματος είναι σταθερή, άρα θα υπάρχει πλεονάζουσα ζήτηση χρήματος. Αυτό θα έχει ένα διπλό συνεπακόλουθο. Πρώτον, θα αυξηθούν τα εγχώρια επιτόκια με αποτέλεσμα να αυξηθούν οι εισροές κεφαλαίων και επομένως τα συνολικά διαθέσιμα και η προσφορά χρήματος. Δεύτερον, θα υπάρξει μείωση του εισοδήματος και της κατανάλωσης και επομένως μείωση του ελλείμματος του εμπορικού ισοζυγίου, που θα οδηγήσει σε αύξηση των συνολικών διαθεσίμων και της προσφοράς χρήματος. Το συνδυασμένο αποτέλεσμα θα είναι μία επιστροφή στο αρχικό επίπεδο ισορροπίας και η διατήρηση του πληθωρισμού. Τέλος, στον βαθμό που η οικονομία είναι ανοικτή και όλα τα αγαθά εμπορεύσιμα διεθνώς, το εγχώριο επίπεδο τιμών είναι απλά συνάρτηση του διεθνούς επιπέδου τιμών και της συναλλαγματικής ισοτιμίας. Ως πολιτική σταθεροποίησης η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση προτείνει την υιοθέτηση ενός προαναγγελθέντος «μονοπατιού» εξέλιξης της συναλλαγματικής ισοτιμίας και την συγκέντρωση διαθεσίμων (τα οποία επιτρέπουν μία ομαλή προσαρμογή του εγχώριου στον εξωτερικό πληθωρισμό).

Η βασική διαφορά του Ριζοσπαστικού Νεοσυντηρητισμού, σε σχέση με τον παραδοσιακό Μονεταρισμό, είναι ότι κατανοεί ότι η κρίση δεν περιορίζεται ούτε επιλύεται μόνον στην νομισματική σφαίρα αλλά έχει βαθύτερες δομικές αιτίες. Επιπλέον, κινητοποιεί κατ’ εξοχήν το διεθνές εμπόριο και την διεθνοποίηση του κεφαλαίου ως αντεπιδρούσα τάση στην κατά τάση πτώση του ποσοστού κέρδους13. Συνεπώς, η πειθάρχηση των ιδιωτικών κεφαλαίων περνά κυρίως μέσα από την έκθεση τους στον διεθνή ανταγωνισμό και λιγότερο από την εγχώρια νομισματική συστολή. Επιπρόσθετα, η επίθεση εναντίον του κόσμου της εργασίας λαμβάνει ακόμη πιο βίαιες μορφές με βαθειές αλλαγές στις σχέσεις εργασίας και στους θεσμικούς διακανονισμούς.

V. H οικονομία της Αργεντινής στην περίοδο 197682

Από το 1975 και μετά η οικονομία της Αργεντινής μπήκε σε φάση κρίσης. Κατά τον Canitrot (1980), υπήρχε ένα τεράστιο δημόσιο έλλειμμα, ένα ισοζύγιο πληρωμών σε απελπιστική κατάσταση και υπερπληθωρισμός συνδυασμένος με ύφεση. Όλα αυτά ήταν συμπτώματα της έντασης των προηγουμένως λανθανουσών κοινωνικών συγκρούσεων.

Με το πραξικόπημα του 1976 ο στρατός πήρε την εξουσία, έχοντας την στήριξη σημαντικών οικονομικών παραγόντων όπως του Συμβουλίου Επιχειρηματιών (Consejo Empresario). Ο πρόεδρος του τελευταίου, Dr. Martinez de Hoz έγινε υπουργός οικονομικών (από το 1976 μέχρι τον Μάρτιο του 1981) και ήταν ο βασικός εμπνευστής του δεύτερου νεοφιλελεύθερου πειράματος, εκφράζοντας την συμμαχία  –  κατά τον Munck (1985a)  –  των βασικών μερίδων του κεφαλαίου (αγροτικής, βιομηχανικής και χρηματοοικονομικής) προς την κατεύθυνση αυτή.

Η ριζοσπαστική νεοσυντηρητική διάγνωση των προβλημάτων της οικονομίας ήταν η ακόλουθη: Υπήρχε 1) παραμόρφωση των σχετικών τιμών (και κατά συνέπεια του μηχανισμού τιμών) από την βιομηχανική πολιτική που εφαρμοζόταν προηγουμένως και, 2) ανεξέλεγκτη επέκταση των κρατικών δραστηριοτήτων στην οικονομία. Οι υψηλοί εισαγωγικοί δασμοί δημιούργησαν ένα προστατευτικό τείχος αλλά και έναν αντιπαραγωγικό βιομηχανικό τομέα. Παράλληλα, ο αγροτικός τομέας  –  όπου υπήρχαν τα φυσικά συγκριτικά πλεονεκτήματα της χώρας  –  υποβαθμίστηκε από μία σειρά δημαγωγικές και αναποτελεσματικές πολιτικές αναδιανομής του εισοδήματος. Επιπλέον, οι μονοπωλιακές πρακτικές ενός ισχυρού και κάθετα οργανωμένου εργατικού συνδικαλιστικού κινήματος, το οποίο συνεχώς πίεζε για μισθολογικές αυξήσεις πάνω από την αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας, προκαλούσαν επιπρόσθετες παραμορφώσεις. Τέλος, ο δημόσιος τομέας ήταν γραφειοκρατικός, αντιπαραγωγικός, φορτωμένος με υπερχρεωμένες επιχειρήσεις και με ένα πολυδάπανο σύστημα κοινωνικής πρόνοιας. Ως συνεπακόλουθο, η Αργεντινή ήταν απομονωμένη από την παγκόσμια αγορά και δεν μπορούσε να δρέψει τα οφέλη του ελεύθερου ανταγωνισμού14. Το ξένο κεφάλαιο εισερχόταν μόνο σε εξαιρετικές περιπτώσεις και όταν του προσφέρονταν ειδικά προνόμια. Επιπρόσθετα, δεν υπήρχε ούτε ένα μεγάλο πλεόνασμα εργατικής δύναμης ούτε μία δομή κινήτρων ώστε να ενθαρρυνθεί η συσσώρευση κεφαλαίου και η ανάπτυξη. Οι προηγούμενες κυβερνήσεις, για να αποφύγουν την στασιμότητα, ανέλαβαν την παροχή αγαθών και υπηρεσιών γεγονός που οδήγησε σε μία αύξηση των δημόσιων δαπανών που ήταν αδύνατον να χρηματοδοτηθούν μέσω της φορολογίας γιατί θα σήμαινε την χρεοκοπία του ιδιωτικού τομέα. Επομένως, κατέληξαν στο δημόσιο έλλειμμα. Ακόμη, επιδοτήθηκαν οι υπό πίεση επιχειρήσεις με σχεδόν αρνητικά πραγματικά επιτόκια. Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν να υπάρξει νομισματική επέκταση η οποία κατέστρεψε την αγορά κεφαλαίων και δημιούργησε χρόνιο πληθωρισμό. Τα σύντομα’ διαστήματα ανάπτυξης έδιναν την θέση τους σε κρίσεις ύφεσης και τα σταθεροποιητικά σχέδια δεν ήταν παρά βραχυχρόνιες θεραπείες15. Αυτό που ήταν αναγκαίο, κατά τους υποστηρικτές των ριζοσπαστικών νεοσυντηρητικών πολιτικών ήταν βαθειές δομικές αλλαγές στον τρόπο λειτουργίας της οικονομίας.

(α) Το οικονομικό σχέδιο του 1976

Αμέσως μετά την ανάληψη του υπουργείου οικονομικών, ο de Hoz προχώρησε στην εξαγγελία ενός δρακόντειου προγράμματος, το οποίο εφαρμόσθηκε για μία περίοδο έξι χρόνων (από τον Μάρτιο του 1976 μέχρι την κρίση των Malvinas). Οι βασικοί άξονες του προγράμματος αυτού ήταν οι ακόλουθοι:

1) Η μείωση του επίπεδου των πραγματικών μισθών κατά 50% σε σύγκριση με τα προηγούμενα πέντε χρόνια, η αύξηση της τιμής των δημόσιων υπηρεσιών και το τέλος της επιδότησης κοινωνικών υπηρεσιών όπως η υγεία και η στέγαση: δηλαδή η μείωση τόσο του μισθολογικού όσο και του μη μισθολογικού κόστους της εργασιακής δύναμης.

2) Ένα πρόγραμμα μαζικής μείωσης των εισαγωγικών δασμών, η κατάργηση των επιδοτήσεων σε μη παραδοσιακές εισαγωγές καθώς και των αναπτυξιακών πιστώσεων, η εξάλειψη των φόρων πάνω στις εξαγωγές αγροτικών προϊόντων και η ενθάρρυνση των τελευταίων: δηλαδή το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας στην διεθνή αγορά.

3) Η απελευθέρωση των χρηματοδοτικών αγορών καθώς και των αγορών συναλλάγματος: δηλαδή η χρηματοοικονομική μεταρρύθμιση.

4) Η μείωση των δημοσίων δαπανών και της απασχόλησης, η ιδιωτικοποίηση των κρατικών επιχειρήσεων και η μείωση των δανειακών αναγκών του δημοσίου: δηλαδή η αποχώρηση του κράτους από την οικονομία.

Το πρώτο βήμα στην εφαρμογή του προγράμματος αυτού ήταν μία αναδιοργάνωση της κατάστασης πραγμάτων. Κατ’ αρχήν έγινε μία επαναδιαπραγμάτευση του εξωτερικού χρέους και μία συμφωνία με το ΔΝΤ. Ακολούθησε μία δραστική υποτίμηση του πέσο (σε δύο στάδια) και η απελευθέρωση των τιμών16. Επήλθε, επίσης, μία μείωση των πραγματικών μισθών, του ελλείμματος του δημοσίου, των επιδοτήσεων και των μη δασμολογικών περιορισμών στο εμπόριο. Όμως, παρά την λεκτική υποστήριξη μίας ενεργής νομισματικής πολιτικής, η προσφορά χρήματος αυξήθηκε pari passu, εν μέρει εξαιτίας του πλεονάσματος του ισοζυγίου πληρωμών το οποίο δημιουργήθηκε στους λίγους μήνες εφαρμογής της νέας πολιτικής. Συνεπακόλουθα, κατά το τέλος του 1976 οι τιμές αυξάνονταν με ένα μηνιαίο ρυθμό μεταξύ 8% και 14% και ο πληθωρισμός παρέμενε ανεξέλεγκτος. Παρόλα αυτά, η ανεργία δεν είχε αυξηθεί και η κοινωνική σταθερότητα ήταν εν πολλοίς αδιατάρακτη.

Μπροστά στο πρόβλημα του συνεχιζόμενου πληθωρισμού επιχειρήθηκε ένα σύντομο και ανεπιτυχές πείραμα ελέγχου των τιμών, με το πάγωμα των τιμών για εκατόν είκοσι μέρες. Στα μέσα του 1977 αποφασίσθηκε να εφαρμοσθεί η νομισματική συστολή με μεγαλύτερη συνοχή και συνέπεια. Οι έλεγχοι τιμών καταργήθηκαν και άρχισε η μεταρρύθμιση των χρηματοδοτικών μηχανισμών. Τα επιτόκια απελευθερώθηκαν και επιτράπηκε στις τράπεζες να λειτουργήσουν στις βραχυχρόνιες χρηματοδοτικές αγορές με ελεύθερα επιτόκια ενώ, συγχρόνως, η ζήτηση κεφαλαίων εκ μέρους των δημοσίων επιχειρήσεων διοχετεύθηκε στις αγορές αυτές. Ως συνέπεια, το μηνιαίο ονομαστικό επιτόκιο αυξήθηκε από 6% (τον Μάιο) σε 13% (στο τέλος του 1977). Επιπρόσθετα, εμφανίσθηκε μία εντυπωσιακή αύξηση των χρηματοδοτικών εταιρειών. Κυριολεκτικά μέσα σε μία νύχτα δημιουργήθηκαν ολόκληροι χρηματοδοτικοί κολοσσοί  –  οι financieras, όπως SASETRU  –  οι οποίοι σύντομα επισκίασαν τις παραδοσιακές επιχειρήσεις. «Ζεστό» χρήμα εισήλθε στην Αργεντινή αναζητώντας ένα γρήγορο κερδοσκοπικό κέρδος. Επιπλέον, έλαβε χώρα μία σημαντική μετακίνηση κεφαλαίων από άλλους τομείς της οικονομίας προς τον χρηματοδοτικό. Υπολογίζεται ότι σε όλη την διάρκεια των ριζοσπαστικών νεοσυντηρητικών πολιτικών (μέχρι την πτώση του καθεστώτος) περίπου 42 δις. δολάρια μετακινήθηκαν από τον παραγωγικό τομέα στα πεδία της κερδοσκοπίας. Κατά την περίοδο 197680 ο χρηματοδοτικός τομέας αυξήθηκε κατά 45%. Επίσης, η ελεύθερη λειτουργία της αγοράς κεφαλαίου ενθάρρυνε την είσοδο ξένων κεφαλαίων. Η παλιά Περονιστική τάση για εθνικοποιήσεις αναστράφηκε και επτά μεγάλες εμπορικές τράπεζες υπό κρατικό έλεγχο, οι οποίες είχαν αγορασθεί από ξένα συμφέροντα στα 1960, επιστράφηκαν στους πρώην ιδιοκτήτες τους καθώς επίσης και μία σειρά κρατικές επιχειρήσεις (κύρια βιομηχανικές, εξορυκτικές και πετρελαίου) πουλήθηκαν. Η BANADE (η κρατική τράπεζα ανάπτυξης) πούλησε τα μερίδια της σε περίπου 200 επιχειρήσεις (βιομηχανικές και υπηρεσιών)17 .

Οι επιπτώσεις των μέτρων αυτών δεν άργησαν να φανούν. Εξαιτίας των υψηλών επιτοκίων αυξήθηκε το χρέος των εγχώριων επιχειρήσεων. Αυτό προσήλκυσε τις χρηματιστικές επιχειρήσεις και ειδικότερα επιχειρήσεις ειδικευμένες σε φθηνές εξαγορές υπερχρεωμένων εταιρειών και είτε οδήγησε στην κερδοφόρα εκκαθάριση τους είτε στην συγκρότηση τεράστιων χρηματοβιομηχανικών και εμπορικών συγκροτημάτων. Η κατάσταση για πολλές εγχώριες επιχειρήσεις επιδεινώθηκε ακόμη περισσότερο από την δημιουργία μίας χρηματοπιστωτικής αγοράς δύο βαθμίδων. Οι τράπεζες και οι μεγάλες βιομηχανικές και εμπορικές επιχειρήσεις, που είχαν διεθνές πρόσωπο και αξιοπιστία, καθώς και κυβερνητικοί οργανισμοί, μπορούσαν να δανείζονται σχετικά άνετα στις αγορές Ευρωσυναλλάγματος. Αντίθετα, οι μικρότερες επιχειρήσεις δεν μπορούσαν να έχουν εξωτερικό δανεισμό και επιπλέον δεν είχαν πια κρατικές επιδοτήσεις (με την μορφή αρνητικών πραγματικών επιτοκίων δανειοδότησης). Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν ο κατακερματισμός της χρηματοδοτικής αγοράς. Προηγουμένως υπήρχαν μία κρατικά ρυθμιζόμενη αγορά (οι τράπεζες) και μία ακριβότερη και μη ρυθμιζόμενη αγορά (οι χρηματοδοτικές επιχειρήσεις)· και οι δύο ήταν εγχώριες. Μετά την χρηματοοικονομική μεταρρύθμιση η κρατική και η μη ρυθμιζόμενη αγορά ενοποιήθηκαν και έγιναν και οι δύο ακριβότερες και, επιπλέον, εμφανίσθηκε μία ξένη αγορά κεφαλαίου η οποία ήταν φθηνή αλλά λίγοι μπορούσαν να την προσπελάσουν. Τα προηγουμένως αρνητικά πραγματικά τραπεζικά επιτόκια έγιναν θετικά και έφθασαν ονομαστικά σε ύψη του επίπεδου του 40% με 60% τον χρόνο18. Οι διεθνώς αξιόπιστες τράπεζες και επιχειρήσεις δανειζόντουσαν στο εξωτερικό και μετά δάνειζαν, με σημαντικά κέρδη πάνω στο κόστος τους, στις μικρότερες εγχώριες εταιρείες19. Ο εντατικοποιημένος ανταγωνισμός από τις απελευθερωμένες εισαγωγές καθώς επίσης και από τις μεγάλες επιχειρήσεις με πιστοληπτική ικανότητα στο εξωτερικό οδήγησε στην χρεοκοπία πολλές από αυτές τις μικρότερες εταιρείες. Επιπλέον μία σειρά ιδιωτικές εμπορικές τράπεζες, έχοντας συσσωρεύσει κέρδη από αυτό το πιστωτικό arbitrage, μπήκαν στο παιχνίδι των εξαγορών μαζί με τις financières. Συνοψίζοντας, εξαιτίας της ύφεσης, του κατακερματισμού της χρηματοπιστωτικής αγοράς και της αύξησης του κόστους (λόγω της αύξησης των επιτοκίων) επήλθε μία μεγάλη συγκεντροποίηση κεφαλαίου σε λίγες επιχειρήσεις.

Από την άλλη, η νομισματική συστολή δεν διήρκεσε πολύ. Εξαιτίας της ανόδου των πραγματικών επιτοκίων επήλθε μία άνοδος των τιμών20 συνοδευόμενη από την ύφεση της βιομηχανίας και μία αύξηση της εισροής ξένων κεφαλαίων. Όλα αυτά οδήγησαν σε μία αύξηση της προσφοράς χρήματος και περιόρισαν τα αποτελέσματα της νομισματικής συστολής. Εν τέλει, ήταν η απελευθέρωση των χρηματοπιστωτικών αγορών (ένα βασικό στοιχείο της πολιτικής de Hoz) η οποία περιέπλεκε την νομισματική διαχείριση. Το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας στις εισροές ξένων κεφαλαίων οδήγησε στην δημιουργία ιδιωτικών χρηματοπιστωτικών οργανισμών (ενθαρρυνόμενων αλλά όχι ελεγχόμενων από την κυβέρνηση), οι οποίοι δημιουργούσαν υποκατάστατα του χρήματος την ίδια ώρα που ο ρυθμός αύξησης του ΜΙ περιοριζόταν, με συνεπακόλουθο την δημιουργία αντίρροπων τάσεων. Με το τέλος του 1977 τα δύο τρίτα του κεντρικού χρήματος (highpowered money) προέρχονταν από την συσσώρευση διαθεσίμοον.

Μετά από μερικούς μήνες προσπάθειας να ρυθμισθούν ταυτόχρονα οι εισροές κεφαλαίων και η επέκταση των εγχώριων πιστώσεων, η απόπειρα εγκαταλείφθηκε τον Μάιο του 1978. Από το σημείο αυτό και μετά ακολουθήθηκε μία διαφορετική πορεία. Ο Μονεταρισμός ανοικτής οικονομίας έγινε η αποδεκτή και προτιμητέα προσέγγιση οικονομικής σταθεροποίησης με την έμφαση του στον αυτοματισμό της διαδικασίας προσαρμογής. Η συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία έγινε το βασικό εργαλείο πολιτικής. Η αποσύνδεση από τους δείκτες (deindexation) έγινε το κλειδί της νέας πολιτικής: αντί να αφήνονται οι μηχανισμοί των δεικτών να δίνουν αξία στον αναμενόμενο πληθωρισμό, τώρα οι τιμές θα προσαρμόζονταν μόνο κατά ένα ποσοστό του αναμενόμενου πληθωρισμού. Έτσι, οι μετακυλιόμενες ισοτιμίες (crawling peg) των πρώτων χρόνων της πολιτικής de Hoz αντικαταστάθηκαν από τις κυμαινόμενες ισοτιμίες, τον Μάιο του 1978, και από το «προαναγγελθέν μονοπάτι» (preannounced path ή πιο γνωστό ως tabula), τον Δεκέμβριο του 1978. Με το τέλος του 1978 η οικονομία ήταν πιο ανοικτή, γεγονός που οδήγησε σε μία ακόμη πιο έντονη έκθεση του προηγουμένως προστατευμένου βιομηχανικού τομέα στον ανταγωνισμό από τις εισαγωγές. Η κύρια ιδέα πίσω από την πολιτική αυτή ήταν η εξής: το χρήμα είναι ενδογενές, η νομισματική πολιτική είναι παθητική, χρησιμοποιείται η tablita, οι τιμές των ειδών δημόσιας χρησιμότητας είναι προανακοινωμένες επομένως  –  με όλα τα προηγούμενα στοιχεία δεδομένα  –  όλες οι υπόλοιπες μεταβλητές του συστήματος θα προσαρμοστούν με βάση τους αυτόματους μηχανισμούς που υποθέτει η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση του Ισοζυγίου Πληρωμών, δηλαδή από τις ελεύθερες ροές κεφαλαίων και με βάση την θεωρούμενη ως αναπόφευκτη τάση εξίσωσης μεταξύ των εγχώριων και των διεθνών επιτοκίων και ρυθμών πληθωρισμού.

Η στροφή αυτή συνοδεύθηκε, το 1980, από ένα μέτρο που είχε ήδη αργήσει πολύ: την εξάλειψη των δασμών. Πρόκειται για ένα τομέα όπου δεν είχαν γίνει σημαντικά βήματα στην διάρκεια των τριών πρώτων χρόνων του πειράματος. Ξεκινώντας το 1976 με ένα κατά μέσο όρο ονομαστικό ποσό του ύψους του 55%, δεν έγιναν ουσιαστικές μειώσεις μέχρι το τέλος του 1978 και τότε μόνο πολύ σταδιακά με στόχο το 15% για το 198421. Ελπιζόταν ότι αυτές οι εγχώριες εταιρείες που παρήγαγαν διεθνώς εμπορεύσιμα προϊόντα θα υπόκεινταν στον περιορισμό ενός ανωτάτου ορίου τιμών, δεδομένου από τις διεθνείς τιμές (προϋποθέτοντας βέβαια ότι οι δασμοί είναι επαρκώς χαμηλοί και η συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία σταθερή).

Όμως, η υποχώρηση της παραγωγής, τα γρήγορα αυξανόμενα κόστη των επιτοκίων, οι συχνές υποτιμήσεις (οι οποίες εφαρμόζονταν αμέσως μόλις άρχισαν να παρουσιάζονται προβλήματα) και όλη αυτή η χρηματοπιστωτική ευφορία η οποία δεν συνοδευόταν από μία στέρεα ανάκαμψη του παραγωγικού τομέα λειτουργούσε ως αντίβαρο στην μείωση των πραγματικών μισθών και των εισαγωγικών δασμών. Ο πληθωρισμός παρέμεινε σε τριψήφια κλίμακα, αναγκάζοντας τον de Hoz να εισαγάγει, μετά το 1979, το κλασικό Λατινικό στρατήγημα της σημαντικής υστέρησης της συναλλαγματικής υποτίμησης πίσω από τον ρυθμό πληθωρισμού. Ο ρυθμός συναλλαγματικής υποτίμησης επιβραδύνθηκε σε λιγότερο από τριψήφια μεγέθη αλλά  –  παραμένοντας χαμηλότερος από τον πληθωρισμό  –  είχε ως συνεπακόλουθο την επίταση της συμπίεσης των κερδών (και την συνεπαγόμενη υποχώρηση της παραγωγής) των ανταγωνιστικών προς τις εισαγωγές εγχώριων επιχειρήσεων.

Διαμορφώθηκε έτσι μία κατάσταση όπου παρά τα έξι χρόνια σταθεροποίησης ένας επίμονα υψηλός πληθωρισμός συνδυαζόταν με μία βαθειά ύφεση (στην πραγματικότητα το κατά κεφαλή ΑΕΠ έπεσε σε πραγματικούς όρους). Επιπλέον, το εξωτερικό χρέος αυξήθηκε επικίνδυνα εφόσον όλη αυτή η χρηματοοικονομική ευφορία και η εισροή ξένων κεφαλαίων δεν κατέληξε σε παραγωγικές επενδύσεις. Περιορίσθηκε στον χρηματοοικονομικό τομέα αποσπώντας υψηλές αποδόσεις, που δεν μπορούσαν στο τέλος να καλυφθούν από ανάλογες αυξήσεις στον όγκο της παραγωγής. Η εικόνα που δίνει ο Πίνακας 5 είναι χαρακτηριστική.

Ο εξωτερικός δανεισμός αυξήθηκε για να αντιμετωπισθούν τα προβλήματα ρευστότητας, όπως επίσης αυξήθηκε το έλλειμμα του ισοζυγίου τρεχουσών συναλλαγών και το εξωτερικό χρέος. Το 1980 μερικές από τις πιο σημαντικές ιδιωτικές τράπεζες και συγκροτήματα οδηγήθηκαν στην χρεοκοπία εξαιτίας των αυξημένων επιτοκίων του Ευρωσυναλλάγματος στο εξωτερικό και των συσσωρευόμενων αδυναμιών πληρωμής χρεών στο εσωτερικό. Το ένα μετά το άλλο μεγάλα χρηματοπιστωτικά συγκροτήματα (όπως SASETRU, ODDONE, GRECCO κλπ.) άρχισαν να καταρρέουν ενώ επήλθε η εκκαθάριση της Banco Intercambio Regional (Τράπεζα Τοπικών Συναλλαγών) η οποία οδήγησε σε μία συνολική κρίση εμπιστοσύνης τον τοπικό χρηματοπιστωτικό τομέα. Επίσης, άλλες τράπεζες αναλήφθηκαν από την Κεντρική Τράπεζα. Οι εξελίξεις αυτές είχαν ως συνέπεια την επίταση της διαδικασίας συγκεντροποίησης με αποτέλεσμα την δραστική μείωση του αριθμού των τραπεζών και χρηματοπιστωτικών εταιρειών από περίπου 400 σε 300. Αυτοί που ευαγγελίσθηκαν την «αποτελεσματικότητα» και την επιβίωση του πιο ικανού για τον βιομηχανικό τομέα αντιμετώπισαν το ίδιο είδος αδυσώπητου περιορισμού.

Με το τέλος του 1980 και τις αρχές του 1982 ήταν πια καθαρό ότι ο βιομηχανικός αλλά και ο χρηματοδοτικός τομέας ήταν στα πρόθυρα της καταστροφής22. Η επεκτεινόμενη χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση πυροδότησε μία πανικόβλητη φυγή από το πέσο. Τα διαθέσιμα της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας μειώθηκαν από ένα μέγιστο επίπεδο 12 δις. δολαρίων το 1979 σε λιγότερο από 4 δις. δολάρια στο τέλος του 1980. Οι διαδοχικές υποτιμήσεις, που ξαναεφαρμόσθηκαν για να σταματήσουν την φυγή, απλά επέτειναν τον πληθωρισμό.

(β) Οι επιπτώσεις στην εργασία και στην βιομηχανία

Η χρηματοοικονομική μεταρρύθμιση μαζί με το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας στην παγκόσμια αγορά αποσκοπούσε στην εκκαθάριση των αναποτελεσματικών μονάδων ιδιαίτερα του βιομηχανικού κεφαλαίου (που δημιουργήθηκαν από τις προηγούμενες στρατηγικές της Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης και του Δομισμού) και στην εξασθένιση των ισχυρών εργατικών συνδικάτων. Εφαρμόσθηκε ένας δραστικός περιορισμός της παραγωγικής δομής με στόχο το να ευθυγραμμισθεί περισσότερο με τις απαιτήσεις του διεθνοποιούμενου (και πολυεθνικού) κεφαλαίου. Αυτό δεν συνιστούσε μία συνομωσία  –  όπως έτεινε να εκλαμβάνει τις εξελίξεις η σχολή της Εξάρτησης  –  αλλά μία αντικειμενική σύγκλιση μεταξύ αυτών των απαιτήσεων και της στρατηγικής των πιο δυναμικών (και διεθνοποιούμενων) μερίδων του κεφαλαίου της Αργεντινής. Απόδειξη αυτού του γεγονότος είναι ότι παρά το ισχυρότατο πλήγμα στην βιομηχανία, σημαντικές μερίδες της ωφελήθηκαν.

Το πρώτο βήμα αυτής της ανασυγκρότησης ήταν η σχετική αναστροφή της σημαντικότητας μεταξύ γεωργίας και βιομηχανίας. Ο παραδοσιακός φόρος στις αγροτικές εξαγωγές εξαλείφθηκε και οι αγροτικές τιμές αυξήθηκαν. Η μεταποίηση (που είχε διαγνωσθεί ως ο προβληματικός τομέας) έχασε κάθε δημοσιονομικό, πιστωτικό ή δασμολογικό πλεονέκτημα που είχε προηγουμένως. Υπήρξε επίσης μία συνειδητή προσπάθεια να ευνοηθεί η ενοποίηση με διεθνικές εταιρείες και η δημιουργία ενός αγροτοβιομηχανικού τομέα. Η αλλαγή στις σχετικές τιμές φαίνεται στον Πίνακα 6:

Μία άλλη σημαντική πλευρά της οικονομικής πολιτικής ήταν η άγρια μείωση των πραγματικών μισθών, που όμως δεν οδήγησε σε μείωση των τιμών. Αυτή η μείωση ωφέλησε το σύνολο του βιομηχανικού τομέα. Ξεκινώντας με την βίαιη μείωση των πραγματικών μισθών το 1976, υπήρξε μία μικρή ανάκαμψη το 1979 και 1980 εξαιτίας της αυξημένης εργατικής αντίστασης, αλλά το 1981 υπήρξε άλλη μία πτώση (στην περίοδο 197582 το μερίδιο των μισθών στο εθνικό εισόδημα μειώθηκε από 45% στο 20% (Munck (1984)).

Όπως φαίνεται από τον Πίνακα 7, η σημαντικότατη αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας (στην περίοδο 197580) συνοδεύθηκε από την επίσης σημαντικότατη μείωση των βιομηχανικών μισθών (και συνακόλουθα και του εργατικού κόστους). Αυτή η αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας ήταν ακόμη μεγαλύτερη σε ορισμένους κλάδους (43% στην κλωστοϋφαντουργία, 31% στις μηχανοκατασκευές, 27% στην βιομηχανία ξύλου, 25% στην χημική βιομηχανία). Ο στρατιωτικός αυταρχισμός συνέτριψε κάθε συνδικαλιστική έκφραση και βοήθησε το κεφάλαιο να εντατικοποιήσει την εργασία (και συνεπώς και την εξαγωγή υπεραξίας).

Η επίπτωση στην εργασία επιδεινώθηκε από την αύξηση της ανεργίας. Ως επακόλουθο της αποβιομηχάνισης και της αύξησης της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας η ανεργία, η οποία στην διάρκεια των πρώτων δύο χρόνων του νεοφιλελεύθερου πειράματος είχε κρατηθεί στο χαμηλό επίπεδο του 34%, αυξήθηκε αλματωδώς. Από 1.030.000 βιομηχανικούς εργάτες το 1976, το 1980 υπήρχαν μόνο 790.000. Σε κλάδους που σχεδόν καταστράφηκαν από την πολιτική de Hoz, όπως την κλωστοϋφαντουργία και την βιομηχανία τρακτέρ, οι συνέπειες ήταν ακόμη πιο εκτεταμένες. Επιπλέον, οι μισθολογικές διαφορές αυξήθηκαν δραματικά.

Παρόλη όμως αυτή την δραστική μείωση του μεριδίου των μισθών, η συνολική επίπτωση του Ριζοσπαστικού Νεοσυντηρητικού πειράματος στην βιομηχανία υπήρξε σχεδόν καταστροφική και οδήγησε σε σημαντική αποβιομηχανοποίηση. Οι προσδοκίες για σημαντικές ξένες επενδύσεις στον παραγωγικό τομέα διαψεύσθηκαν εφόσον τα πολυεθνικά κεφάλαια προτίμησαν την χρηματοοικονομική κερδοσκοπία. Ενώ το 1975 η βιομηχανία παρήγαγε το 28% του προϊόντος, το 1982 παρήγαγε το 22%. Επίσης το 1981 η βιομηχανία λειτουργούσε σε μόλις το 50% της εγκατεστημένης δυναμικότητας (Munck (1984)).

Η βιομηχανική πτώση  –  εκφράζουσα ανεπαρκή ποσοστά κέρδους  –  αποκαλύπτει αυτό που συνήθως τα ορθόδοξα οικονομικά αγνοούν, δηλαδή ότι το πσοστό κέρδους εξαρτάται όχι μόνον από το μερίδιο των μισθών (δηλαδή το κόστος της εργασιακής δύναμης) αλλά και από την οργάνωση της άμεσης διαδικασίας της παραγωγής, δηλαδή την συνολική αποδοτικότητα της (τόσο με την εντατικοποίηση της εργασίας όσο και με οικονομίες σε σταθερό κεφάλαιο).

Συνεπώς δεν αρκεί μόνον η αναδιανομή εισοδήματος προς όφελος του κεφαλαίου αλλά απαιτείται και η ριζική αναδιάρθρωση της παραγωγής23.

V. Συμπεράσματα

Τον Μάρτιο του 1981 ο Martinez de Hoz αντικαταστάθηκε. Ο διάδοχος του είχε να αντιμετωπίσει ένα διεθνές χρέος ύψους 30 δις. δολαρίων, ένα πληθωρισμό που έτρεχε με περίπου 200%, διαθέσιμα ύψους μόλις 1 δις. δολαρίων και μία σοβαρότατη υποχώρηση της βιομηχανικής παραγωγής και της απασχόλησης. Δεν είναι περίεργο λοιπόν το ότι το Ριζοσπαστικό Νεοσυντηρητικό πείραμα του 197682 χαρακτηρίσθηκε ως το «ορφανό μοντέλο», αφού κανείς δεν ήταν διατεθειμένος να αποδεχθεί την πατρότητα του. Όμως η συζήτηση γι’ αυτό δεν έχει λήξει.

Αρκετοί νεοσυντηρητικοί συγγραφείς προέβαλλαν μία σειρά επιχειρημάτων που προσπαθούν να δικαιολογήσουν την αποτυχία του. Το πρώτο είναι η αργοπορία στην εισαγωγή της δασμολογικής μεταρρύθμισης. Το δεύτερο ήταν η υστέρηση της συναλλαγματικής υποτίμησης πίσω από τον πληθωρισμό. Και τα δύο αυτά επιχειρήματα έχουν περιορισμένη βαρύτητα. Η βασική αδυναμία του μοντέλου έγκειται στην μυωπική αντίληψη της κρίσης από τα ορθόδοξα οικονομικά, εφόσον αγνοούν το κοινωνικό της περιεχόμενο και παραμένουν σε ένα επιπόλαιο και επιφανειακό επίπεδο. Αυτό φαίνεται στην αποτυχία της υποτιθέμενα αυτόματης λειτουργίας των εξίσου υποτιθέμενα διορθωτικών μηχανισμών της Νομισματικής Προσέγγισης του Ισοζυγίου Πληρωμών. Ιδιαίτερα το άνοιγμα της οικονομίας και το διεθνές εμπόριο και επενδύσεις (εξαγωγές και εισαγωγές εμπορευμάτων και κεφαλαίου) είναι μία αντίρροπη τάση στην πτωτική τάση του ποσοστού κέρδους, την οποία κινητοποιεί κατ’ εξοχήν ο Ριζοσπαστικός Νεοσυντηρητισμός. Όμως δεν είναι ούτε η μοναδική ούτε επαρκής, ιδιαίτερα σε φάσεις γενικευμένης και αύξουσας διεθνοποίησης του κεφαλαίου.

Η βίαιη επίθεση στην εργασία και η δραστική μείωση του κονδυλίου μισθών δεν επιλύει από μόνη της την κεφαλαιοκρατική κρίση. Ενώ κινητοποιεί αντίρροπες τάσεις στην πτώση του ποσοστού κέρδους, τις περιορίζει μόνον στην σφαίρα της διανομής. Αντιθέτως  –  ακόμη και στην εκδοχή των Ριζοσπαστικών Νεοσυντηρητικών Οικονομικών και των Οικονομικών της Προσφοράς με τα έντονα δομικά χαρακτηριστικά  –  παραγνωρίζει ότι ο πυρήνας της κρίσης εδράζεται μέσα στην σφαίρα της παραγωγής. Είναι η σφαίρα αυτή και οι διαδικασίες που συνδέονται με αυτήν (αναδιάρθρωση της άμεσης διαδικασίας παραγωγής, βελτίωση της εξαγωγής (σχετικής) υπεραξίας κλπ.) που παίζουν τον βασικό ρόλο. Επιπλέον, η αναγκαία αναδιάρθρωση της σφαίρας αυτής δεν μπορεί να πραγματοποιηθεί μόνον από την λειτουργία των δυνάμεων της αγοράς, αλλά απαιτεί την ενεργή παρέμβαση του κράτους ως συλλογικού κεφαλαιοκράτη.

1. Ο Μουζέλης (1987) ισχυρίζεται ότι η Ελλάδα και χώρες της Λατινικής Αμερικής  –  όπως η Χιλή και η Αργεντινή  –  χαρακτηρίζονται από κοινά θεμελιώδη χαρακτηριστικά: την πρώιμη εδραίωση του κοινοβουλευτισμού και την ύστερη εκβιομηχάνιση. Τις χαρακτηρίζει επομένως ως χώρες της κοινοβουλευτικής ημιπεριφέρειας που διαφοροποιούνται τόσο από τις βιομηχανικά αναπτυγμένες χώρες του κοινοβουλευτισμού όσο και από την υπανάπτυκτη και μη κοινοβουλευτική περιφέρεια. Ο Μηλιός (1993) έχει δείξει το αβάσιμο  –  τόσο σε θεωρητικό όσο και σε εμπειρικό επίπεδο  –  της θέσης του Μουζέλη.

2. Η Νομισματική Προσέγγιση του Ισοζυγίου Πληρωμών βασίζεται στα έργα των H.Johnson, R.Mundeil, D.Laidler, J.Parkin. Εκπροσωπεί έναν από τους βασικούς άξονες για την μετάβαση από τον παραδοσιακό (εθνικό) Μονεταρισμό στις ριζοσπαστικές νέο συντηρητικές πολιτικές ανοίγματος της οικονομίας. Η κεντρική της θέση είναι ότι σε μία εποχή ραγδαίας διεθνοποίησης του κεφαλαίου η κατάργηση των εθνικών προστατευτικών φραγμών  –  που παραμορφώνουν τις δυνάμεις της αγοράς  –  θα οδηγήσει στην οικονομική σταθεροποίηση και ανάπτυξη. Το Ισοζύγιο Πληρωμών, οι συναλλαγματικές ισοτιμίες, οι διαφορές μεταξύ εθνικών επιτοκίων και οι διεθνείς κεφαλαιακές ροές γίνονται οι βασικές μεταβλητές πολιτικής, εκθρονίζοντας την ποσότητα χρήματος του παραδοσιακού Μονεταρισμού, θα πρέπει να επισημανθεί ότι η προσέγγιση αυτή έχει συνενωθεί με την Κευνσιανή θεωρία (δες FrenkelJohnson (1976), Frenkel Gylafson Hellwell (1980)).

3. Αυτό είναι ένα γεγονός που συνήθως παραγνωρίζεται από την σχολή της εξάρτησης.

4. Πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι υπάρχουν κάποια προβλήματα στην περιοδολόγηση του Canitrot. Είναι αδιαμφισβήτητο ότι η περίοδος 193050 αποτελεί μία τυπική φάση Υποκαθιστούσας Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίησης. Όμως υπάρχουν σημαντικά προβλήματα με την δεύτερη περίοδο (195970). Πρώτον, γιατί περιλαμβάνει την περίοδο του πρώτου Μονεταριστικού πειράματος από την στρατιωτική χούντα του Ognania (195962). Δεύτερον, γατί οι Δομιστικές πολιτικές του Frondizi και των Περονιστών, μετά το 1962, ανήκουν σε ένα άλλο ρεύμα  –  διαφορετικό από την Υποκαθιστούσα Εισαγωγές Βιομηχανοποίηση. Τόσο στον Μονεταρισμό όσο και στον Δομισμό το βασικό ζήτημα είναι ο πληθωρισμός, θα αναφερθούμε αργότερα σε αυτό εκτενέστερα.

5. Υπάρχει ένας μακρύς κατάλογος τέτοιων οργανισμών. Η ΙΑΜΕ (αργότερα μετονομασθείσα σε DINFIA), ήταν εξαρτημένη από την Αεροπορία και δραστηριοποιόταν σε μεταλλουργικές και μηχανικές κατασκευές (όπως την παραγωγή των πρώτων τρακτέρ, αυτοκινήτων, αεροπλάνων, βλήματων εδάφους αέρος κλπ.). Επίσης, υπήρχε μία επιχείρηση πετροχημικών (βασισμένη στις απαλλοτριωμένες στον πόλεμο τριάντα γερμανικές εταιρείες φαρμακευτικών και χημικών προϊόντων) υπό την Εθνική Διεύθυνση Κρατικών Βιομηχανιών (DINIE). Τέλος, η ναυπηγική εταιρεία AFNE εξαρτιόταν από το Ναυτικό.

6. Παραδείγματος χάριν, δίπλα στο εργοστάσιο της DINFIA στην Κόρντομπα εγκαταστάθηκε αργότερα ένα μεγάλο μέρος της αυτοκινητοβιομηχανίας.

7. Κατά αυτήν την διεθνή συγκυρία η μορφή του διεθνούς ανταγωνισμού μεταξύ των κεφαλαίων βασιζόταν στην στενή σχέση κάθε συγκεκριμένου κεφαλαίου με το κράτος προέλευσης του. Το τελευταίο υποστήριζε ενεργά τόσο την εσωτερική συσσώρευση του πρώτου όσο και την διεθνή ανταγωνιστικότητα του.

8. Για την έννοια του συνολικού κυκλώματος του κεφαλαίου βλέπε Fine Harris (1979, κεφ.1).

9. Παραδείγματος χάριν, περιορισμοί στις εισαγωγές πρώτων υλών και τροφίμων από την Βρετανία και τις ΗΠΑ προκάλεσαν μειώσεις των τιμών και όξυναν τα ήδη επιδεινωμένα εξαγωγικά προβλήματα των εξαγωγέων τους. Επιπλέον, ισχυρά προστατευτικά μέτρα σε κλάδους όπως το ένδυμα, η κλωστοϋφαντουργία και το υπόδημα κατάφεραν ισχυρά πλήγματα στις βιομηχανίες και τις εξαγωγές αρκετών Λιγότερο Αναπτυγμένων Χωρών. Το πλήγμα στην κλωστοϋφαντουργία της Αργεντινής  –  μία μάλλον επιτυχημένη περίπτωση προηγουμένως  –  ήταν περίπου θανάσιμο.

10. Συνηθισμένα τέτοια «μποτιλιαρίσματα» είναι η ανεπαρκής προσφορά ειδών διατροφής, η μη διαθεσιμότητα ξένου συναλλάγματος, αδυναμίες της εσωτερικής αποταμίευσης, μη ευελιξία της φορολογικής δομής και των δημόσιων δαπανών, σπανή ορισμένων ενδιάμεσων εισροών κλειδιών κλπ.

11. Ένα σημαντικό χαρακτηριστικό των Λατινοαμερικανικών Ριζοσπαστικών Νεοσυντηρητικών πολιτικών ήταν ότι επιβλήθηκαν από στρατιωτικά και αυταρχικά καθεστώτα, που λειτούργησαν ως η «σιδηρά χειρ» για την πειθάρχηση της κοινωνίας. Εξάλλου μία συνήθης δικαιολόγηση της αποτυχίας των μονεταριστικών πολιτικών ήταν ότι εφαρμόσθηκαν μόνον εν μέρει λόγω πολιτικού κόστους και ότι εγκαταλείφθηκαν γρήγορα λόγω πολιτικών και κοινωνικών αντιδράσεων. Επομένως ο αυταρχισμός θεωρήθηκε ως αναγκαία προϋπόθεση για την επιτυχή εφαρμογή του Ριζοσπαστικού Νεοσυντηρητισμού. Αυτό φυσικά, σε θεωρητικό επίπεδο υπέκρυπτε μία θεμελιώδη αντίφαση: από την μία «λιγότερο κράτος» (απόσυρση του κράτους από την οικονομία) και από την άλλη ασφυκτική και αυταρχική παρουσία του κράτους στην θέσπιση πολιτικών και οικονομικών περιορισμών (πόσο μάλλον αύξηση του κρατικού αυταρχισμού).

Ο Foxley (1985) επεσήμανε εύστοχα ότι η έκταση της εφαρμογής των πολιτικών αυτών εξαρτήθηκε από: 1) την ιδεολογία του στρατού και την φύση των κοινωνικών και πολιτικών συμμαχιών που τον υποστήριζαν, 2) την βραχυπρόθεσμη επίπτωση των πολιτικών αυτών: εάν οι βασικοί βραχυπρόθεσμοι στόχοι (μείωση του πληθωρισμού, ισοσκελισμός των εξωτερικών λογαριασμών, «κανονικοποίηση» της παραγωγής κλπ.) επιτυγχάνονταν, τότε τα στρατιωτικά καθεστώτα προχωρούσαν στους μακροπρόθεσμους δομικούς μετασχηματισμούς.

12. Εν αντιθέσει με τις παραδοσιακές μονεταριστικές απόψεις περί ουδετερότητα: του χρήματος, η νέα προσέγγιση θεωρεί ότι το χρήμα παίζει ρόλο καθώς δεν είναι εξωγενές αλλά ενδογενές.

Η νομισματική βάση είναι M=L+R, όπου L: δάνεια στην Κεντρική Τράπεζα και R: αποθέματα. Όταν το δημοσιονομικό έλλειμμα είναι υπό έλεγχο τότε το L είναι μη σημαντικό. Το R είναι ενδογενές και καθορίζεται από: 1) το μέγεθος του ελλείμματος του εμπορικού ισοζυγίου και, 2) τις εξωτερικές κεφαλαιακές ροές που ρυθμίζονται από την διαφορά μεταξύ διεθνών και εγχωρίων επιτοκίων, προσαρμοσμένων κατά την αναμενόμενη υποτίμηση του εγχώριου νομίσματος. Επομένως, συνολικά η νομισματική βάση είναι ενδογενής.

13. Για μία αναλυτική έκθεση της θεωρίας της κατά τάση πτώσης του ποσοστού κέρδους και των αντίρροπων τάσεων της βλέπε Fine Harris (1979). Fine (1986) και Weeks (1982).

14. Κατά τον D. Pastore (υπουργό Οικονομικών των τελευταίων ημερών της χούντα?), υπήρχε μία όιαδεδομένη πεποίθηση ότι ο παγκόσμιος πληθωρισμός ήταν περίπου σταθερός.

15. Ο Foxley (1985), από μία άλλη θεωρητική σκοπιά, χαρακτηρίζει την κατάσταση αυτή ως την «διαβόητη κυκλική συμπεριφορά της αργεντίνικης οικονομίας».

16. Ο Foxley (1985, σ. 160) επεσήμανε ότι μετά από τρεις μήνες ελεύθερων τιμών (Ιούνιος 1976) το γενικό επίπεδο τιμών αυξήθηκε 55 φορές σε σχέση με μία φυσιολογική  –  σύμφωνα με τα προηγούμενα δεδομένα της Αργεντινής  –  περίοδο (Δεκέμβριος 1970), η προσφορά χρήματος αυξήθηκε μόνον 35 φορές και η συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία υποτιμήθηκε 53 φορές.

17. Παρόλα αυτά υπήρξαν οξύτατες συγκρούσεις μέσα στο καθεστώς σχετικά με τις ιδιωτικοποιήσεις. Η κρατική εταιρεία πετρελαίου (YPF) παρέμεινε κυρίαρχη παρά τις ευρύτατες παραχωρήσεις σε έρευνες εξόρυξης σε ξένες εταιρείες. Τα μεγάλα συμφέροντα του στρατού στην βιομηχανία (ιδιαίτερα στην πολεμική βιομηχανία) παρέμειναν άθικτα και αυτό αποτέλεσε μία πικρή ήττα για τον de Hoz.

18. Οι διακυμάνσεις εξέφραζαν, εν μέρει, το βαθμό υστέρησης της συναλλαγματικής ισοτιμίας από τον εγχώριο πληθωρισμό  –  μία παρέκκλιση από την ορθόδοξη πολιτική. Η αύξηση της υστέρησης μείωνε το βραχυπρόθεσμο πραγματικό επιτόκιο ενώ αυτή η μείωση προκαλούσε αύξηση του πληθωρισμού.

19. Η ορθόδοξη οικονομική θεωρία προσπαθεί να αντιμετωπίσει τα προβλήματα αυτά μέσω μίας σειράς θεωρητικών ασκήσεων, κενών όμως οποιουδήποτε σημαντικού ρεαλιστικού και κοινωνικού περιεχομένου. Παραδείγματος χάριν, ο Blejer (1982) διακρίνει δύο διαφορετικές προσεγγίσεις στο πρόβλημα των επιτοκίων σε χρηματοοικονομικά περιουσιακά στοιχεία που αποτιμώνται σε διαφορετικά νομίσματα:

1) Το θεώρημα της συγκαλυμμένης ισότητας των επιτοκίων (covered interest parity theorem): όταν υπάρχουν οργανωμένες spot και forward αγορές συναλλάγματος που λειτουργούν χωρίς διοικητικούς περιορισμούς, τότε οι βραχυπρόθεσμες κεφαλαιακές κινήσεις θα οδηγήσουν στην εξίσωση (όταν εκφρασθούν στο ίδιο νόμισμα και αφού καλυφθεί η λειτουργία της forward αγοράς συναλλάγματος) των αποδόσεων αυτών των περιουσιακών στοιχείων, που είναι όμοια σε όλα εκτός του νομίσματος αποτίμησης.

2) Η υπόθεση Fischer: για μία ανοικτή οικονομία και για εργαλεία που είναι όμοια σε όλα εκτός του νομίσματος αποτίμησης τους, οι διαφορές των επιτοκίων υπάρχουν εξαιτίας τη; αναμενόμενης αλλαγής του επιτοκίου μεταξύ των διαφορετικών νομισμάτων.

Προφανώς η υπόθεση Fischer είναι όμοια με το θεώρημα της συγκαλυμμένης ισότητας των επιτοκίων όταν δεν υπάρχει αμοιβή του κινδύνου στην αγορά forward (δηλαδή το ποσοστό forward και η αναμενόμενη μελλοντική ισοτιμία είναι ίδια).

20. Κατά τον Foxley (1985) η αύξηση των επιτοκίων (ονομαστικών και πραγματικών) ισοδυναμούσε με ένα σοκ προσφοράς: το κόστος χρηματοδότησης των επιχειρήσεων αυξήθηκε και αυτό οδήγησε  –  μέσω του μηχανισμού του markup  –  στην αύξηση των τιμών.

21. Αυτή ήταν μία από τις βασικές δικαιολογίες για την αποτυχία του πειράματος (βλέπε Auemheimer (1984)).

22. Το 25% των συνολικών απαιτήσεων του χρηματοοικονομικού τομέα (πάνω από 10 6m. δολάρια ΗΠΑ) ήταν αδύνατον να εκπληρωθεί.

23. Στο σημείο αυτό θα πρέπει να επισημανθεί ότι, αντίθετα με ό,τι πιστεύουν τα ορθόδοξα οικονομικά αλλά και μερικές νεομαρξιστικές απόψεις, η γενικευμένη βελτίωση της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας δεν οδηγεί σε αύξηση αλλά σε μείωση του γενικού μέσου ποσοστού κέρδους. Για την αντίστροφη σχέση παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας και ποσοστού κέρδους βλέπε Carchedi (1991).

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ

Auernheimer L. (1984), «Economie Liberalization and Stabilization Policies in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay», World Bank

Barletta N. – Blejer M. – Landau L. (1984) (eds.), «Economic Liberalization Policies in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay: Applications of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments», World Bank symposium

Beccaria L.  –  Carciofi R. (1982), «Recent Experiences of Stabilisation: Argentina’s Economic Policy», I.D.S. Bulletin

Blejer M. (1982), «Interest rate differentials and exchange risk: recent Argentine experience», IMF staff papers

Canitrot A. (1980), «Discipline as the central object of economic policy: An essay on the economic programme of the Argentine Goverment», World Development, vol. 8

Carchedi G. (1991), «Frontiers of Political Economy», Verso

Diaz Alejandro C.F. (1970), «Essays on the Economic History of Argentina Republic», Yale Univ. Press

Felix D. (1982), «Latin American Monetarism in Crisis», I.D.S. Bulletin

Fine B. & Harris L. (1979), «Rereading Capital», Columbia University Press Fine B. (1986), «The Value Dimension», Routledge

Foxley A. (1985), «Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics»

Frenkel J.Gylafson Hellwell J. (1980), «A Synthesis of Monetary and Keynesian Approaches to Shortrun Balance of Payments Theory», Economic Journal no. 90

Frenkel J.Johnson H. eds (1976), «The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments», Alien and Unwin

Μηλιός Γ. (1993), «Η Υπανάπτυξη (της θεωρίας) ως Απολογητική: απόψεις για την ελληνική κοινωνία τον κοινοβουλευτισμό, την εκβιομηχάνιση», θέσεις νο. 45

Μουζέλης Ν. (1987), «Κοινοβουλευτισμός και εκβιομηχάνιση στην ημιπεριφέ ρεια: Ελλάδα, Βαλκάνια, Λατινική Αμερική», Θεμέλιο

Munck R. (1984), «Behind the news: Argentina», Capital θ Class no.22

Munck R. (1985a), «Democratization and Demilitarization in Argentina», Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 4, no. 2

Munck R. (1985b), «The modem» military dictatorship in L.A.: the case of Argentina (197682), Latin American Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 426

Weeks J. (1982), «Equilibrium, Uneven Development and the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall», Capital θ Class no. 16

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‘Overworked Greeks? Working time trends in Greece’

‘Overworked Greeks? Working time trends in Greece’

Asian-African Journal of Economics and Econometrics vol.7 no.1-2

Ioannides A.

Mavroudeas S.

University of Macedonia

Department of Economic Studies

156 Egnatia St.

P.O.Box 1591

54006 Thessaloniki

GREECE

tel.: +30 +31 – 891779

e-mail: smavro@uom.gr

Abstract

Today there is increasing evidence supporting the claim that an increasing number of workers around the world are overworked. Although, many researchers have raised the issue of the longer working time, it is usually considered a non-European phenomenon. This paper disputes this perception with reference to the case of Greece and argues that there is convincing evidence that there is a marked increase in actual working time in Greece from the mid-1980s and onward. This tendency is particularly strong for wage earners having a university degree, who are in many cases being labelled as ‘cadres’ that do not follow the usual work time regulations concerning eight-hour work, weekends, overtime etc. It is also strong in more traditional categories of workers (manufacturing, construction etc.).

A statistical and econometric evaluation of the official statistical data – despite their significant limitations that tend to underestimate actual working time – confirms this hypothesis.

Introduction

During recent years the issue of the work-time trends has restarted to receive attention in economics. Till recently there was a widespread belief that there is a permanent secular tendency of the work-time to decline – or at least to remain constant. The case of a contemporary resurge in work time was offhandedly rejected as unrealistic for developed economies. In a nutshell, it was believed – and this continues to be the majority’s view – that working time tend to decrease or at least not to increase from the 20th century and onwards. It is true that the early decades of the 20th century witnessed a dramatic decline of average hours per worker as a result of trade unionist struggle against the long work hours and the exhausting conditions of work that prevailed before. Under this pressure capital ceded a portion of the improved labour productivity in the form of reduced work-time. This was reflected in state legislation which first imposed maximum hours constraints (as exemplified in the English Factory Laws and the US Fair Labor Standards Act) and then, in uneven waves, legislated reductions in work-time for the rest of the 20th century. Thus, stability in the level of work hours and standardized work schedules for full-time workers became one of the hallmarks of the postwar era. Consequently, average and median weekly hours remained virtually constant through the 1960s, whereas annual hours continued declining through the 1970s due to the growth in paid holiday and vacation time (see Golden & Figart (2000b), p.2).

However, a growing number of recent studies have cast doubts on these beliefs. Empirically, there is increasing evidence that sometime after the 1973 crisis the declining work-time trend not only ceased but it has been probably reversed. The advent of ‘labour flexibility’ is the main culprit for this change. During the last 25 years statutory and collectively bargained limits to the length of the workweek are increasingly either neglected or becoming irrelevant. The organization of time moves from the more or less synchronized hours of work and leisure to more multiple and widely differentiated patterns of flexible working time arrangements. The ‘standard’ workweek gives way to schemes of hours averaging over longer intervals of time and the eight hours workday is violated for increasing sections of the workforce. These trends bring forth the significance of actual working time, as differentiated from the statutory one. Flexibility and destandardisation make statutory arrangements more or less ineffective. On the other hand actual working time (which incorporates overtime, absenteeism, moonlighting etc.) becomes far more important since it can show the real trends in work-time since in many cases a decline in statutory time can co-exist with an increase in actual work time.

Actual working time appears to be rising in many countries and for increasing segments of the working class; whereas, at the same time, other segments become underemployed. However, the first seems to be the dominant trend. For example, there is significant evidence that actual weekly work hours are rising in the United States, Japan and most of the emerging and less developed market economies (see ILO-KILM (1999)). Particularly the case of overworking in the US has been raised by many researchers (see Schor (2000), Bluestone & Rose (1998), Golden & Figart (2000a) etc.). There is ambiguity on what is happening in Europe, where the greater power of the labour movement and the stronger traditions of the welfare state (despite reversals on both planes during the recent decades) have presented greater resistance to the trend of the increasing work hours. Most studies, influenced by the 35 hours movement and particularly its legislation in France, assume that the postwar downward trend is still effective. However, it is usually neglected that statutory decrease can go hand in hand with actual increase in work time. Furthermore, in Southern Europe the trend towards overworking appears to be more pronounced (see Mutari & Figart (2000)).

This paper studies the case of Greece and argues that there is convincing evidence that there is a marked increase in actual working time in Greece from the mid-1980s and onward. This tendency is particularly strong for wage earners having a university degree, who are in many cases being labeled as ‘cadres’ that do not follow the usual work time regulations concerning eight-hour work, weekends, overtime etc. It is also strong in more traditional categories of workers (manufacturing, construction etc.). In Mavroudeas & Ioannides (2002) we have argued that official statistical data have significant limitations regarding working time (neglect in changes in the structure of employment, increased moonlighting that goes mainly in the ‘black sector’ economy, increased ‘feminization’ of work and the peculiar character of self-employed people) and tend to underestimate actual working time. Despite these limitations, an econometric evaluation of the working time trends in Greece confirmed the hypothesis of the increasing working time. In this paper we extend the statistical and econometric evaluation of this hypothesis.

Work time: empirical and analytical issues

Evidence of a rising duration of working time in the last decades has been provided by many studies. Most of them focused on the US and North America. The debate was triggered by Schor’s (1991) influential study. Using household surveys of hours from the Current Population Survey (CPS), she found that annual work hours (both paid and unpaid) have increased in the last three decades in the United States. Her claim was echoed by Bluestone & Rose (1998, 2000), who supplemented CPS data with the household survey of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and extended the trend through the mid-1990s. They show that average hours (both weekly and annual) started rising from 1982. This rise was affected both sexes and was stronger among the most highly educated workers.

Other analyses of CPS data gave similar findings. Mishel & Bernstein (1994) and Mishel, Bernstein & Schmitt (1999) have discovered a definite (although smaller than what Schor has calculated) increase of work-time in the USA during the previous three decades. Jacobs & Gerson (1998) agree only partially with Leete & Schor. They argue that it is not the average work-time that is increasing but only the margins of its distribution, i.e. the percentage of those working many hours and the percentage of those working few hours. However, particularly for the USA, they do agree that the percentage of those working more than 50 hours is one of the higher in the world. Heath & Ciscel (1998), also, found that work-time in the USA increased during the 1980s. Additionally, they focused on a rather neglected dimension of this increase: it is total work-time per family that has increased the most and this has serious impact on family and social life.

On the other side, Robinson & Godbey (1997) using time diary evidence argued that total (paid and unpaid) hours have decreased between 1965 and 1995. This triggered a measurement controversy. Robinson & Godbey (1997) argued that time diaries measure actual hours of work more precisely than self-reports as in the CPS and PSID, where workers may overestimate their work time (for example, by systematically neglecting ‘on-the-job leisure’ during work hours). Schor and others (e.g. Jacobs (1998)) counter-argued that time diaries underestimate actual work time for a number of reasons (‘busy person bias’, possible neglect of multitasking activities, functional character of ‘on-the-job leisure’).

Regarding the situation in Europe, certain studies (e.g. Basso (2003)), justifiably argue that it will sooner or later follow the US model. More specifically, Basso (2003: 140-147) – using data from the ‘Second European Survey on Working Conditions’, which was conducted from the end of 1995 till the beginning of 1996 – maintains that there is significant evidence that the tendency of working time to increase is starting to appear in Europe as well. This tendency, as Basso (2003: 144-145) and Mutari & Figart (2000) argue, is stronger and more evident in the less developed EU countries and particularly in the South European ones (Greece, Italy, Portugal). Bosch (1999), also, has reached the conclusion that work-time in Europe has ceased to decline and in some countries it has started to increase as in the USA. Bosch argues that the greater income inequality in these countries has played an important role in this reversal.

The case of overworking might be controversial and conclusions not unanimous. However evaluations of one crucial aspect of actual working time, overtime, are much more unambiguous. For the US case, it is clearly rising from the 1982 and onwards, even setting aside cyclical fluctuations (Hetrick (2000)). There is another crucial aspect of overtime: its division between paid and unpaid overtime (see Bell et al. (2000)). In many cases it extremely difficult to record the second in labour data for a number of reasons (e.g. legal consequences). However, it is not rare today workers to concede unpaid overtime work because of the pressure of economic difficulties and the fear to lose their jobs in a stringent period.

All these indicate several well-known problems of measurement regarding actual work time. First, the annual rather than the weekly measurement of actual working time gives a more reliable indicator, because it takes into account vacations, holidays, vacations and flexible work time arrangements. Particularly the latter create significant measurement problems. For example, in many countries reductions of statutory working time are given by increasing vacations or decreasing annual work time; thus leaving rather unaffected weekly working time. Second, often second jobs are not accounted for, because they are illegal or semi-legal or for tax evasion purposes (moonlighting). Generally, labour supply data do not include much information on hours and wages in secondary job or overtime work. Finally, in some countries statutory work time is compulsory (and thus affects directly actual work time) whereas in others it simply sets a safety net (and affects less actual work time).

There are also a number of analytical issues regarding the study and explanation of work time trends. Neoclassical economics maintain that work hours reflect workers’ individual choices between work (and its reward) and leisure. They also tend to consider unpaid work time as a transitory and paranormal case that cannot be sustained in the long run. Thus increases in the length of the working day tend to be analysed assuming corresponding increases in the daily wage rate, and are presumed to reflect changing ‘preferences’ of workers in favour of increased income as opposed to a preference for leisure.

In contrast, Marxist analyses emphasize the role of class power in determining the ‘normal’ hours of work. For Marx (1976, p.344) the establishment of a norm for the working day, presents itself as a struggle between collective capital and collective labour. Hence, normal hours tend to depend upon the work practice in a given industry or manufacturing process, together with the legislation enacted to set limits on working hours and are not the simple aggregate product of free individual choices.

Finally a number of heterodox approaches adopt institutionalist perspectives and take a middle-of-the-road position between Marxism and neoclassicism. They usually try to supplement the neoclassical labour supply model with elements outside the field of individual preferences (see Golden & Figart (2000b)). Thus they maintain that working time is influenced by and influences an array of cultural norms as well as economic forces. The supply of hours depends upon individual and joint preferences within families that reflect societal expectations, roles, and values.

This paper argues that the Marxist perspective is superior to both the other two approaches. It has a conception of the economic dimension that is both social (as against neoclassical individualism) and production-centered (as against both neoclassicism and the institutionalism). Additionally it can grasp wider non-economic social relations (culture etc.) and incorporate them in its analysis through a coherent process of layered abstractions instead of simply adding them up in a rather unprincipled manner (as most of the institutionalist approaches do). Within this framework, work time is a fundamental variable since it is the source of value and the basis of the operation of the capitalist system (i.e. the exploitation of wage labour through the appropriation of a portion of it as unpaid labour time). Hence surplus-value reflects this unpaid labour time. Struggles concerning the level of surplus-value are fundamentally struggles concerning work time. Particularly the extraction of absolute surplus-value depends upon the increase of normal work time.

The Greek case

In Greece a marked increase in actual working time can be identified. This tendency is particularly strong for wage-earners having a university degree, who are in many cases being labeled as ‘cadres’ that do not follow the usual work time regulations concerning eight hour work, weekends, overtime etc. It is also strong in more traditional categories of workers (manufacturing, construction etc.).

Measurement problems

Official statistical data have significant limitations that tend to underestimate actual working time. However, despite these drawbacks, even when using the available statistical data, there are significant indications supporting our approach.

The first problem with the data has to do with the change in the structure of employment. With more people working under part-time and part-year contingent contracts, with significant increase in moonlighting, and with substantial increases in overtime (at least in manufacturing), the movement toward ‘non-standard’ work-weeks and work-years is growing. Yet the standard statistics hardly measure this. In Greece, as elsewhere, the increase of working time is not always happening through the official channels (for example, the extra hours in the private sector are rarely reported in the purpose of saving the insurance charges), therefore it is usually underestimated by the official data.

Second, there is a marked increase of moonlighting in the recent years. These second jobs are usually underreported in order to avoid taxes and social insurance charges. Additionally, a great part of moonlighting takes place in the so-called ‘black economy’, which is notoriously big in Greece and of course it is not accounted for adequately. However, there is significant evidence that not only part-time work is increasing but also that moonlighting constitutes a great part of it. These moonlighting hours have to be added on top of the officially measured real working time.

A third problem arises from a basic feature of the Greek Economy: the existence of big sectors of economic activity, where self-employment is the main mode of employment. In fact this means that workers have to ‘buy’ their jobs. During the last years this mode of employment has expanded in new sectors of economic activity. Under this type of employment workers usually work more than average, under fully flexible work schedules. The expansion of this mode of employment indicates an increase on real working time, which is not usually accounted in official data. This Greek peculiarity is enhanced by the universal trend for increasingly blurring boundaries between work and non-work time. Capitalist restructuring (following both traditional and new technology paths) destroys the traditional division of work and family. This process –which affects also ‘typical’ workers – has even stronger repercussions on this stratum of self-employed workers who become the champions of working time increases.

‘Feminisation’ of work

Another important factor is the growing participation of women in the labour market (see Table 1). This participation is more inclined towards flexible work arrangements and in many cases belongs to the informal or ‘black’ economy (and thus it cannot be easily measured). This growing ‘feminisation’ of the work force means a major increase in the work time needed for the reproduction of the working class’ families since another member of a working class’ family performs wage labour and has to recuperate from its attrition. At the same time it contributes additional labour (both paid and unpaid) to the capitalist system.

TABLE 1:: PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN GREECE

Year

1980

1990

1995

2000

Labour Force, female(% of total labour force)

28

35

37

38

Source: World Bank (http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats)

Work time data

Setting aside all these problems of underestimation, a first glance indication is given by the legislation for the daily and weekly working time in combination with the statistics for the real working time per employee. Data about working time are being collected by the Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) from the 1974 and onward. However, there exist similar data from older types of survey of NSSG from the 1960s. From 1981, it is conducted according to the rules of EUROSTAT, which have been revised in 1983. EUROSTAT, ILO (International Labour Organization) and OECD estimations and studies are mainly based on this set of data. NSSG’s Labour Force Survey is a household survey covering all the country and conducted yearly. Hours of work refer to the number of hours actually worked during the reference week in first job or business. This includes all hours including extra hours regardless of whether they were paid or not. Persons who have also worked at home (e.g. teachers preparing lessons) are asked to include the number of hours they have worked at home. Unfortunately, the Labour Force Survey provides data for the mean working time in Greece for the year 1987 and afterwards. We have to turn to some other source to collect the data that are necessary for an econometric evaluation of the working time trend. The only statistical survey that can provide such evidence for Greece is the Labour Statistics of the NSSG. They are quarterly surveys investigating wages and occupation in Manufacturing, Mining, Commerce, Energy, Banking and Insurance sectors. They include data only for the paid working time, excluding working time that has been worked but not paid. As mentioned above, this leads to the underestimation both of the working time and the possible upward trend that exhibits. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other set of data covering the last 40 years period in Greece we have to relay upon them, as some ILO and OECD estimations and studies are doing so.

According to these data (Table 2) there is an increase in actual weekly working time in Greek Economy, from 1986 till1998 (the last available data).

TABLE 2. Actual average work time in Greece

Years

Average weekly hours

1962

44,08

1963

43,38

1964

43,95

1965

43,78

1966

43,3

1967

43,55

1968

43,7

1969

43,8

1970

44,63

1971

44,13

1972

44,58

1973

43,73

1974

43,8

1975

42,7

1976

41,83

1977

41,05

1978

41,25

1979

41,18

1980

40,7

1981

39,53

1982

38,6

1983

38,53

1984

38,18

1985

39,25

1986

39,2

1987

39,25

1988

41,13

1989

41,1

1990

41,08

1991

41,08

1992

41,08

1993

41,09

1994

41,85

1995

41,13

1996

41,18

1997

40,87

1998

41,13

Source: OECD Statistical Compedium, Labour Statistics NSSG

ILO’s KEY INDICATORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET (KILM), using the same data set has estimated the actual annual hours worked per employee – broken by males and females – for the period 1990-94. Annual estimations, as explained before, can capture better the contemporary tendency towards flexible labour arrangements. Again, in the case of annual hours, the tendency of the real working time to increase is evident for both sexes.

TABLE 3. Annual hours worked per person

Years

Males

Females

1990

819.7

735.7

1991

830.1

738.7

1992

854.8

757.5

1993

860.7

759.8

1994

851.2

755.7

Source: ILO – KILM

Other, less extensive, surveys have similar findings For example, a survey conducted by the pollster company METRON ANALYSIS, commissioned by the Ministry of Labour found even more pronounced results. The survey – which covered the whole country, was conducted from 14/9/2000 till 29/9/2000, used a three-stage sampling process and had an effective sample of 2.473 persons – found that the average real working time for private sector workers is 44.3 hours, while for public sector workers is 37.8 – by far higher than the hours dictated by the 8 hours per day legal limit (METRON ANALYSIS (2000, p.3). A big section of the employees (42.9%) declared that they work more than what is legally provisioned in their main or sole occupation. Additionally, 30% of the employees declared that their overtime work is not paid, while only 13.6% declared that it is paid but not sufficiently enough.

An econometric evaluation of the working time trends

We assume that if the data exhibit a time trend this would be a deterministic rather than a stochastic one. This is because a great percentage of the driving forces of this process are external to the economic system and they are the outcome of a plan, usually made from governments and/or the employers associations (in high ‘correlation’ with the working class resistance). This assumption is not indisputable of course, since the trend could also be the outcome of cumulative distortions that take place at the level of every single enterprise.

Under the previous assumption we will show that there is a statically significant time trend in the working time series for Greece and there is also a structural change affecting the slope of the trend.

The data for working time are plotted in Figure 1. We can visually identify two possible break points, the first at the years 1972-1973 and the second between 1984 and 1985. These two possible break points are consistent with important events that affected the economy, such as the oil crisis in 1973 and the announcement of the new economic policy for Greece after the second electoral victory of PASOK in 1985. Since our point is to show a rise in working time during the last years we will check only for the second possible break point.

The equation we use is linear since it is the simplest and more intuitive specification and since we have no economic reason to assume a higher order polynomial. In addition to this is the form of the line graph of the data, plotted in figure1.

Yt= C(1) + C(3)*t + et                                                                            (1)

Where Yt is the work time

t is for time

et is a disturbance term and

C(1), C(3) are the constant term and the slope coefficient to be estimated.

To test for the possible structural change we will use a dummy variable (d) which equals zero for the years before 1985 and one thereafter. So the equation will take the form

Yt= C(1) + C(2)*d + C(3)*t + C(4)*t*d + et                                  (2)

Where C(2) and C(4) are the coefficients associated with the dummy variable.

The sample we used is from 1972 to 1998. The reason for neglecting previous years is that we mainly want to check the behavior of the working time after the 1973 crisis, since the underlying assumption is that recent trends in working time are generated by the permanent effects and the attempt of overcoming this crisis. This assumption will also help us to use only one dummy variable in our equation, avoiding over specification problems.

The estimation of equation (2) (more specifically the Durbin-Watson statistic) indicates the existence of serial correlation among the residuals. The same conclusion is reinforced by the Q-statistics. In the case of serially correlated residuals the estimators C(1) till C(4) will be biased. The existence of serial correlation in the residuals was rather expected, since working time is affected in the short run by business cycles.

To overcome this problem we implement a second order autoregressive error of the form:

et = φ1 et-1 + φ2 et-2 + εt                                                 (3)

where εt is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).

The above formulation allows capturing the cyclical component of the series. Equation (2), with an AR(2) process for the error term, was estimated using the Non-linear Least Squares method (with the help of the econometric package EViews). The results are shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5. Estimation outputs for equation (2) (NLS)

Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(1) 44.37380 0.342510 129.5548 0.0000
C(2) -6.456084 0.908786 -7.104076 0.0000
C(3) -0.527863 0.047401 -11.13618 0.0000
C(4) 0.672779 0.063932 10.52342 0.0000
C(5) 0.463103 0.209634 2.209102 0.0384
C(6) -0.252611 0.219060 -1.153164 0.2618
R-squared 0.917048     Mean dependent var 40.96593
Adjusted R-squared 0.897298     S.D. dependent var 1.569459
S.E. of regression 0.502968     Akaike info criterion 1.656548
Sum squared resid 5.312505     Schwarz criterion 1.944512
Log likelihood -16.36340     Durbin-Watson stat 2.035307

The fit of the equation to the data is now better then in the previous case. The first two coefficients (C(1), C(2)) represent the constant term (before and after the structural change) and have no economic meaning. C(3), which is the slope of the linear equation until the structural change, is negative and statistically significant, as should be expected after viewing the plotted data. C(4) has to be added to C(3), to give the slope of the equation after the break point year of 1985. The statistical significance of C(4) proves that working time does not exhibit a constant trend throughout the period under examination (Mills, 2003, p.16). Further, the absolute value (απόλυτη τιμή) of C(4), which is bigger then the absolute value of C(3), shows that the downward trend of working time is reversed to an upward trend for the years after 1985. The coefficients C(5) and C(6) are the estimators of φ1 and φ2 respectively.

Formally, the estimation gives us the following equations describing the phenomenon before and after 1985:

Yt= 44,3738 – 0,527863*t + et           (for t before 1985)      (4)

and

Yt= 37,917716 + 0,1449161*t + et      (for t after 1985)         (5)

From equations (4) and (5) we can conclude that there was a statistically significant downward trend in working time from 1973 till the change of economic policy in 1985. After that year the trend changes sign (remaining significant), but the upward movement is now to a smaller degree. This was expected, since it is rather easier to reduce than to increase the working time due to political reasons. Besides, we estimate that the major part of the actual rise in working time is most of the times invisible by the official statistics and occurs also through other channels like second job, the rise of number of workers in each family etc.

All these findings confirm the hypothesis of the increasing working time in the Greek Economy.

Work time trends in the basic productive sectors of the Greek Economy

 

In this section we study the available work time data for three major productive sectors of the Greek economy: manufacturing, constructions and transportation – communications. The best available data are from 1987 and onwards. Previous data are incompatible with the new series. The choice of these sectors reflects the Marxian preoccupation with those sectors of the economy where productive labour is performed (as distinguished from unproductive wage labour). It is in these sectors that surplus-value is produced and therefore the increase or not of work time is particularly relevant.

It would be interesting to check also other sectors of the economy and particularly the tertiary sectors because there are empirical signs that overworking affects them as well. Two points are important here. First, that some activities that were considered traditionally as services and unproductive have nowadays changed character. Second, that the unproductive activities have significant macroeconomic effects since they entitle their capitalists to get a share of total surplus-value produced in the economy as a whole. However, the available Greek data are extremely problematic since their classifications have changed radically several times.

  1. 1.      Manufacturing

 

The data for the weekly working time in the manufacturing sector are shown in Table 6

TABLE 6. Weekly working hours in manufacturing

Years

Actual weekly work hours

1987

 40

1988

 41

1989

 41

1990

 41

1991

 42

1992

 43

1993

 42

1994

 42

1995

 42

1996

 42

1997

 42

1998

 42*

1999

 42

2000

 43

* Average of the years 1997 and 1999 because they do not exist data for this year.

Source: NSSG

As we can observe, the data are rounded off to integers. This causes a lack of the appropriate accuracy necessary for our tests. A big part of the work time variations are lost because of this reason. A second problem with the data is the small time period they cover, especially when it is known from the total sectors working time trend that the missing years are important. Finally the 1993 change of classification system, although limited for the examined sectors, affects the continuity of the data. The technique is the same used in the general case, but we don’t search for a break point here. The equation under estimation is the following:

Yt= C(1) + C(2)*t + et                                                                            (6)

The type of the correlation of the residuals indicates a first order autoregressive form for the error term and the estimated equation is:

Yt= 41,33856+ 0,093360*t + et                                              (7)

The coefficient C(1) has no economic meaning. The estimated C(2) coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 87% level of significance. This indicates the existence of an upward trend for weekly working time. The relatively low level of significance may be due to the small sample period, the rounding off and the change of classification system mentioned above, or due to the informal ways through which is achieved the increase in working time.

2.      Constructions

The data for the weekly working time in the manufacturing sector are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7. Weekly working hours in Constructions

Years

Actual weekly work hours

1987

36

1988

38

1989

39

1990

38

1991

40

1992

39

1993

40

1994

40

1995

40

1996

40

1997

40

1998

40.5*

1999

41

2000

41

* Average of the years 1997 and 1999 because they do not exist data for this year.

Source: NSSG

The problems concerning the data, mentioned in the previous case, hold in this case too. The estimation of the equation (6) was conducted with the use of a second order autoregressive form for the error term. The estimated equation is:

Yt= 38,41299 + 0,189033*t + et                                                (8)

 

The coefficient C(2) is positive and statistically important at the 99% level of significance. This indicates an upward trend for working time in the construction sector.

  1. Transport – Communications

 

The data for the weekly working time in the manufacturing sector are shown in Table 8

 

TABLE 8. Weekly working hours in Transport-Communications

Years

Actual weekly work hours

1987

44

1988

44

1989

44

1990

44

1991

45

1992

45

1993

46

1994

46

1995

46

1996

46

1997

46

1998

46*

1999

46

2000

46

* Average of the years 1997 and 1999 because they do not exist data for this year.

Source: NSSG

Using the same technique as in the manufacturing sector we estimate equation (6) for the sector of transportations and communications. The estimated equation is:

Yt= 44,40448+ 0,143357*t + et                                                 (9)

The C(2) coefficient is positive again and significant at the 0,79% level of significance. We can’t be positive about rejecting the null hypothesis in this case. All the previously mentioned explanations about the quality of data still hold for this sector. One additional explanation is, of course, the already very high level of weekly working time in this sector, which makes a possible upward trend much more difficult to occur and to be counted.

Conclusions

If the hypothesis of overworking is verified for Greece this, in our opinion, would mark the renewed significance of the extraction of absolute surplus-value. In Mavroudeas & Ioannides (2002) we have argued that contemporary capitalist restructuring, following the 1973 structural crisis and the subsequent long downturn, strives to construct a new era or a new stage of capitalism. This new stage will be based on a new configuration of absolute and relative surplus-value. Contrary to the previous capitalist stage where absolute surplus-value played a lesser role, nowadays absolute surplus-value is upgraded. This does not imply that relative surplus-value ceases to be dominant but rather that the equilibrium between them is changing under the permanent hegemony of relative surplus-value. In the Greek case the increased significance of absolute surplus-value is accentuated by the participation of the Greek economy in the European Union. As Carchedi (1999) has shown, particularly the European Monetary Union (EMU) project of the EU obliges less developed European economies to intensify the extraction of surplus-value and particularly absolute surplus-value.

These developments may support profitability but will definitely worsen labourers’ working and pay conditions.

References

Basso P. (2003) Modern Times, Ancient Hours, London: New Left Books.

Bell D.& Hart R. (1999) Unpaid Work, Economica 66,271-90

Bell D., Hart R., Hubler O. & Schwerdt, W. (2000) Paid and unpaid overtime working in Germany and in the UK, Bonn: IZA Discussion Paper No. 133.

Bluestone B. & Rose S. (1998) The Unmeasured Labor Force, Jerome Levy Policy Briefs no. 39A, May.

Bluestone B. & Rose S. (2000) ‘The enigma of working time trends’ in Golden & Figart (eds.) (2000a) ‘Working Time: International trends, theory and policy perspectives’, London: Routledge.

Bosch G. (1999) Working time: tendencies and emerging issues, International Labour Review, Vol. 138 , No. 2, pp. 131-149

EC (2003) Employment in Europe 2003, Directorate – General for Employment and Social Affairs, Luxembourg: Official Publications.

Golden L. & Figart D. (eds.) (2000a) Working Time: International trends, theory and policy perspectives, London: Routledge.

Golden L. & Figart D. (2000b) ‘Doing something about long hours’, Challenge, vol.43 no.6.

Heath J., Ciscel D. & Sharp D. (1998) The Work of Families: The Provision of Market and Household Labor and the Role of Public Policy, Review of Social Economy, Vol. LVI, No4, Winter 1998

Hetrick R. (2000) ‘Analyzing the Upward Surge in Overtime Hours’, Monthly Labor Review no.123.

ILO-International Labour Organization (1999), Key Indicators of the Labour Market-KILM, Geneva: ILO.

Jacobs J. & Gerson K. (1998) Who Are the Overworked Americans? Review of Social Economy, LVI (4).

Leete L. & Schor J. (1992) The great American time squeeze, Economic Policy Institute, Washington D.C.

Leete L. & Schor J. (1994) Assessing the time squeeze hypothesis: estimates of market and non market hours in the United States, 1969-1989, Industrial Relations 33(1): 25-43

Marx K. (1976) Capital, Vol. I, London: Penguin Books, 1867.

METRON ANALYSIS (2000) Survey for employment in Greece, Athens: METRON ANALYSIS.

Mills T. (2003) Modelling Trends and Cycles in Economic Time Series, New York: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Mishel L.& Bernstein J. (1994) The State of Working America 1994-95, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe

Mishel L., Bernstein J. & Schmitt, J. (1999) The State of Working America, 1998-99, Economic Policy Institute, ILR Press.

Mutari E. & Figart D. (2000) ‘The social implications of European work time policies: promoting gender equity?’ in Golden & Figart (2000a) ‘Working Time: International trends, theory and policy perspectives’, London: Routledge.

Robinson J. & Godbey G. (1997) Time for Life: The Surprising Ways Americans Use Their Time, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Schor, J. (1991) The overworked American, New York: Basic Books.

Schor J. (2000) Working hours and time pressure: the controversy about trends in time use, in Lonnie Golden and Deborah Figart (eds): Working Time: International trends, theory and policy perspectives, London and New York: Routledge.

———————————————————————————-

 

Reform, reform the reforms or simply regression? The ‘Washington Consensus’ and its critics

Bulletin of Political Economy

vol.1 no.1

 

Reform, reform the reforms or simply regression? The ‘Washington Consensus’ and its critics

 

Stavros D. Mavroudeas[1] & Demophanes Papadatos[2]

 

 

Ι. Introduction: The debate about the definition

The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined in 1989 by John Williamson (Williamson (2004b)). It was introduced in a period when the Keynesian dominance in economic theory and policy had collapsed – after the mid-1970s crisis and Keynesianism’s apparent inability to solve it – and neo-liberalism (promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the US and the UK respectively) had become the new orthodoxy. Williamson’s aim was to codify that part of the neo-liberal analysis and policy proposals which have become commonly accepted within Development Theory and particularly in the circles of the big developmental institutions (primarily the IMF and the World Bank) seated in Washington. In Williamson’s (2000, p.254) own words his effort ‘was an attempt to distill which of the policy initiatives that have emanated from Washington during the years of conservative ideology had won inclusion in the intellectual mainstream rather than being cast aside once Ronald Reagan was no longer on the political scene’. Thus, ‘Washington’ refers to the influential circles and institutions based in Washington. And ‘Consensus’ refers to the part of neo-liberal policy prescriptions that had been widely accepted. There is another geographical dimension in the term ‘Washington Consensus’. Its policy prescriptions were primarily issued for the Latin American economies in the 1990s, although they subsequently spread to the rest of the developing and less developed countries. Again in Williamson’s (2000, p.251) own words, the term refers ‘to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989’. Williamson (1990, 2000, p.252-3) summarizes these policy prescriptions in ten propositions:

1)      The imposition of fiscal discipline.

2)      The redirection of public expenditure priorities towards other fields.

3)      The introduction of tax reforms that would lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base.

4)      The liberalization of the interest rate.

5)      A competitive exchange rate.

6)      The liberalization of the trade

7)      The liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment.

8)      The privatization of state-owned economic enterprises.

9)      The deregulation of economic activities.

10)  The creation of a secure environment for property rights.

 

The theoretical foundations of these proposals can be easily discerned. They are the usual analyses advanced by neo-liberal economic theory. Economies are in crisis because of impediments to the free operation of the market. The impediments came from the overinflated interventionist Keynesian state and its expansionary and redistributive policies that deform market data and signals. The solution, according to the neo-liberal mandra, would be the withdrawal of the state from the economy and the reinstatement of the unhindered operation of the market. Therefore, fiscal discipline should be imposed on public activities and a return to the balanced budgets (as opposed to the Keynesian deficit and expansionary budgets). The now limited public expenditure should be directed towards fields that cover its cost (possibly through the imposition of compensative payments) and would support private entrepreneurship instead of paying for public works and redistributive policies. Subsequently, the tax system should be reformed so as not to hit hard business profits and the incomes of the upper strata, which were conceived as the locomotive of the economy. After all, the limited public expenditure can do with less taxes. Additionally, the operation of the financial system should be liberated from the state grip and prerogatives and be left to the free operation of the market forces. Thus, the interest rate should be determined more or less competitively. The withdrawal of the state from the economy required, also, the privatization of all the activities and enterprises that were state-owned and directed, the limitation to a minimum of all state regulations and adequate guarantees that there wont be any violations of property rights (as it had happened previously with nationalisations etc.).

With the advent of the second generation of neo-liberal theories, which emphasised the opening of the economies, the previous set of policy proposals was supplemented with three others that aimed to the liberalisation of international trade, capital movements and financial activities. Thus, protectionist measures had to be abolished and free trade movements established. Also, the free international movement of capital investments had to be secured. And, last but not the least, international financial transactions and, primarily, the exchange rate of the currency had to be set according to market prerogatives and not by state policies.

All these ideas had already been established as the orthodoxy in the developed countries in the 1980s. What the Washington Consensus aimed to do was to introduce them in the developing and less developed countries. As Williamson explicitly stated, there appeared to be a sort of global apartheid, which claimed that developing countries came from a different universe which enabled them to benefit from (a) inflation (so as to reap the inflation tax and boost investment); (b) a leading role for the state in initiating industrialization; and (c) import substitution. The Washington Consensus aimed to break this differentiation.

Quite soon, after its formal declaration, the Washington Consensus came under criticism from many quarters. These criticisms emanated from mainstream economics (Atkinson (1999b), Rodrik (1992, 2002, 2003) and particularly a current associated with the work of J.Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b) and also from Marxist Political Economy (Fine (2001a, 2001b, 2002), Shaikh (2003, 2004)). An important point in this controversy was the very definition of the term ‘Washington Consensus’. For nearly all its critics the term was synonymous with neo-liberalism and a blind fundamentalism of the market.

Williamson (1997, 2000, 2004a) made a feeble defence of his term arguing rather unconvincingly that it was not in his intentions a so close identification of the term with neo-liberalism. He maintained that he simply codified the consensus view within the big Washington institutions and his concept was a mere technocratic formulation devoid of ideological and political motivation. He also argued that his ‘Washington Consensus’ was not even a policy prescription but simply a list of policy reforms; although he is sympathetic to the former view and he accepts that at the time of the introduction of the term these two coincided (Williamson (2004a)). However, he added that his definition might be problematic in some aspects and also that he himself had reservations on some of these. For example, in retrospect, he doubts whether Washington institutions unanimously favoured the competitively determined exchange rate and the rapid abolition of capital controls. His reservations with the Washington Consensus’ policies were that their poverty reduction policies had to be more emphasized and sophisticated and that a greater emphasis should be put upon institutions and their role.

Despite Williamson’s arguments it cannot be denied – and even he cannot reject altogether – that the Washington Consensus has a definite ideological and political background: that of the neo-conservative policies of the last quarter of the 20th century. Furthermore, the Washington Consensus cannot be delegated to a simple sum of policy proposals. It has definitely a spinal column on the basis of which the whole edifice has been constructed. This is implicitly accepted even by Williamson when, in many papers, argues that there are three big ideas behind the Washington Consensus: macroeconomic discipline, market economy and opening of the economy (at least in respect of trade and foreign direct investment). Washington Consensus’ macroeconomic discipline is of a particular type and has specific priorities that differentiate it from other types of macroeconomic orderly state of affairs. It has certainly nothing to do either with Keynesian macroeconomic prerogatives or with those of other more radical perspectives. In almost all cases it led to austerity budgets and policies that favoured the wealthier and worsen the position of the lower strata. The same holds for the push towards a market economy and the opening of the economy. The first stems from a neoconservative conception of the economic role of the state and of its alleged inability to manage properly the economy. The second has the same origins complimented with the simplistic belief that it will lead to increased competition and thus consumers will in the end be better off. As it will be shown in the next chapter, these had the same negative effects as the first big idea. In this sense, the Washington Consensus is a perspective that dictated a policy prescription. Indeed, under its auspices, numerous reform programs were imposed – willingly or unwillingly – on less developed or developing countries.

The controversy about the definition established rightfully a meaning for the term. The actual content of a term is not given by the intentions of its founders but by the broader socio-political environment and the practical outcomes of the policies dictated by the term. On these grounds, it is overwhelmingly clear that in the 1980s and 1990s there predominated in official circles a current that considered as its main task the abolition of the state-run development policies and the restoration of the free operation of the market disregarding costs and special features of the developing economies. This current was clearly associated with neo-liberal theory and the Washington Consensus was its arm in the field of Development theory and policy. Consequently, the discussion of the concept cannot be constrained to the limited agenda of issues that its creator proposed but must encompass its whole spectrum of theory and applications. Williamson (2002) himself soon conceded the argument accepting that, from the time that the term became public property, its meaning is being set by the wider perception about it. Therefore, he declared that there is no meaning in struggling for the content of the term and called for an issue-by-issue discussion of the proposed policies.

 

 

II. Washington Consensus and its consequences

Besides the controversy on its definition, there is also a heated debate on whether the Washington Consensus promoted the development of developing and less developed economies or not. Today there is a widespread perception that it failed and that it led to crises and impoverishment. It would not be unfair to state that the term truly carries a bad reputation. This is accepted even by its defenders as, for example, by Naim (2002) who acknowledged that the Washington Consensus is a ‘damaged brand name’. Criticisms and the concomitant bad reputation do not stem only from theoretical and ideological opposition to the Washington Consensus but, most of all, from a series of persisting problems and crises that are, rightly or wrongly, associated with it.

 

Increase in poverty, inability to catch-up and social upheavals

After the first years of implementation of Washington Consensus policies and reforms there was a growing sense, among friends and foes, that it failed its promises. More specifically, from the late 1990s and onwards, the Washington Consensus was facing major difficulties regarding a number of issues, which were not included in its declared objectives but are crucial for the development process. It was criticized for failing to organize a ‘human face’ adjustment process and, thus, for causing social upheavals. Additionally, it was criticized for failing to deliver significant advances in performance, let alone development. Several studies argued that its policies led to an increase in poverty and inequality both between developed and developing and less developed economies and within themselves. Additionally, the apparent inability of developing and less developed economies to catch-up the level of growth of the developed ones and, in many cases, the increase of the gap between them were attributed also to the policies instigated by the Washington Consensus.

The first criticism, ‘adjustment with a human face’, touched upon the many cases where reforms dictated by the Washington Consensus had led to abrupt changes and a disruption of social cohesion. The imperatives of the Washington Consensus’ policies were usually implemented in a technocratic manner, disregarding social and political complexities. This, in return, created major problems and led to social and political upheaval. This was particularly true in cases of ‘shock treatment’ reforms.

The aforementioned criticism was also closely linked to the second one, i.e. the inability to exhibit an unambiguously better economic performance and to promote development. Issues of poverty, the environment, and of women’s position, had been overlooked drawing criticism over both the desirability and the efficacy of adjustment policies. Of all these issues of particular importance came to be the rise in inequality and poverty (see Atkinson (1999a)).

For almost all critics, Washington Consensus’ inability to address issues of poverty and inequality lays in its analytical perspective. The Washington Consensus held the view that poverty and inequality were problems of a secondary order, which more or less would have been alleviated once the market was free to operate undisturbed by the impediments of ineffective state intervention. In particular, it was thought that if the domestic markets where liberated from any impediments, then the free operation of capital, domestically, but mainly internationally will provide all the stimulation and the efficiency necessary for feasible development (see Kozul-Wright & Rayment (2004)).

Against this market-fundamentalist presumption, most of the critics point out that during the last twenty years of the 20th century after the implementation of Washington Consensus’ policies and structural changes there was a marked increase of poverty and inequality (see Chossudovsky (1997)). Critics coming from the Marxist Political Economy stream attribute this upsurge to the class nature of the Washington Consensus, i.e. that it is a set of policies that promotes capitalist interests and moreover the interests of big imperialist powers. Some mainstream critics argue that advocates of the Washington Consensus confront only the so-called ‘traditional causes’ of inequality (such as land concentration, dominance of natural resources, unequal access to education, and urban bias (in pricing policies, allocation of public expenditure and investment and so on)). For them, while such traditional factors were clearly responsible for the high-income concentration observed in the 1950s through 1970s and their persistence at a high level in the subsequent two decades, they cannot (with the possible exception, in some regions, of educational inequality) explain the widespread surge in inequality observed over the past twenty years of the Washington Consensus. Instead, several ‘new’ factors – such as technological changes with ‘new technologies’ generating a demand for skills and an earnings distribution more skewed than the emanating ‘old technologies’ – have had more relevance to the recent rise in inequality. This critique might be pertinent but it is beyond doubt that the Washington Consensus cannot address even the ‘traditional causes’ of inequality.

 

 

The crises of the 1990s

The problems mentioned above were brought forward and emphasized in the mid-1990s after a series of crises in the developing world: the 1994-5 Mexican ‘Tequila’ crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1997-9 Russian ‘Vodka’ crisis, the 1998 Brazilian crisis and finally the 2000 Argentinean crisis. In all these cases, the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions were blamed since these crises happened while these countries were implementing its policies and structural reforms. A common feature of all these cases is that they ended up as exchange rate crises. However, it is also true that each case had its own specific characteristics.

In the first case, Mexico, the problems were caused by the attempt to open the economy and introduce financial liberalisation. This led to the collapse of the peso and the default of the Mexican debt. In the Asian case the crisis was caused by the attempts to conform to an international environment a-la Washington Consensus and at the same time to reform their internal structure away from the Asian developmental model and towards the Washington Consensus prescriptions. The crisis took again the form of an exchange rate crisis and led to abrupt abandonment of these reforms. The Russian case is different since it stems from the transition process towards a market economy. Shock adjustment policies, the opening of the economy and its increased financialization made it vulnerable to contagion effects of the Asian crisis. This caused the collapse of the stock market, subsequent devaluations of the rouble and finally the suspension of its convertibility. In the Brazilian case the attempt to introduce financial liberalisation backfired. The imposition of fiscal discipline by redirecting public expenditure towards other fields and the reform of the tax system towards Washington Consensus standards demolished the Brazilian fiscal and tax system. This led to an exchange rate crisis again. Finally, the Argentinean case encompasses all the features of the Washington Consensus prescription. It began with an ambitious plan of budget, trade and monetary reform and quite soon proceeded to a currency board, i.e. the pegging of the peso to the US dollar on an one-to-one basis. These reforms created serious problems in the economy and led to the biggest sovereign default in modern history.

A closer look to each of these cases will enlighten the inherent problems of the Washington Consensus prescriptions and the causes of its bad reputation.

The 1994-5 Mexican peso crisis could be classified as a Balance of Payments crisis. The rapid liberalization of domestic markets caused imports to grow much more rapidly than exports. Tight monetary policy to reduce inflation produced high interest rates, which attracted foreign capital inflows to deregulated and liberalized domestic financial markets, which financed the trade gap. It was attempted to introduce competitive exchange rates, which implied that domestic interest rates had to be liberalised. But this caused the real appreciation of the peso, which worsened further the trade balance by turning relative prices against exports. The capital inflows also encouraged import growth as foreign borrowing allowed domestic banks to compete for domestic market share by lending to households to finance consumption and to arrange foreign exchange loans to domestic business at international interest rates. The result was continually increasing Mexican payments deficit, along with record increases in bank’s non-performing loans, a fall in private savings and low domestic investment, with slow growth and rising unemployment accompanying a fall in the rate of inflation and a government budget surplus. In February 1994, the increase of US interest rates led to withdrawal of investors and, thus, to the collapse of the peso (i.e. the inability to keep its peg to the dollar) and finally to the default of the Mexican dept. However, the crisis would have occurred irrespectively of the reversal of US interest rate policy since the real appreciation of the peso would eventually have collided with the increasing external deficit, and Mexico would have experienced an exchange rate crisis that would have been aggravated by a domestic financial crisis due to bad bank loans to households and foreign currency exposure of business clients.

The Asian crisis of 1997 has been very different. Most of the countries engulfed in it (Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and to a certain extent Malaysia) had no macroeconomic imbalances. Yet, there was a discernible tendency towards deterioration in foreign account caused by a fall-off in the rapid growth of exports in most countries. But, this was caused not by changes in what had until that time been successful internal stabilization policy (following the Asian developmental model), but rather by changes in the external environment (towards Washington Consensus standards), over which they had little control and there were few policy responses available. This is a characteristic of the world of increased economic interdependence and free global capital flows. Thus, unlike Mexico, it is impossible to argue that excessive domestic bank lending and real exchange rate appreciation led to a consumption and import boom which eventually created an expanding foreign deficit that speculators recognised as unsustainable since both the real exchange rate appreciations and the increased domestic bank lending occurred well after the beginning of the decline in trade balances and the increase in foreign bank lending. Rather, the process appears to have been the opposite. It was the rise in short-term bank inflows and the decline in the developed countries’ demand in the presence of liberalization of domestic financial markets that led to the deterioration in the trade balance, which was then further aggravated by dollar appreciation and rapid domestic credit expansion. It is for this reason that the crisis was not a foreign exchange crisis caused by a payments imbalance, since there was no clear evidence that exchange rates were inappropriate. Reserves were extremely large, external balances were moving in the right direction and official international agency assessments of country fundamentals suggested that the external positions were sustainable at existing exchange rates.

In the Russian case of 1997-9 the crisis followed a different path. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a transition process to a market economy was initiated. Policies of shock adjustment to a liberalised, privatised and open economy were systematically employed. The result was the tremendous transfer of wealth and resources to a handful of previously unknown foreign capitalists and to groups of previous managers. On the other hand the Russian economy shrank considerably and large segments of the population were impoverished. The opening and the financialisation of the economy brought foreign investors to the Russian stock market both for easy hefty returns and in order to diversify their portfolios. When the Asian crisis occurred in 1997 many of them withdraw from the Russian market in order to cover losses in Asia while the IMF made the same mistake it made in Asia, i.e. pressing the Russian government to go further to the liberalisation of the economy towards Washington Consensus standards. Thus, in June 18th 1998 it delayed a $670 million tranche of a loan to Russia. After that the Russian government succumbed to the IMF demands and increased land taxes. Although the IMF released the loan and also gave an additional one, political and social tensions (e.g. a miners’ strike) scared investors, who withdrew for a second time from the Russian market. This ultimately led to the fall of several governments and, despite initial refusals, to subsequent big devaluations of the rouble forcing – in the end – the suspension of its convertibility.

In the case of Brazil the whole affair was born out of the neoliberal fixation with hyperinflation which existed but, contrary to other Latin American economies, was not creating significant problems as the foreign account was not excessively imbalanced, the exchange rate was not overvalued, net public debt as a share of GDP was declining, and while low from historical perspective, its growth rate was on average above other economies in the region. Following the neo-liberal mandras active fiscal policy and the monetary control were abandoned and high real interest rates were used in order to stem hyperinflation. However, this reinforced hyperinflation by causing:

  • a direct increase in the costs of capital since there was no long-term capital market,
  • an increase in the government deficit, since the outstanding debt was directly linked to short-term rates.
  • an increase in the rate of inflation through the impact on capital costs and on the fiscal imbalance.

The reinforced inflation spiralled into indexed inertial hyperinflation, and impeded the full development of private long-term capital markets. Thus when policies of market liberalization were introduced according to the Washington Consensus prescriptions – to replace the system of government directed development financing – there was no private sector market structure available to take its place. The financial system operated as a rentier on the float created by the adjustment lags in the indexing system of financial contracts. Indeed, there was hardly any long-term business financing to be done. Only the State continued to invest in any appreciable magnitude and this peculiarly Brazilian characteristic of efficient state financing of investment was under increasing attack from the rapid deterioration of government finances and the neo-liberal push towards increased liberalisation. Then the Real plan was introduced, which was in many respects similar to earlier reform plans (e.g. de-indexing of wages and prices, using the nominal exchange rate as the anchor for price stability). Nonetheless, interest rates continued to be the major instrument of economic policy. Its implementation had as a consequence the reversal of the exchange rate policy of the previous period from maintaining competitiveness through devaluation to maintaining competitiveness by creating pressure on domestic producers from foreign imports. Since it was difficult for domestic producers to adjust their costs rapidly; the real appreciation of the Real produced a growing payments imbalance in the new context of liberalised foreign trade. The foreign capital inflows that matched the growing trade imbalance also had an impact on fiscal conditions, since the Central Bank adopted a policy of sterilization of inflows in order to protect its inflation-fighting monetary policy. As result, the continued reliance on high interest rates reinforced the imbalances on the foreign and domestic (fiscal) accounts and reversed the economy from one of inertial inflation to tendential deflation. This ultimately led to an exchange rate crisis.

Notwithstanding, the Argentinean is the most characteristic of all the crises caused by the Washington Consensus prescriptions and, at the same time, the most severe one. Argentina is the country that most enthusiastically embraced the economic model promoted by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury: market liberalization, opening to foreign investment (particularly foreign direct investment) and a reduced role for the state in the direct production of goods and services, but also as a promoter of development. As such, for almost a decade Argentina was promoted as a model showcase till December 2001 when it fell dramatically from grace. All started in 1991, when the finance minister Domingo Cavalho, under the auspices of the IMF, introduced his budget, trade and monetary reform plan. This was a series of economic shocks, followed by the subsequent introduction of a currency board, which had as its primary aim to fight hyperinflation and to stabilize the economy following the standards set by the Washington Consensus. The balancing of the budget was achieved first, through extensive privatisations, tax reforms, cuts in state expenditure, etc. The achievement of fiscal discipline was immediately followed by the tightening of monetary policy, which allowed for the introduction of the most revolutionary of all the reforms, a currency board linking the domestic currency, the Argentinean peso on a 1:1 basis to the dollar. The introduction of this parity aimed at anchoring permanently Argentine’s monetary policy to the US, in order to make the former more credible both domestically and internationally with regard to the stabilization of the economy and permanent price stability. It was one of the first dollarisation experiments. However, the linkage of the peso to the US dollar and consequently directly to the US monetary policy, meant that the Argentinean monetary policy had to adjust towards the needs and aims of the American interest rate policy. As the Argentinean interest rates had to follow the US interest rates in order to keep the parity of the peso to the dollar, this put tremendous pressure on the domestic economy. As a result, exports fell dramatically while imports increased, business defaults increased, unemployment increased, government tax revenue fell dramatically, and a domestic debt-deflation process started affecting the banking system and increasing dependence on external capital flows in order to keep the currency board. The process ended by the end of 2001, when two interrelated events accelerated the crisis. Firstly, on 6 November, Argentina’s sovereign credit rating was downgraded to ‘sovereign default’, following the decision of President Fernando De la Rua’s government to carry out a distressed debt exchange. This resulted in a panicky run on banks, which culminated in deposits decreasing by US$1.8 billion on the single day of 30 November. On 3 December, the De la Rua government imposed a freeze on bank deposits known as the ‘corralito’ (‘little fence’). This severely limited the amount of money that could be withdrawn from banks accounts, and trapped many people’s savings in failing banks. On 5 December, the IMF announced that it was suspending loans to Argentina because the De la Rua government had failed to meet conditions on public-spending cuts, and refused to disburse a scheduled $1.3 billion Special Drawing Rights tranche needed to pay debt obligations and to support the currency peg.

The combination of these two events led to a process that brought the Argentinean economic, political and social system to the brink of meltdown, crystallizing a longer-term process of crisis. Widespread political unrest erupted as a result, and on 20 December, as the protests intensified, De la Rua resigned. Argentina then went through five nominal heads of state in ten days. During this political turmoil, the dollar-peso parity was abandoned and Argentina defaulted on its debt of about US$150 billion. The countrywide protests diminished after the fall of De la Rua, but discontent has simmered on, particularly as the economy has gone into free fall. The Argentinean economy contracted dramatically, with GDP falling by a record 16% and manufacturing output falling by almost 20% in the first quarter of 2002, and industrial production in general by 17% during the first seven months of 2002. The currency collapsed to about one quarter of its original value, and inflation has spiralled. Unemployment has soared, public services have disintegrated, schools have closed, and state pensions and public sector workers’ salaries have gone unpaid.

Williamson ((2004b) p.6, (2004a) p.11-12) makes an unconvincing attempt to divorce his definition of the Washington Consensus from the Argentinean fiasco. Although he praises the rest of the Cavalho reforms (and indeed Cavalho himself) he disavows (a) the imposition of a fixed exchange rate which became overvalued and, (b) the lack of an orderly fiscal system which made impossible the use of the surpluses of the boom years in order to bring down the debt/GDP ratio. Both arguments are weak.

The currency board was the way to rapidly control hyperinflation. Otherwise a more smooth process would have been adopted. The shock adjustment was chosen because otherwise the whole process might be derailed. The currency peg to dollar was hailed as a bold new attempt to push even further, more rapidly and beyond the point of return the Washington Consensus prescriptions. In this way the peso was supposed to acquire more credibility and since this other currency was the dominant international currency, to reflect the operation of an open liberalised economy. Thus, the exchange rate would be competitively determined without any state intervention or old ‘Latin stratagems’ (i.e. the silent devaluation of the currency in order to acquire trade competitiveness). Thus, its subsequent disavowal sounds as ex post sophistry. On the other hand, the fiscal system and the indebtness of the Argentinean economy got out of control not because of the lack of fiscal order or a high debt/GDP ratio but exactly because of the attempt to impose internal macroeconomic ‘discipline’ and external openness almost automatically through the currency board.

 

III. Friends and foes of the Washington Consensus

Three broad streams can be discerned regarding the evaluation of the Washington Consensus. The first stream encompasses its defenders and supports, critically or uncritically, its legacy. The second one stems also from neoclassical economic theory but assesses negatively the impact of the Washington Consensus and also disputes part of its analytical framework. This second stream is associated with the post-Washington Consensus argument. Finally, there is a third stream coming from Marxist and Radical Political Economy that not only assesses negatively the impact of the Washington Consensus but also adheres to a completely opposite analytical and ideological perspective.

 

Reformists and fundamentalists

The supporters of the Washington Consensus are subdivided in two camps. The first one comprises of the fundamentalists that argue that the failures of the Washington Consensus were the result of faulty implementation and reluctant reformers (e.g. Krueger (2000), Franco (1999)). The second camp argues that there should be ‘a reform of the reforms’, i.e. that despite Washington Consensus merits it is necessary a reappraisal of its agenda (e.g. Kuczynski & Williamson (2003), ECLAC (1995), Ffrench-Davis (2000)).

For the fundamentalists both the neo-liberal character and the policy prescriptions are correct. What went wrong is the way they were applied. Thus, in pushing through the reforms careful consideration has to be given to state capacity, bureaucratic constraints and agency problems. Issues of effective governance and even ‘second-best options’ have to be taken into account. There is, however, a new element that creeps in their defence of the Washington Consensus. By focusing on these issues, they have to pay attention to the role of the institutions; an element rather alien to the pure versions of the neo-liberal approach.

However, a growing majority of the adherents to the Washington Consensus recognizes that its problems are much more serious than simply implementation errors. This approach has been enforced by internal disagreements within mainstream economics. The poor record of the Washington Consensus has caused significant uneasiness within the mainstream, which culminated, from the mid-1990s and onwards, to a series of critiques (e.g. Fisher (2003), Krugman (1990), Rodrik (1992), Sachs (1987)). For these critics the original version is too rigid (by disregarding intermediate positions between the extremes of indiscriminate liberalization and arbitrary interventionism) and jumps to policy recommendations based simply on the maximization of liberalization. Thus, a search for a reformist version began. Several versions of this have been proposed (‘reform of the reforms’, ‘augmented Washington Consensus’ etc.). Williamson (2003, p.237) himself led this process by acknowledging that the results of even his definition of the Washington Consensus have been disappointing for three main reasons:

1) As proved by the series of crises, the Washington Consensus did not emphasized crisis avoidance. Additionally, it is guilty for reckless enthusiasm for capital account liberalization.

2) The reforms were incomplete, particularly regarding the labour market where dualism persisted. Also fiscal reform did eliminate budget deficits but did not foresaw to create in good times surpluses as a buffer for bad times when deficit spending is required. Additionally, there was a disregard for reform of institutions and good governance.

3) The objectives of the reforms were narrow (simply to restore growth) without concern for employment, income distribution, poverty and other social issues.

However, he argues that these failures do not necessitate the abandonment of the Washington Consensus, nor giving socialism another chance or introducing industrial policy or closing the economy. For Williamson (2003, p.330), the way forward is to liberalise the labour market but in a civilized way, to improve income distribution and to recognize the role of institutions. He even plays down the differences with the post-Washington Consensus critics by arguing that their sole difference is that the latter presents its agenda as a repudiation of the WC whereas he argues for its continuation and reform. Similarly, Williamson (2004a, p.1) applauds – with minor corrections – Rodrik’s (2002) Augmented Washington Consensus, despite the latter’s explicit rejection of its feasibility (see Rodrik (2002, p.1). Rodrik has argued that in the end of the 1990s emerged a revised version of the Washington Consensus, which augments the initial agenda with the following items:

1)      Corporate governance

2)      Anti-corruption

3)      Flexible labor markets

4)      WTO agreements

5)      Financial codes and standards

6)      ‘Prudent’ capital-account opening

7)      Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes

8)      Independent central banks/inflation targeting

9)      Social safety nets

10)  Targeted poverty reduction

 

In a similar vein, Ffrench-Davis (2000) and ECLAC (1995) offer a mixed account of the impact of Washington Consensus reforms on Latin American economies and argue for the need of a ‘reform of the reforms’. For them, the initial reforms imposed macroeconomic discipline on local authorities, defeated hyperinflation, improved budget balances and fiscal savings and promoted exports. On the other hand, new imbalances were caused (particularly regarding the external sector), policies were too rigid and could not adapt to changes in the macroeconomy and social dimensions were neglected, thus causing social clashes.

To a large extent the reformists attempt to drop the overtly neo-liberal character of the Washington Consensus by attacking neo-liberal fundamentalism and arguing for a practical policy-oriented debate rather than ideological and general-theoretical controversies. They also emphasize the role of institutions – which is a shy alias to the state – and the importance of social issues (such as poverty and equity). They, therefore, concur – setting aside individual grievances – with aspects of the post-Washington Consensus thesis although they, usually, reject the label.

 

Post-Washington Consensus: a critique from within

The post-Washington Consensus thesis, launched in 1998 by Joseph Stiglitz, is the most ambitious attempt to resolve the Washington Consensus problems, from within mainstream economics. What distinguishes it from other mainstream critiques of the Washington Consensus is that it is sharply critical of the latter and that it is based on a differentiated analytical approach, the ‘economics of information’. For Stiglitz (1989), there is no perfect information, as the neoclassical mainstream posits. Instead, informational asymmetries exist which allow for transaction costs and market imperfections. Thus, the definition of market imperfections is broadened and the argument for state intervention to mitigate them is reinforced. This contrasts directly with the Washington Consensus, where the state is not seen as a corrective power. It contrasts also with the old Keynesian big government policies. The early Keynesian opposition to the Washington Consensus has often accepted the latter’s terms of debate, i.e. to counterpose the state and the market and to favour state intervention whether in getting prices wrong, picking winners, or guiding the private sector through public expenditure. On the contrary, for Stiglitz (1998a, p.25) there cannot be a return to old Keynesian policies but the state must focus exclusively on what he calls fundamentals, i.e. economic policies, appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection, basic education, health, infrastructure, law and order, environmental protection. For him the question is not whether the state should or should not be involved, but rather the question of how it should be involved. His main argument is that the state is not an anti-market force but a complementary one.

On this alternative analytical approach are based the ‘New Development Economics’ (Nobel (2001)) and the post-Washington Consensus, which emphasise history and institutions. Through the emphasis on institutions it attempts to bring the social dimension back into the analysis as the means of addressing, and potentially correcting, market imperfections. It also aims to differentiate itself from old Keynesian statism.

For Stiglitz (1994, 1998a, 1998b) the Washington Consensus fails because the simple liberalization of markets does not suffice for their normal operation, particularly in the developing countries. The existence of information asymmetries, that prevent markets from allocating resources efficiently, and the lack of complete and efficient institutional systems to mitigate these asymmetries are the causes of this failure. Thus, development policy should not aim only to the markets but also to the institutions. In a sense, the post-Washington Consensus shares the same agenda with its predecessor but with some crucial modifications. The removal of the constraints and controls on the markets and the international capital mobility and privatizations should be done through a smooth and gradual process and by taking into account the specific historical and social situations. Essential part of this process is the creation of new institutional regulatory frameworks that can guide, correct and control the market. Moreover, more room is allowed for discretionary and active policies. On top of all these, Stiglitz rejects the Washington Consensus monistic focus on fighting inflation and puts priority on the stabilization of output and the promotion of long-run growth (through education, transfer of technology and several other channels that are being neglected by the Washington Consensus). Finally, he emphasizes the role of the financial system (the ‘brain’ of the economy) and argues that the aim should not be a liberalized financial system but a properly regulated and efficient one.

 

The radical critique: capitalism’s structural problems and the developing countries

There is also a more radical critique of both the Washington and the post-Washington Consensuses coming from the Marxist Political Economy. This approach follows a different analytical course by focusing on social classes and the struggle between them rather than on maximising individuals (as both Consensuses do). In this context the Washington Consensus is a vehicle for the exertion of imperialist dominance by the developed capitalist economies (and primarily the US) over the developing and less developed countries. Its set of policies advances the specific interests of these economies, which are similarly advanced with the so-called globalisation.

Thus, Shaikh (2003, 2004) disputes that trade and financial liberalisation promotes development, as both the Washington and the post-Washington Consensus (more qualified) believe. Empirically, the now developed economies have, in the past, systematically used activist and protectionist trade and financial policies in order to attain their present status and, in many cases, they follow them even today. Also, as even mainstreamers accept (e.g. Rodrik (2001), p.7), it has been proven that liberalisation policies do not lead to higher growth rates. Thus, the pressure the pressure to liberalise favours the developed over the developing by prohibiting for the latter to follow the path of the former. Shaikh, also, shows that these ill-guided policies stem from the erroneous orthodox ‘theory of comparative costs’ and he argues that an approach based on the classical theory of ‘competitive advantage’ is both analytically and empirically superior.

Similarly, Fine (2001a, 2001b, 2002) criticises the Washington Consensus for consciously neglecting crucial aspects of the development process in order to push the neo-liberal reforms that promote the interests of dominant capitalist economies. He also criticises the post-Washington Consensus for not being a true alternative to its predecessor and for, ultimately sharing the same analytical and policy agenda. Despite its vociferous opposition, it actually shares the same analytical foundations, namely methodological individualism, with the additionally flavour of the emphasis on informational asymmetries. This reductionism to individual behaviour, even when supplemented with an emphasis on institutions, cannot grasp the social dimension and moreover class and power relations. Furthermore, despite again Stiglitz’s newfound focus on history, it cannot grasp the qualitative dimensions of development and particularly its nature as a transition from one stage of development to another and reduces it to the arrangements required for dealing with market imperfections. Finally, Fine argues that both Consensuses are part of the same ‘imperialist’ attempt by orthodox economics to colonise fields (such as Economic Development theory), which have hitherto remain no-go areas.

On policy issues, Marxist economists argue that markets, instead of promoting stability and equality, are potential destabilisers and that free competition increases poverty and inequality. This holds especially for financial liberalisation and international capital mobility, which – as the experience of the 1990s reconfirmed – increase domestic financial fragility and trigger balance of payments crises. Additionally, financialisation drains resources that might have fostered the growth of production and employment and increases unproductively the returns of financial intermediaries. Finally, they claim that unbridled competition leads to the concentration and centralisation of capital and, thus, to the creation of national and international monopolies, which impose their interests on the poorer strata and the less developed economies. Ultimately, this process leads to growing divergence between economies, contrary to the orthodox beliefs. In terms of the domestic economy, the Washington Consensus’ policies lead to adverse income distribution, since they put the onus on the poorer strata and they systematically erode workers’ bargaining power (via greater wage flexibility, reduced regulation and minimum wages). Adverse income distribution worsens even more with privatisations (that make more costly the provision of utilities) and the erosion of the state’s redistributive role (through regressive changes in taxation systems and the curtailment of public expenditure).

For the radical critique the way forward for the developing countries is neither the Washington nor the post-Washington Consensus. Instead, another developmental model is required in which the state must have an explicitly active role in promoting trade and industrial policies and positive income redistribution. Moreover, these new state economic functions should be democratically accountable and based on popular movements. Such an alternative developmental strategy would necessarily have to strive against hegemonical international economic relations.

 

 

IV. Development as a social problem

In the beginning of the 21st century the Washington Consensus is, nominally at least, dead. However, the way forward is far from obvious.

From a long-run point of view the world economy is still living in the aftermath of the 1973 structural crisis. The fact that since then almost all the crucial macroeconomic variables exhibit a rather dismal record is tantamount to that. This crisis ended the previous modus operandi of capitalism and called for a new architecture of the system. From the perspective of Marxist Political Economy, this was not a simple periodic overaccumulation crisis, but its structural character had to do with the exhaustion of the core elements (relation between paid and unpaid labour time, production and circulation processes, social and political edifice etc.). The first systemic attempt to overcome it followed the prescriptions of the then economic orthodoxy, i.e. Keynesianism. Thus, conservative Keynesian policies were employed. Their main feature was that they regarded the crisis simply as an underconsumption one and attempted to solve it via a contradictory reinforcement of demand. In particular, they resorted to austerity measures (where the curtail of any wage increases reduced workers’ income and the labour cost and promoted profitability) and state policies (tax cutting, state orders and subsidies) that supported capitalist consumption and the demand between capitalist enterprises. These policies failed, in the long – run, because they weakened intra-capitalist competition, thus deterring the destruction of less competitive capitals.

Then followed the neo-conservative currents, first with their national (monetarism) and then with their internationalised (neo-liberalism) version. Some of their main features were the emphasis on the supply–side, the permission to competition to work unhindered, the withdrawal of the state from the economy and also its opening. The withdrawal of the state form economic activities created new spaces for capitalist profitability through the privatisations (seldom at basement prices). It curtailed also the ability of the working and popular classes to press for concessions and economic benefits. Together with the liberalisation of internal and external markets, it applied in all markets (including the labour market and for this reason neo-conservatism’s attack on workers’ position was much more severe than that of conservative Keynesianism) rules of strict competition. These permitted the full application of the clearing force of competition (the survival of the fittest) – with limited ability of the state to adulterate this process – as a means of overcoming the crisis. The Washington Consensus is the brainchild of these currents in the field of Development theory and policy. As such it has similar merits but also suffers from similar deficiencies with its developed countries’ blueprints. It has sustained capitalist profitability in the mid-run by providing new areas for investment, reducing labour wage and non-wage costs and clearing the economy from unviable individual capitals. On the other hand, by overemphasising the role of competition it fall to the naïve belief that simply the spontaneous action of individual capitals will suffice to return the capitalist economy to another ‘golden era’ of accumulation. However, there exist significant contradictions between individual and collective capitalist interests and for this reason the role of the state, as a ‘collective capitalist’, is necessary. Furthermore, the width and the depth of the capitalist restructuring required to surpass the structural crisis necessitates much more than the spontaneous action of the market forces. This is another reason why the state is required as a commanding centre, which will guide, motivate and correct the market.

These inabilities lie at the heart of the failures of neo-liberalism and of the Washington Consensus. Tantamount to that is the renewed emphasis – either by its supporters or by its mainstream critics – on the role of institutions. For these reasons both neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus are virtually dated in the beginning of the 21st century and the search began for their successors. Social-liberalist trends appear as such a successor and the post-Washington Consensus is part of them. Their main trust is that they represent a rupture within the continuum of neo-liberalism. They built upon its successes but also strive to correct its deficiencies. Thus a new role for the state-headquarter is researched and also, in the face of serious social upheavals, a more sophisticated form of attacks on and compromises with the working class and the other popular classes.

However, this new emerging orthodoxy has its own deficiencies and, in the cases of the post–Washington Consensus, the radical critique is very accurate on that. In analytical terms, its critique against the Washington Consensus correctly pinpoints its non–social character and its inability to grasp the socio–political dimensions of the development process. However, this defect cannot be repaired by simply adding a role for the state and the institutions to combat market imperfections caused by informational asymmetries and conceived on the basis of methodological individualism. The socio–political dimensions of the development problem are far wider, cannot be grasped properly even by ‘socialised’ versions of methodological individualism and require more radical and rigorous instruments than simple institution–building. In a sense, where the Washington Consensus creates (or expands) markets – and in some cases where this cannot be done it creates quasi – markets by imposing private–sector modes of operation – the post–Washington Consensus attempts to create quasi–societies as complements to the markets. It neglects that it is social and class interests that create institutional frameworks and rules – and sometimes even markets. Furthermore, the division in different social and class interests is not the result of more or less fleeting informational asymmetries but of more fundamental and deep–rooted socio–political factors. For all these reasons and despite the valiant critique of its proponent against its predecessor, it seems that the most that the post–Washington Consensus can offer is a compromise with the former. This is probably bound to produce similar dismal results with the Washington Consensus regarding the development process. The only area where it may have a limited success is in a form of gatopardismo – to borrow from Lucino Viscodi’s famous film: everything in the system has to be changed in order for the system to remain unchanged.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Atkinson, Anthony (1999a), ‘Is Rising Inequality Inevitable? A Critique of the Transatlantic Consensus’, third WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki.

 

Atkinson, Anthony (1999b), The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State, Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

Chossudovsky, Michel (1997), The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, London: Zed Books.

 

Economic Commission for the Latin America and the Carribean of the U.N. – ECLAC (1995), Policies to Improve Linkages with the Global Economy, Santiago: United Nations.

 

Fine, Ben (2001a), Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political economy and social science at the turn of the millennium, London: Routledge.

 

Fine, Ben (2001b), ‘Neither the Washington nor the post-Washington consensus: An introduction’ in Fine Ben, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus (eds), (2001), From Development Policy in the Twenty-first century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus, London: Routledge: Studies in Development Economics.

 

Fine, Ben (2002), ‘Globalisation and Development: The Imperative of Political Economy’, preliminary draft for the Conference ‘Towards a New Political Economy of Development: Globalisation and Governance’, Sheffield, July.

 

Fisher, Stanley (2003), ‘Globalization and its Challenges’, American Economic Review vol.93 no.2.

 

Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo (2000), Reforming the Reforms in Latin America: Macroeconomics, Trade, Finance, London: Macmillan.

 

Franco, Gustavo (1999), ‘Brazil’s economic crisis the result of political complacency, banking expert says’, Stanford [online] Report, October 13.

 

Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo & Williamson, John (2003) eds., After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Washington: Institute for International Economics.

 

Krueger, Anne (ed.) (2000), Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

Krugman, Paul (1990), The Age of Diminished Expectations, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

 

Kozul-Wright, Richard & Rayment, Raul (2004), ‘Globalization Reloaded: An UNCTAD Perspective’, Discussion Paper No.167.

 

Naim, Moises (2002), ‘Washington Consensus: A Damaged Brand’, Financial Times October 28.

 

Nobel (2001), ‘Markets with Asymmetric Information’, Advanced Information, http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/public.html.

 

Rodrik, Dani (1992), ‘Conceptual Issues in the Design of Trade Policy for Industrialization’, World Development vol. 20, No3, June.

 

Rodrik, Dani (2001), The Global Governance of Trade: As if Trade Really Mattered, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

 

Rodrik, Dani (2002), ‘After Neoliberalism, What?’, Remarks at the BNDES Seminar on ‘New Paths of Development’, Rio de Janeiro, September 12-13.

 

Rodrik, Dani (2003), Growth Strategies, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

 

Sachs, Jeffrey (1987), ‘Trade and Exchange-rate Policies in Growth-oriented Adjustment Programs’, in V. Corbo, M. Goldstein and M.Khan, (eds.), Growth-oriented Adjustment Programs, IMF and the World Bank, Washington D.C.

 

Shaikh, Anwar (2003). ‘Globalization and the Myth of Free Trade’, Paper for the Conference on Globalization and the Myths of Free Trade, New School University, New York.

 

Shaikh, Anwar (2004). ‘The economic mythology of neoliberalism’, in Alfredo Saad-Filho (ed.) ‘Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, London: Pluto Press.

 

Stiglitz, Joseph (1989), ‘Markets, Market Failures and Development’, American Economic Review vol.79, no.2.

 

Stiglitz, Joseph (1994), ‘The Role of the State in Financial Markets’ in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development economics, vol.2, World Bank, Washington, D.C., May.

 

Stiglitz, Joseph (1998a) ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus’, the 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture Helsinki, January.

 

Stiglitz, Joseph (1998b) ‘Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes’, Prebisch Lecture, UNCTAD, Geneva.

 

Williamson, John (1990), ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’ in Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How much has happened?, Washington: Institute for International Economics.

 

Williamson, John (1997), ‘The Washington Consensus Revisited’, in L. Emmerij (ed.), Economic and Social Development into the XXI Century, IDB, Washington, D.C.

 

Williamson, John (2000), ‘What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?’, World Bank Research Observer vol.15 no.2, August.

 

Williamson, John (2002), ‘Did the Washington Consensus Fail?’, remarks at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 6.

 

Williamson, John (2003), ‘Our Agenda and the Washington Consensus’ in Kuczynski & Williamson (eds.) After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Washington: Institute for International Economics.

 

Williamson, John (2004a), ‘The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development’, A lecture in a series ‘Practitioners of Development’ delivered at the World Bank, January 13.

 

Williamson, John (2004b), ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’, paper commissioned by Fundacion CIDOB for the conference ‘From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance’, Barcelona, September 24-25.

 


[1] Dept. of Economics

University of Macedonia

[2] Bank of Greece

THE MONETARY EQUIVALENT OF LABOUR AND CERTAIN ISSUES REGARDING MONEY AND THE VALUE OF LABOUR-POWER

 

THE MONETARY EQUIVALENT OF LABOUR AND CERTAIN ISSUES REGARDING MONEY AND THE VALUE OF LABOUR-POWER

 

 

 

EQUIVALENT MONETAIRE DE TRAVAIL ET CERTAINES ISSUES CONCERNANT L’ ARGENT ET LA VALEUR DE LA FORCE DU TRAVAIL

 

S.Mavroudeas

University of Macedonia

Department of Economic Studies

 

Economie Applique tome LIV no.1, 2001

 

ABSTRACT

Certain contemporary answers to the Sraffian challenge to Marxian Value Theory, as the “New Solution to the Transformation Problem”, argue that money is the direct incarnation of abstract labour. Then the value of money is defined as a ratio between total prices and total hours worked and the value of labour-power as the division of money wages by the value of money, contrary to their Marxian definitions relating them to a commodity money and to a basket of wage goods respectively. This route, while facilitating the establishment of directly quantifiable relations, misrepresents the operation of the capitalist economy and weakens the labour theory of value, since it recourses to a Smithian labour-commanded conception of value.

 

 

 

ABSTRAIT

Certaines reponses contemporaines au defi Sraffien a la theorie de valeur Marxienne, comme la «Nouvelle Solution au probleme de transformation», pretend que l’argent est l’ incarnation direct du travail abstrait. Alors la valeur de l’argent est definie comme un taux entre prix totaux et des heures totales deja travaillee, contrerairement a leurs definitions Marxiennes les associant  a un argent commoditaire et a un panier des biens de consommation des ouvriers respectivement. Cet itineraire, tout en facilitant l’etablissement des relations directement quantifiables, represente mal l’execution de la economie capitaliste et affaiblit la theorie de valeur du travail, puisqu’il a recours a une conception de valeur Smithienne comme travail commande.

 

 


INTRODUCTION

 

The revival of interest for the Labour Theory of Value was marked by the Sraffian answer to the “transformation problem”, prevalent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The latter started from the physical quantities of production and their interrelationships and constructed an equilibrium model of input-output equations where the relation of prices to physical magnitudes was entirely independent of values. This emphasis on the technical characteristics of production led to the rejection of the category of value as redundant. Subsequent Marxist replies to the Sraffian challenge had rightly focused upon abstract labour, as the concept differentiating the Marxian from the Ricardian embodied labour perspective. Most of these approaches bypassed the technicist and static-equilibrium Sraffian framework and aimed to construct a social value paradigm. This project poses a formidable question: if abstract labour is the Marxian alternative to the empiricist Ricardian embodied labour, then how is the former expressed in reality? Ricardian embodied labour, i.e. the labour actually expended during the production process of a commodity, poses no such problems but fails to address the social aspect of labour. On the other hand, while abstract labour expresses inherently the social dimension, it cannot be easily recognised tangibly within actual reality. Abstraction necessarily dictates some degree of departure from the concrete.

For certain of the approaches that confronted the Sraffian challenge it was deemed necessary to establish an unmediated representative of abstract labour. Some [e.g. Gleicher D. (1985-6)][1] attempted to discover an unmediated (i.e. existing without the mediation of others) actual existence of abstract labour within the production process. It was argued that capitalism has a single historical tendency to degrade and simplify work. Therefore at the modern stage of mature capitalist development it predominates a generally common form of undifferentiated work which is the obvious and direct incarnation of abstract labour. Such perspectives drew popularity and support during the high days of the Labour Process debate and under the auspices of the Braverman thesis on deskilling. However, as soon as these influences retreated and, furthermore, it was established that capitalism poses no single tendency towards either upskilling or deskilling, the validity of the undifferentiated work thesis was seriously questioned.

At this point another possible route appeared ahead for those searching for a direct and unmediated representative of abstract value: money. The so-called “Rubin school”[2], theories of some form of a Labour Equivalent of Money (LEM)[3] and, more prominently, the “New Solution” (or “New Interpretation”) to the “transformation problem”[4] share this thesis. Their common kernel recognises money as the direct and exclusive incarnation of abstract labour. For the last two strands this leads to a relationship between money and abstract labour at the level of the aggregate magnitudes of the capitalist economy which enables to define a version of “value of money” (LEM) or, alternatively, of Monetary Expression of Labour (MEL). For all the representatives of these views – with the possible exception of De Vroey – these ratios are based on a net rather than a gross product level. This relationship between money and abstract labour is then coupled with a peculiar understanding of the value of labour-power.

It is telling how the “New Solution”- which can be taken as the exemplary showcase, since is the more coherent and analytically articulate version of this approach – confronts these issues. It posits an immediate equality between the total price of the net product and the total living labour performed in each period. On this basis it defines the MEL as the ratio of the price of the net product divided by the total hours worked. The MEL is subsequently employed throughout the analysis in order to render prices into values. The value of labour-power is then defined as the product of the rate of money wages by the MEL. Both these definitions depart from the Marxian understanding of the value of money and of labour-power that linked the first to the value of a commodity-money and the second to the value of a bundle of wage-goods. However, “New Solution’s” perspective has considerable merits. First, money – which is downgraded to a simple numeraire in the Sraffian perspective – is brought in [Mohun S. (2000), p.113]. Second, it becomes fairly easy to construct macroeconomic models which admit of empirical verification [Foley D. (1997), p.20] while remaining founded on the labour theory of value, since the MEL translated flows of money in real-world capitalist accounts to flows of labour-time and vice versa [Foley D. (1997), p.17-18]. Therefore, there is no need o a separate accounting system based on labour coefficients and ordinary national accounts can be used. In this way a social value paradigm is constructed, the empirical validity of the labour value theory is reasserted and significant obstacles – the “transformation problem” being the most important of them – are surpassed.

This article studies “New Solution’s” methodological and analytical foundations. It argues that, although its aims are legitimate and commendable and certain of its insights can be very fruitful, the approach adopted in this respect is problematic. If the only thing at stake were the so-called “transformation problem” – which has ended up in a rather arcane academic debate – then reservations and objections would not be important. But for both Ricardo and Marx and the “New Solution” scholars the transformation of values to prices concerns not an academic dispute but the understanding of the internal workings of the capitalist system. As such it cannot be simply a matter of mathematical hypotheses or a problem of its own. An explanation of the transformation procedure – and a “solution” to its mathematical technicalities – should illuminate the way capitalism operates. Thus, the analysis of the transformation process should lead, at a lower level of abstraction and with the introduction of further hypotheses, to a value-theoretic macroeconomic analysis. It is on these grounds that “New Solution’s” methodology and fundamental hypotheses are questioned.

In a nutshell, this article argues that this welcomed return to the empirically tangible flirts dangerously with empiricism and has grave analytical implications, which appear mostly in two fundamental areas: the conceptions about money, its value and the value of labour-power. In both these areas the quest for the empirically tangible leads to a Smithian labour-commanded perspective [Lapavitsas C.-Mavroudeas S. (1997), Shaikh A.–Tonak E. (1994)]. “New Solution” posits that money represents value in a direct, not mediated, and ideally abstract manner, allowing the derivation of equilibrium macroeconomic relationships. In fact – and leaving aside the well known problems associated with the use of the net rather than the gross product – the opposite is true: socially necessary labour-time (the substance of value) becomes expressed in units of money (the price-form of value) through a series of indirect mediations. These mediations, moreover, inherently contain the possibility of disequilibrium and violent economic upheaval. To collapse the mediated expression of value as price into the simple division of the total hours worked over the price of the net product is to miss both the complexity of the real process and the potential for disequilibrium inherent to the latter. In a similar manner, to posit the value of labour-power as the product of money wages by the MEL has the following two deeply problematic implications. First, the commodity nature of labour-power can be effectively denied and this was indeed the case in certain works [e.g. Mohun S. (1994)]. Second, this concept of the value of labour-power is reminiscent of Smith’s labour-commanded rather than Marx’s abstract labour. Consequently, the analysis of the effect of technical change on the rate of exploitation and on the formation of values and prices is significantly hampered.

The characteristic feature of capitalism as a social system is that it transforms money and labour-power into peculiar commodities. Marx attempted to develop a labour theory of value based on the notion that value is generated in production, which could also apply to these two peculiar commodities. Because of their peculiarity, his application of the labour theory of value to them follows a more sophisticated route than the one for ordinary commodities. The determination of the value of money is mediated by the role of the commodity-money and the determination of the value of labour-power is mediated by the role of the basket of commodities that represent the consumption standards of the working-class. To surpass this process of mediation by recoursing to labour-commanded, while facilitating the establishment of empirical – and quantitative – relations, loses significant aspects of reality and weakens the labour theory of value. “New Solution” pays a heavy toll by abandoning this process of reasoning. It ends up with a weakened explanatory power, which emerges when it is accepted that it consists of definitions rather than determinations.

The main focus of this article is on the definition of the value of labour-power, although reference will be made to the definition of the value of money as well, since these two definitions are interlinked and there is a certain “symmetry” in the way “New Solution” theorises them. Section I of the article attempts to reconstruct and support Marx’s conception about abstraction and value. It questions the validity of those approaches that search for a direct and unmediated incarnation of abstract labour in general and, particularly, those that find such an incarnation in money. Abstract labour does not have – and it is not required to have – an autonomous, direct and unmediated mode of existence. On the contrary, like most abstractions, it exists through other things and relations. This does not mean that abstractions are intellectual tricks and have no real existence, but that their reality is expressed via separate external forms. Section II discusses the role of the value of money and argues that it is crucial for any value-theoretic analysis. However, it is argued that Marx’s linkage of the value of money to the value of a commodity-money is indispensable. “New Solution’s” definition of the MEL fails to grasp this linkage. Section III turns to the determination of the value of labour-power focusing on its commodity nature. It is maintained that the value of labour-power depends critically on a set of use-values, represented by the bundle of wage-goods. Finally, Section IV shows that the root of “New Solution’s” problems lays in its problematic understanding of dialectical abstraction and the resulting conception about abstract labour.

 

 

I. DIALECTICAL ABSTRACTION AND VALUE IN MARX

 

The method of dialectical abstraction is a central tenet of Marxian theory. Following Marx’s well-known premonition that all science would be superfluous if the internal essence of things was identical with their outward appearance, abstraction is employed in order to move behind appearance to discover the underlying essence. It is the latter that constitutes the determining aspect. This rigorous distinction between essence and appearance but also their dialectical interrelationship is a particular differentiating characteristic of Marx’s methodology, stemming from his Hegelian inheritance.

The Marxian perspective is partly similar with that of Ricardo, in the sense that both – Marx in more coherent and general philosophical terms, Ricardo solely in the field of the value-price relationship – searched for a force underlying and determining outward forms. However, as Zeleny (1980) has shown, while for Ricardo essence is something qualitatively fixed and non-differentiable, Marx understands it as a dynamic force, which is historically transitory and proceeds through different levels of development. For Marx the essence of things is dynamic and transformable exactly because it is not a technical characteristic but a fundamentally social one. For this reason, Marx was able to incorporate the historical and social dimension and to establish the transitory character of the capitalist system. Additionally, apart from essence being dynamic and transformable, Marx also understood that there exist feedback relations between essence and appearance, again contrary to Ricardo. Essence determines appearance but – at a secondary level and taking into account the time dimension – the latter in turn affects it.

Both these two elements – the historical and dynamic character of essence and the feedback relationship between essence and appearance – lay beneath Marx’s differences with Ricardo’s Value theory. Whereas Ricardo’s embodied-labour neglects the historical and social dimension, Marx’s abstract labour is founded exactly on this dimension. Value is the representation of labour solely in capitalism and on this basis – i.e. the social relations between producers and non-producers – it determines price. It is neither a supra-historical nor a technical factor. Additionally, price is not only the necessary form of outward appearance of value but it affects – at a chronologically sequent and secondary level – value.

In this sense, Marx’s conception about abstraction differs from both that of Ricardo and that of orthodox Economics. Ricardo’s abstraction searched for an essence behind prices which could be directly derived and would have an unmediated physical presence. Orthodox Economics, on the other hand, when employing a process of abstraction, understand it as a purely logical trick; abstraction is a mental exercise which may enable us to grasp reality but which it is not itself real. Marx, contrary to Ricardo, maintained that the process of abstraction must follow a dialectical spiral passing through several stages. Beginning from the most abstract (and simpler) level, at each stage of the dialectical spiral more concrete (and secondary) features should be added until — at the final stage — we can acquire the total unity of appearance and essence. Contrary to orthodox Economics, the Marxian abstraction refers to real relations and it is not a simply mental process. For orthodox Economics — following the dominant positivist and empiricist perspective — “real” (as opposed to “ideal”) is only something that has an immediately tangible physical presence that can be directly verified empirically. For Marx essence need not have — and in most cases does not have — an autonomous physical presence. Its “reality” is established via its forms of appearances, i.e. it is present through the physical existence of other things.

Therefore, the value abstraction is a real – not mental – abstraction because it derives from a real social process: that of commodity exchange. It is precisely this empirical non-particularity of the value that renders it «abstract», just as its provenance in the socio-temporal sphere of actual human interactions renders it «real».

Value is the representation of abstract labour and it is a characteristic pertaining to the capitalist mode of production exclusively[5]. In this it differs from exchange-value (the exchange ratio between commodities) that applies to all commodity-producing modes. Every social mode of production has a certain mechanism of equalisation of concrete labours. In the capitalist mode of production this equalisation takes the form of the renumeration of concrete labours to the space of abstract labour. The latter is expressed through market exchange. However, the value abstraction – and therefore abstract labour – is not generated in exchange but in production and refers to the capital-labour relation. It hinges upon a double indifference. On the one hand, capitalists are indifferent towards the particular type of production process they are going to exploit, since use-value is of no significance for them. The only thing that matters is the availability of a working population for exploitation. Only at a secondary level an individual capitalist considers the particular type of production process he will exploit. On the other hand, with the advent of the real subsumption of labour by capital, workers become equally indifferent to the particular type of labour they are going to perform in exchange for wage. This of course holds at the higher level of abstraction. At lower levels, and towards the concrete, the workers consider the particular type of work they are going to perform in “symmetry” with capitalists’ before mentioned secondary level of consideration[6].

On the other side, this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society – in the United States. Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category «labour», «labour as such», labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice.

[Marx (1981), p.104-5]

 

In this sense, abstract labour ‑ as a social concept ‑ is established at the primary determining level of production and then expressed through exchange. Capitalists in their choice for the organisation of a production process take social relations as given. Then they proceed in the direct production process by taking into account market conditions and having from the start in mind the transformation of the products into commodities. Thus, concrete labour performed under their command is already rendered commensurable with general social labour available for exploitation. However, this primary, preliminary, tentative but also latent commensuration is ultimately realised in the actual sphere of exchange. There and only there the initial commensuration will ‑ or will not ‑ be validated. Abstract labour, as the immanent measure of value, is operationalised through the socially necessary labour‑time.

The ultimate and most mature form that value ‑ as the representation of abstract labour ‑ assumes is that of money. However, money‑form acquires its power of representation only because the labours expended are primarily indifferent towards their specific concrete application. Marx established through the analysis of the form of value that money is the necessarily and spontaneously emerging representative of value, the universal equivalent. The emergence of the universal equivalent is itself a complex process, which is inextricably connected with the existence of a commodity that operates as the basis of money. The form of money that actually represents value, on the other hand, need not necessarily be the commodity money.

Thus, for Marx, labour is expressed as value through a set of production and exchange relations, and value is given an independent representation by money. To put it differently, value accounted for by its intrinsic measure (i.e., socially necessary labour-time) becomes value accounted for by the external measure of value (i.e., units of money) through a process of successive mediations.

 

 

II. ABSTRACT LABOUR, MONEY AND ITS VALUE

 

“New Solution” bypasses all this method of analysis and proceeds to identify directly money with abstract labour, following a self-proclaimed “Rubin type approach”[7]. There are obvious merits in this view. First, money has a directly social dimension since it is related to state power and thus surpasses shallow techicism and/or physicalism. Second, it refers almost immediately to the process of intra-capitalist competition – which was undermined in the Ricardian and Sraffian approach. However, these merits are greatly outstripped by their deficiencies.

Indeed money, as the general equivalent with which every commodity is exchanged and, thus, as the general mediator of commodity exchange, has an obvious social character. However, its deification as the sole and absolute expression of the social dimension is an oversimplification. It certainly undermines the inherently social character of production and reduces it to a fragmented sum of private processes, conceived from a basically technical perspective, and related solely through exchange. It neglects the social division of labour – of which I.I.Rubin was well aware of and in many cases warned against such a misconception. For Marx, in exchange is made visible the contradiction between private labour and the social division of labour which is internal to production itself. The social dimension, therefore, derives and exists first and foremost in production. Value, as the central pivot of social relations, is created in production and defined prior to, and independent of, money. For Marx money is indispensable (contrary to the Classicals’ theorisation of the economy as a barter system) but it is a secondary and dependent element.

Commodity exchange is organically prior to the category of money and ought to obtain without the mediation of the latter. This has nothing to do with the actual historical succession, but refers to the essential nature of history. The capitalist mode of production was born and subsequently inherited forms of money deriving from the context of pre-capitalist modes. However, these forms had to be transformed to the money-form appropriate to capital. In this sense, the capital-labour relation is an organic prerequisite for the emergence of the capitalist money-form. Thus, the exchange equivalence between commodities derives primarily from their common intrinsic character, namely of being products of labour. Money and money prices mediate this equivalence, but are not the primary determining factors[8]. Money does not precede the commodity but it is generated from the differentiation within commodity exchange. Value, then, is created in production and is validated in exchange. The crucial distinction is that between use-value (expressing the material foundation of production) and value (the social form). The production and circulation of use-values can be defined independently: a certain determinate quantity of use-values is first produced and then exchanged. However, the production and circulation of value cannot be defined independently: labour-time is expended in production but it is socially validated in circulation. Consequently, abstract labour and value are prior to money. Abstract labour creates value in the immediate production process, prior to exchange. The category of money should be derived from the commodity category only when the value category is sufficiently developed.

“New Solution” and the MEL

The central idea of the “New Solution” is that money represents labour-time and thus one can use a measure of the MEL appropriately defined at the level of the aggregate system of the capitalist system to translate flows of money in real-world accounts into flows of labour-time and vice versa. In this way the need of a separate accounting system based on embodied labour coefficients is not necessary. Therefore, MEL is defined as the ratio of the net domestic product at current prices to the living labour expended in an economy over a period of time.

In algebraic terms – following a simplified version of Foley D. [(1997), p.13-16)[9] – the vector of net output, y, depends on x (the vector of gross output) and A (the matrix of input coefficients):

 

(1)                          y = x – Ax

 

The vector of commodity values, λ, depends on A and l (the vector of living labour):

 

(2)                          λ = λA + l

 

The value of the net product is equal to the total living labour generated in production:

 

(3)                          λy = lx

 

Given p (the vector of money prices), the money price of the net product is py. Then py is directly mapped on λy (the value expression of the net output) and thus Marx’s second invariance condition (the equality of total price to total value) is established (see Sinha A. [(1997), p.52)]. Then MEL is defined as:

 

(4)                          MEL = py / λy = py / lx

or alternatively:

(5)                          LEM = λy / py = lx / py = 1 / MEL

 

Lipietz A. [(1985), p.23] defines LEM as the quantity of abstract labour represented by the unit of money (called currency), which can be found by dividing the quantity of labour needed to produce the net product by the price of that product. Similarly, Foley D. [(1982), p.41] defines the value of money as the ratio of aggregate direct labour-time to aggregate value added. De Vroey M. [(1981)], on the other hand, proposes the «monetary expression of social labour-time» as the ratio of the sum of prices to the sum of values. Hence, Foley, while endorsing Lipietz’s formulation, has reservations about De Vroey’s formula since it does not clarify whether the sum of prices refers to aggregate price or aggregate value added.

The central aspect of this theory, as is freely admitted [Foley D. (1982), p.41], derives from the contours of a «Rubin school» approach. Rather than labour-time determining price, this theory begins at the global level by positing that the money value of the whole mass of net production of commodities expresses the expenditure of the total social labour in a commodity-producing economy. Hence, it retains at the global level the relation between money and embodied labour, which is central to the idea that money is a form of value and that the substance of value is abstract social labour (Foley D. [(1982), p.37]. This requires a strict relation between the monetary unit (whether that unit is linked to a general equivalent commodity-money or not [Foley D. (1997), p.19] and abstract social labour-time. Thus, a unit of money is defined as a claim to a certain amount of the abstract social labour expended in the economy. However, once this relation between money and abstract labour is established at the aggregate level, then a transformed monetary unit (MEL) is used in order to calculate the value of each particular commodity.

After deriving the MEL, the “New Solution” proceeds to define the value of labour-power as the division of money wages (w) by MEL (or alternatively the product of money wages multiplied by the value of money):

 

(6)                          VLP = w / MEL = w / (py/lx) = w ´ (lx/py) = (w/py) ´ lx                               (7)

 

This is necessary because one of the declared purposes of the “New Solution” is to solve the so-called “transformation problem”. As it is well known, the essence of this problem is to derive a set of prices of production from the technical conditions of production subject to the equalisation of the profit rate for all competing capitals while – at the same time – satisfying Marx’s two “invariance conditions” (i.e. the equality of total profit to total surplus-value and of the total price of the output to total value). As it has been shown, the “New Solution” begins by assuming as given a transformed version of the second invariance condition; namely that the total price of the net output is equal to its total value. On this basis it defines the MEL. And then, by defining the value of labour-power as the product of money wages multiplied by the inverse of the MEL, it proves easily the first invariance condition.

This extremely elegant scheme has, however, significant problems. The adoption of a net product perspective is highly problematic since it undermines the role of constant capital [Saad-Filho A. (1996)]. Gross output contains the value of constant capital, that is “dead labour” expended in the past which needs validation in the present, while at the same time securing the reproduction of the existing conditions of production. This is a very complicated question because, if there is continuous technical change, then the latter differentiates the social evaluation of “dead” relative to “living” labour. Thus, present production conditions affect the validation of the product of past production conditions. Foley D. [(1997), p.24] has argued that the “New Solution” can incorporate an estimation of constant capital by using MEL. But this stratagem can only hold if the expression of the value of constant capital into its price takes place at the same rate as that of the net product into its own price. There is no a priori reason why this will hold.

Nevertheless, the net product is not “New Solution’s” critical problem. Its main deficiency is that it resorts to a Smithian labour-commanded conception of the value of money and the value of labour-power. The Smithian conception has been rightfully criticised by both Ricardo and Marx. The gist of their criticisms was that Smith’s perspective could not grasp the effects of changes in technology and productivity on the value of commodities. The “New Solution” perspective suffers from very similar problems.

First, as can be seen from equation (5), the value of money (LEM) – and this holds also for its inverse (MEL) in equation (4) – is simply the command exercised by the monetary unit over the value of net output in the sphere of exchange. In other words, it is the command of the monetary unit over the value of other commodities. For Marx, the value of money is fundamental in the process through which the substance of value (labour-time) is expressed as price (the money-form). However, he did neither posit a direct identification between these two nor understood it as simply labour-commanded. Because he considered that it was necessarily linked to the role (and the value) of commodity money, the process of determining the value of money proceeded through several levels of abstraction which reflected an equally sophisticated real process. For this reason he distinguished rigorously between the intrinsic or immanent (labour-time expended under the normal conditions of productions (average degree of skill and intensity etc.), i.e. socially necessary labour-time) and the external measure of value (money). In capitalist commodity production, labour is only indirectly socialised through exchange. Therefore, the quantitative expression of value must assume a form of expression appropriate to the modalities of exchange. The primary determining sphere of production must be expressed according to the prerequisites of the secondary sphere of exchange. Thus, the external measure is required. If value has labour-time as an immanent measure (one appropriate to its nature, its primary determination in production) and money as an external measure (one appropriate to the secondary determination in exchange), it is the first that assumes primacy, it is inherently appropriate; and the second is externally necessitated. For the “New Solution”, however, this distinction becomes mere lip service and both aspects are being subsumed by MEL. In the latter the primary determination by production is lost and the causal determination – accurately expressed in the distinction between immanent and external measure – is at least blurred. Seldom, if a causal relation is defined, this is a circulationist one: money (and exchange) is the primary determinant.

Marx’s layered process of abstraction and his rigorous distinction between the intrinsic and the external measure of value is evident in his treatment of the value of money. The latter is related to the value of a specific commodity (usually gold) operating as the general equivalent. Its conditions of production determine the value of this money-commodity and then the value of it is used to measure every other commodity. Thus the sphere of production maintains an indirect but firm grip on the sphere of exchange. This process is characterised by contradictions and disequilibria since even the price of the monetary unit diverges from its value, due to variations in its organic composition and its turnover time. The MEL neglects all this contradiction-ridden process and obscures the possibility of disequilibria. This might not be a problem for a theory establishing merely accounting identities. However, it is a serious problem for a theory aiming to link its definitions with a coherent and realistic macroeconomic analysis.

By the same token no mechanism is provided explaining how changes in its constituent parts determine changes in the level of MEL. Although MEL can grasp the changes in productivity on aggregate, it cannot grasp them when they apply unevenly between sectors. If productivity changed evenly between sectors, the effect would be reflected by both the numerator and the denominator of MEL and, therefore, expressed in the subsequent MEL. However, if productivity change takes place unevenly among sectors the MEL would only reflect its undifferentiated average effects on the capitalist economy as a whole. This problem becomes graver when productivity changes take place unevenly between the aggregate level and Department II (i.e. the department producing means of consumption), which is crucial for capitalism’s essential tendency to extract relative surplus‑value.

Because the MEL is a ratio which can be derived only ex post – as Foley D. [(1997), p.23] admits – it does not provide any relation of determination between value and price and, thus, lack explanatory power. This deficiency takes a rather heavy toll. Foley D. [(1997), p.18-19] argues that MEL’s definition MEL does not commit us to any particular theory about its determination and it can work equally well for a commodity-money system or for a state-credit based system. This is partially true. In both cases the determination of the MEL would require an intermediary: either the price of commodity-money relative to that of other commodities (which is geared in production) or speculation on the prospective solvency of the state (which is geared in circulation). These intermediations would affect differently the derivation of MEL. However, the first intermediation would secure the primacy of production (the locus of the production of value) and grasp changes within it, whereas the second would depend on circulation. In the second case the determination of MEL (the translator of prices to values) would be critically affected by exchange.

 

 

III. WAGE, THE VALUE AND THE NATURE OF LABOUR-POWER

 

“New Solution” has a highly innovative conception of its other pillar, the value of labour-power. As can be seen from equation (6), the latter is defined as the product of the rate of money wages by the MEL This is radically different from Marx’s own definition of labour-power (as well as from Ricardo’s definition of the value of labour) which refers to a customary or average standard of living of the working class associated with a bundle of consumer goods (and the labour-time embodied in them).

For Marx, the value of labour-power represents an amount of labour-time (necessary labour) which is expressed as wage (its money-price) and which, in turn, is able to buy a bundle of commodities necessary for the reproduction of labour-power. Hence, the expression of the substance of the value of labour-power (necessary labour-time) to its monetary price-form (the wage) is necessarily related to the value of the bundle of consumer goods.

Within the formal framework of the transformation controversy, the value of labour-power – given b, the vector of workers” consumption commodities – is defined as follows:

 

VLP = λblx

 

This has to be transformed to its prices of production equivalent, earning the uniform rate of profit (pp being the production price):

 

            VLPp = ppblx

 

And, finally, the value of labour-power should be expressed in the wage w, its monetary price-form which is subject to supply-demand fluctuations and the short-term equilibrium of forces in the class-struggle between capital and labour.

For Marx, wage vacillates around its value but it rarely coincides with it. Therefore,

 

w ³ VLP

 

Wage can also be lower than the value of labour-power (w <VLP) but this will endanger, in the long-run, the reproduction of labour-power and, thus, the viability of the capitalist system.

This mathematical formulation, while faithful to Marx’s own theory, when put within the simultaneous equations context of the transformation controversy leads to well-known difficulties. If the value of labour-power is the value of a given physical bundle of means of subsistence, then its transformed-value (price of production) should be adjusted so as to continue to buy the same bundle at its new transformed-value. Marx, in his transformation tables, while deriving a transformed-value of the means of consumption, he valued variable capital at the original value rate. Thus, the real wage (the ratio of a unit of means of subsistence over a unit of labour-power) changed at the end of the transformation procedure. Critics pointed out that the value of variable capital has to be transformed as well. If the real wage is held constant – as Bortkiewicz L. [(1949)], Seton F. [(1957)] and Morishima M. [(1973)] have argued – then total surplus-value does not coincide with total profit.

“New Solution” adopts a different perspective. The value of labour-power is not the labour-time required to produce the use values necessary for the reproduction of the worker but the value of money wage multiplied by the value of money, therefore the wage share in the net product. In this sense, the value of labour-power is the portion of the total labour-time that a given sum of money wages can command.

There are well known problems with the use of the wage share – which is an ex post measure and depends crucially upon distribution – and Foley D. [(1997), p.25] recognises them. However, these problems are exacerbated because, as already argued above, this definition of labour-power is akin to Smith’s second approach to the labour theory of value (labour-commanded in exchange rather than embodied in production). To sustain this perspective many “New Solution” writers find it necessary explicitly to reject the commodity-nature of labour-power (unlike not only Ricardo and Marx but also Smith).

“New Solution’s” definition of labour-power serves two declared purposes. First, with regard to the transformation problem, it derives – almost by definition – Marx’s second condition of invariance. Second, when explicitly linked to the rejection of the commodity-nature of labour-power, it refutes Samuelson’s P. [(1982)] well‑known argument that if labour‑power is a commodity it is similar to all others and therefore it does not deserve a special status.

The fulfilment of the first purpose follows as an immediate corollary of “New Solution’s” definition of labour-power. The labour-time represented by the variable capital advanced at the beginning of the production process (money wages) is assumed to re-emerge intact in the proceeds from the sale of output. The labour embodied in constant capital, on the other hand, has a money equivalent paid at the beginning of the production process which almost always differs from its money equivalent received from the sale of output. Thus, variable capital is understood as simply a quantity of labour-time represented directly by a sum of money; constant capital, on the other hand, is necessarily connected to a bundle of capital goods the price of which might diverge from their values. Then Marx’s first condition of invariance (total profit equals total surplus‑value) is easily derived by positing the total value of labour‑power as the wage share in the net product.

The second purpose is related to the first, since much of Samuelson’s critique hinged upon the re-valuation of variable capital. On this ground, Samuelson argued that if labour-power is a normal commodity then either there is no basis for a theory of labour exploitation. This leads to a complete rejection of the explanatory validity of the Labour Theory of Value.

This section shows that, despite certain interesting insights, “New Solution’s” conception of the value of labour-power cannot grasp properly the essential properties of the capitalist system and, indeed, is inferior to the Marxian conception. Firstly, whether the commodity-nature of labour-power is explicitly rejected or not, it implies that its value is determined by relations external to capitalist production, above all through class struggle in the sphere of distribution. The determination of the value of labour-power, divorced from the use values consumed by workers and from the related socially necessary labour-time, can only be attributed to the operation of institutional arrangements and power relations. When this is supplemented with the rejection of the commodity-nature of labour-power, then it can easily lead to a prioritisation of power relations independently and almost prior to socio-economic relations. Secondly, it is further shown that the implicit adoption of the Smithian labour-commanded perspective makes it impossible to analyse the effect of technical change on the value of labour-power (the extraction of relative surplus-value), and thereby on the rate of exploitation and the rate of profit. Overall, “New Solution’s” attempt to derive the value of labour-power immediately from directly observable factors (money-wages) – whereas appearing to strengthen the empirical validity of the Labour Theory of Value – it ends up in a quagmire. Being unable to distinguish levels of abstraction, it cannot grasp the complex intermediation process between socially necessary labour-time, use-values (bundle of subsistence goods) and money-prices (wage). On the contrary, the classical Marxian definition of the value of labour-power is better suited to theorise this essential process.

 

 

On the value of labour-power

The Marxian definition of the value of labour-power links together three dimensions: labour-time (value), use-value (bundle of commodities) and money-price (wage). The substance of the value of labour-power (necessary labour-time) is expressed as wage (its money-form price) through a series of mediations, of which more important is that of a customary living standard expressed by a bundle of consumption goods (use-values).

In the fundamental dimension of labour-time, the value of labour-power denotes the division of the working day into necessary and surplus labour-time [Marx K. (1982), p.325]; which is the foundation of capitalist exploitation. This division reflects the subsequent division of labour in necessary and surplus labour. The first is the labour necessary for the production of the use-values that are required for the reproduction of the labourer. Surplus labour is performed by the labourer but it is appropriated by the capitalist as surplus-value. Marx K. [(1982), p.325f] characteristically argues that:

In this work we have up to now used the term «necessary labour» to designate the time necessary under given social conditions for the production of any commodity. Henceforward we use it to designate as well the time necessary for the production of the particular commodity labour-power. The use of the same technical term in different senses is inconvenient, but it cannot be entirely avoided in any science. Compare, for instance, the higher with the lower branches of mathematics.

 

To this extent the determination of the value of labour-power is similar with that of all other commodities. However, labour-power is a commodity different from all the others, since it only exists as a capacity of the living individual and it is inseparable from its bearer. Its reproduction is that of the human being, one aspect of which (his capacity to work) is commodified in capitalism. But it is not also a natural good that enters the market without any value, acquiring there a price. Its reproduction entails human effort but this is not expended through a capitalist production process. Neither wage labour nor means of production take part in this process. For these reasons there is no creation of new value or surplus-value and the sale of the commodity labour-power does not operate according to the rules of typical capitalist commodity exchange (obtaining an average rate of profit etc.). The only requirements for this reproduction process are non-waged human effort and a set of means of consumption bought in the market. The first is not paid and does not have a cost neither receive an income. However, the means of consumption are produced through wage labour – thus there is labour embodied in them – and there are bought in the market, as all capitalist commodities. Therefore, they contain value and have a price, which workers have to pay.  On the other hand, contrarily to consumption goods consumed by capitalists (luxuries), workers” consumption is a productive activity and they transfer their value to the commodified aspect of human reproduction (labour-power). This value has to be reflected on the price that is paid for buying labour-power (wage).

The reproduction of labour-power is a sine qua non operation of capitalism for obvious reasons. Since workers take care themselves of the reconstitution of their capacity to work, the system has only to guarantee them the necessary means of consumption. Therefore, necessary labour-time reflects the labour-time required for the production of this set of consumption goods. There are good reasons for this association of necessary labour-time (for the reproduction of labour-power) with a set of use-values (consumption goods).

Because workers do not participate in capitalist exchange and competition they do not have a view of the value dimension as it is formed in this sphere. They are primarily concerned about a range of goods necessary for their recuperation from the work effort and for the subsistence of their families. Therefore, they are interested in a basket of commodities but seen primarily from its use-value side. In the labour process workers comprehend the labour-time aspect – since this is a field of continuous struggle with capital over conditions of work – and the physical aspect (in the form of a mass of produced commodities). They do not conceive the value dimension because they do not participate in competition. In the consumption process they spend their income to buy the use-values necessary for their subsistence. Two considerations are present there. First, the set of necessary use-values has to be obtained. Second, in order to acquire it workers must have the necessary amount of money, so as to pay for the money-price of this set. The first consideration reflects the use-value side, whereas the second reflects the money-price side. The latter is the more concrete form of value, following the transformation of labour values to prices of production and then to market prices. Labour values represent the labour-time dimension which dominates the production process and class struggle within it. Prices of production reflect labour values in the sphere of intra-capitalist competition on the basis of a given technological structure. Finally, market prices do not only encompass supply and demand fluctuations but also the conditions of formation of the general equivalent.

Hence, workers conceive first, the labour-time dimension, second the use-value dimension and third, the market-price dimension of the necessary means for the reproduction of their labour-power. Their understanding is crucial because the determination of the value of labour-power is not a technical process but a contested social terrain, subject to class struggle. Marx – contrary to Ricardo’s initial belief in a naturally fixed level of subsistence – advanced a dynamic theory of the determination of the value of labour-power. He recognised two elements: a) a physical one, which covers the so-called «natural needs» (such as food, clothing, fuel, housing etc.), which also varies according to the climatic and other physical peculiarities of a country and, b) a historical and social one [Marx K. (1982), p.275]. Whereas the physical element is only distantly socially determined, the historical and social element is directly socially determined and reflects the balance of class forces in a particular society. Workers’ struggle in production over their working conditions affects the allotment of labour-time between its necessary and its surplus component. Additionally, they struggle in distribution for wages that would guarantee -and even improve – their recuperation from work. Whereas the first struggle is about labour and labour-time, the second struggle is about money-wages. The link between them is provided by a bundle of commodities representing workers’ customary standard of living; itself constituted via class struggle.

For these reasons Marx’s determination of the value of labour-power links necessary labour-time to a bundle of consumption goods and, then, both to money-wages. This is a complex process that is characterised by disequilibria. Marx” theory of wage does not imply a simplistic identification of necessary labour time and wage, as Lassale’s «iron law of wages». The physical element sets the ultimate minimum limit. This does not mean that the value of the labour-power and the wage cannot increase. However, it does mean that there is an upper limit to this increase and this is given by the movement of the rate of profit:

«labour is subject to the economic power of capital in capitalism from the outset, and its «share» must naturally always be conditional on the «share» of capital. Therefore the real uppermost limit of wages is given by the size of profit, and, more precisely, by the movements of the rate of profit».

[Rosdolsky R. (1977), p.284]

 

Thus, during the transformation process, necessary labour-time is reflected in a bundle of consumption goods. This defines the value of labour-power. Then the wage (its money-price) oscillates around this value. It is true that, insofar as the simultaneous equations framework of the so-called “transformation problem” is concerned, this requires that the value of variable capital should be equal to the transformed value (price of production) of the means of subsistence. And there appear well-known mathematical problems. Moreover, there is no reason whatsoever which necessarily equates socially necessary labour-time with the labour embodied in the means of subsistence that represent workers” customary standard of living. However, with regard to the essential workings of the capitalist system which preclude this static framework, Marx’s transformation procedure is extremely accurate. This procedure is inherently dynamic and even more riddled with disequilibria for a major reason. Intra-capitalist competition expresses a secondary contradiction of the capitalist system. On the contrary, the formation of the value of labour-power and its transformed expression as wage touches upon capitalism’s fundamental contradiction: the capital-labour relation. The conflicts and the disequilibria generated from class struggle are much more grave than that of intra-capitalist competition.

“New Solution’s” definition of the value of labour-power takes an altogether different course. It discards the intermediation of a set of use-values (and their value) between necessary labour-time and money-wages and proceeds to link them directly. Money-wages (denominated through MEL) are equated immediately with socially necessary labour-time. Money-wages are taken from conventional statistics, multiplied by the value of money and equated with a part of the net product. This definition has the merit of sidestepping automatically the problem of the divergence of the value of variable capital from that of the means of consumption. Additionally, it appears to relate robustly labour-time with money-wages. Therefore, the transformation riddle is surpassed. Notwithstanding, the theoretical sacrifices are far heavier than an accurate volley in the transformation war.

Whereas Marx’s definition tracks the relations of determination which exist in capitalism through a sophisticated dialectical procedure, “New Solution” isolates and then juxtaposes arbitrarily just the first and the last moment of this procedure. This, even within the static framework of the transformation controversy, is extremely problematic. If money-wages (transformed by MEL) are directly and without any mediation equated to socially necessary labour-time – and, thus, to the value of labour-power – a number of significant problems emerge. First, the traces of relations of determination, that permeate Marx’s dialectical procedure, disappear. The value of labour-power becomes simply the wage share of the net product. Additionally, “New Solution’s” conception of the value of labour‑power ends up to a Smithian labour-commanded conception of value rather than one based on abstract labour. For the “New Solution” the value of labour‑power is the living labour commanded by the money wage of the workers. This leads to the inability of grasping properly class struggle in production – over the division between necessary and surplus labour-time – as the foundation of the value of labour-power. Particularly, the effects of the extraction of relative surplus-value – which dominates the division between necessary and surplus labour-time – cannot be understood properly. Finally, “New Solution” fails not only to theorise correctly the value (of labour-power) – price (wage) relation but can also lead to a problematic wage theory (and this was again the case for certain “New Solution” scholars). By rejecting the mediation of a bundle of commodities, the wage is only distantly and weakly linked to production. The only other possible process of wage determination is through class struggle in the sphere of distribution. This process, however, leads to the operation of institutional arrangements and power relations. Its only weak link to production is that it is supposed that capital and labour struggle over the division of labour productivity gains between profits and wages.

 

Labour embodied in consumption goods vs. labour commanded by wage

MEL has already been criticised for leading to a Smithian labour-commanded perspective and for failing to grasp adequately changes in productivity. Whereas it grasps productivity changes on aggregate, it cannot grasp them when they apply unevenly between sectors. This problem becomes graver when it touches upon the determination of the value of labour-power. The basis of capitalism’s essential tendency to produce and extract relative surplus-value is productivity changes which take place unevenly between the aggregate level and Department II (i.e. the department of means of consumption). MEL fails dismally to capture this process. This is exactly the case on which Ricardo criticised Smith.

Furthermore, this labour-commanded conception of the value of labour-power leads to an identification of surplus‑value with the living labour commanded by the existing mass of profit. Whereas this is logistically and algebraically correct, it inverts the relation of determination and, henceforth, lacks explanatory power. Instead of profit being the monetary form of surplus‑value it is the latter that is a derivative of the profit share.

Shaikh A.‑Tonak E. [(1994), p.179] have voiced a similar criticism. Replying to these Foley D. [(1997), p.21-22] argues that the “New Solution” is consistent with the Ricardian and Marxian position and does not follow the Smithian view. He maintains that according to Smith’s second definition the value of labour is identified as the amount of commodities (i.e. labour) that it can command on the market and not the amount of the bundle of commodities. In other words, it is the ratio p/w, where p is the money price of the commodity and w the money wage rate. Then, he argues that the “New Solution” derives the MEL as the ratio of the value of the net product at market prices to the living labour expended and this does not involve the level of money wages. This may be partially true for the MEL, which is a ratio; although when speaking of the LEM (or the value of money) it is clearly true that it is labour-commanded. Moreover, “New Solution’s” definition of the value of labour‑power – as can be seen from equations (6), (7) – is obviously labour-commanded since it is simply the wage share in the net product, and a share of the living labour generated in production. This share is determined according to the ratio of the money wage to the money price of the net product. Hence, this ratio is the amount that the value of labour‑power can command out of the total living labour. In other words, if LEM is the command over the value of other commodities, “New Solution’s” value of labour-power denotes the command over the labour of others.

As a consequence of the above, the “New Solution” macroeconomic models are not able to explain the effect of productivity changes on the value of labour‑power[10]. This is a major weakness for an approach which wants to analyse the empirical features of the capitalist economy, characterised as the latter is by continuous increases in productivity. According to Marx, a major historical feature of the capitalist mode of production is that technological change is the main means of capitalist competition and this is deployed mainly through the extraction of relative surplus‑value (i.e. cheapening the value of wage goods). This is the driving force for changes in the composition of capital and subsequent changes in the whole circuit of capital.

Additionally, another problem that arises from “New Solution’s” macroeconomic models is that the process of income distribution cannot also be determined endogenously. The wage share is derived as the labour commanded by the money wages, but nothing in the model explains the level of money wages:

Rather than concrete labour embodied in commodities workers consume, the value of labour‑power is a proportion of abstract labour performed. As the object of class struggle, it is conceded to workers in the form of wages in exchange for a unit of labour‑power bought by capitalists. This division of abstract labour, or money value added, defines the rate of surplus‑value for the economy as a whole, ipso facto determined by class struggle between workers and capitalists.

[Mohun S. (1994), p.402)]

 

Foley D. [(1982), p.43] also argues that:

Workers in capitalist society do not bargain for, or receive, a bundle of commodities as payment for the labor power, they receive a sum of money, the money wage, which they are then free to spend as they wish…

 

It is evident from the above – but also many other references [Foley D. (1986b), p.41, Lipietz A. (1982), p.75] – that the wage share is determined through distributional class struggle which operates as a black box. This can easily lead to substitute Marx’s theory of wages with one very similar to that of Carey: wages rise and fall in proportion to the productivity of labour. This view – very popular within theories of the “Golden Age” and the post-W.W.II “capital-labour accord” – is closely related to the already mentioned inability to conceive properly relative surplus-value.

The classical Marxian perspective follows a different route. Like all other commodities, the bundle of wage goods (reflecting the value of labour-power) can become cheaper as a result of increases in labour productivity. However, unlike other commodities, workers (the bearers of the commodity labour-power) may turn back and claim a share of the productivity gains. Capital is able to extract relative surplus-value when productivity gains in the wage goods sector are accompanied by a constant or rising but lagging behind real wage, which result in a rising rate of exploitation. For Marx (1982, p.705), increasing productivity of labour is accompanied by a cheapening of the worker (i.e. a higher rate of surplus-value), even when real wages do rise, because the latter never rise in proportion to the productivity of labour. As Rosdolsky R. [(1977), p.290] points out, «if this were to be the rule, the rate of surplus-value could never rise -and hence the production of «relative surplus-value», and capitalism itself, would become an impossibility».

This Marxian thesis begs a crucial question: could labour (either from the outset of capitalism or after certain structural transformations which lead to a new capitalist stage) fight for regular productivity bargaining? In this case, the extraction of relative surplus-value would become an impossibility and the determination of wage should follow a different from the Classical route. In our opinion, Marx understood correctly that, in the long-run, capital is structurally empowered to extract relative surplus-value, whereas labour is equally structurally disadvantaged to bargain regularly and accurately for productivity gains.

Labour productivity constitutes the source of social wealth. Therefore, the struggle over the division of social wealth between profits and wages has to do with the way labour productivity increases are divided. This fight has certain degrees of freedom but it is not structurally unconstrained. There is a range of numerical values within which workers” struggle can get back part of the productivity gains without endangering fatally, at least in the long-run, capitalist accumulation. This protracted war is characterised by big strategic confrontations, day-to-day skirmishing and periods of truce. The first establish a broad balance of class-power, favouring the one of the two main antagonists, the working or the capitalist class. Periods of truce are characterised by the explicit or implicit acceptance on all sides of a status quo. Notwithstanding, even this is subject to small-scale day-to-day skirmishes where additional ground is gained or lost. However, in this conflict capital has the ability to conceive its value dimension, because it participates not only in production but also in exchange; whereas labour participates only in production and has, therefore, only a mediated and ex post conception of the value dimension of labour productivity increases. The necessary mediating link is the bundle of consumption goods that represent working-class” living standard, compared to the total mass of the social product. For this reason capital is structurally empowered to extract relative surplus-value. Consequently, wages are not formed according to the sharing of labour productivity gains between capital and labour because the latter is structurally handicapped in conceiving in advance this dimension and also because this would make capitalism non-viable in the long-run.

For a sharing of productivity theory of wage to be sustained, a theoretical detour is necessary. If wage reflects labour productivity increases, then the working-class must have the ability to conceive value changes. Since the only market that workers participate is the suis generis labour-power market, they cannot conceive this dimension. This can only be done through specific institutional structures (trade unions, state bodies etc. equipped with scientific agencies). Then distributional struggle takes place on the basis of and within these structures. Its outcome establishes a wage (a “going rate”), which represents an amount of total abstract labour-time. However, this division has no direct link to class struggle in production and the division between necessary and surplus labour-time. It takes place ex post and probably on the basis of past historical experiences. What each side will gain is based not on its position within production but on its general political and social power. Therefore, power relations, instead of being derived from production relations, assume an explanatory primacy over them. On the contrary, Marx’s conception has the merit of establishing a firm link between production and exchange. Distributive class struggle and the broader class balance are founded on class-struggle in production. This is an accurate conception of the essential workings of the capitalist system. Hence, it remains only the second question: is there a turning point at some stage of capitalist development, where structural transformations led to a different process of wage formation?

Another clarification is necessary at this point. All the “New Solution” writers by no means unanimously accept the above mentioned theoretical detour. The present consensus stops to the definition of the value of labour-power and its determination by the price level and labour productivity. It is only present in those writers that come from (e.g. Lipietz) or have a relation to (e.g. Mohun) the Regulation Theory. It is the latter that argued that in the Fordist era wage formation has ceased to be determined on the basis of a bundle of consumption goods and it is linked to labour productivity increases[11]. This view has been both theoretically and empirically refuted [Brenner R.-Glick M. (1991), Mavroudeas S. (1990)], In theoretical terms, capitalist development – and particularly the extraction of relative surplus-value – is not possible under such circumstances. Empirically, the so-called “capital-labour accord” has not been verified neither for the post-W.W.II period nor for any other era.

 

Is labour-power a commodity?

Certain “New Solution” writers find it necessary to supplement their definition of the value of labour-power with the explicit rejection of the commodity nature of labour-power [Lipietz A. [(1985), p.154], Foley D. [(1982), p.43], Mohun S. [(1994)]]. It is true that this position is not unanimously adopted within “New Solution”. Dumenil has never alluded to that and Foley – in subsequent works [Foley D. (1986a)] – has attempted to keep a guarding distance. On the other hand, the rejection of the commodity-nature of labour-power provides a firmer ground for “New Solution’s” definition of the value of labour-power. Additionally, it is supposed to offer a reply to Samuelson’s P. [(1982)] well‑known argument that if labour‑power is a commodity similar to all others then it does not deserve a special status.

This defence against Samuelson’s argument has been firstly proposed by Bowles S.‑Gintis H. [(1981), p.7‑8] who maintained that labour‑power’s special status derives from the fact that it is the only production input that has a non‑commodity nature. Lipietz (1985) endorses the Bowles‑Gintis thesis, but he stops short of breaking his links with the Labour Theory of Value by warning against extending this thesis to the point of the abandonment of the labour substance of value. Additionally, according to Lipietz, this rejection opens the way to analyse the MEL and its «value» as socially constituted. Foley A. [(1982), p.42], also, reiterates the argument against Samuelson, and explicitly links it to the ability to derive the second invariance condition.

However, this support to Marx’s Labour Value theory does little justice to it, since it attempts to confront Samuelson’s critique on its own ground, disregarding the fact that the latter misrepresents Marx’s view. Samuelson, based on the well-known premises of the neo-classical theory of productive factors, believed that Marx considered labour-power as a normal-type commodity. Therefore, he missed the special character of this commodity. For Marx labour-power is a special commodity because its deployment (labour) – unlike other production inputs – is the active creator of human social wealth. This also constitutes labour‑power’s value-augmenting capacity. Therefore, every production process and every other commodity should be accounted (and exchanged) according to its labour content. On the other hand, the labourer (the bearer of labour-power), in the capitalist system – and unlike pre-capitalist systems – is a free person. Thus, the acquisition of his capacity by the proprietor of the means of production can be done only through the typical market mechanism of the capitalist system. That is through the sale of his labour-power as a commodity. To attempt to establish the exceptional character of labour-power by denying its commodity nature opens the floodgates for the rejection of the Labour Value Theory – as Samuelson was very well aware of. If the Labour Theory of Value is rejected – or weakened – in this way, then a theory of capitalist exploitation has to recourse to the theoretically and empirically problematic terrain of power relations (as Bowles and Gintis have done).

Two lines of justification for the rejection of the commodity nature of labour-power have been proposed. A broader and more general one argues that labour-power is not a commodity since it is not (re)produced through a capitalist labour process and the rules of capitalist exploitation, competition and the formation of a uniform rate of profit do not apply to it. The second and more historically qualified version is based on the empirical belief that the structure and the determinants of working-class” consumption has changed radically after W.W.II.

Mohun S. [(1994)] provides the fullest account of the first line. Labour‑power is not considered as a commodity since it is not capitalistically produced. He argues that the classical definition of the value of labour‑power  (as a bundle of wage‑goods) is valid only in a special case. Since labour‑power is a commodity, sold in the market for its exchange‑value, which in turn is spent on means for subsistence, then the value of the subsistence commodity bundle will be equivalent to the value of labour‑power, and can therefore be taken as its measure only when prices are proportional to values. Instead, he proposes what he considers as the more general case. Labour‑power is not a capitalistically produced commodity. Its reproduction may be conceived to take place through a labour process which (re)produces people, but the relations involved are not class ones, There is no private property in the means of (re)production from which non‑possessors can be excluded, the labour involved is not wage labour, and (re)production is neither production for sale nor production for profit. Therefore, labour‑power does not enter the world of commodities and does not operate according to its rules (average rate of profit etc.). Moreover, since it does not enter the world of commodity equivalence and since prices are not proportional to values (as a rule), then the value of the bundle of wage‑goods does not coincide with the value that the wage can purchase (or command). As a result ‑ on the basis of the rejection of the commodity nature of labour‑power ‑ the wage is separated from the value of labour‑power, in the classical sense. Instead, it is determined on the aggregate level (in the division of the net product between wage and profit share).

Mohun’s argument that labour‑power is not capitalistically produced is not sufficient to establish the non-commodity nature of labour-power. As we have argued, the reproduction of labour-power entails the use of capitalistically produced consumption goods. This bundle of commodities has a value and is the equivalent of the value of labour‑power. This equivalent is a set of produced commodities whose production involves different compositions of capital, having to earn the economy‑wide rate of profit, and whose output values (and input values). Therefore the transformation of its value into prices of production is necessary. Then, the problem of non-proportionality between necessary labour-time and labour-time embodied in consumption goods emerges. The amount of labour-time accruing to workers does not necessarily coincide with the amount expended for the production of their subsistence goods. In this crucial transformation capital’s structural advantage to extract relative surplus-value is founded. The fact that necessary labour-time is not directly validated through the competition process (therefore, it cannot be transformed to prices of production) is a fundamental aspect of this process. Finally, wage (the money price of the value of labour-power) usually deviates even more not only from necessary labour-time but also from the transformed value (prices of production) of workers” consumption bundle, since the conditions of formation of the general equivalent (and thus the value of money) as well as short-term fluctuations of supply and demand in the labour-power market affect it critically. Mohun’s approach collapses this two-dimensional dialectical transformation to a one-dimensional one. He concentrates on the problem of disproportionality between labour-time embodied in workers’ consumption bundle (transformed in prices of production terms) and the labour-time that can be commanded in the market by their wage. Then he attempts to bypass this riddle by simply divorcing them under the auspices of the rejection of the commodity nature of labour-power. This may avoid the formalistic strictures of the «transformation problem» but it fails to conceive properly the internal workings of the capitalist system. Compared to the Marxian definition, this theoretical strategy necessarily leads – by jettisoning the commodity definition and the intermediation of the bundle of consumption commodities – to a theory of conditions of work and wages exclusively in terms of power relations as such.

The second line of supporting the non-commodity nature of labour-power (as can be found in many works by Lipietz) is based on the Regulationist historicist perspective. According to it, workers” consumption has ceased to be confined to a mere bundle of subsistence goods and not only covers a wider range of commodities but it is also internally diversified (different segments of the working-class have different consumption habits). Additionally, working-class social power has increased and instead of being restrained to the set of subsistence goods it struggles with capital for sharing the productivity gains. For this reason the value of labour-power has to be divorced from any set of commodities and, moreover, to lose its _special status_ commodity-nature that Marx attributed to it.

We have already dealt with the view that wage is formed on the basis of a distributional class-struggle over productivity gains. It is however interesting to study the rest of the Regulationist argument. Its basis is the belief that before Fordism workers” consumption was not commodified. Only with the advent of mass production (which they equate erroneously with Fordism and locate at the beginning of the 20th century) emerged the necessity of a mass market for capitalist commodities and the so-called social consumption norm was created. This, quite popular in the 1970s and 1980s view, is theoretically and empirically false. If workers have non‑market access to the means of subsistence [i.e. workers” consumption is not commodified], or they own resources which enable them to produce commodities on their own account to exchange, via money, for means of subsistence [i.e. workers or the members of their extended family operate as petty‑commodity producers as well] then there is no social condition which would force people into the market to sell the only saleable thing they posses, their capacity to work. Such a system is certainly not capitalism[12]. Empirically, Regulation Theory has failed to prove that a radical change took place in workers” consumption after the 1920”s which would justify the mass market hypothesis [Mavroudeas S. [(1990), ch.III], Mavroudeas S. [(1999c)] , Brenner R.-Glick M. [(1991)]].

The additional point made by Regulation is based on stylised facts – i.e. a loose and incoherently conceived empirical believes. Namely, that, from the Fordist era and onwards, workers” consumption is not confined to a specific bundle of commodities but expanded to a wider range of goods. This was supplemented with the equally problematic belief that in post-Fordism wage-earners” consumption is diversified, on the basis of status relations and conspicuous consumption trends, that not only a unified bundle of consumption goods does not exist but also that the new almost post-modernist fragmented consumption patterns have even less relation to social relations and struggles in production. The rejection of the commodity-nature of labour-power on these grounds is grossly unjustified. The diversification of the range of consumption goods that different segments of the working-class consume is not a new thing and certainly predated the emergence of the alleged Fordist era. However, the representation of the value of labour-power by the labour-time embodied in a single bundle of consumption commodities is made for analytical simplicity. There are no theoretical or empirical problems, for Marxist theory, if it is substituted by a range of consumption commodities.

As we have already argued, Marx’s theory of the value of labour-power overcomes a number of deficiencies of the Ricardian perspective. Marx understood – and even defended against Malthus – Ricardo’s “beast of burden” approach [Marx K. (1969), p.119]. According to the latter the cost of maintenance of men and the cost of manufacture of any commodity are on the same plane. Marx defended the Ricardian approach on two levels. First, that the equation of men to things is conducive to capitalism. Second, he praised Ricardo’s intellectual honesty, since the latter adopted this position not because of the particular interests of the bourgeoisie but because it supported the general functionality of the capitalist system. However, the Ricardian approach is marred by technological determinism. For Ricardo the working class lacked – and it was not probably necessary to acquire – the social power to bargain for any other part of the social product apart from its necessary means of subsistence. Hence, class struggle took place not in production (between capital and labour) but in distribution between capital and land-owners. Furthermore, the bundle of subsistence goods was determined on the basis of physical-technical conditions. Bortkiewicz has formalised the Ricardian argument by technologically determining a basket of consumption goods; an approach which has been branded “labour-feeding technology approach” or “fodder method” [Sekine T., (1997), p.23]. Marx, on the other hand, maintained that workers are in a position – and indeed they should – to struggle for a better sale of their labour-power. The outcome of this struggle is the creation of the value of labour-power, which apart from the physical dimension has a historical and social dimension as well. Class-struggle, in both production and distribution, affects both the long-run value of labour-power and the short-run fluctuations of its price (wage). Consequently, the Marxian perspective has far lees problems with the variations in the value and the price of labour-power and it is better suited to accommodate internal differentiations of workers” consumption pattern.

Last, but not the least, the post-fordist assertions about an economy dominated by a demand-side which is fragmented beyond the point of return have not been empirically proved. Additionally, they lead to a completely different theoretical framework than that of typical Regulation Theory.

 

 

IV. VALUE, THE METHOD OF DIALECTICAL ABSTRACTION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

 

Methodologically, the concept of abstraction employed by the “New Solution” in identifying money as the representative of abstract labour is highly problematic. The “New Solution” adopts Marx’s definition of money as the representative of value but ascertains the nature of this representation by a mere division of the total value by the total price of the net output. This is a direct, unmediated, and ideally abstract representation of value by money. Marx’s own analysis, however, stresses precisely the opposite: the representation of value by money is indirect, mediated, and a real abstraction.

On the contrary, “New Solution” collapses this process into the MEL; which cannot capture either its complexity or the many levels of its determination. Money is derived from abstract labour and value on the aggregate level, but this derivation is implicitly refuted in its constituent parts (individual commodities and production processes), where money is posited as the main determinant. This treatment of the relation between value and money derives from a perspective astonishingly similar to that of Franklin B. [(1836)]. As it is well known, Franklin was one of the first theorists that proposed labour as the measure of value rather than the precious metals. However, Marx K. [(1987)] has attacked Franklin’s theory of abstract labour for failing to distinguish between concrete and abstract labour and, hence, for not being able to understand and to establish their relationship. As a consequence, Franklin had mistaken money as the direct incarnation of abstract labour:

Franklin, on the contrary, considers that the value of shoes, minerals, yarn, paintings, etc., is determined by abstract labour which has no particular quality and can thus be measured only in terms of quantity. But since he does not explain that the labour contained in exchange value is abstract universal social labour, which is brought about by the universal alienation of individual labour, he is bound to mistake money for the direct embodiment of this alienated labour. He therefore fails to see the intrinsic connection between money and labour which posits exchange value, but on the contrary regards money as a convenient technical device which has been introduced into the sphere of exchange from outside.

[Marx K. (1987), p.296-7]

 

This problematic understanding of dialectical abstraction and the subsequent “violent” identification of value with money create significant problems for the “New Solution” analysis. Instead of creating a macroeconomic model evolving on several levels and employing an array of levels of abstraction, it collapses it to an identification of values with prices with MEL in the role of deus ex machina that enables the commensurability between values and prices. The same holds for the value of labour-power. “New Solution’s” definition attempts to link directly and without the intermediation of a bundle of consumption goods necessary labour-time to money-wages. Thus, in practice, there are no levels of abstraction.

In short, the “New Solution” conception of abstraction, employed to define abstract labour and directly to express it as money, lacks what may be called dialectical rigour. It resembles Ricardo’s «violent abstractions» – as Marx characterised them – in the sense that Ricardo also attempted to relate values to prices directly and in an unmediated way. Whereas Ricardo employed the distinction between form and essence and proceeded to discover essence through abstraction, his abstractions were «violent» [Zeleny J. [(1980), ch.3]]. Ricardo, by not considering the social dimension, limited his perspective to the determination of the magnitude of value (i.e. the quantitative aspect of value). Additionally, he could not clarify the distinction between the form and the substance of value. Therefore, he did not distinguish exchange‑value and value, but used both terms almost synonymously in contrast with use‑value. Henceforth, he attempted to relate prices of production almost directly and unmediated to values. The difference between Ricardo’s “violent abstractions” and those of the “New Solution” is that the former commence with labour whereas the latter commence with money.

Consequently, the “New Solution” approach suffers from the same misconception ‑ though from the opposite side ‑ as the neo‑Ricardians understanding of the relationship of form and essence. It searches for a direct and unmediated form of existence of abstract labour. However, instead of a technically defined (by the technical coefficients of production) invariable measure of value ‑ as the neo‑Ricardian standard commodity ‑ it attempts to establish a «social» quasi‑invariable measure of value in the form of MEL. Neo‑Ricardian physicalism tends to be substituted by institutionalism as the basis for the social determination of money and the value of labour-power (and subsequently its price, the wage). The very same empiricist search for an unmediated tangible form of existence of abstract labour is closed in the one case with the recourse to production and technicism and in the other case with the recourse to money and circulation. In the first case the social aspect is absent from production and is added artificially in distribution. In the second case the social aspect is present but through the disfiguring lenses of circulationism and possibly institutionalism. There is no presence ‑ and primacy ‑ of the sphere of production as expressed by the labour performed  ‑ and the class struggle associated with it ‑ within it.

“New Solution’s” inability to recognise different levels of abstraction makes impossible to recognise properly significant facets of the operation of the capitalist system. Other elements (such as the value of money and its peculiar value of labour-power) are posited at the wrong level of abstraction (immediately in the beginning) and without the necessary relations of determination (their derivation from money-commodity and a bundle of consumption goods respectively). And others (such as the extraction of relative surplus-value and its repercussions) cannot be grasped and are missing completely. Last, but not the least, the resort to a Smithian labour-commanded perspective rather than empowering it weakens the Labour Theory of Value.

 

 

REFERENCES

 

Aglietta, M. [1979], A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, NLB, London.

Benetti, C.-Berthomieu, C.-Cartelier, J. [1975], Economie classique, economie vulgaire, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble-Maspero.

Bortkiewicz, L. [1949], «On the correction of Marx»s fundamental theoretical construction in the third volume of Capital» in: Sweezy P. (ed.) Karl Marx and the close of his system, Augustus Kelley, New York.

Bowles, S.-Gintis, H. [1981], “Structure and Practice in the Labour Theory of Value»,  Review of Radical Political Economics, vol.17, no.1-2.

Brenner, R. – Glick, M. [1991] «The Regulation Approach: Theory and History», New Left Review, no.188.

Campbell, A. [1997], “The Transformation Problem: A Simple Presentation of the “New Solution”, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol.29, no.3.

De Vroey, M. [1981], «Value, Production and Exchange» in Steedman, I.-Sweezy, P. (eds.) The Value Controversy, Verso, London.

Dumenil, G. [1980], «De la valeur aux prix de production», Economica.

Dumenil, G. [1983‑84], «Beyond the transformation riddle: a labour theory of value», Science & Society, vol.33, no.4.

Dumenil, G. – Levy, D. [2000], Technology and Distribution: Historical Trajectories a la Marx”, CEPREMAP

Elson, D. [1979], “The Value Theory of Labour” in Elson, D. ed. [1979], Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism, CSE Books, London.

Foley, D. [1982], «The value of money, the value of labour-power and the Marxian  transformation problem», Review of Radical Political Economics, vol.14, no.2.

Foley, D. [1986a], Money, Accumulation and Crisis, Harwood Academic, New York.

Foley, D. [1986b], Understanding Capital, Harvard University Press, London.

Foley, D. [1997], «Recent developments in the Labour Theory of Value», Eastern Economic Association, Washington DC, USA, 3-6 April.

Franklin, B. [1836], The Works of Benjamin Franklin, J.Sparks, Boston.

Gleicher, D. [1985-6], «The ontology of labor values «, Science & Society, vol.XLIV, no.4.

Lapavitsas, C. – Mavroudeas, S. [1997], “The “New Solution” of the Transformation Problem”, Eastern Economic Association, Washington DC, 3-6 April 1997.

Lipietz, A. [1982], «The so‑called transformation problem revisited», Journal of Economic Theory, vol.26.

Lipietz, A. [1985], The Enchanted World, Verso, London.

Marx, K. [1981], Grundrisse, Penguin, London.

Marx, K. [1969], Theories of Surplus-Value, Part II, Routledge, London.

Marx, K. [1982], Capital, Vol.I, Penguin, London.

Marx, K. [1987], A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in: Marx K.-Engels F. , Collected Works, Lawrence and Wishart, London.

Mavroudeas, S. [1990], Regulation Approach: A Critical Appraisal, Ph.D. thesis, University of London.

Mavroudeas, S. [1999a], «Regulation Theory: the road from Creative Marxism to Post -Modern disintegration», Science & Society, vol.63 no.3.

Mavroudeas, S. [1999b], «Periodizing Capitalism: problems and method» Research inPolitical Economy, vol.17.

Mavroudeas, S. [2001], «Forms of existence of abstract labour and value-form», in Freeman,

A.-Kliman, A.-Wells, J. (eds), The New Value Controversy, Edward Elgar, London, (forthcoming).

Mohun, S. [1994], «A re(in)statement of the labour theory of value» Cambridge Journal of  Economics, vol.18, no.4.

Morishima, M. [1973], Marx’s economics: a dual theory of value and growth, Cambridge University Press, London.

Rosdolsky, R. [1977], The making of Marx’s «Capital», Pluto, London.

Rubin, I.I. [1973], Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, Black Rose Books, New York.

Rubin, I.I. [1978], “Abstract labour and value in Marx’s system”, Capital & Class, no.5.

Saad-Filho, A. [1996], «The Value of Money, the Value of Labour-power, and the Net Product: An Appraisal of the «New Approach» to the Transformation Problem» in Freeman, A. – Carchedi, G. (eds) Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics, Edward Elgar, Vermont.

Sekine, T. [1997], An outline of the dialectic of capital, Vol.II, Macmillan, London.

Seton, F. [1957], «The transformation problem», Review of Economic Studies, no.24.

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Zeleny, J. [1980], The logic of Marx, Blackwel, Oxford.


[1]                      It should be noted that Gleicher himself aimed to a new theory of the ontology of abstract labour based on the works of Sraffa, Uno and Braverman rather than attempting to reject Sraffa.

[2]                      The so-called “Rubin school” [Benetti C.-Berthomieu C.-Cartelier J. (1975)] sought to construct an abstract-labour theory founded on social relations. It maintained that labour becomes abstract (and thus socialised) only through the exchange of commodities with money, therefore money is the direct and exclusive expression of abstract labour. For a critique of this view and a dispute of its association with I.I.Rubin see Mavroudeas S. [(2001)].

[3]                      Certain Regulationists [e.g. Aglietta M. (1979), De Vroey M. (1981)], were among the first propagators of the LEM perspective. For an extensive critique of this view see Mavroudeas S. [(1990), (2001)].

[4]                       The “New Solution” originated with Dumenil G. [(1980), (1983-84)] and Foley D. [(1982)]. Lipietz A. [(1982)] – coming from the Regulation Approach – adopted this approach and added a so-called viability condition Dumenil”s solution. This condition claims that the viability of the system (i.e. the existence of positive prices of production from a zero to a maximum profit rate) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of profit rate equalising prices. Dumenil G. [(1984), p.343] has rejected this condition as irrelevant and further disputed the assumption that the system of prices should guarantee an evenly distributed rate of profit. In reply to Dumenil, Lipietz A. [(1984), p.353-4] evaded these issues.

[5]                      There is an ongoing debate within Marxist Political Economy on this issue. This article supports the position voiced by Rubin I.I. [(1973), ch.11, 14] and Elson D. [(1979), ch.1], among others, that value – as the expression of abstract labour – is a category belonging solely to the capitalist system. In pre-capitalist societies the socialization and equalization of labour was not effected through a market system; therefore the concept of abstract labour does not apply to them. Equally, in pre-capitalist societies commodity exchange was not based, mainly, on wage labour. Thus, value as the representation of abstract labour is a category applying solely to the capitalist system.

[6]                      At this lower level of abstraction it might not be unrealistic to maintain that the workers’ concern about their specific job is probably greater than the capitalists’ concern about their branch of activities, since the worker is closer to the use-value aspect of production.

[7]                      Rubin was opposed to many of the views of his modern “disciples”. He affirmed explicitly that value could be studied without having previously established money [Rubin II. (1978), p.36]. Equally explicitly he condemned the view that value is created in circulation, as many of his contemporary adherents – but not the “New Solution” – maintain. On the contrary he stated explicitly that “abstract labour and value are created or “come about”, “become” in the process of direct production (Marx used the expression “werden” more frequently for this process) and are only realised in the process of exchange” [Rubin I.I. (1978), p.125]. Finally, referring to the quantitative determination of abstract labour, Rubin I.I. [(1973), p.154] clarified that it is a misunderstanding “to admit that the social equalization of labor in the process of exchange is carried out in isolation of dependence on production (for example, the length, intensity, length of training for a given level of qualification, and so on), and thus, the social equalization would lack any regularity since it would be exclusively determined by market spontaneity”.

[8]                      See Marx’s K. [(1971), p.161-3] polemic against Bailey.

[9]                      See also Campbell A. [(1997)].

[10]                    It is indicative of this problem that some very interesting studies by “New Solution” scholars on the effects of productivity changes on wages leave aside the problem of the definition of the value of labour-power (e.g. Dumenil G.-Levy D. [(2000), p.9]) and also that they consider the real wage (Dumenil G.-Levy D. [(2000), p.9,18-19] rather than a MEL denominated money wage.

[11]                    For Regulation the workers’ consumption was not commodified in the pre‑Fordist regimes, irrespectively of whether wage was linked or not to a bundle of commodities. In contrast, in Fordism, a social norm of consumption is supposed to be created which reflects a form of social wage divorced from the actual performance of labour‑power in production and the gearing of it to a bundle of commodities. In this sense the value of labour‑power, for Regulation, is equally the amount of commodities that the wage share can buy. This wage share is determined through collective bargaining, which is understood as class struggle in distribution that takes place via institutional arrangements. Its only link to production is through the alleged linkage of wages to productivity increases.

[12]                    Mohun S. [(1994), p.397], also, rejects the Regulationist argument exactly on this ground.

—————————————————————————-

 

FORMS OF EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM

Eastern Economic Association 1996

 

FORMS OF EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT LABOUR AND VALUE-FORM

 

Stavros D. Mavroudeas

Department of Economic Studies

University of Macedonia

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

                        The question of the ontology of abstract labour is a thorny issue of Marxist Value Theory, since it touches upon the realism of the concept and its subsequent relevance in differentiating Marx’s Value Theory from that of Ricardo. The first part of the paper surveys the methodological foundations of the problem. These are situated in the dialectics of essence and form. The second part examines the dominant approaches to the question. one purports that the ongoing transformations of the labour-process lead to the immediate appearance of abstract labour as concrete undifferentiated labour. However, the current historical reality of the capitalist labour- process – based on contradictory forms of skilling and deskilling – refutes the very basis of this approach. The other dominant approach, usually misnamed as «Rubin school», attempts to discover an equally unmediated existence of abstract labour in money. The «New Solution to the Transformation Problem» is a characteristic derivative of the second route. Both these two approaches to the question at hand suffer from crypto-positivism and maltreat dialectics, in the sense that they are trying to discover an unmediated expression of existence of essence. The third part reviews and criticises New Solution’s pivoting of value by money and the related formulation of the Labour Equivalent of Money.

 

 

PART I

VALUE, PRICE AND THE FORM-ESSENCE DIALECTICS

 

 

I.1 The value abstraction in Marx

 

The Marxian Critique of Political Economy – as opposed to the Classical Political Economy tradition of Smith and Ricardo – aims at the construction of a social and historical perspective. The difference of Marx’s paradigm is founded on two essential areas: the method and Value theory.

Marx’s method does not make the separation between logic and object that is characteristic of the positivist «model-real world» dichotomy, pertaining in Economics. Instead, he applies rigorously the dialectics of form and essence by positing that all science would be redundant if the outward appearance of things coincided with their internal essence. It is the latter that generates the former and, therefore, science should discover it and then explain why and how appearance is created. In this approach Marx follows Ricardo’s perspective. As Pilling (1986, p.29) has shown, Ricardo break radically with the pre-Ricardian methodology:

Ricardo, in effect, insists that the science can no longer operate with «description» on the one hand and «analysis» on the other. It must, starting with its basic principle – the determination of value by labour-time – make all the outward appearances of the system «answerable» to it.

However, Marx’s understanding of the form-essence dialectics differs significantly from Ricardo’s. According to Zeleny (1980, ch.3) «while for Ricardo essence is something qualitatively fixed and non-differentiable, Marx sees and investigates the alteration of that essence; he understands it as something historically transitory which proceeds through different levels of development and qualitatively changes». This perspective enables Marx to capture the historical and social – and transitory – character of the capitalist mode of production.

From within this methodological perspective Marx advances his Value theory. Whereas Ricardo employed a concept of embodied-labour which is a mere mental construct, Marx derives his labour theory of value from the actual workings of commodity-producing society itself, as a consequence of social relations between producers and non-producers and formulates an abstract-labour value theory. Value abstraction is a real – not mental – abstraction because it derives from a real social process: that of commodity exchange. The “reality” of the commodity abstraction, however, defies the dominant (posivitist-empiricist) perception for what is “real” (as opposed to the “ideal”): an empirically specifiable content. It is precisely this empirical non-particularity of the value that renders it “abstract”, just as its provenance in the socio-temporal sphere of actual human interactions renders it “real”.

Marx’s perspective that value constitutes the essence of which prices are the necessary form of appearance implies a determination process as well as a feedback relationship between them. This perspective hinges upon his understanding of the movement of capital as a total circuit of capital (production-circulation-exchange-distribution). Contrary to Ricardo who, by not considering the social-historical dimension and ignoring the value-value form distinction – thereby confusing value with exchange value – limited his perspective to the determination of the magnitude of value, Marx not only emphasises the primacy of value’s social determination but also notices the social and historical character of the difference between use-value and exchange-value. Therefore, he distinguishes substance of value (labour-time), value and exchange-value.

Value is the representation of abstract labour and it is a characteristic pertaining to the capitalist mode of production exclusively. In this it differs from exchange-value (the exchange ratio between commodities) which applies to all commodity-producing modes. Every social mode of production has a certain mechanism of equalisation of concrete labours. In the capitalist mode of production this equalisation takes the form of the renumaration of concrete labours to the space of abstract labour. The latter is expressed through market exchange. However, the value abstraction – and therefore abstract labour – is not generated in exchange but in production and refers to the capital-labour relation. It hinges upon a double indifference. On the one hand, capitalists are indifferent towards the particular type of production process they are going to exploit, since use-value is of no significance for them. The only thing that matters is the availability of a working population for exploitation. Only at a secondary level an individual capitalist considers the particular type of production process he will exploit. On the other hand, with the advent of the real subsumption of labour by capital, workers become equally indifferent to the particular type of labour they are going to perform in exchange for wage.

On the other side, this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society – in the United States. Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category “labour”, “labour as such”, labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice.

(Marx (1981), p.104-5)

 

In this sense, abstract labour – as a social concept – is established at the primary determining level of production and then expressed through exchange. Abstract labour, as the immanent measure of value, is operationalised through the socially necessary labour-time.

The ultimate and most mature form that value – as the representation of abstract labour – assumes is that of money. However, money-form acquires its power of universal representation only because the labour-powers expended are primarily indifferent towards their specific concrete application.

 

 

I.2 The ontological status of the Marxian type of abstraction

 

It is a trivial statement to reiterate that for Marx as he declares in the Preface to the first edition (1867) of Capital I, the power of abstraction should provide the point of departure and the foundation of the dialectical movement of investigation, through a continuum of mediations, towards the concrete. The starting point of the investigation is the «cell-form» (Marx (1982, p.90), which he identifies with Hegel’s «in itself» (or essence) (see Zeleny (1980), Banaji (1979), p.17). The movement from the essence to the concrete is continuous, so that in approaching the concrete forms in which the world exists we do not abandon the sphere of essence; rather, we now investigate this very essence in its form of appearance. This is a journey from the simple (the abstract) to the combined (the concrete as the unity of many determinations). This process is supplemented with a movement from the concrete to the abstract. In this dual-way process the movement from the abstract to concrete is, in Ilyenkov’s (1982, p.138) terminology, the leading or determining aspect[1].

Two possible criticisms and/or misconceptions can arise from this thesis.

The first is an explicit criticism and boils down to the outright rejection of the form-essence dialectics – and therefore value-price relationship – as Hegelian sophistry. Orthodox economics – as exemplified first of all by Bohm-Bawerk (1975) – are the most vocal representatives of this view. In this case abstraction becomes only a mental activity, since in the positivist world the status of the “real” is attributed solely to empirically unmediated presences. Theory becomes a mere simulation of reality.

In the first case, abstraction is rejected outright and it is substituted by the inductive-deductive method of positivism (usually, in the traditional form of successive approximation). If abstraction is not all together discarded, it is substituted by the contentless abstraction which is characteristic of the positivist method. Abstraction becomes either a purely logical trick, which enables us to approximate reality (similar to the neo-classical method), or an average of immediately observable factors. In a strong version, it hinges on the more general proposition that logic stands outside the object of the study and that «reasoning» exists solely in the mind and has no organic relation with the world outside. In a weaker version, it denotes that not all theory, but only abstraction is merely a logical construction.

From the point of view of the dialectical logic both versions are equally unacceptable. Indeed, Marx’s method does not make the separation between logic and object that is characteristic of the positivist «model-real world» dichotomy. In the dialectical world, the object under investigation determines the path and the movement of logic, while the latter retains its separate identity. According to Marx (1981, p.101-102), «the totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can… the real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical». Historical Materialism posits a dialectical relationship between reality and its appropriation by thought, which is grounded in reality and operates simultaneously on both the level of theoretical or logical development and the level of real historical events.

The second misconception, while accepting the reality of abstraction, attempts to discover an empirically unmediated presence of its subject. Therefore, it search for a historically present essence as such. In this sense concepts should follow and reflect closely historical reality. However, the grounding of Marxian dialectical abstraction in historical reality does not imply a crude naturalistic identification of theory with objective reality. The ordering of economic categories derives not by their historical sequence but by their essential relations of determination within capitalism, which might be precisely the opposite of what it seems to be their historical sequence (see Marx (1981), p.107-108).

The level of theoretical development is derived from real historical events. Activity on this level, insofar as it diverges from and runs counter to the actual historical events (and the level of immediate appearances), is not an a priori construction, but reflects the «life of the material» in its essence and expresses the essential and necessary relations of reality. There is, therefore, in Marx’s works a continuous dialectical oscillation between abstract dialectical development and concrete historical reality. The Marxian system does not posit a simple, straight line from reality to the theory nor from appearance to essence. On the contrary, it relates them through a continuous spiral pattern: it oscillates from the one to the other, each time at more complex levels (assuming more determinations).

Hence, abstraction  is neither a mere logical tool nor a necessarily unmediated presence (see Ilyenkov (1982, p.33-34)).Therefore, the search for an unmediated presence of essence within the totality of concretes – while attempting to answer the positivist rejection of essence as non-existent and, hence, being either redundant or a logical trick – fails to the same empiricist error by implicitly attributing the status of the “real” only to empiristically tangible things.

 

 

 

 

PART II

The “problem” of the form of existence of abstract labour:

money vs. concrete undifferentiated labour

 

During the recent years, there has been a continuing controversy over the nature and the form of existence of abstract labour. One approach attempted to discover an unmediated (existing without the mediation of others) actual existence of abstract labour within the production process, i.e. a generally common form of undifferentiated work. Another approach posited money as the incarnation and the sole measure of abstract labour, resulting to a market-centered and circulationist conception of value. We will contend that both approaches are equally erroneous since they suffer from the same crypto-positivism and cannot understand properly the dialectics of form and essence.

 

 

II.1 Unmediated existence of abstract labour

 

Gleicher’s (1983, 1985, 1985-6) approach is characteristic of the first and not-so-popular today answer to the problem of the status of abstract labour. Gleicher (1985-6, p.463) attempted “to sketch an alternative ontology of value as abstract labour… which includes both traditional Marxist, as well as Sraffian elements, while also rejecting elements from both approaches”. He linked Uno’s (1980) conception of value (derived from an analysis of the “commodity as such”, i.e. without identification with a particular set of relations of production) and the views concerning the capitalist labour process which have been articulated by Braverman (1974) and Aglietta (1979). The cornerstone of his view is the actual-physical existence of abstract labour in the production process. This approach is contrasted to that of what Gleicher (1983, p.98) branded the “Rubin school” (defined as “the writers who argue that money is the sole measure of abstract labour; that labour only becomes abstract in the act of exchange between commodity and money”). He argued, contrary, that abstract labour has been the ongoing historical result of the development of the capitalist mode of production.

Gleicher (1985-6, p.465) assumed a middle-of-the-road position and contended “that the conditions cited by he Sraffians – technical coefficients and the wage rate – can be understood to determine prices of production only through the existence of abstract labor as an actual social phenomenon constituting commodity value, as well as through the formation of surplus value”. Then he considered the form of existence (the ontology) of abstract labour and maintained that it exists in its own right (i.e. as a great mass of basically undifferentiated work), through the implications of Babbage’s (1832) principle on the simplification of collective labourer and Braverman’s (1974) thesis on the deskilling of work in capitalism.

On the basis of this Gleicher (1983, p.107) suggested that capitalist development results in the historical abstraction of labour: “abstract labour is taken to be actual (concrete) labour that has become independent of, and hence homogeneous across, various use-values”. This is based on an extremely problematic definition of abstract labour as the “subjective activity of producing use-value that is not specific to the production of any single use-value, but which, to the contrary, represents the possibility of producing a wide variety of use-values” (Gleicher (1983), p.107).  This definition conflates abstract and concrete labour. It is the latter that is expressed in use-value. Additionally, it implies that any labour aiming at a specific use-value (highly skilled and dedicated work) is not accounted as abstract (social) labour, which is obviously wrong.

Facing criticisms – well grounded in the fact that capitalism has not a single tendency to deskill labour but a contradictory relation of skilling-deskilling  – Gleicher (1985-6, p.466) shifted his answer from the organisation of production to the system of hierarchy:

While the proportion of unskilled workers is vastly increased by mechanization, the existence of a hierarchy of skills is not eliminated… With mechanization the differentiation of human activities manifest in the hierarchy of skills is no longer determined by the nature of the direct interaction of the worker and the a commodity in the process of being produced. Instead, the hierarchy of skills comes to correspond to the differences in activities operating, maintaining and designing systems of machinery… As such, they come to be common over a wide range of industries. Even skilled tasks become available to industries across the social division of labor; that is, even highly skilled labor becomes abstract.

 

And he concluded: “the hierarchy of skills is not a ranking of the relative productivity (units of use-value per hour) of individual workers engaged in the different tasks associated with a labour process. The individual worker, no matter what rank he/she occupies in the hierarchy of skills, is not the producer of a use-value. Each worker’s labour is abstract.” (Gleicher (1983), p.115-6). This argument is highly controversial. Not even the most simplistic approaches suggest that hierarchy of skills is a ranking of labour productivity. Moreover, since the end of manufacture and the mechanisation of production (machinofacture) no individual worker is the sole and exclusive creator of a use-value; instead, use-values are produced through co-operation. Of course each worker’s labour is abstract – that is belongs to social labour and it is (socially) accounted as such – exactly because of this common social aspect and not because of an indifference to either its physical-technical conduct or its particular product (use-value).

Finally, Gleicher bundled together hastily under the label of the “Rubin school” nearly every writer that adhered to value-form analysis (e.g. Pilling, Rowthorn, Arthur, Gerstein, Kay, Fine and Harris, Himmelweit and Mohun, Elson, Eldred and Hanlon, De Vroey, Foley and Lipietz) and disregarded both their differences and whether they recognise money as the sole measure of value. For example, Foley, De Vroey and Lipietz accept this characterisation and are guilty to a considerable extent to Gleicher’s accusations. Eldred and Hanlon support the same theses and even discard Value theory in general, but they recognise that Rubin actively disagreed with their view. Himmelweit and Mohun occupy a middle position: they consider that the socially necessary labour time is determined in the sphere of exchange. But, on the other hand, Elson[2], Fine and Harris, Pilling, Gerstein etc. do not accept that money is the immediate incarnation of abstract labour and they distinguish rigorously – following Marx – between the immanent (labour time) and the external (money) measure of value.

 

 

II.2 The “Rubin school”

 

The second and more popular course has been proposed by a significant number of authors and was, more or less, self-proclaimed as “the Rubin school”. However, Rubin was explicitly opposed to the views that his modern “disciples” voice. In many places he affirmed that value can be studied without having previously established money (Rubin (1978), p.36). Additionally, he explicitly condemned the view that value is created in circulation and stated that “abstract labour and value are created or “come about”, “become” in the process of direct production … and are only realised in the process of exchange” (Rubin (1978), p.125). Finally, referring to the quantitative determination of abstract labour, Rubin (1973, p.154) clarified that it is a misunderstanding “to admit that the social equalization of labor in the process of exchange is carried out in isolation of dependence on production (for example, the length, intensity, length of training for a given level of qualification, and so on), and thus, the social equalization would lack any regularity since it would be exclusively determined by market spontaneity”.

Writers such as Benetti (1974) and Cartelier (1976) are representative of the “Rubin school”. They have defended Marxist Value theory by elaborating an abstract-labour theory on the basis of a social paradigm, as opposed to the technological Sraffian one. They, therefore, emphasised the necessity for a connection between the physical-technical dimension and the social dimension of economic activities. Money, then, was posited as an indispensable element and as the ultimate expression of the transformation of private to social labour and as the social embodiment of value-in-process. Benetti and Cartelier argued that it is only through the exchange of commodities against money that private labour is validated and becomes abstract social labour. For them, value, rather than being linked to a mere embodiment of labour – a technical process – referred to this validation of private labour through the exchange of commodities against money. So they accepted that the analysis of value-form is fundamental for the construction of the social paradigm. They maintained that the aim of Value theory should be to explain the specific functioning of a decentralised economy in which no a priori defined social cohesion is conceivable, rather than determining the equilibrium exchange-magnitudes. The qualitative aspect of Value theory was divorced from the quantitative one; and while the former was prioritised, the latter was undermined. In this context Benetti and Cartelier argued that values and prices are «incommensurable» factors and attacked Marx for attempting to establish equations of the type «sum of prices equals sum of values», since these bring together those two «incommensurable» factors.

The shortcomings of this theory were considerable and took their toll in its subsequent evolution which ended, for most of these authors in the complete overhauling of their initial theses and the rejection of value and its substitution by money, as the main determinant of their theoretical systems. or example, For example, Benetti-Cartelier (1980) and Deleplace (1981), while still supporting a social paradigm, have rejected all reference to value. They dropped the commodity as the starting-point of the analysis, for connecting the physical and social aspects of the capitalist mode of production. They retained only the social aspect, because economics can only study the forms of socialisation and not the physical aspect (concrete production). The new starting-point is money, which serves as both substance and form of socialisation and is no longer related to abstract labour and value. The valuation of commodities is simply their monetary equivalence.

The main deficiency of their initial theories is a common characteristic of the «Rubin school». Their justified preoccupation with the social dimension often results in an attempt to establish one representative of this dimension as the absolute embodiment of it. This is usually discovered in money. Indeed money, as the general equivalent with which every commodity is exchanged and, thus, as the general mediator of all commodity exchanges, has an obvious social character. However, the deification of the general equivalent as the sole and absolute expression of the social dimension is an oversimplification and has its own fetishised connotations as well. It certainly undermines the inherently social character of production and reduces it to a fragmented sum of private processes, conceived from a basically technical perspective, and related solely through exchange. This is a caricature of Marx’s theory of the anarchic character of capitalism, it neglects the social division of labour (or it understands it in a circulationist sense) and has strong similarities with the exchange economics of vulgar political economy. For Marx, in exchange is made visible the contradiction internal to production itself (the contradiction between private labour and the social division of labour), which is internal, inherent to the social division of labour itself. The social dimension, therefore, derives and exists first and foremost in production. Value, as the central pivot of social relations, is created in production and defined prior to, and independent of, money. In this sense, Marx employs Value theory, in “Capital” vol.I, in order to analyse production while abstracting from exchange and distribution. Exchange is considered only in the simple form of worker-capitalist relation. The fact that exchange, which in its developed form implies the level of “many capitals”, is not present does not hinder Marx from employing Value theory in the analysis of production in abstraction from the other spheres. Of course, for Marx money is indispensable for capitalism (contrary to the Classicals’ theorisation of the economy as a barter system). Nevertheless, it is a secondary and dependent element.

The common consequence of these views of the «Rubin school» was a recourse to circulationism and the undermining of the primacy of the moment of production within the total circuit of capital. These errors opened the way, at a later stage, to the dethronement of value by money. The hypercriticism of the initial phase and the absolute separation between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of value (in order to establish the significance of the social aspects) led, later, to a subsequent divorce between the physical and the social dimension. Money, then, provided an easy but also highly narrow and unstructured solution to this dilemma. On the one hand, it could not be accused of technicism since it was posited directly at the social level (usually via its derivation from the functions of the state rather than the Marxian derivation from the commodity). On the other hand, it has an immediate physical presence. Hence, the broken relation between the social and the physical was re-established somehow through an arbitrary reformulation around money and at the cost of the redundancy of value. The initial dive into the social and the realm of essence ended with a covert return to the physically observable and the level of appearance.

De Vroey (1982, p.40) provides a typical example of this circulationist deficiency by declaring that Value theory is neither a production theory nor a circulation theory, since exchange creates value, but production determines its magnitude. Abstract labour truly becomes a circulation category (being defined as the social form for the allocation of social labour among specific production tasks) and is separated from labour power actually expended in production. In order to disengage value from a crude and simplistic linkage to the difficulty of production, he ends up with a downgrading of the primacy of production within the total circuit of capital. This error is made most obvious when he criticises Meek for seeing the economy as a «system of production» and for neglecting the commodity form (which he defines as the other basic component of the capitalist mode of production, the particular social form in which social labour is allocated in a decentralised economy), since «the theory of value is constructed without any consideration of circulation or money» (De Vroey (1982), p.40). He fortifies these accusations with the argument that without money the theory of value simply cannot stand up (De Vroey (1982), p.40). For him, «the notion of value refers to a social property of commodities: rather than being linked to a mere embodiment of labour – a technical process  – value refers to the validation of private labour through the exchange of commodities against money» (De Vroey (1982), p.40). Then, from this thesis it follows necessarily that value is created in exchange. With this the evolution of his argument is brought to its conclusion. He begins by correctly rejecting the embodied-labour value theory. Then he continues by breaking almost any link between the socially necessary labour-time and the concrete labour expended in a particular production process and expressed in a commodity. In his approach, labour is the substance of value at the general level (as total abstract labour) but the relation between particular production processes and commodity values (based on and mediated through socially necessary labour-time and concrete labour) is undermined significantly. Hence, the assertion of this relation on the whole opens the way for its negation in its parts: labour-power expended in all production processes establishes the commensurability of the products of these processes in general. Money is posited as the necessary and sufficient factor, the true incarnation of this relation. Then, money displaces labour-time as the main determinant at the level of exchange of particular commodities. Abstract labour and value become exchange categories.

On the contrary, for Marx commodity exchange is organically prior to the category of money and ought to obtain without the mediation of the latter. This has nothing to do with the actual historical succession, but refers to the essential nature of history. The capitalist mode of production was born and subsequently inherited forms of money deriving from the context of pre-capitalist modes. However, these forms has to be transformed to the money-form appropriate to capital. In this sense, the capital-labour relation is an organic prerequisite for the emergence of capitalist money-form. Thus, the exchange equivalence between commodities derives primarily from their common intrinsic character, namely of being products of labour. Money and money prices mediate this equivalence, but are not the primary determining factors[3]. Money does not precede the commodity but it is generated from the differentiation within commodity exchange. Value, then, is created in production and is validated in exchange. The crucial distinction is that between use-value (expressing the material foundation of production) and value (the social form). The production and circulation of use-values can be defined independently: a certain determinate quantity of use-values is first produced and then exchanged. However, the production and circulation of value cannot be defined independently: labour-time is expended in production but it is socially validated in circulation. Consequently, abstract labour and value are prior to money. Abstract labour creates value in the immediate production process, prior to exchange. The category of money is derived from the commodity category only when the value category is sufficiently developed.

Marx’s (1987, p.296-7) critique of Franklin (1836) is tantamount to the above:

Franklin, on the contrary, considers that the value of shoes, minerals, yarn, paintings, etc., is determined by  abstract labour which has no particular quality and can thus be measured only in terms of quantity. But since he does not explain that the labour contained in exchange value is abstract universal social labour, which is brought about by the universal alienation of individual labour, he is bound to mistake money for the direct embodiment of this alienated labour. He therefore fails to see the intrinsic connection between money and labour which posits exchange value, but on the contrary regards money as a convenient technical device which has been introduced into the sphere of exchange from outside.

 

Contrary to this approach, De Vroey posits money before value and abstract labour, as the necessary condition for their existence. Hence, money, in liaison with a vague notion of labour as the source of human wealth and as the creator of commodities create abstract labour, at the general level (on the level of the whole economy). Then, abstract labour creates value as the social form which permits the commensurability and exchangeability of commodities. Value, in its turn, determines the market value of each particular commodity. Market value is a money mediated representation of the amount of abstract labour congealed in the particular commodity. The main primary determining factor is money, which should exist from the outset. It is, therefore, posited implicitly as an exogenous parameter that determines ultimately the whole circuit. The weak and ill-defined association of money with abstract social labour at the general level, which gives a flimsy pretext of a value perspective, collapses completely as De Vroey moves from the general level to that of the particular commodities. Then, money – albeit under the guise of being the social incarnation of total abstract labour – becomes openly the chief determinant; the link between labour and value is all but nominally lost.

 

 

 

 

PART III

Historicist forerunners of the Labour Equivalents of money

 

 

III.1 Aglietta on the monetary expression of the working hour

 

A derivative of the second answer to the problem of the form of existence of abstract labour are those approaches that attempted to construct a labour equivalent of money and, thus, transform value variables to monetary ones.

The forerunner in this course is Aglietta (1979). In his attempt to connect value and monetary terms in the same equation, he ended up with a qualified confusion of the distinction between the immanent (socially necessary labour-time) and the external (money) measure of value and an arbitrary and mathematical juxtaposition of these two, rather than a dialectical interrelationship. What is, ultimately, wrong in his approach is not the aim to theorise value and monetary terms in a unified framework and within the same system of equations (as Bohm-Bawerk has accused Marx for doing) but the way he established this link. The pivot for such an approach is not the mathematical linearity but dialectical abstraction.

His theoretical and definitional premises are quite contradictory, since in a number of places, Aglietta holds that value is the primary determinant and he even supports Marx’s derivation of money from commodity money. Yet, behind these assertions lies a more subtle argument. Money is derived from abstract labour and value on the aggregate level, but this derivation is implicitly refuted in its constituent parts (individual commodities and production processes), where money is posited as the main determinant. The separation of abstract labour from concrete useful labour and from socially necessary labour-time expended in the production of a particular commodity operate as the implicit and silent foundations of his approach. It has been argued elsewhere (Mavroudeas (1990)) that Aglietta separates the determination of wage from the socially necessary labour-time for the reproduction of labour-power. Now this separation seems to be generalised for all commodities and not only labour-power (the commodity nature of which is seriously questioned by the Regulationists). The neglect of concrete labour and its relation to abstract labour and the conception of the latter exclusively through money are the next steps.

He maintains that what he considers the dual problem of conceptualising a commodity economy (as expressed by abstract labour) and the wage relation (as expressed by the partition of abstract labour into the value of labour-power and surplus-value) can be solved by developing an intermediate theory of social forms. From this intermediate theory he infers the transformations brought about by the effect of these social forms on the space of value. These social forms ultimately give rise to the concepts of the monetary expression of the working hour and the nominal reference wage (Aglietta (1979), p.275). Two points ought to be brought forward with regard to these formulations. Firstly that, when Aglietta is talking about social forms, he refers primarily to structural (and, in his conception, institutionalist and historicist) forms. Secondly, Aglietta (1979, p.275) argues that these social forms (through the monetary expression of the working hour and the nominal reference wage) link together value and income magnitudes.

According to Aglietta (1979, p.64), total abstract labour is divided into value of labour-power and surplus-value. Thus, he establishes a net product approach:

VA = V + SV     (1)          where VA = total abstract labour

V = value of labour-power

SV = surplus-value

Then, he assumes Marx’s equation of total price to total value, albeit in a slightly transformed version: total income (VP) is the monetary form of total abstract labour. From this he derives a weight through which he wants to establish an equation between particular values and particular prices. This is the «monetary expression of the working hour» (or the monetary constraint):

(2)

He, subsequently, normalises this variable taking into consideration its past magnitudes. This is the «monetary expression of the socially necessary labour», which is a function of the past magnitudes of m and on which depends the conversion of the value of labour-power into wages:

(3)          where S=total wages

V = value of labour-power

Finally, from these he defines the “nominal reference wage” as the wage related to the quantum of abstract labour:

(4)

From (4) it follows that:

(5)

where the rate of surplus-value: e = SV/V

 

Finally, from this conceptualisation of the relation between value and monetary expressions, Aglietta derives his theory of distribution; and he, essentially, monetises all the value determinants by drawing two conclusions:

(1) that the overall distribution of revenue is founded on the social relations of production and depends on the transformation of the conditions of production.

(2) that the distribution of income depends crucially on the conditions that form the general equivalent. The latter has a determining influence on the wage relation.

The first conclusion is an assertion of the primacy of the moment of production within the total circuit of capital. Nevertheless, it is a non-substantial assertion since it is immediately undermined. The second point is tantamount – especially in relation to his theory of value and money – to a substitution of value by money as the main determinant of income distribution. Another consequence is the adoption of a Keynesian demand-side perspective. Both fallacies are made evident in what Aglietta calls the autonomy of the monetary system and the, consequent, pivoting of value by monetary factors.

Aglietta (1979, p.329) argues that «the formation of the general equivalent, and consequently also its reproduction in time, has a certain autonomy in relation to the sum total of conditions of production and exchange». This autonomy is the solution to what he perceives as the main contradiction of capitalism; namely its anarchic character. The autonomous monetary system is the necessary instrument for synthesising the separate and independent economic acts into a commodity economy. It is indicative of this covert inversion of the Marxian position by Aglietta (1979, p.329) that he explicitly maintains that, although capitalism «can only be analyzed scientifically on the basis of an objective, abstract labour, that defines a homogeneous social space», this social space cannot solve its main contradiction:

The solution to this contradiction lies in the autonomy of the monetary system. The formation of the general equivalent makes possible a refraction of the homogeneous space of value that evolves over time. This refraction is summed up in the monetary expression of the working hour. On the basis of this logical solution, we were able to link the formation and division of total  income to the fundamental concepts that define value and capitalist relations of production.

 

From this, the pivoting of value by monetary factors follows necessarily. Innovating individual capitals are able to gain a surplus profit but the generalisation of the new techniques lead to the disappearance of this surplus profit. The old conditions of production will then have been destroyed and the capital still fixed in them devalorised. This process is effected through the monetary determination of (monetary) prices, separately from the system of prices of production:

This ability of the monetary determination of prices to give an objective economic representation to local changes in the division of labour beyond the coherence of a system of production prices can be called the pivoting of value. It is the continuous evolution of nominal market prices that maintains over time the social link between individual capitals, despite the heterogeneity of the conditions of production. The pivoting of value is thus the homogenization by the monetary exchange C-M through which the value  generated in a particular productive operation is measured within the current system of norms of production and exchange.

(Aglietta (1979), p.302)

 

At this point a crucial matter remains unanswered. If there is an autonomy of the monetary system and if values are pivoted by monetary factors, then what determines the monetary system? Since monetary circulation (i.e. the price level) affects value commensuration, then how is the former determined? In the case that the monetary system assumes more than a certain autonomy, then a variant of the Quantitative Theory is at sight. The other route open is an exogenous institutionalist determination of the monetary system. In this case, a subsequent question is posed: if distributional struggle is the main determinant of institutional compromises, then is it itself beyond almost any determination? Aglietta alludes that it is loosely determined – in the interaction between the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation – by the labour productivity and the general price level. The first constrains capital-labour distributional struggle. The question remains about what determines the latter.

Finally, it should be noted that Aglietta’s thesis is situated within the general historicist and middle-range framework of the Regulation Approach[4]. The autonomisation of the monetary system and the institutional determination of the wage are considered as particular characteristics of the Fordist epoch, not pertaining to previous periods. In this sense, they rely heavily on empirical factors pertaining to that period. Two elements are considered of paramount importance: (i) the development of the credit system and the emergence of non-commodity forms of money, and (ii) collective bargaining and the supposed separation of the determination of the wage from its pivoting by the value of labour-power (understood as the value of the bundle of commodities consumed by the worker).

In recent works Aglietta discards value in favour of a theory of socialisation based on routines and money. Aglietta-Brender (1984) while rejecting the market as the fundamental regulatory mechanism of the capitalist mode of production, they portray the latter as a complex network of social relations based not on the entrepreneurial spirit but on the existence of a tight imbrication of routines. Then they proceed by stressing the importance of money as the factor around which the whole system evolves. Aglietta-Orlean (1982), dismiss «labour value» as «Ricardian dross». They reject the notion of any substance behind the form of commodity exchange, which is considered as a process of socialisation that does not presuppose a social substance. Labour – which, according to Marx, is the object of socialisation and also the inherent essence that operates as the immanent measure that ensures the commensurability of commodities – is thrown out as well. Instead, Girardian behaviourism and anthropology («the desire to be» fragmented by the lack of «being») assumes the role of the substance of the whole process. Money substitutes value as the basis of social forms and operates as the necessary mediator of social cohesion. As even Lipietz (1985, p.169) admits, production is removed from the centre of attention and Aglietta-Orlean slip back to the economics of exchange.

 

 

 

PART IV

Measure of value and Labour Equivalent of Money

 

Aglietta’s initial considerations with regard to the relation between value and money find their culmination in the so-called «New Solution to the Transformation Problem» (Dumenil (1980), Lipietz (1982), Foley (1982)). It is indicative that although he did not participate in this project many of its contributors attribute their initiating intuitions to his work.

The main novelty of the «New Solution» project lays in its «transformation of input prices». This is held to be necessary because the prices of production of the material elements of the advanced capital (means of production and means of subsistence) are not proportional to their values. This approach is exemplified in Lipietz (1982) where he: (a) interprets the value of labour-power as a share of value added and, (b) applies the transformation to the net product. The crux of his solution is that variable capital should be treated differently from constant capital, whose value must be transformed. In contrast, in the case of variable capital, the wage – insofar as it represents a share of value added, i.e. it is a «number of hours» – is conserved by the transformation, while the labour-time itself (considered as the equivalent of a particular bundle of commodities) is transformed. To that effect, the «New Solution» is rightly criticised for separating value and price.

In this paper we would not engage with the central aspect of the “New Solution”, but rather confine to two of its major pillars, namely the Labour Equivalent of Money (LEM) – or its inverse Monetary Equivalent of Labour (MEL) – and the value of labour-power. These are interrelated since the first is based on the second.

 

 

IV.1 LEM and the relation between abstract labour and money

 

Lipietz (1985, p.23) defines LEM as the quantity of abstract labour represented by the unit of money (called currency), which can be found by dividing the quantity of labour needed to produce the net product by the price of that product.

Foley (1982, p.41) follows a similar line by defining what he calls the «value of money» as the ratio of aggregate direct labour-time to aggregate value added. Also De Vroey (1981) proposes the «monetary expression of social labour-time» as the ratio of the sum of prices to the sum of values. Notwithstanding, Foley, while endorsing Lipietz’s formulation, has reservations about De Vroey’s formula since it does not clarify whether the sum of prices refers to aggregate price or aggregate value added (as he proposes).

The central aspect of this theory, as we already have pointed out and as is freely admitted (Foley (1982, p.41), derives from the contours of a «Rubin school» approach. Foley, who is more frank about possible deviations from Marx’s theory, points out that rather than labour-time determining price, this theory begins at the global level by positing that the money value of the whole mass of net production of commodities expresses the expenditure of the total social labour in a commodity-producing economy. Hence, it retains at the global level the relation between money and embodied labour which is central to the idea that money is a form of value and that the substance of value is abstract social labour. The concept of value is recognised as a property of the whole mass of the net commodity product. This requires a strict relation between the monetary unit (whether that unit is linked to a general equivalent money-commodity or not) and abstract social labour-time. Thus, a unit of money is defined as a claim to a certain amount of the abstract social labour expended in the economy. We have already criticised this approach, in the less developed form that it appeared in previous works, for opening the floodgates to a subsequent negation of Value theory. The new element that Foley and De Vroey (1984) introduce here is that money is no longer derived from the commodity, as Marx has proposed.

As it is obvious, this approach keeps one of the so-called “invariance postulates” – namely the equation between total prices and total values (Σp=Σw) – while rejecting the other – the equation between total profit and total surplus-value (Σπ=Σs-v).

De Vroey (1984, ch.1) relates these developments to the Benetti-Cartelier latest theories as well as to Aglietta a-Orlean. He argues that the first step was made by Benetti-Cartelier (1980) when, while rejecting Value theory and the commodity nature of money, money was posited as the only «directly social relation», the only institution transcending the opacity of the fragmented commodity economy. Money rather than deriving from commodity exchange was attributed to state sovereignty. The next step was established by Aglietta-Orlean (1982). Their thesis was that money is not exclusively a directly-social reality but has an ambiguous character, since it belongs both to the indirectly-social (private) form and to the directly-social form (for example, private forms of money should be taken into account).

The attempts to construct LEM reflect a similar – though from the opposite side – with the neo-Ricardians’ misunderstanding of the relation of form and essence. Instead of searching for a technically defined (by the technical coefficients of production) invariable measure of value, a “social” quasi-invariable measure of value is advanced in the form of the “labour equivalent of money”. In this they are quite close to Ricardo’s initial – and futile – attempts to establish an invariable measure through gold. Neo-Ricardian physicalism is substituted by institutionalism as the basis for the social determination of money and the value of labour power (and subsequently its price, the wage). The same empiricist search for an unmediated tangible form of existence of labour value is closed in the one case with the recourse to production and technicism and in the other case with the recourse to circulation and institutionalism. In the first case the social aspect is absent from production and added artificially in distribution. In the second case the social aspect is present but through the misfiguring lenses of institutionalism and – despite the analyses of the labour process – ultimately in circulation.

With regard to MEL’s justification, two arguments can be brought forward.

First, the usual textual references to Marx are at least sketchy and insufficient. Although Marx seldom used the measurement of value by socially necessary labour-time and by money interchangeably, this is done usually in passim and there is no sustainable evidence that this rather casual treatment constituted a theoretical position per se. Additionally, Marx  nowhere established explicitly a theoretical relation – such as the monetary expression of labour – which relates the quantum of SNLT  expressed in money or vice versa.

Marx distinguished rigorously between the intrinsic or immanent and the external measure of value. The intrinsic measure of value is the labour-time expended under the normal conditions of productions (average degree of skill and intensity etc.), i.e. socially necessary labour-time. However, in commodity production (and moreover in capitalist commodity production) labour is not directly socialised but only indirectly through commodity exchange. For this reason, the quantitative expression of value must assume a form of expression appropriate to the modalities of exchange. In this sense, the qualitative and quantitative dimension of the sphere of production must assume a qualitative and quantitative form of expression conforming to exchange. The primary determining sphere of production must be expressed according to the prerequisites of the secondary sphere of exchange. Thus, an external measure, namely money, is needed.

Second, when supporters of MEL recognise the Marxian distinction between the immanent and the external measure of value, they fail to understand its substantive content. Thus, they subordinate both to MEL:

social labour and money are not two mutually exclusive measures of value but two aspects of the same measure… In this sense, value has a twofold measure: the MEL

(Ramos (1995), p.11)

 

If for Marx value has labour as an immanent measure (one appropriate to its nature, its primary determination in production) and money as an external measure (one appropriate to the secondary determination in exchange), it is the first that assumes primacy, it is inherently appropriate; and the second is externally necessitated. On the contrary, for the MEL approach, this distinction becomes mere lip-service and both aspects are being subsumed by MEL. In the latter the primary determination by production is lost and the causal determination – accurately expressed in the distinction between immanent and external measure – is at least blurred. Seldom, if a causal relation is defined this is a circulationist one. money (and exchange) are the primary determinants.

 

 

IV.1.2 On the nature of labour-power

                The question of the commodity nature of labour-power is the crux of the LEM perspective. It hinges upon an almost explicit rejection of its commodity character. In this it finds a forerunner in Bowles-Gintis (1981, p.7-8):

If wage labour is treated as a commodity, and labour as its use-value, it has no «special character» in terms of which the labour theory of value can be justified. If the labour theory of value is to be defended at all, it must be by virtue of some non-commodity aspect of wage labour… the theoretically necessary and sufficient non-commodity aspect of labour-power must be located at sites distinct from the site of capitalist production: family and state…

 

Essentially, Bowles and Gintis have taken up an argument advanced by Samuelson (1982), namely that since labour-power is a commodity it is similar to any other commodity and, therefore, it does not deserve a special status. They accept the essence of this position and propose that almost any kind of commodity (e.g. land) can be used to construct a value theory and even to define a form of exploitation. Then, in order to rehabilitate the significance of labour-power they reject its commodity nature. What this approach neglects, in both radical and conservative versions, is that Marx has proposed that although labour-power is a commodity it is different from any other commodity because it is the source and the creator of human social wealth. This constitutes labour-power’s value-creating capacity.

Lipietz (1985, p.154) endorses the Bowles-Gintis thesis:

The debate which led to the new solution, by contrast [to the Standard Solution’s “economism” of the “production of commodities by means of commodities” (including labour-power, a commodity produced by feeding with the basket of wage-goods)], emphasised the non-commodity nature of wage-labour and opened the way to analysis of the social constitution of the monetary equivalent and its “value”.

 

Lipietz (1985, p.155) even argues that there are only «few incidental arguments» in Marx’s work where he tries to justify the reduction of value to labour as «the only element common to commodities». This is an obvious mistreatment of Marx, who considers – not in few incidental arguments but in his whole theory – that labour is not simply the common element but the inherent common substance that constitutes the value of commodities. But Lipietz stops short of breaking any link with the Labour Theory of Value by warning against stretching their thesis till the abandonment of the labour substance of value.

Within the LEM approach two versions can be discerned. The first and earlier emerged under the auspices of Regulation and is characterised by the usual institutionalist-historicist flavour. The second derives from the “New Solution” and views the nature of labour-power abstractly, i.e. irrespectively of particular historical stages. In the first there is an uneasy relationship between the value of labour-power (understood as a bundle of commodities) and the autonomisation of the monetary system. In the second version, the value of labour-power depends explicitly upon the formation of the general equivalent which is not derived from commodity-money. Thus, the unstable Regulationist theoretical geometry is being restructured and acquires theoretical coherence, at the cost of breaking away from the Marxian and Classical course.

 

 

1. The Regulationist historicist perspective

                For Regulation, in the pre-Fordist stages wage is linked to the labour cost of the goods consumed (i.e. wage is a typical price of a value, namely the value of labour-power), but the latter are not considered as commodities or at least as capitalist commodities. Working-class consumption is perceived as non-capitalist before Fordism. It is the latter that extends capitalist dominance on this area.

Regulation totters between, on the one hand, a classical Marxist (and Classical) understanding of the value of labour-power as determined by the bundle of commodities consumed by the labourer and, on the other hand, an income distribution that depends crucially upon the formation of the monetary equivalent. Whereas in the Marxian and Classical framework the latter is derived from commodity, in the Regulationist framework it depends on the autonomy of the monetary system with the abovementioned problems. Within this framework, Regulation considers that in the pre-Fordist periods the wage-goods were non-capitalist and hence the reproduction of labour-power (and its value) remained outside the realm of capitalist relations. Only in the Fordist era it comes under capitalist domination, via the creation of a social norm of consumption and the coupling of mass production with mass consumption.

Two versions of this argument have been proposed. The strong one – exemplified by De Vroey (1984) – argues that workers’ consumption during the pre-Fordist stages had the following characteristics: a) non-commodity relations were dominant over commodity relations, b) the reproduction of labour power took place mainly through domestic activities, c) wages only complemented this reproduction, d) the greater amount of the commodities purchased were non-capitalist (De Vroey (1984), p.48, 52). Lipietz, for example, adopts a weaker one. In the strong version the distinction between commodities in general and capitalist commodities is not important, since it is held that working-­class’ consumption as a whole lay primarily outside the sphere of commoditisation and otherwise comprised mainly of non-capitalist commodities. That leaves domestic production, petty-commodity production and agriculture as the possible providers of the workers’ means of subsistence. On the other hand, the weak version sidesteps the question of the extent of commoditisation of working-class’ consumption and only asserts that the latter did not include capitalist products. In this case the distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist commodities is crucial, because it may be accepted that workers’ consumption was commoditised but the goods that entered it were non-capitalist commodities. There is, furthermore, a significant failure of both versions to define non-capitalist sectors that produced these goods.

There are insurmountable empirical problems with the strong version. Working-class’ consumption was commoditised very early. The separation of producers from their means of production cannot but result in them not being able to produce the greater amount of their means of subsistence. During the early phases of capitalism, the bigger part of all their major needs – such as food, clothing, housing etc. – had to be bought. This was supplemented by their own production; or rather the domestic production of their family since it was impossible, especially considering the longer working hours of that period and the worse working conditions, for the working members of the family to work extensively and regularly in domestic production. Another significant factor – quite important in many newly industrialised countries, also – could be the support of the extended family, who were peasants. Their support was usually in the form of either agricultural products or money. However, all these contributions had a complementary and irregular character.

The weak version proposes a more sustainable position. Workers’ consumption may have come under the dominance of commodity relations, but these were mainly non-capitalist until the ’20s; true capitalist relations emerged only after W.W.II. This version is also erroneous. There are two implicit assumptions that inform this misguided regulationist thesis.

Firstly, Regulation has a simplistic understanding of capitalist commoditisation, derived from their Althusserian conception of a specific society as the sum total of different modes of production one of which assumes hegemony over the others and provides the unifying framework. Consequently, it cannot conceive how remnants of previous modes of production can be integrated into the capitalist mode of production and although they retain their formal characteristics their function has altered radically by becoming operational parts of the capitalist mode of production and by ceasing to represent a different mode of production. Their much acclaimed example of petty-commodity production is characteristic. Capitalism has assimilated elements of simple commodity production, such as craftsmen and family works, and has benefited from certain of their aspects as they provided at the same time a market for capitalist products as well as cheap complementary products and services. Many of petty-commodity producers’ means of production were capitalist products and many of the services they provided were serving as side-products and complementary aspects of capitalist production (an obvious example being clothes repairs by tailors). A typical case where these regulationist shortcomings are evident is agriculture. It provided much of urban population’s means of subsistence and capitalist concentration and centralisation, in many cases, took place quite late. The majority of the agricultural sector was till late, and often it is still, comprised by small farmers. Despite that, it has become capitalist and has ceased to represent small commodity production since it was not surplus products that were exchanged nor was the main bulk of production for self-subsistence. Production for exchange had become the norm and the agricultural sector represented both a market for capitalist commodities (such as machines, certain materials, fertilisers etc.) and a provider of means of trade (as traders and merchants were the main retailing outlet of agricultural products). Regulationists are suspiciously silent on this subject.

Furthermore, the regulationists identify Fordist mass production with mass consumption. More accurately, they assume that Fordist mass production must come before mass consumption. This is a very neat and almost algebraic logical formulation. Notwithstanding, historical reality is often a very capricious thing and it tends to override logic formulas and take the most «irrational» routes. There is no reason whatsoever why mass consumption must follow mass production, let alone Fordist mass production. Indeed, there existed mass consumed products before the advent of mass production. Even in the crucial area of consumer durables – which may provide a last ditch defence for the regulationist argument organised around the notion of a consumer durables revolution – a mass market was created before the 1920s[5].

Concluding, Regulation rejects implicitly the commodity character of labour-power by arguing that, whereas its value depends on the bundle of goods, the latter are not commodities or not capitalist commodities. Only in the Fordist era they become commodities. But then wage is autonomised from the value of the bundle of commodities and depends on the social conditions that form the monetary sphere. Keynesian social structures and policies of effective demand determine – and are established through distributional class struggle – the level of wage.

 

 

2. New Solution’s general formulation

                Foley (1982) and Mohun (1994) propose a more general formulation of the value of labour-power, liberated from Regulation’s historicist preoccupations. Labour-power is not considered as a commodity since it is not capitalistically produced in general.

Mohun (1994, p.397) considers first a case similar to that of Regulation: “if people have non-market access to the means of subsistence, or if people own resources which enable them to produce commodities on their own account to exchange, via money, for means of subsistence, then labour-power will not be a commodity at all”. He rejects these cases because as a rule the reproduction of labour-power under capitalism passes through capitalist channels: “So there must be some condition, or social relation, which separates the majority of people from the means of production, and which either forces people into the market to sell the only commodity they posses, their capacity to work, or labour-power, or forces them into non-market dependence upon those who do so sell” (Mohun (1994), p.397). Thus, he distances himself from the Regulationist fallacies on commoditisation of workers’ consumption.

But then he distinguishes two definitions of the value of labour-power. The first is the classical one, as a bundle of wage-goods. Since labour-power is a commodity, sold in the market for its exchange-value, which in turn is spent on means for subsistence, then – given that prices are proportional to values – the value of the subsistence commodity bundle must be equivalent to the value of labour-power, and can therefore be taken as its measure. He rejects this view as a particular case, when prices are proportional to values. Instead, he proposes what he considers as the more general case.

First, he argues that labour-power is not a capitalistically produced commodity; it is a commodified aspect of human beings, and human beings are not produced in any valorisation process. The reproduction of people can be considered as a labour process, but the relations involved are not class ones, there is no private property in the means of (re)production from which non-possessors can be excluded, the labour involved is not wage labour, and (re)production is neither production for sale nor production for profit.

Second, since labour-power is not capitalistically produced, it does not enter the world of commodities and does not operate according to its rules (average rate of profit etc.). Since it does not enter the world of commodity equivalence and since prices are not proportional to values (as a rule), then the value of the bundle of wage-goods does not coincide with the value that the wage can purchase (command).

Against this approach, It might be argued that what is at issue is the equivalent of the value of labour-power, and that this equivalent is a set of produced commodities whose production involves different compositions of capital, having to earn in equilibrium the economy-wide rate of profit, and whose output (and input) values therefore require transformation into prices of production.

The result is that – on the basis of the rejection of the commodity nature of labour-power – wage is separated from the value of labour-power. Instead, it is determined on the aggregate level (in the division of the net product between wage and profit share) and then its quantum is established as a measure of value. This quantum (LEM or MEL) is then applied to individual capitals and labour processes. Again, here the same problem with the Regulationist version arises: what determines this distribution? Mohun (1994, p.402) gives a telling answer:

Rather than concrete labour embodied in commodities workers consume, the value of labour-power is a proportion of abstract labour performed. As the object of class struggle, it is conceded to workers in the form of wages in exchange for a unit of labour-power bought by capitalists. This division of abstract labour, or money value added, defines the rate of surplus-value for the economy as a whole, ipso facto determined by class struggle between workers and capitalists.

 

Then the problem of the determination of the price level appears again. Mohun (1994, p.407) recognises that “there is an infinite number of conceivable price systems compatible with this understanding of value theory, each price system being a different redistribution of labour-times, and each price a representation of abstract labour, or a form of value”.

A final point requires clarification. For the New Solution, variable capital is not revalued, during the transformation procedure. More accurately, wage (the price of labour-power) is not revalued, although the bundle of wage-goods (the actual value of the labour-power) is revalued. Since labour-power is not a capitalistically produced commodity, there is neither average rate of profit nor value and surplus-value involved and, hence, nothing to transform (Mohun (1994), p.401). This differential treatment of the value-price relation of an input hinges upon its rejection of the commodity-nature of labour-power. On the contrary, it is considered as an input whose value (the value of labour-power) and its price (the wage) are determined outside proper commodity relations and mainly through a distributional class struggle. This distributional class struggle establishes structural forms (usually in the form of institutional arrangements) which regulate the wage level.

 

 

Conclusions

                The LEM perspective opens an interesting field of discussion by aiming for a social paradigm and by focusing on the role of money. However, the results are less than the expectations generated.

By questioning the commodity nature of labour-power it opens the floodgates to the rejection of the whole Classical and Marxian approach on value. What ultimately determines the distribution of the social product – between the wage and the profit share – is the black box of distributional class struggle. The latter is considered almost open and beyond any determination. Additionally, it is operationalised usually through the recourse to blatant institutionalism, i.e. it is solved exogenously. Equally, by relating value (and abstract labour) to (non-commodity) money at the general level and then by changing the course of determination of the constituent parts it flirts dangerously with a Quantity Theory version. The subsequent re(in)statement of Labour Value Theory appears more as a dethronement.

 

 

 

REFERENCES

Aglietta M. (1979), “A Theory of Capitalist Regulation”, NLB

Aglietta M.-Brender A. (1984), “Les metamorphoses de la societe salariale”, Calman-Levy

Aglietta M.-Orlean A. (1984), “La violence de la monnaie”, PUF

Babbage C. (1832), ‘On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures’in ‘The works of Charles Babbage’ edited by Martin Campbell-Kelly, London : William Pickering

Benetti C. (1974), «Valeur et Repartition», Maspero

Benetti C.-Cartelier J. (1980), “Marchands, salaries et capitalistes”, Maspero

Bohm-Bawerk E. (1975), “Karl Marx and the Close of his System”, Merlin

Bowles S.-Gintis H. (1981), Structure and Practice in the Labour Theory of Value”, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol.17 no.1-2

Cartelier J. (1976), «Surproduit et reproduction sociale», Maspero

Deleplace G. (1979), ‘Theories du capitalisme’, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble-Maspero, Grenoble

De Vroey M. (1981), “Value, Production and Exchange” in Steedman-Sweezy eds.   (1981), “The Value Controversy”, Verso

De Vroey M. (1982), “On the Obsolescence of the Marxian Theory of Value: A Critical Review”, Capital & Class no.17

De Vroey M. (1984), “Inflation: a non-monetarist monetary interpretation”, Cambridge Journal of Economics vol.8 no.4

Dumenil G. (1980), “De la valeur aux prix de production”, Economica

Elson D. ed. (1979), “Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism”, CSE Books

Elson D. (1979), “The Value Theory of Labour” in Elson ed. (1979), “Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism”, CSE Books

Fine B. ed. (1986), “The Value Dimension”, Routledge

Foley D. (1982), “The value of money, the value of labour-power and the Marxian        Transformation Problem”, Review of Radical Political Economics vol.14 no.2

Franklin B. (1863), “The Works of Benjamin Franklin”, J.Sparks, Boston

Gleicher D. (1983), “A historical approach to the question of abstract labour “, Capital &         Class no.21

Gleicher D. (1985), “A rejoinder to Eldred: Abstract Labour, the Rubin School and the              Marxist Theory of Value”, Capital & Class no.24

Gleicher D. (1985-6), “The ontology of labor values: remarks on the Science & Society            value symposium”, Science & Society vol.XLIX no.4

llyenkov E.V. (1982), “The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete in Marx’s Capital”,         Progress

Kay G. (1979), “Why Labour is the starting point of capital”, in Elson ed. (1979), “Value:           The Representation of Labour in Capitalism”, CSE Books

Lipietz A. (1982), “The So-Called “Transformation Problem” Revisited”, Journal of      Economic Theory no.26

Lipietz A. (1985), “The Enchanted World”, Verso

Marx K. (1971), “Theories of Surplus-Value”, vol.III, Progress

Marx K. (1981), “Grundrisse”, Penguin

Marx K. (1979), “Capital”, vol.I, Penguin

Mavroudeas S. (1990), “Regulation Approach: a Critical Appraisal”, Ph.D. thesis,       Birkbeck College, University of London

Mohun S. (1994), “A re(in)statement of the Labour Theory of value”, Cambridge Journal         of Economics vol.18, no.4

Pilling G. (1986), “The law of value in Ricardo and Marx” in Fine B. (1986), “The Value              Dimension”, Routledge

Ramos A. (1995), “The Monetary Expression of Labour: Marx’s twofold measure of   value”, EEA Conference

Rosdolsky R. (1977), “The making of Marx’s “Capital”, Pluto Press

Rubin I.I. (1973), “Essays on Marx’s theory of value”, Black & Rose

Rubin I.I. (1978), “Abstract labour and value in Marx’s system”, Capital & Class no.5

Uno K. (1980), “The Principles of Political Economy”, London

Vatter H. (1967), “Has there been a twentieth-century consumer durables revolution?”,          Journal of Economic History vol.xxvii no.1

Zeleny J. (1980), “The logic of Marx”, Blackwel


[1]           See Marx ((1981), p.100), Rosdolsky ((1977), p.25), Rubin ((1978), p.109-110)).

[2]                      Elson (1979), not only distanced herself from Rubin but she even accused him of the same technicist deviation as Sweezy, Dobb, Meek, Althusser etc.

[3]           See Marx’s (1971, p.161-3) polemic against Bailey.

[4]           See Mavroudeas (1990).

[5]           See Vatter (1967).

“Deconstructing the Canon: Political Economy and Post-Modernism”

European Conference on the History of Economics (ECHE)

 

“The History of Economics: Constructing the Canon”

 

17-19 April, 1997, Panteion University, Athens

 

 

 

 

“Deconstructing the Canon: Political Economy and Post-Modernism”

 

Stavros D. Mavroudeas

University of Macedonia

Department of Economic Studies

156 Egnatia St.

P.O.Box 1591

54006 Thessaloniki

GREECE

 

tel.: +30 +31 – 891779

fax: +30 +31 – 891750

e-mail: smavro@macedonia.uom.gr

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

                The study of the historical creation and the theoretical substantial content of Political Economy is an area dominated by heterodox and Marxist interpretations. These interpretations generally focus on the emergence of capitalist economies and the subsequent need for a self-sufficient scientific theory of economic relations. On the basis of these objective foundations of the relation between economy and economic theory the construction of Political Economy is explained. An explicit social perspective (usually through a class theory) underlies this theorisation.

On the other hand, Orthodox Economics understand Political Economy as mere history of economic thought, i.e. as a succession of more or less personal contributions with rather limited relation to the socio-economic framework. The relation between economy and economic theory is theorised through a historicist and mainly a-social perspective, since for Orthodox Economics social classes have no relevance, politics are excluded and methodological individualism reigns.

Recently, and under the diffusion of influence of the post-modernist trend within social sciences, another line of interpretation appears to emerge. This interpretation – in contrast to both the heterodox and Marxist emphasis on socio-economic factors and the neo-classical historicist and a-social perspectives – advances a politicist, historicist and relativist view. Politicist and historicist since agents’ actions are considered as almost indeterminate and history as totally unbound and open. Relativist because on the basis of history’s openness (every outcome is possible) any subjective interpretation is justifiable. Politicist because the reasons for the emergence of political economy are to be found not in the socio-economic framework but mainly in the field of the political.

This paper criticises the post-modernist interpretations from a Marxist perspective and rejects their arguments as historically unfounded and logically inconsistent.

 

 

European Conference on the History of Economics (ECHE)

 

“The History of Economics: Constructing the Canon”

 

17-19 April, 1997, Panteion University, Athens

 

 

 

 

“Deconstructing the Canon: Political Economy and Post-Modernism”

 

Stavros D. Mavroudeas

University of Macedonia

Department of Economic Studies

 

 

I. Introduction

                If there is a canon in the interpretation of Political Economy, this is provided by heterodox and Marxist views and it is based on an objective socio-historical perspective. Indeed, the study of the historical creation and the theoretical substantial content of Political Economy is an area dominated by heterodox (institutionalist, post-Keynesian, neo-Ricardian, Radical Political Economy) and Marxist interpretations. There are important reasons for this: the main focal points of Political Economy (the primacy of production over relations of exchange, Value theory, social classes and the interrelationship between the economic and the political sphere) have been discarded by neo-classical Economics in favour of a theory of prices and an economics-of-exchange perspective. The original Political Economy framework has been retained only by the heterodox and Marxist traditions.

These interpretations generally focus on the emergence of capitalist economies and the subsequent need for a self-sufficient scientific theory of economic relations. On the basis of these objective foundations of the relation between economy and economic theory the construction of Political Economy is explained. An explicit social perspective (usually through a class theory) underlies this theorisation.

On the other hand, Orthodox Economics understand Political Economy as mere history of economic thought, i.e. as a succession of more or less personal contributions with rather limited relation to the socio-economic framework. The relation between economy and economic theory is theorised through a historicist and mainly a-social perspective, since for Orthodox Economics social classes have no relevance, politics are excluded and methodological individualism reigns.

Recently, and under the diffusion of influence of the post-modernist trend within social sciences, another line of interpretation appears to emerge. This interpretation – in contrast to both the heterodox and Marxist emphasis on socio-economic factors and the neo-classical historicist and a-social perspectives – advances a politicist, historicist and relativist view. Politicist and historicist since agents’ actions are considered as almost indeterminate and history is perceived as totally unbound and open. Relativist because on the basis of history’s openness (every outcome is possible) any subjective interpretation is justifiable.

Objective socio-economic factors are reduced to mere historical accidents, caused by concrete historical conjunctures. At the same time, discursive elements assume an overarching importance which is expressed in the supposed explanatory primacy of the politics. Politics are understood as an ideological-cum-semiological  terrain and explain the specific outcome of struggles in concrete historical conjunctures.

This conception of politics – in contrast with previous views relating politics to the theory of classes – emphasises ideological and discursive factors and downgrades (if not eliminates at all) social and class factors.

The overall result of this perspective is a politicist interpretation of Political Economy, because the reasons for the emergence of political economy are to be found not in the socio-economic framework but mainly in the field of the political (Meuret (1988), p.225).

In this sense, the post-modernist interpretation is truly a deconstruction of the political economic understanding of Political Economy. The fundamental socio-economic factors are being relativised and reduced to historical accidents. Politics are autonomised from socio-economic factors and, then, based on subjective ideological-discursive elements and upgraded as explanatory factor. Additionally, theory is autonomised from socio-economic evolution and related to medium-term and subjectivist political influences. The outcome is a deconstructed Political Economy, understood as the chance outcome of concrete historico-political conflicts.

This paper is divided in three parts. The first gives a general analysis of post-modernism and its relationship to post-structuralism and post-marxism. The second traces the impact of post-Modernism in economics. Finally, the third studies one of the major areas of post-modernisr influences in economics: that of the interpretation of its past and present. This area covers the dispute of the “canon” of interpretation, believed to be common in all “modernist” approaches (neo-classicism, Keynesianism, Marxism – and with the probable exception of certain Institutionalist trends). Meuret’s (1988) thesis of the political genealogy of Political Economy, provides a powerful version of the post-modernist perspective and proposes a re-interpretation of the creation of Political Economy. This paper criticises the post-modernist interpretations from a Marxist perspective and rejects their arguments as historically unfounded and logically inconsistent.

 

 

II. On Post-modernism

                Post-modernism is not a grand theory per se since its very definitional premise is a question of this type of theories. Lyotard (1984, p.xxiii) criticises sciences (or scientific discourses, in his theoretical framework) for tending to legitimise themselves with reference to some metadiscourse or «grand narrative», such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational subject or of the working class, or the creation of wealth. In contrast, he defines post-modern as «incredulity towards metanarratives» (Lyotard (1984), p.xxiv). According to Callinicos (1985, p.86), «postmodern science refuses any homogenising, terrorist metanarrative, proceeding by introducing new moves into old games, or inventing new games, so that they can be evaluated, not from the standpoint of some uniform truth, but on the basis of a pragmatics which is concerned with utterances’ effects, not their conformity to some overarching philosophical discourse». It is, therefore, more than obvious that the rejection of the general theoretical approach[1] is intrinsic to post-modernism. Of course, Lyotard’s grandiose declaration does not close the question for, if we set aside the post-modernist jargon, language tricks and mythology, the dialectics of life have the strange habit of often turning the content of a grand and pompous declaration into its exact opposite. Anti-theories usually become a mirrored image, albeit painted in black instead of white, of the very theories they claim to reject; and, seldom does their foremost definition by a sterile negation devoid them of any positive content. In this sense, post-modernism, by positing itself as the absolute opponent of the «grand narratives» becomes itself one; although it is a suis generis version, since it denies its very role.

The methodological counterpart of this post-modernist thesis is the method of decomposition or deconstruction and a blatant relativism and eclecticism. Its foundations lay on the so-called «post-modern» crisis. The course of the argument runs as follows. Traditional pre-industrial societies are supposed to be characterised by an organic cohesion of the life-world. On the other hand, modernity – identified with industrial society and dominated by technology – is ruptured by its differentiation into autonomous spheres (a thesis shared with representatives of the theory of post-industrial society). But it is able to retain its cohesion by virtue of an «imperialism» of the rationality and an ideology of progress, universality and continuity which takes the form of certain «grand narratives».

The dissolution of this cohesive element leads to the «postmodern» crisis and the eruption of discontinuity into the continuity of modernity. Furthermore, the precipitation of rationality together with the undermining of the role and the impact of material relations opens the way for the discourse. The discursive elements and the whole variety of possible interplays between signifier and signified become the centre of attention. Nothing can exist without its discursive reflection; the signified is inseparably bound to its signifier. Additionally, deconstruction questions even the correspondence between signifier and signified since, as Derrida argues, these two categories are interchangeable. The result is an open advocation of relativism or, in Platt’s (1989) terminology, of propositional undecidability. Deconstruction seeks to avoid any final propositional commitment because there are no essential determinations relating its objects of analysis to one another. Everything goes. This claim amounts to a total rejection of the existence of any essence. For example, for Derrida the existence and the eternal replication of difference makes any essential meaning undecidable[2]. Consequently, attempts, such as that of Platt, to apply post-modernism to the social sciences adopt notions like «recursion». Recursion, a term borrowed from computer science, refers to structures or networks which define themselves in progressively simpler terms. A recursive network is one in which distinctions of level can be made on the basis of repeated self-referencing operations. This relational but also indeterminate approach gives a typical example of post-modernist relativism. Finally, propositional undecidability is coupled with methodological individualism and an emphasis on mimesis, repetition and habits as the levers for the creation of discourses and social environments (although we must bear in mind that post-modernism refutes the concept of society as the all-embracing framework). The final mix is an extremely eclecticist recourse to historical relativism (see Raulet (1989), p.160).

Callinicos (1985), taking as criterion their method of theorising discourse, distinguishes two major post-modernist strands. The first, associated with Lyotard, draws heavily on a version of analytical philosophy of language (speech-act theory). The second strand is post-structuralism, which is itself divided into two sub-strands. On the one hand, there is Derrida’s textualism (characterised as the heir of German classical idealism) which denies the possibility of ever escaping the discursive; discourse has no extra-discursive referents and encompasses all the aspects of reality. On the other hand, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari propose a version of «worldly post-structuralism», which, in contrast to Derrida’s idealist theory, proposes an articulation of the discursive and the non-discursive. It is the «worldly post-structuralism» that provides most of the discreet links between certain newer non-orthodox «middle-range» theories[3], post-marxist theories and post-modernism (although Lyotard, based on his previous participation in the «Socialisme ou Barberie» group, advances a variant of post-marxism, as well).

«Worldly post-structuralism» meets the post-structuralist and post-marxist theories of another strand deriving from Althusserian structuralism and a mistreatment of Gramsci’s work. The typical and most representative exemplification of this strand is provided by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The fallacy of this approach has been exhibited in a number of critiques, of which the most prominent are those of Wood (1986) and Geras (1987). However, it is necessary to point out certain aspects of these theories which operate as their discrete links with post­-modernism.

To start with, the scapegoat of «essentialism», especially in the form of the supposed Marxist economism, is once again ceremoniously thrown in the fire. Consequently, structural relations, and especially class relations, are purged, downgraded or relativised and, instead, discourse assumes explanatory primacy. There are no such things as material and class positions and actions, but only discursively constructed ideas about them. As Wood (1986, p.62) remarks:

In this, Laclau and Mouffe have followed the now familiar trajectory from structuralism to post-structuralism – though they seem uncertain whether the post-structuralist dissolution of reality into discourse can be regarded as a general law of history (as it were) or whether it is only in the modern age, and particularly with the advent of «industrial society», that social reality has dematerialized and become susceptible to discursive construction.

Anderson (1988, p.40-55) has given a very lucid and accurate account of the common descent and the theoretical and personal continuity which links structuralism to post-structuralism. He delineates three major themes that established, in successive stages, the trajectory from structuralism to post-structuralism. Firstly, the originating discipline from which structuralism drew virtually all of its concepts, and then extending them to all the major structures of society, was linguistics; leading, thus, to what Anderson terms as the exhortation of language. Secondly, this absolutization of language led to the attenuation of truth. The precarious balance between the signifier and the signified, inherent in structuralist linguistics, severed any possibility of truth as a correspondence of propositions to reality. This, in return, implied a critical weakening of the status of causality. «Causality, even when granted admission, never acquires cogent centrality on the terrain of structuralist analysis» (Anderson (1988, p.50). The result of this process was the randomization of history. Since causality is weakened, an unbridgeable gulf exists between the general laws and causes and the actual events. So, there is the paradoxical result that a total initial determinism ends in the reinstatement of an absolute final contingency. All these three major themes, described by Anderson, lay at the heart of the notorious structure-subject riddle and already led the way to post-structuralism. It takes only the unavoidable questioning of the validity and the weight of the distinction between signifier and signified in order to detonate a chain reaction leading to post-structuralism. In a nutshell, the way that structuralism formulated, and believed it had solved, this riddle contained the seeds for a subsequent capsize into its antithesis; post-structuralism proper is born.

As Wood (1985) has shown, this trajectory from structuralism to post-structuralism has assumed flesh and bones in the journey of certain intellectuals from Althusserianism to post-marxism; she, moreover, identifies Poulantzas as their forerunner. For them the explanatory primacy of discourse is based on the autonomisation of ideology and politics from the economy. This is supplemented with the randomisation of history and politics. The first implies that the discursive elements cease to be determined, even in the last instance (according to the Althusserian past of these writers), by the economy. This is part and parcel of their anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist drive and their quest for «openness» and an «unsutured» theory. On the other hand, the randomisation of history and politics initiates a recourse to historicism. The result is an awkward hybrid of (implicit) absolute determinism and absolute contingency, with the emphasis on the latter. Following their Althusserian structuralist past, Laclau and Mouffe theorise structures and laws in a rigid, static and non-dialectical way (worthy, indeed, of mechanistic determinism) which, in return, enables them – but now under the new banner of post-structuralism -to reject them in favour of the indeterminacy of the historically specific.

 

 

III. Post-modernism, Economics and Political Economy

                It is only recently that the post-modernist trend appeared to make inroads in the field of economics. This is not strange since for post-modernism in social sciences the study-area of the economy has been considered as the basis of the socio-economic relations in all the so-called modernist discourses (neo-classicism, Marxism etc.). Post-modernism rejected this «essentialist» dominance of the economic relations.

Of course, there are unbridgeable differences between the Marxian perspective (as well as that of the Classical Political Economy) and that of neo-classical Economics.

The Marxian Critique of Political Economy considers socio-economic relations as an unseparable whole, which in bourgeois society is being fetishistically separated in the spheres of economics and politics. Within this unseparable whole social relations securing the creation of social wealth and the material reproduction of society (i.e. the moment of production and its subsequent moments of circulation/exchange and distribution) have a determining primacy over non-productive spheres of social activities. However, the latter  exert feedback influences of the former. From the theoretical aspect, the study of the socio-economic relations in production, exchange and distribution constitute the basis on which the study of the rest of the socio-economic relations (ideological, political etc.) should be studied. In this sense the Marxian Critique studies economic relations in direct but also structured connection to social and political relations. The same holds for the Classical Political Economy of Smith and Ricardo, since – by definition – it studies economic relations as social relations.

On the contrary, Economics separate artificially «economic» relations from social and political relations. Moreover, they study as «economic» relations primarily those activities that arise in exchange (i.e. market relations). However, these «economic» relations (i.e. the market) are being considered the basis of the social and political relations – which are being studied by separate scientific branches. Post-modernism conflates unjustly those two opposing perspectives under the common accusation of economism.

The recent post-modernist inroads in economics may be grouped in three broad theoretical categories:

1) A middle-of-the-road trend, organised in the area of Radical Political Economy around the remnants of the newer non-orthodox “middle-range” approaches (Regulation, Flexible Specialisation).

2) A current deriving from the Althusserian tradition (Amariglio-Ruccio (1994), Callari-Cullenberg-Biewener (1994)).

3) A host of authors flowing from the Keynesian, post-Keynesian, Institutionalist but also from heterodox neo-classical trends (Samuels (1990, 1991), Mirowski(1991), McCloskey (1985), (Klamer (1988), Weintraub (1991)).

 

The newer non-orthodox “middle-range” theories

                The first current adopts influences from the “worldly post-structuralist” strand. It maintains that a radical historical change has taken place and we live in  a new post-modern era of capitalism (post-Fordism, second industrial divide etc.). In this sense post-modernist elements in theory are the corollary of real changes rather than simply a theoretical perspective. Post-structuralism and post-marxism provide the links between the new intellectual fashion of post-modernism and the Regulation Approach, and possibly certain other newer non-­orthodox «middle-range» theories.

These theories are based on some mediating ground, which is usually provided in the form of the structure­-subject relationship and the relation between economy, politics and ideology. Furthermore, it is often accompanied with a more or less covert recourse to methodological individualism, as a solution to the structure-subject riddle. The newer non-orthodox «middle-range» approaches supply the ideal ground for such an experiment. For them, the problem of the structure-subject is crucial, not only because it is an important problem as such, but also because it affects their general-theoretic requirements. In addition, theoretical and conceptual relativism, multi-causality, eclecticism, empiricism and historicism lay at the very heart of their theoretical systems. Finally, the majority of their representatives share the same social and intellectual past with the proponents of post-modernism and post-marxism. Post-­structuralism and post-marxism, apart from being the new trend, appears to solve many of their broader referential problems.

For example, Lash (1990), proposing a political economy of post-modernism, believes that a «regime of signification» is co-articulated with a «regime of accumulation». On this basis, he defines the new restructured form of capital accumulation as «post-fordism» or «disorganised capitalism», which is characterised by a turn from mass production and consumption to the services and information economy, flexible production and specialised consumption. With regard to the social aspect, the working-class is being shrinked and fragmented, resistance is apportioned to decentralised and multi-collective (inter-class) social movements and individualism returns. Additionally, Lash argues that this new (post-fordist) regime of accumulation is being transformed with accelerating rhythms to a regime of signification, because both the means and the forces of production acquire an increasingly cultural – rather than strictly economic – hue. The forces of production are no longer mediated by the material means of production but constitute issues of discourse and communication between management and workers. Lash suggests that the wide-spread implementation of quality circles and team briefings are obvious and undeniable proofs of this alleged transformation. For the critical reader it is obvious that all these theoretical elements are loans from the Regulation Approach and the Flexible Specialisation theory. In addition references to the neo-classical institutionalism of Williamson and the theory of post-industrial society of Bell are equally present.

Another typical example is provided by the post-marxism of Laclau and Mouffe. When they attempt to give a solitary and vague economic reference to their elaborations they invoke the regimes of accumulation.

This does not mean that the Regulation Approach or any other newer non-orthodox «middle-range» theory adhere heart and soul to post-modernism and/or post-marxism. On the contrary, they represent a middle-of-the-road choice. In the regulationist tradition Lipietz introduces shyly the concept of the Universe of Discursive and Political Representations as a counterpart for the usual concepts of the Regime of Accumulation and the Mode of Regulation. Aglietta – in his latest works – moves further to discard the initial regulationist  theory and adopts Foucault’s theory of power, Baudrillard’s historical account and Girard’s methodology as his new framework.

On the other hand the Flexible Specialisation theory adopts an even more relativised, historicist perspective and from that point of view argues for its superiority against Regulation (Hirst-Zeitlin (1991)). Mass production and its flexible successor are accidental historical creations rather than inherent necessities of capitalism (Sabel-Zeitlin (1985)). The saturation of mass standardised products’ markets led to a change in consumer preferences and the creation of market niches based on quality characteristics. Additionally, the exhaustion of Fordist technical capabilities and the crisis of the 1970s led to the re-emergence of flexible small-scale production. This combination is crystalised in the creation of a new technological paradigm. based on flexible, programmable machinery able to respond swiftly to demand changes, using multi-skilled workers and in a context of co-operation and competition exemplified by the modern day neo-Marshallian industrial districts. The result is the new era of Flexible Specialisation. It is interesting that the driving force in these developments is considered the sphere of consumption and its «liberation» from supply-side constraints. A true consumer-sovereignty appears to reign and furthermore consumer preferences are formed on the basis of status and discursive elements. Curiously enough Baudrillard’s post-modernist theory is not invoked.

 

Post-Althusserian post-modernism

                There is also a current deriving from the Althusserian tradition, which ascribes explicitly to post-modernism. It is represented by authors around the Rethinking Marxism U.S. journal. It appears to have certain links with the British Althusserian branch around the Economy & Society journal, although the latter is closely associated with the Flexible Specialisation thesis (see Hirst-Zeitlin’s (1991) critique of Regulation and their exclamation of the superiority of Flexible Specialisation). For example, Amariglio-Ruccio (1994) maintain that their rejection of the «essentialism of the market» – that, according to them, can be found in both Marxism and Hayekian liberalism (and indeed of many other types of essentialism as well) – is similar to that of Hindess (1987).

This current does not accept the notion of a post-modern epoch (contrary to Laclau-Mouffe, who also stem from the Althusserian tradition). Amariglio-Ruccio (1994) reject the identification of the character of the economic theory with the issue of contemporary economic processes[4]. Instead, they try to propose a version of post-modern Marxism as a general theory. They criticise neo-classical, Keynesian and Marxist theories for their common foundational axes, namely (a) order (a strict causal determinism and ultimate orderly processes), (b) centering (the definition of the composition and nature of the economic subject as rational), (c) certainty (the purge of uncertainty and openness). They argue that the opposite poles (i.e. disorder, decentering and uncertainty respectively) should be introduced though a post-modern Marxist theory. Marx’s analysis is translated in terms of historical conjectures and contingencies; and, consequently, laws of motion and necessity are discarded. Then the Althusserian theory of ideology and his methodology of overdetermination are introduced. The first is supposed to enable the social construction of subjects and their discursive nature. The notion of overdetermination and the process without a subject is taken to imply a radical contingency and uncertainty about socio-economic processes.

The post-Althusserian project of the creation of a post-modern Marxism is inherently contradictory since post-modernism rejects general theory in principle. Additionally, on the one hand due reference is paid to post-structuralism but, on the other hand, the Althusserian structuralist approach of a process without subject is adopted. This makes the whole scheme inherently inconsistent. It is true – as Anderson has pointed out – that latent links exist between the prima facie opposite trends of structuralism and post-structuralism. But this does not make the trajectory from the one to the other less contradictory, Finally, the Althusserian theory of ideology was based on the theory of theoretical practice. According to the latter the scientificity or truth of thought is judged by the purely internal criteria of theoretical practice, not by its dialectical relationship to the concrete reality. The result of this thesis is the crude counterposition of an empiricist understood reality and a theory riddled with scientism. In a way, the Althusserian purge of

 

dialectics and its substitution with a structuralist formalism ended up with a version of the relation between reality and theory on the same lines with the positivist dichotomy «model-real world». It is true, on the other hand, that at the same time it opened the floodgates for subsequent positions which – while keeping the separation between model and real world – they questioned the objectivity of the former and relativised even more its content. In the post-Althusserian post-modernism not only theory is separated from reality but also there are no «internal» criteria for the judgment of scientific truth. But, although Althusserianism opened these gates there was a lot of work needed in order to pass them. This was not Althusser’s doing but that of his epigones. In this sense, the post-Althusserian invocation of L.Althusser as a «post-modern» thinker (Ruccio (1991), p.500) is completely unfounded.

 

Heterodox, Keynesian and Institutionalist post-modernists

                Finally, there is                 a large host of writers stemming from the traditions of the Economics who begin by questioning the objectivity of economic theory. In contrast, they stress the social construction of theory as discourse, the decentering of the subject (in the sense that multiple subject-positions exist) and that subjectivity is not prior to but constituted by systems of language, power and other social factors. Therefore, scientific objects are always preinterpreted and science cannot be separated from rhetoric. Hence, value judgments cannot be purged from theory in the way orthodox Economics – via the distinction between normative and positive economics – do. Finally, from this perspective, they question traditional scientific boundaries in the social sciences.

It seems that this diverse host of writers is quite close – although without explicit reference – to the textualist post-modernism. in the sense that they concentrate on discursive elements. Extra-discursive referents are not employed or appear to have almost no consequence.

Their starting point is the social construction of economic subjects[5]. Assaulting neo-classical orthodoxy, they maintain that economic theories are socially constructed and non-value free. In this way the purported neo-classical monopoly of truthfulness, impartiality and objectivity is negated. On the contrary, many different theoretical perspectives can exist within economic science, depending upon different ethical (value) judgments. However, there are no specific criteria for judging the truthfulness of each theory. Additionally, the social construction of the subjects is equally relativised and understood in mere political terms. Whereas Marxism recognises the social construction of subjects but bases this construction upon the social division of labour and the subsequent class structure, for post-modernists this «imperialism» of the economic – and even more of the sphere of production – is unacceptable. Instead, they choose more fluid, short-term and relativist referents which enable the acclaimed openendedness and indeterminacy of their theory. Post-modernists override the scientific boundaries but without transforming their interrelationship. «Politics» are added rather than organically linked to «economics». The only major change is that both are discursively understood. In the cases where an extra-discursive is employed, this is usual a theory of power not generated by socio-economic relations in the production of social wealth (as in Marxism) but by the inherent nature and desires of mankind (e.g. Foucault).

Samuels (1996) provides a representative account of this perspective. Although he does not reject the importance of truth (o.p.p.114), he posits that the social construction of truth leads to a multiplicity rather than homogeneity of truth (o.p.p.115). Therefore, all epistemological, ontological and theoretical positions are functional with regard to the reconstruction of extant reality. This reconstruction is almost solely a discursive matter. Hence, vast opportunities for selective perception exist (o.p.p.117). These arguments hold even more forcefully in social sciences, which – most notably economics – are systems of belief and modes of discourse and not solely epistemological phenomena (Samuels (1991), p.516). The social construction of knowledge-belief (the control of language), in return,  organises the control of the definition of reality. Consequently, it has an inexorable political nature (o.p.p.517). It is indicative how he understands this political nature: it is when the mode of discourse (i.e. selective perception) is combined with hierarchical social structures (o.p.p.519). The prioritisation of the characteristic «hierarchical» is telling. Politics are understood as mere struggle for power and hierarchy. This struggle is autonomised from the economy and even overimposed on the latter.

 

IV. A political genealogy of Political Economy?

Meuret’s (1988) «Political genealogy of political economy» is an interesting attempt to propose a post-modernist interpretation of the birth and the establishment of Political Economy. Meuret’s framework is based on a combination of Foucault’s theory of knowledge (as a programme of truth but without calling into question its actual truthfulness) and the Annales economic historiography. His main thesis is that Political Economy became the dominant discourse because it constructed a better political framework for the co-existence of capital, state and those trying to protect themselves from their power. Thus, the reasons for the emergence of Political Economy are to be found in the field of the political rather than that of the economic. It is indicative that, for Meuret, the final crisis of the ancien regime (the last stage of the feudal system) is caused mainly by political reasons; and particularly political ideological and discursive factors.

Meuret begins his essay by adopting Foucault’s savoir and Veyne’s “programme of truth” perspective, within which a theory is posited as a discourse autonomised from and non-determined by other spheres of social activities. Therefore, a particular theoretical discourse should not lay claim to truthfulness. The very term genealogy, employed by Meuret, denotes that his account of the construction and establishment of Political Economy does not pose the claim of truthfulness. Then the habitual post-modernist jargon of discourse, representations, utterances, rhetoric (op.p.241) etc. is employed in his study. A major element of his analysis is the way in which political theories and economic representations are linked. He argues that economic and political representations stand on an equal par and they reciprocally determine how men agree on a common perception of the world in order to inhabit it together. The question is why these – or only these two – fields of discursive representations exist.

His second theoretical pillar is his definitional framework and the subsequent historical account of the evolution of modern societies. Both these elements are adopted from the school of the Annales. He defines, following Braudel, three major actors: capitalism, the state, and the public.

Capitalism is not the understood as a mode of production (founded on the private ownership of the means of production and the subsequent transformation of labour-power to a commodity) but as that economic organisation in which the indispensable exchange of necessary commodities is organised on the basis of the very minimum of necessary regulations (o.p.p.227). Capitalism’s actors are all those – merchants, industrialists, landowners – “who conduct themselves according to its rules, who play its game” (o.p.p.227). This definition of capitalism confines it to a mere mode of exchange relations. This understanding has critical consequences in Meuret’s analysis. Additionally, there is nothing to explain why these three figures (who correspond to the three of the four basic fractions of capital – merchant, industrial, landowning, money capital – are his sole actors. Then, the economy is defined as “sometimes all the exchanges of a given society, sometimes that part which remains outside the capitalist game” (o.p.p.227). Again here the economy appears mainly as an organisation of exchange. When a non-capitalist, in Meuret’s terms – and non-exchange (?) – part is included, this cannot be explained, since the economy is confined to exchange relations and production is absent.

Then the state is taken as an almost self-defined concept. This conception, also, fails to grasp the state as a derivative of the socio-economic organisation and not as a primary agent. Consequently, it fails also to understand the changes in the nature of state from one socio-economic system to the other. In his analysis Meuret cannot distinguish between the absolutist state of the last era of feudalism and the capitalist state.

Finally, the public is defined as “all citizens with the power to repudiate the state to the extent that they exercise this power… It is not a sociological but a political reality: a set of opinions, attitudes and propositions, of tacit resistances and acceptances which do or do not allow a governmental apparatus to function” (o.p.p.228). Again this term is highly problematic. The notion of citizen has a different content under different socio-economic systems (e.g. in a slave-owning city-state, in capitalism). Furthermore, it limits opinions and struggles only to those in relation to the state. There are no relations of struggle within the socio-economic structure, even if these are considered of equal validity to those in relation to the state.

Meuret’s definitions fail to understood politics and political power as a truly social process. Additionally, he fails to establish them on the problem of production and distribution of social wealth. This failure derives from both the neglect of the sphere of production (and the socio-economic relations of production) and the subsequent rejection of the concept of social classes (defined on the basis of these socio-economic relations of production). The result is a more or less open recourse to methodological individualism: “men agree on a way of perceiving the world in order to inhabit it together, economically and politically” (o.p.p.228).

On the other hand, his historical account of the development of modern (capitalist) economies fails to distinguish rigorously from the preceding ancien regime and also cannot explain the conflictual process of development of capitalism from within this regime.

A final point is necessary with regard to the adoption within Meuret’s post-modernist account of the Annales’ historical and definitional framework. The school of Annales or of the New French History dominated the French intellectual scene for quite a long time, since its emergence in 1929, and continues to have an imposing presence. Its linkage to post-modernism sounds curious enough, since it has been known for its emphasis on structures rather than agents. It focuses on the economic background of history, instead of the political events, and it pursues an inter-disciplinary approach, transcending the boundaries between the scientific branches. Especially Duby and Braudel emphasise the perennial character of the heavy structures («structures lourdes»). The impact of these structures is expressed through the norms levied on daily life which confine the space of liberty allowed for initiatives to individuals and groups.

However, the Annales passed through several phases of evolution[6]. It is the second period of the Annales, which begun after the 2nd WW. and revolved around Braudel’s works, that emphasises structure. The theses of the first period of the Annales (expressed in the works of Bloch and Febvre) came under the attack of the then predominant structuralism. Braudel answered this attack by incorporating part of the structuralist project. The concept of structure was appropriated, if not as a conceptual framework, at least as a descriptive notion. The structure was seen as embodied in the beginning of the period of long duration. In Braudel’s (1969) words, «historical structures are visible, detectable, and to a certain extent measurable: duration is their measure». Thus, there was a shift to a historical approach that privileged the long duration and undermined specific events.

Meuret adopts from the Annales’ perspective (a) the interdisciplinary framework and (b) its terminology. On the other hand, he discards their emphasis on economic relations and the structuralism of the second period.

Based on the above, Meuret advances his political genealogy because he maintains that the reasons for the emergence of Political Economy are to be found in the field of the political. He defines Political Economy as a discourse and, moreover, as the governmental discourse of the modern world (o.p.p.227). because it was able to construct a superior political framework for the co-existence of capital, state and those trying to protect themselves from their power. Political Economy’s exemplary version is found in A.Smith. However, Political Economy’s superiority over other discourses – either in the field of Political Theory or in pre-classical economic theories – is not based on its theoretical status only but it was crucially reinforced by a particular event, the industrial revolution (o.p.p.247). In this sense, the predominance of Political Economy over other discourses does not derive from its truthfulness but from its programmatic value (as a prescription for actions) in relation to external events. This is a clear-cut post-modernist argument, which however, fails to explain why this crucial external referent – the industrial revolution – has taken place. If the latter was a necessary feature of capitalism – as Marx thought – this creates problems to Meuret’s production-less understanding of capitalism.

Meuret proposes a four-phases periodisation of the political genealogy of Political Economy, which is founded on the relation between representations of the economy and its congruence with the political system:

(a) the period of absolutism (till 1680), where the state is accepted as the legitimate regulator of market activities in order to guarantee people’s happiness and the state strength

(b) absolutism’s crisis of legitimacy of the state (18th century), which is attributed to political reasons

(c)18th century pre-classical search (Physiocrats etc.) for a redefinition of the role and the legitimacy of the state

(d) A.Smith’s solution as the discourse of Political Economy, in which the state and market relations are equally domesticated (in the sense that are mutual defined on a national (domestic) basis and the second operates with minimum regulations and is the sole responsible for social wealth whereas the first should overlook and guarantee this function)[7].

This account is based on political and historically accidental factors plus the primacy of the discursive elements. The lack of any reference to classes and social relations of production creates significant explanatory problems. For example, the era of mercantilism – as the transition period when one element of the feudal system (the state of absolute monarchy) allied with the precursors of capitalism (merchant capital) in order to overcome the feudal socio-economic fragmentation – loses any significance. Equally, the construction of Political Economy is confined merely to the redefinition of the role of the state and of the modus operadi of market. Crucial elements of the Smithian theory, such as Value theory, the role of the division of labour, the problem of the source of social wealth appear to play no role. In this understanding of Political Economy is highly questionable if D.Ricardo – who is usually considered as the most coherent representative of Political Economy and who paid less attention to philosophical and political problems and focused on a production-based Value theory – has any place at all. In contrast, a different approach – deriving the evolution of the science of economics from socio-economic developments and founding them primarily – but not exclusively – to the sphere of production can provide a better understanding of the emergence of Political Economy: (a) why at a certain historical epoch became necessary the construction of an autonomous science of economic relations, (b) why its first version took the form of Political Economy  and (c) why Political Economy retreated and Economics took its place as the dominant version of a science of economic relations.

 

 

V. Conclusions

 

Post-modernism attempts, legitimately, to dispute the supposed socially-neutral and objective character of Economics. However, in disputing this as a particular socially-constructed discourse it rejects the existence of a criterion of truthfulness. Additionally, this social construction is reduced to an autonomised sphere of politics. In contrast, for Marx there is such a criterion for choosing between competing socially-constructed perspectives: labour and the right to distribution of the producers of social wealth. Moreover, the Marxian social-construction begins from the production of social wealth and from that generates the political-form as an organic but also determinate derivative. Post-modernism by creating an imaginary world where only words, texts and discursive elements exist and production is annihilated, recourses to a renovated version of idealism.

Political Economy and its Marxian Critique have provided much more promising routes in order to explain historical reality and act within it.

 

 

 

REFERENCES

Aglietta M. (1979), “A Theory of Capitalist Regulation“, Verso

Amariglio J.-Ruccio D. (1994), “Postmodernism, Marxism, and the Critique of Modern Economic Thought”, Rethinking Marxism vol.7 no.3

Blaug M. (1970), “”Economic Theory in retrospect”,

Braudel F. (1985), “Civilisation and Capitalism”, London

Callari A.-Cullenberg S.-Biewener  C. (1994), “Marxism in the Postmodern Age“, Guilford

Callinicos A. (1985), “Postmodernism, Post-structuralism, Post-Marxism“, Theory, Culture and Society vol.2 no.11

Dosse F. (1986), “History in pieces: from the militant to the triumphant Annales“, Telos no.67

Foucault M. (1970), “The order of things”, London

Geras N. (1987), “Post-Marxism? “, New Left Review no.163

Hindess B. (1987), “Freedom, Equality and the Market“, Tavistock

Hirst P.-Zeitlin J. (1991), “Flexible specialisation versus post-Fordism”, Economy and Society no.20

Klamer A.-McCloskey D.-Solow R. (1988) eds. «The consequences of Economic Rhetoric», Cambridge University Press

Laclau E.-Mouffe C. (1985), “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics“, Verso

Lash S. (1990), “Sociology of Postmodernism”, Routledge

Lipietz A (1983), “The enchanted world“, Verso

Lyotard J.-F. (1984), “The Post-modern Condition“, Manchester University Press

McCloskey D. (1985), «The Rhetoric of Economics», University of Wisconsin Press

McCloskey D. (1988), «

Meuret D. (1988), “A political genealogy of political economy”, Economy and Society, vol.17 no.2

Mirowski P. (1991), «Postmodernism and the social theory of value», Journal of Post

Keynesian Economics, vol.13 no.4

Piore M. – Sabel C. (1984), “The second industrial divide”, Basic Books

Platt R. (1989), “Reflexivity, recursion and social life: elements for a postmodern

sociology“, Sociological Review vol.37 no.4

Raulet G. (1989), “Marxism and the post-modern Condition“, Telos no.67

Reich M. -Edwards R. – Gordon D. (1982), “Segmented Work, Divided Workers: the                 Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States”, Cambridge University Press

Rubin I.I. (1989), “A History of Economic Thought”, Pluto

Ruccio D. (1991), “Postmodernism and economics”, Journal of Post-Keynesian          Economics vol.13 no.4

Sabel C.-Zeitlin J. (1985), “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets

and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization“, Past&Present no.108

Samuels W. (1990), “Economics as Discourse“, Kluwer

Samuels W. (1991), “Truth” and “discourse” in the social construction of economic   reality”, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics vol.13 no.4

Samuels W. (1996), «Postmodernism and economics: a middlebrow view», Journal of

Economic Methodology vol.3 no.1

Smith A. (1976a), “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, Oxford

Smith A. (1976b), “The Wealth of Nations”, Penguin

Weintraub E.R. (1991), “Surveying dynamics”, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics              vol.13 no.4

Wood E. (1986), “The retreat from class: A New “True“ Socialism“, Verso


[1]                      The general or «grand theory» approach constructs theories covering the whole spectrum, from the more abstract laws and concepts to the empirical analysis within a unified framework.

[2]                      Derrida (1981, p.219) defines undecidability as follows:

An undecidable proposition, as Godel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition which, given a set of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms.

[3]                      The breed of the «middle-range» theories rejects abstract general laws and the necessity of a general theory which it substitutes with intermediate concepts with an almost immediate identification with the most concrete phenomena or with empirical observations believed to be so (stylised «facts»).

The newer non-orthodox «middle-range» theories are a group of theories that predominated – and indeed characterised – the so-called Radical Political Economy after the 1970s. Approaches such as the French Regulation (Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1983)), the American Social Structures of Accumulation (Reich-Edwards-Gordon (1982)) and the Flexible Specialisation thesis (Piore-Sabel (1984)) are typical representatives of this trend.

[4]                      Amariglio-Ruccio (1994, p.9) dispute as unfounded and simplistic the supposed emergence of «consumerism».

[5]                      Works associated with the so-called new social movements (e.g.  feminist economics) take also part in the project of the «social construction: of economic categories. In many cases they adopt the post-modernist perspective.

[6]                      For an exposition of its theory, a periodisation and also a critique of the school of Annales, see Dosse (1986).

[7]                      Meuret recognises correctly that for Smith the state has a role in the economy.

‘Stages of Capitalist Development: Is there a new post-1973 stage in process?’

International Conference

‘The work of Karl Marx and the challenges of the 21st century’

Institute of Philosophy

Havana, Cuba 5-7 May 2003

 

 

‘Stages of Capitalist Development: Is there a new post-1973 stage in process?’

Stavros D. Mavroudeas

Alexis Ioannides

University of Macedonia

Department of Economic Studies

156 Egnatia St.

P.O.Box 1591

54006 Thessaloniki

GREECE

tel.: +30 +31 – 891779

fax: +30 +31 – 891750

e-mail: smavro@uom.gr

 

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that capitalism’s development is not a continuous process but a succession of stages characterized by different qualitative and quantitative features. The Marxist political economy tradition analyses this process through periodization theory.

The first part of this paper offers a critical survey of the main currents in periodization theory. Different theories and methodological approaches are presented and evaluated. Finally, a specific theory of periodization of capitalism is proposed. It is argued that periodization should be conducted at the level of the mode of production. Its main criterion should be the relations of extraction and appropriation of surplus-value and the attendant modes of socialisation of production. The modes of extraction and appropriation of surplus-value refer upon its two fundamental processes, absolute and relative surplus-value. Additionally, surplus-value should be conceived first and foremost as a relation between necessary and surplus labour-time. Thus, while accepting Marx’s point that in capitalism relative surplus-value is always predominant, it is argued that different stages are recognised according to the historically specific configuration between absolute and relative surplus-value. Changes in the immediate production-process, the mode of socialisation of production, the forms of capitalist competition, the internationalisation of capital, the political form etc. stem from this main criterion.

On the basis of this perspective three stages of capitalist development are recognised:

(a)     laissez-faire capitalism (till the end of the 19th century), characterised by the special importance of absolute surplus-value.

(b)     monopoly capitalism, subdivided in two phases 1) the monopolist phase (marked by the 1929 crisis and the turbulent period of transition till W.W.II) and, 2) the state-monopolist one (from the end of W.W.II till the crisis of 1973). This stage is characterised by an increased dependence upon relations of relative surplus-value.

(c)     a new stage of capitalist development whose construction began heuristically after the 1973 crisis and continues till today. This new third stage is characterised by a resurgence of absolute surplus-value although relative surplus-value remains always dominant.

The second part of this paper tests the hypothesis about this new third stage of capitalist development on the basis of modern studies about the evolution of real work-time. There is convincing evidence that a rising number of workers in advanced countries, and in the U.S. particular, are regularly clocking workweeks in excess of their statutory standard. This change marks the reverse of a long-time trend for the reduction of actual working time. Additionally, other studies suggest that capitalist restructuring has led to a significant intensification of work. All these strengthen the hypothesis about a new configuration of absolute and relative surplus-value giving rise to a new stage of capitalist development.

 

I. Introduction

During the last two decades the operation of the capitalist system has been marked by significant problems but also far-reaching transformations. After the crisis of the beginning of the ‘70s, a prolonged period of difficulties began which affected all its crucial factors (profitability, capital accumulation etc.). Capital’s answer to these problems has been the initiation of radical changes in almost all its basic operational relations.

Labour-process changes towards forms of flexible labour and the production-process is being reshaped through the introduction of information technology and microelectronics. Competition exhibits a contradictory trend. On the one hand, crisis and cutthroat competition increases the centralisation of capital (particularly through recurrent waves of mergers and acquisitions) although in particularly dynamic new sectors new small firms appear and challenge traditional giants. On the other hand, faltering profitability has led to lean production and a reduction of the average size of the firm associated with a widespread expansion of subcontracting, which have an unclear effect on the concentration of capital. The financial system has altered via the expansion of credit money, the introduction of electronic money and a greater role for the stock market (as opposed to banks). State’s economic functions seem to change from Keynesian direct interventionism not to its extinction – as extreme neo-liberalism purports – but rather towards a state-supervisor. Distribution relations are modified with persistent attempts to restrain and even to reduce the value of labour-power and also with changes in the taxation and the social security system. International economic relations are marked by a more increased internationalisation of production, deregulation of capital flows and an ambiguous and crisis-prone over-expansion of the financial sector. Additionally, systems of economic and even political transnational integration are painstakingly but persistently established (EE, NAFTA etc.).

Finally, these transformations of the determining fundamental socio-economic relations of operation – moulded themselves through class struggle – affect class structure and political intermediation. New forms of work but also new sectors of the capitalist economy are reshaping radically the synthesis of both the working class and the bourgeoisie as well as their antagonism. Concomitantly, old forms of political intermediation (through the mass party system that predominated in most of the world) are crackling.

These changes pose a formidable task for Marxist theory and politics. How should the labour movement face them? Do they represent progressive changes or at least leave open the possibility for progressive solutions? Or, on the contrary, they signify a reactionary retrenchment? In any case, can the labour movement answer to these challenges by simply keeping its old line or a new radically change one is required? Usually responses to these questions have been confined to a shallow politicist basis. Contemporary social-democratic responses – frequently called centre-left – pose globalisation, flexible labour etc. as unavoidable but also welcome facts and call for a new realism. The latter implies an accommodation with the major aspects of capitalist transformations. What remains for the Left is to add a ‘social’ dimension to these transformations, which is supposed to secure social cohesion and ‘solidarity’ in the face of blind market forces. More traditionalist left responses condemn these changes as reactionary but believe that they can be confronted by following the good old ways.

It is interesting to contrast these rather shortsighted views with the way that the labour movement attempted to confront the previous wave of capitalist transformations, in the beginning of the 20th century. Both social-democratic and revolutionary responses derived from the fruitful theoretical debate on imperialism. All contributions in that debate (Lenin (1977), Hilferding (1981), Luxemburg (1971), Bukharin (1976)) based their political conclusions on trenchant theoretical analyses, unifying the most concrete political directives with abstract general theory. This study argues that a similar course is required today for the labour movement to be able to confront adequately and successfully the capitalist onslaught. The appropriate vehicle for such a synthesis is a theory of periodization (or stages) which starting from the more abstract level (general relations of operation) would be able to recognise particular eras of the capitalist system and then formulate concrete political directives.

The second part of this work studies the methodological aspects of a Marxist theory of periodization and sets the appropriate criteria. Particular attention is placed on the views of Poulantzas and Fine-Harris (1979). Its main conclusion is that periodization should be conducted at the level of the mode of production.

In the third part a specific theory of periodization of capitalism is proposed. It is argued that periodization should be conducted at the level of the mode of production. Its main criterion should be the relations of extraction and appropriation of surplus-value and the attendant modes of socialisation of production. The modes of extraction and appropriation of surplus-value refer upon its two fundamental processes, absolute and relative surplus-value. Additionally, surplus-value should be conceived first and foremost as a relation between necessary and surplus labour-time. Thus, while accepting Marx’s point that in capitalism relative surplus-value is always predominant, it is argued that different stages are recognised according to the historically specific configuration between absolute and relative surplus-value. Changes in the immediate production-process, the mode of socialisation of production, the forms of capitalist competition, the internationalisation of capital, the political form etc. stem from this main criterion. On the basis of this perspective three stages of capitalist development are recognised:

(1) laissez-faire capitalism (till the end of the 19th century), characterised by the special importance of absolute surplus-value.

(2) monopoly capitalism, subdivided in two phases 1) the monopolist phase (marked by the 1929 crisis and the turbulent period of transition till W.W.II) and, 2) the state-monopolist one (from the end of W.W.II till the 1973 crisis). This stage is characterised by an increased dependence upon relations of relative surplus-value.

(3) a new novel stage of capitalist development whose construction began heuristically after the mid-1970s crisis and continues till today. This new third stage is characterised by a resurgence of absolute surplus-value.

The fourth part applies this periodization theory in the case of Greece. Its first section proposes a periodization of Greek capitalism.  In a nutshell, it is argued that the evolution of Greek capitalism is characterized by significant peculiarities and time-lags regarding the general model of periodization proposed. These peculiarities and time hystereses marked mainly the two first stages. It is indicative that when the capitalist heartland of the West was entering the era of transition from the first stage to the second one capitalism in Greece had only been consolidated and fully formed. Thus, Greek capitalism covered in a peculiarly unified way the stages of laissez-faire and monopoly capitalism. This coexistence continued after W.W.II when the characteristics of the monopoly stage – and particularly those of the state-monopolist phase – predominated clearly. However, from the 1970s and onward most of the Greek peculiarities have been smoothen and the time-lags eliminated. Hence, the processes giving birth to the new third stage emerged in Greece at the same time with the capitalist heartland of the West.

The second section of the fourth part focuses upon the empirical evidence, in the case of Greece, concerning the emergence of a new post-1973 stage. The emphasis is placed on the main criterion – that of the new configuration of absolute and relative surplus-value – and particularly on the hypothesis of the resurgence of absolute surplus-value. In brief, it is argued that there is convincing evidence that such a resurgence is taking place. Finally the last part concludes.

 

 

II. Methodological and conceptual problems

The problem of periodising a social mode of production (i.e. of distinguishing different phases, stages or epochs within it) has been always a significant problem for Marxism. Marx himself has given ample proof of this, though without giving an explicit theory of periodization of social modes of production. He did distinguish different periods within feudalism but, more importantly, he gave elements for periodising the capitalist mode of production as well (formal and real subsumption of labour by capital, absolute and relative surplus-value etc.). However, there exist significant lacunae in the Marxian legacy on this field. Apart from the lack of an explicit theory of periodization, capitalism – as an historical mode of production and despite the fact that, during Marx’s time, it was already a fully developed mode of production – passed through several phases and transformations since then.

The necessity of periodization is almost obvious. Firstly, theory has to follow the pace of life and history is truly initiatory. Marxism, contrary to orthodox economics, has a dynamic and historical approach to time: changes (and even more importantly radical changes [ruptures and breaks in historical evolution]) do happen. Critical social theory must focus on changes and, furthermore, play an active role in bringing forth these changes.

Secondly, Marxist theory is based on – and aims at – a unity between scientific study and social praxis (the unity of theory and praxis). Thus, theory has to have political derivatives and implications (i.e. medium and short-term guidances for social action). Politics, after all, are exercised at the level of historically contingent (i.e. at the level of concrete). Abstract theory alone cannot provide such guidances. Theory, therefore, should – on the basis of its general principles (abstractions) – move to a lower level of abstraction and unify the abstract with the historically contingent in order to provide such political guidelines. The political role of theory – apart from providing ideological weapons – is to provide political tools for analysing current situations and organising political action. That means to give the ability to have a more general and informed-by-abstractions (i.e. able to foresee) perspective rather than simple empiricist perception. In this sense Marxist politics (i.e. medium and short-run directives) are organised on the basis of general principles and theory (i.e. the long-run point of view).

For all these reasons periodization should be a sine-qua-non element of both Marxist theory and politics. Moreover, it provides the link between theory and medium-term policy formation since it bridges the abstract with the historically concrete.

The first problem is that of the method of periodization. If capitalism, or any other social mode of production (m.o.p.), should be periodized, what are the criteria for this? Furthermore, since no social m.o.p. exists in a general pure form, but as specific, historically concrete and differing social formations then at what level should periodization be conducted. The answer to these questions depends on a crucial methodological problem: is essence fixed or not?

If essence is fixed, then the capitalist m.o.p. – as an essence – is non-transformable and hence no structural transformations take place at this level. Consequently there are no stages at the level of the m.o.p. The evolution of a m.o.p. does not exhibit separate stages or epochs but it is a continuous trend. Then, any changes are not deriving from the set of “internal-necessary” relations of the capitalist m.o.p., but are historically specific outcomes affecting external aspects – the level of appearances – of the m.o.p. These are considered as the expression of the historical process of class struggle. The latter is considered as entirely historically specific. This approach – whose structuralist characteristics are more or less obvious – considers class struggle as separate from and external to the capital-relation. Now, if class struggle is a functional subservient of the “iron necessities” of social structure then it follows obediently the course dictated by it: the course of history is almost pre-given. If, on the contrary, class struggle is self-determined then many historical outcomes are possible. In the first case a version of the old deterministic and mechanistic perspective is at hand. In the second, a variant of relativism and voluntarism emerges. Both are generated from the same framework, that of the (futile) controversy between structuralism and post-structuralism. Whereas the first version answers to the structure-agent riddle by positing a rigid determination of the agent by the structure, the second resorts to indeterminacy and agnosticism[1].

On the contrary, if essence is dynamic and transformable, then periodization should be conducted at the level of essence (i.e. at the level of the capitalist m.o.p.). In this case the capital-relation generates itself stages rather than being a continuous trend. Additionally, class struggle is an integral part of the capital-relation and of the course of capitalist accumulation. This course was implicitly followed by Marx, who considered class struggle at the level of the mode of production and indicated that the proletarian struggle is generated by the process of production, exchange and distribution and affects them as well[2]. This feedback relationship is established at the level of essence.

It is worth mentioning that the problem of the nature of essence has been a contested terrain since the creation of Political Economy. One of the fundamental differences between Marx and Ricardo was that while for Ricardo essence is something qualitatively fixed and non-differentiable, Marx sees and investigates the alteration of that essence; he understands it as something historically transitory which proceeds through different levels of development and qualitatively changes (see Zeleny (1980), ch.3)»[3].

The second fundamental question on periodization is whether it should be conducted at the level of the m.o.p. or at the level of socio-economic formation. The answer on this depends on the position taken on the problem of the nature of essence.

The Althusserian tradition posited the social formation (i.e. a concrete historical case where a number of different modes of production co-exist under the articulating dominance of one of them) as the only concretely tangible material. It, therefore, attributed to it actual historical time. The m.o.p. is a concept pertaining to the sphere of theory; hence it is not appropriate for the periodization of living history, but only for its logical analysis. Consequently, the theory of economic history should study only the actual social formations (which consist of several modes of production) and should have nothing to do «with the tendencies determined by the theoretical analysis of an isolated mode of production» (Althusser-Balibar (1977), p.300). Poulantzas (1975, p.48)[4] has overstated this argument by adding that only social formations that can be periodized, since it is in them that the class struggle is enacted.

Fine and Harris (1979, ch.7) have argued convincingly – following his periodization of feudalism[5] – that Marx’s perspective was different. Capitalism should be periodized as a m.o.p. in abstraction from specific social formations, since the laws of motion of the capitalist m.o.p. themselves give rise to distinct stages rather than continuous trends.                Periodization should not be conducted separately from the general theory of a m.o.p. but a continuation of the latter at a lower level of abstraction, This approach is not divorced from history nor is it an autonomized product of the head. It reproduces history in thought not in the sequence of actual historical time but in its essential determinations which are no less real than the immediate appearances.

A third – related to the above – problem concerns the notion of the social formation. The Althusserian tradition defined the social formation as a concrete historical case where a number of different modes of production co-exist under the articulating dominance of one of them. Thus, two elements can be distinguished. The first is its historically specific character (i.e. that each particular social formation is the concretisation of a particular and different historical course: every society has its own course). This specificity is attributed to class struggle, which is considered as separate from the essence of the mode of production. We have already dealt with this fallacy. The second element is that each social formation is considered as an articulation of different modes of production. This thesis is founded on the understanding of the mode of production as something pure and on the structuralist method of overdetermination.

The conception of the m.o.p. as a pure structure, non-existent in itself in actual historical time[6] suffers from high doses of idealism and ends up with an almost Weberian model of “ideal-type”. On the contrary, for Marx essence is a real category. Instead of a dichotomy between reality and its appropriation by thought, characteristic of positivism, Historical Materialism posits a dialectical relationship between them, which is grounded in reality. Marx’s analysis operates simultaneously on two levels: on the level of theoretical or logical development and on the level of real historical events. The level of theoretical development is not identical with but it is derived from real historical events. Activity on this level, insofar as it diverges from and runs counter to the actual historical events (and the level of immediate appearances), is not an a priori construction, but reflects the «life of the material» in its essence and expresses the essential and necessary relations of reality. There is a dialectical oscillation between abstract dialectical development and concrete historical reality which relates them through a continuous spiral pattern, moving each time at more complex levels (assuming more determinations). In this sense, essence is a category of the reality, though it expresses itself through the mediation of forms of appearance.

The m.o.p. is an essence, which requires abstractions from immediate appearances. However it is no less realistic than its immediate – and less “pure” – forms of appearance. Equally, the structuralist notion of overdetermination runs contrary to the Marxian relational dialectics of the abstract and the concrete. It posits “pure” structures which are then aggregated under the dominance of one of them. But societies are not aggregations but organic unities.

After these considerations, does the concept of the social formation have any meaning?. We believe that it has as the concrete expression of the form of existence of a m.o.p. in a particular historical society. In this sense it is a unity between higher (more abstract) and lower (more concrete) levels of determination. Class struggle is part of both these levels. Thus, we can distinguish stages within the general theory of capitalism and then see the evolution of particular social formations within or between these stages.

A final point must be cleared. Till now we have examined two opposing approaches to the problem of periodization. Both of them are organised within a grand-theoretical tradition, i.e. a type of general theory requiring a coherent explanatory framework covering everything from the most abstract to the most concrete elements. This is obvious in the case of any approach attempting to periodize capitalism on the basis of a general theory of capitalism. It is equally obvious for the Althusserian approach which do not periodize at the level of the general theory but relates closely its periodization with a general theory. The first incorporates history (and struggle) to all levels of abstraction (from the higher to the lower) whereas the latter only to the lower levels. The not-so-curious result, for the Althusserian approach, is that in this way struggle can become quite indeterminate. When the “overdetermination” by a general theory of capitalism is set aside then the same previously overtly deterministic framework becomes almost absolutely indeterminable and relativist. This is the case with the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories (Regulation Approach, Social Structures of Accumulation etc.) which appeared in the 1970s. Their position falls entirely in the ground of good, old historicism. History is beyond determinations and thus it cannot be studied according to the evolution of a more or less given essence. Therefore, there are no general tools and concepts: every historical epoch must have its own theory and concepts. Such an approach does not see dynamic (or fixed) essences giving (or not giving) rise to stages but recognises only historical epochs which are an aggregation (?) of autonomous and historically specific developments in each particular society. For this reason they adopt a middle-range theoretical perspective. The latter in contrast to general theories – covering the whole spectrum, from the most abstract laws and concepts to the empirical analysis of the concrete, in a unified framework – reject abstract general laws and the necessity of an all-embracing theory which are deemed to be either redundant or a distant accessory. It substitutes both with intermediate concepts with an immediate identification with the most concrete phenomena. No general tendencies are recognised and periodization is understood as simply a formalistic typology. The only element that gives cohesion to their theoretical structure and surpasses the specificities of each period is articulation (or the disarticulation) between capital accumulation and institutional forms (see Mavroudeas (1990)).

 

III. An alternative approach

The periodization of capitalism should be conducted at the level of the m.o.p., from a capital-theoretical perspective and in close relation – at a lower level of abstraction – with its general theory (see Fine-Harris (1979)).

Each m.o.p. is based on a specific set of class relations of production. Relations of production are directly class-determined, whereas forces of production are only indirectly class-determined as well. The existence of these relations of production requires a further constitution of social relations that are preconditions for economic reproduction (i.e. the integration of production-distribution-consumption). Moreover, this economic reproduction requires and necessitates the creation of social reproduction (comprising of political, ideological etc. relations with a particular structure of links between themselves and the economy). Thus, while m.o.p.s are distinguished in terms of the fundamental relations of possession and control among producing and non-producing classes (not merely in their legal form, since this can be superficial and deceiving, but in their essential nature), stages in each mode are differentiated on the basis of the specific forms of these basic relations and their social reproduction. Therefore, the criterion for the periodization of a class-divided social m.o.p. should be the evolution of the process of production and appropriation of surplus. This covers two crucial areas: 1) the way in which production is socialised (i.e. autonomous or separate individual production processes are related) and, 2) the method of appropriation of the surplus. In addition, the prerequisites of general social reproduction should be taken into account. In the capitalist m.o.p. the accumulation of capital and the class struggle associated with it are the basic forces determining the transformation of this mode from one stage to another. In a more general perspective, accumulation and class struggle within this mode determine not only changes within it but also the contradiction-ridden movement from this mode to another. The specific criterion for the periodization of the capitalist m.o.p. should be the mode of producing, appropriating and controlling surplus-value and the associated mode of socialisation of production. This is so because its transformations are closely related with new forms of class struggle and are reflected in the transformations of the whole production process and, subsequently, to the whole economic reproduction. These, in turn, produce, and in many cases presuppose, changes in the social relations, in political relations and the state form of the state etc.. The mode of appropriation of surplus-value is closely related to the modes of socialisation of production. Because the capitalist m.o.p. – contrary to most pre-capitalist m.o.p.s – is fundamentally a ‘free’ decentralised system (private enterprises, competition, labour markets) the latter concern the way that all these decentralised private economic processes are compounded in a unified socio-economic system. In this way they express the specific mode of existence of (1) the fundamental contradiction (capital-labour) and, (2) the secondary contradictions (intra-capitalist competition). The socialisation of production is ultimately expressed in the form of the linkage of production-exchange-circulation-distribution. Since the capitalist m.o.p. appears as relations of exchange (despite its structuration as relations of production), its specific periods are expressed as different forms of exchange; which, however, arise out of different forms of production. Periodization should cover this unity of essence and appearance.

On this basis we can rank, in terms of importance, the following categories of relations that characterise the stages of the capitalist m.o.p.:

 

1) Labour and Production Process

It constitutes the fundamental kernel of every socio-economic system since it through this that the latter’s means of reproduction are being produced. In the capitalist m.o.p. it imprints the mode under which labour is subsumed by capital. As such it reflects also the balance between the two ways of appropriating surplus-value (absolute and relative).

Several theories (Fine-Harris (1979), Regulation etc.) tend to periodize capitalism on the basis of the extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value. Additionally absolute surplus-value is identified almost exclusively with the predominance of the formal subsumption of labour by capital and relative surplus-value with the real subsumption. Then they periodize accordingly capitalism. For Fine-Harris (1979) absolute surplus-value and formal subsumption prevailed during laissez-faire capitalism, which lasted till the end of the 19th century. Regulation, on the other hand, posits their reign for the whole (abnormally long and rather vague) pre-fordist period, which lasted till the 1930s. As said before, this extremely clean cut connection is incorrect. The capitalist system, apart from its phase of birth, was characterised by the real subsumption of labour and the predominance of relative surplus-value.

This view is quite problematic since the very essence of capitalism consists in the continuous revolutionization of the social and technical conditions of the labour-process so as to push back the initial natural limits of necessary labour-time and, hence, progressively to extend the domain of surplus labour. It is not thus absolute but relative surplus-value that, according to Marx (1981, p.769) constitutes the essential basis of the capitalist m.o.p. The processes of extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value co-exist and are interwoven from the first moments of capitalism. During its birth era – which however does not constitute a separate period – there was a predominance of absolute surplus-value and the formal subsumption of labour. However, as soon as capitalism completes its emergence its is relative surplus-value and the real subsumption that assume primacy (see Brenner-Glick (1991)).

What change between different stages of capitalism are neither the predominance of absolute surplus-value nor formal subsumption. It is the balance between relations of extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value. This balance depends crucially upon the prevailing modes of organisation of the labour-process (always on the basis of real subsumption of labour). This relation, again, has been theorised erroneously by the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories who assigned an unwarranted special role to class struggle within the immediate sphere of production (see Brenner-Glick (1991)). Justifiably confronting the monopoly-theoretical tradition – which periodized capitalism according to the forms of competition – they attributed to the immediate production process the central role. But this turn was not unproblematic. They moved to the other side and almost separated the sphere of production from the rest of the total circuit of capital. It is true that the moment of production is the dominant one within the total circuit of capital (production-circulation-exchange-distribution). However, just because it is the dominant one but within a unified process, it cannot be separated from the rest of the process (Marx (1981), p.99-100)). In capitalism socio-economic relations – generated and founded exactly in the sphere of production – appear as a coherent social system mainly in the sphere of exchange: production for exchange. Therefore, the system appears as a social system mainly on the level of exchange relations: everything before is autonomous. The capital-labour relation is based on the individual relations between capitalists and workers at a social molecular basis. Of course, its general preconditions – and most of all the separation of labour from the means of production – are pre-given for the whole of society. But the specific and particular individual forms of these fundamental relations – the creation of an individual capitalist firm and the specific capital-labour relation expressed in it are «socially spontaneous». They are regulated only at a second, subsequent level by labour laws and regulations governing intra-capital competition. Therefore, the extraction and appropriation of surplus-value and the socialisation of production refer the whole spectrum of the total circuit of capital. In this sense, there is neither radical autonomy nor special role of class struggle within the immediate production process. Furthermore, a proper theorisation and periodization of capitalism must be based on the whole of the total circuit of capital and on the dialectical determination and unity of its different moments.

 

2) Process of socialisation of production

This covers:

(a) intra-capitalist competition (particularly its inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral dimension as well as tendencies with regard to the centralisation and concentration of production),

(b) money and credit (the formation of the general equivalent, types of money (commodity, fiat, credit money etc.) and their interrelationship, credit mechanisms)

(c) State’s economic functions

 

3) Process of income distribution

In the sphere of distribution two divisions are of particular importance: (1) the division between wages (depending crucially upon the value of labour-power and the relevant bundle of wage-goods) and profit, (2) the division of total surplus-value in (industrial) profit, interest and rent. Both these divisions are influenced by monetary intermediation, since it affects both the validation of the wage-goods bundle and the distribution between profit, interest and rent. In each stage of the capitalist m.o.p. the specific mechanisms of formation of these two fundamental divisions are transformed.

 

4) Forms of crisis

The capitalist m.o.p. is riddled with crises of overaccumulation deriving from the tendency of the rate to fall due to the increasing organic composition of capital. However, although this is the fundamental cause of crises, they are expressed in different forms and through different mechanisms (stock-market crises, collapses of exchange rate regimes etc.). Each stage exhibits considerable specificities with regard to crises.

 

5) Processes of political intermediation

The capitalist system – contrary to previous class systems – is characterised by the fetishist separation of socio-economic relations in the economy (which appears solely as exchange relations) and the political sphere (which appears as a socially-neutral management of common affairs). Thus the capital-relation is doubled in form in the domain of the economy (where inequality and class divisions predominate) and the domain of politics (where typical equality among members of the society prevails). The capitalist state – as the collective capitalist, the representative of the general interests of the bourgeoisie – has to appear as a neutral mediator between capital and labour as well as in conflicts between different fractions of capital. Hence the political-form is generated from the capital-relation, although it retains a degree of autonomy. Political intermediation, ideological hegemony and institutional structures – the main levers of the domain of politics – change also in accordance with transformations of the capital-relation[7].

 

6) International system

Capitalism is the first class system that acquired a global dimension. From its very first it created an system of international relations whose main characteristics are antagonism between capitalist blocs (backed by states) and relations of unequal exchange and exploitation between more and less developed countries. In sum, as implicitly suggested by Fine-Harris (1979), imperialism is not relevant only to the stage of monopoly capitalism (as maintained by Lenin) but the universal mode of capitalism’s international system. The structure of the international system  – and specifically its main factors (which of capital’s main fractions (productive, money or merchant capital) are internationalised and predominate, what plays the role of international money, what are the forms of international competition, what supra-national politico-economic structures exist etc.) – changes from stage to stage.

 

The process for the transition from one stage to another

A crucial question is why and how there is a transition from one stage to another. The cause is a combination of the limits of capital accumulation and the subsequent limits set by class struggle. The capitalist m.o.p. is a system endogenously crisis-prone. The continuous production and appropriation of surplus-value and its accumulation leads to crises of overaccumulation. Its very success is what leads to its failure.

Capital’s desire for profits leads it to struggle against labour and other capitals. The struggle against labour is manifested in the increasing replacement of workers by machines through the mechanisation of production. Hence the type of technical change pertaining to capitalism is labour-saving. This increases both the productivity and the intensity of labour. His struggle of its individual capital against labour has meaning only if it is expressed, as a lower unit cost, in the (Intensified) competition with other capitals. Thus, intensified competition and the subsequent mechanisation of production lead to rising technical, organic and value composition of capital. This increased composition produces a downward shift in the rate of profit even when the rate of surplus-value is rising faster than the composition of capital (Rosdolsky (1977), chs 16, 17, 26). A crucial factor in this relation is that the worker has definite physical limits which fetter the continuous imposition of new combinations of increased productivity and intensity of labour, within a given technological pattern. Beyond these limits the increase of the rate of surplus-value (in its fundamental sense, as a change in the demarcation line between necessary and surplus labour-time) cannot continue and, consequently, it cannot counteract the increasing composition of capital. The decline of the rate of profit necessarily leads to a fall in the mass of profit signalling the beginning of a crisis (Grossmann (1992)). Crises of overaccumulation are surpassed through the devalorisation of capitals but above all through the deepening and the intensification of processes of labour exploitation. The latter is the crucial link in overcoming a capitalist crisis. The processes of labour exploitation – through the mechanisms of absolute and relative surplus-value – always have a historically concrete character and are expressed by the specific mode of organisation of the production process. As said before, every mode of organisation of the production process (technology, combination of absolute and relative surplus-value, processes of increasing labour productivity and intensifying labour) have definite limits beyond which the worker cannot be pressed. Surpassing these limits is destructive for the capitalist system as a whole – although each individual capital strives to overcome them – since it will destroy its very basis of operation, labour. On the ground of this struggle for the change of the demarcation line between necessary and surplus labour-time class struggle in production arises, The working-class – even in its more ‘molecular’ and less conscious form of struggle – strives against the deterioration (if not for the improvement) of the terms of sale of its labour-power and its conditions of work. When this resistance is combined with capital’s inability to successfully continue its accumulation then it becomes obvious that capitalism’s modus operandi has to be transformed. The successful implementation of such transformations implies an increased socialisation of production, since through this capitalist dynamics can be coordinated better and crisis-tendencies, although not avoided, can be managed easier.

Through this process of accumulation – class struggle – crisis – transformation is expressed the Marxian contradiction between production relations and productive forces. The very development of productive forces (even in their capitalistically determined form) is fettered by its own production relations and on this ground develops both working-class’ struggle as well as capitalism need to be transformed. Whether this outcome will be achieved depends crucially on the balance of class forces. The latter is at the same time ‘open’ and constrained. It is ‘open’ because the working-class’ conscious struggle can create history and lead to surpassing capitalism and open the process for socialist transition. It is constraint because this possibility is restricted by existing economic constraints (particularly the knowledge of collective labourer and its ability to direct the production process, development of productive forces etc.). The working-class can revolutionise these conditions but it cannot neglect them.

 

IV. A periodization of capitalism

On the basis of the periodization theory delineated above the capitalist m.o.p. has already passed through two stages, whereas from the mid-1970s a new stage appears to be in the process of creation. The first stage, the laissez-faire capitalism lasted till the end of 19th century. The second stage, monopoly capitalism, persevered till the mid-1970s. The second stage was divided in two sub-periods: (a) pure monopoly capitalism (rocked by the 1930s crisis and with a turbulent phase of transition that lasted after W.W.II), (b) state-monopoly capitalism (established after W.W.II). Finally the third stage that seems to emerge after the1970s is still under construction. This still open character makes problematic its christening. However, its fundamental structures and tendencies are already visible.

Laissez-faire capitalism was characterised by the limited dominance of relative surplus-value, since capital was still in a position to employ extensively processes of extraction of absolute surplus-value. The only existing process of socialisation of production was through the market. The form of the simple firm predominates and capitalism expanded via mainly the concentration of capital. The centralisation of capital was quite marginal, although monopolies existed, but basically because of peculiar physical and technical conditions of an industry rather than because of an organic tendency of the system. The law of value was expressed almost exclusively through market intra-capital relations. The monetary sphere was based on commodity-money. State’s economic functions were restricted to the regulation of the monetary circulation and foreign trade. In the field of income distribution there was only the direct wage whereas the central form of appropriation of surplus-value was through market profits of the enterprise. Crises of overaccumulation were expressed mainly in the sphere of merchant capital as overproduction of commodities. The political-form was based on the restriction of the political and economic freedom of the working-class. Since only capital was systematically organised (through the state), class struggle was unmediated confrontation in the factories and/or in the streets. Finally, the international system was organised on the basis of colonial empires and it was mainly commodity capital that was internationalised.

The great crisis at the last third of 19th century in combination with the increasing resistance of the working-class (formation of trade unions and workers’ parties, class struggle that was stamped by the Chicago demands for the division of the day etc.) marked the end of this stage. However, pure monopoly capitalism failed to produce a more long-lived solution, despite W.W.I, and was rocked by the 1929 crisis. The eruption of imperialist rivalries led to W.W.II. It was through this process of violent devalorisation of capitals, accelerated technological and organisational changes and, foremost, pressure on the rate of exploitation of labour that the foundations for the post-war ‘Golden-Age’ of capitalist accumulation were laid. This was the second sub-period. Of state-monopoly capitalism, was established.

Monopoly capitalism involved an even greater change of balance towards relative surplus-value based on the continual re-organisation of the labour-process, The new production process involved a greater mechanisation of production and the introduction of new methods of control and direction of labour via the sophisticated Taylorist systems. The increased socialisation of production was based new forms of intra-capitalist competition, monetary intermediation and state economic functions. Intra-capitalist competition led not only to increased concentration but also centralisation of capital. Monopolies arise not only because of physical and technical peculiarities but mainly through the very operation of intra-capitalist competition[8]. The type of joint-stock company predominated. Furthermore, the credit system (banks etc.) acquired a enhanced significance since production’s financial prerequisites were increased (augmented centralisation of capital etc.). In the area of monetary intermediation, fiat money was more loosely linked to commodity-money. Additionally, credit money’s role was extended. The state started regulating the general framework of production (Factory Laws etc.) although it did not intervened directly in production (with the exception of abnormal war periods which, however, represented primitive experimentations with state-monopoly forms). The operation of the law of value was crucially affected by the private credit system. In general, there was an enhanced socialisation of productive forces which was reflected in the socialisation of production relations in the labour-process (separation of ownership and control), in the “accounting” process in the sphere of realisation (monopolies socialised the formation of prices and allocation of markets) and financial control (money capital was socialised with the development of private credit through finance capital). In the sphere of distribution interest assumed a dominant position as form of appropriation of surplus-value. The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall (TRPF) and credit relations induced increasingly violent crises. The political-form was marked by bourgeois social reforms aiming on crisis management. Workers’ parties and trade unions (grounded in the socialisation of production and concentration of wage-labour) were legalised and vote and election rights universalised. Parties changed from clubs to mass organisations and there was a process of combined repression and containment of the working-class (through reformism and clientele relations). The international system was reorganised on purely imperialist lines, thus acquiring its proper capitalist character and leaving behind old remnants. Money capital was internationalised mostly through trusts and cartels. Capital exports took mainly the form of commodities and loans rather than direct investment).

The second sub-period of the monopoly capitalism stage (i.e. state-monopoly capitalism) while sharing many features of the first sub-period, differed in the further socialisation through direct state involvement in the circuit of capital (through state enterprises, taxation and state credit). Of crucial importance was state control of the credit mechanisms. Capitalist control of the economic process took new forms and taxation became important in the appropriation and distribution of surplus-value. This signified a decisive turn in the relationship between economy and political-form, since their formal separation became less distinct.

 

Α  new third stage

We have argued that capitalism has entered after the mid-1970s crisis a new period. Of course, this is still a case for study. In this paper, it will be attempted to substantiate this argument on mainly theoretical and qualitative grounds (without ignoring the necessity of quantitative empirical support [9]). The same argument has been put forward by most of the newer middle-range theories. Dichotomies such as fordism-post-fordism (Lipietz (1986), Boyer-Mistral (1978) for the Regulation Approach), mass production-flexible specialisation (Piore-Sabel (1984) for the Flexible Specialisation approach), modernism-postmodernism (Harvey (1990) and the similar distinction between ‘organised’ and ‘disorganised’ capitalism by Lash-Urry (1987))[10]. However, both the theoretical perspective and the method of this study differ radically.

It is generally agreed that most of the crucial operational variables of the capitalists system have exhibited a dismal course after the 1973 crisis. Profitability, growth rates (output, productivity etc.) are faltering. Although a great crisis (similar to those of the end of 19th century or the 1930s) has not erupted, there is a series of recessions (1973-75, 1979-82, 1991-92) and after them upswings cannot restore capital accumulation to its pre-1973 levels. In a sense it seems that capitalism is passing through a period of prolonged but also latent – to a great extent – crisis. The concomitant restructuring of capital – despite the significant victories against labour, induced by the neo-conservative policies of the 1980s and 1990s[11] – is still in search of a steady and secure configuration. On the other hand, significant transformations have been made or are under way which represent a radical departure from the old operation-as-usual of the system.

The labour and production process is changing towards so-called flexible labour. The introduction of information technology – although with dubious effects in labour productivity itself and with a better record for circulation activities – plays a significant role since it enhances capitalist control of the labour-process and, therefore, achieves an increase in the rate of exploitation. At the same time, it enables vital economies in the use of constant capital. In this sense, flexible labour – contrary to the middle-range theories’ belief about its open character and the possibility of progressive scenarios – represents an extremely reactionary restructuring of the labour-process.

An important feature of this new version of the capitalist labour-process is that – contrary to the Braverman thesis about a deskilling trend – it exhibits a complicated and contradictory tendency of multi-specialisation and deskilling. Whereas some types of work are deskilled, others become multi-skilled and capital attempts to motivate labour’s initiative and inventiveness under its control (e.g. quality circles etc.). Furthermore, both deskilled and multi-skilled categories represent nowadays combinations of manual and mental labour. This universalisation of sides of mental labour as well as the increased weight of multi-skilling do not signify a progressive development in itself. Capitalism needs labour’s initiative and experience but, at the same time, it purges it from any element of workers’ antagonism and attempts to incorporate them under its own prerogatives. For this reason knowledge, in flexible labour under capitalist control, is deprived of any universal and critical dimension – which might enable labour to assume control of the production process – and are restricted to the ability of exercising (probably with imaginative and original way) of multiple applications.

Thus, flexible labour enables a new balance between absolute and relative surplus-value. It is probably the first time after a long period that capital attempts not simply to increase both absolute and relative surplus-value but also to change the balance between them. During the recent years processes of extraction of absolute surplus-value have been systematically strengthened. A direct method is through schemes for a reshuffling of total labour-time, which violate the legal limits of working hours (sometimes with a reduction of the total working hours per week or per month[12]). The destandardisation of working time arrangements, such as the ‘annualisation of hours’ or other hours-averaging schemes accommodate capitalist aims to extend operating times and better meet fluctuation in demand[13]. An indirect method is through wage reductions which lead many workers to supplement their income through a second – in many case illegal – job. Hence, although typically the total working hours per week are reduced, the actual working hours have increased for the majority of the working-class. Additionally, there is clear evidence that overtime – whether unpaid or paid (sufficiently or not) – is increasing (e.g. (Hatrick 2000)).

Evidence of a rising duration of working time in the last decades has been provided by many studies. Most of them focused on the US and North America, Japan and the Less Developed Countries (e.g. Schor (1991), Bluestone – Rose (2000), Golden – Figart (2000) and considered it, implicitly or explicitly a non-European phenomenon. However, other studies cast doubt on this presumption (see Lehndorff (2000)). In fact, despite stiffer workers’ movement resistance, increasing actual working time is also taking foothold in Europe.

This increased significance of absolute surplus-value does not, however, challenge the predominance of relative surplus-value. The capitalist restructuring of the labour-process in the 1980s and 1990s – through both the skills improvement and the intensification of work[14] – increases relative surplus-value as well. Green (2000) shows accurately that effort-biased technical change, which intensifies work, stems from innovations such as Total Quality Management and new information technologies and is linked with multi-skilling. This effort-biased technical change does not contradict but it is complementary with skill-biased technological change.

Subsequently, new processes of socialisation of production are being explored. In intra-capitalist multi-sectoral monopolies assume an increasingly significant role. There is a contradictory enhancement of the tendencies of concentration and centralisation of capital. Whereas under the pressure of crisis the average firm has tended to become more ‘lean’, there was considerable increase of the weight of constant capital (both because of wage reductions and the cost for introducing new technologies). The centralisation of capital on the one hand increased, through successive waves of mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, however, increased the sub-contracting of peripheral activities. What many studies – mainly on the Just-in-Time system and ‘new competition’ – have shown is that, contrary to certain beliefs, there was a centralisation of all the critical processes whereas secondary activities were sub-contracted but under the almost direct control of the central firm. Thus, essential control was restricted to even less centres and sub-contracting, in the cases that resulted to a proliferation of the operating firms, are more or less appendages of the central firm.

In monetary intermediation credit money is enhanced further and new forms of money (electronic etc.) appear. There appears to be a reshuffling in the financial system towards a greater role for the stock-market (the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model) as opposed to banks (the ‘Japanese-German’ model). There is also a change in the banking system where there is a move from traditional activities (deposits and loans) towards new financial intermediation activities (securities, mutual funds etc.). But, foremost, this is a turbulent period because since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system there is growing instability in international relations.

State economic functions also change. Contrary to neo-liberal sermons there is not a withdrawal of the state but a new role for it. It leaves certain productive activities to private capitals (becoming itself more ‘lean’) through privatisations. It adopts private-economic criteria for the operation of the remaining public enterprises (thus, increasing the rate of exploitation in that segment of the working-class that have remained somehow protected the previous period). But, on the other hand, it becomes the general staff of capitalist accumulation by assuming even greater responsibilities in the socialisation of production. Many of its functions become increasingly de-politicised, and thus unaccountable, as the trend towards independent Central Banks. This move does not signify a retreat of the state but a retrenchment of its crucial functions in deeper and more untouchable to political pressures centres.

In the sphere of income distribution there have take place concerted assaults on wages. It is being attempted to form a new value of labour-power, lower than what contemporary working conditions and modern needs dictate, by establishing a new working-class’ consumption pattern. Furthermore, it is tried to push wages even lower than that value. Significant pressure has been put on the indirect wage, through cuts and direct and indirect privatisation of the social security system.

Crises of overaccumulation acquire indirect sensors in the financial system, which seem to express and warn in advance incoming crises. Thus, the post-1973 era is riddled with crises of the stock-market and the mechanisms of exchange rates.

The sphere of political intermediation is in continuous turmoil. However, it appears to be a move away from the mass and also unified parties of the previous stage towards loose party formations, without mass organisations and riddled with internal differentiations on the basis of particular interests and lobbies. This move is supplemented with the realignment of all parts of the official political spectrum around neo-conservative policies, making conservative and social-democratic management almost indistinguishable.

Finally, the international system is undergoing a monumental transformation. The internationalisation of productive capital – following the previous internationalisation of commodity and money capital – and the increasing importance of multinational multi-sectoral corporations marks this era. This is supplemented by a liberalisation of international capital movements and the frantic push of schemes of transnational economic integration. However, this rapidly growing internationalisation of capital has not led to an abolition of the centrality of the nation-state, as the globalisation thesis maintains.

 

 

V. A periodization of Greek capitalism

In Ioannides – Mavroudeas (2000) we have argued that Greek capitalism is characterized by significant peculiarities and time hystereses regarding the general model of periodization proposed. These peculiarities and time lags stem from the very way and time that capitalism was established in Greece. Greece belongs to the host of societies where capitalism was established later than its birth in its heartland in the Western Europe. Although primitive bourgeois and capitalist relations were born much earlier in the region of Greece, a number of crucial factors (the type of social relations in the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires, the lack of a national basis etc.) hindered considerably their development. Thus, capitalism lingered to be established in Greece. It is indicative that when the capitalist heartland of the West was entering the era of transition from the first to the second stage, capitalism in Greece had only been consolidated and fully formed. On the other hand, the economy of the region of Greece and also important sectors of economic activities (merchant, maritime and financial capitals) were very closely related to Western capitalism. This contradiction marked capitalism’s whole genesis period. Thus, Greek capitalism’s retardation was coupled with significant western capitalist links and influences. For these reasons Greek capitalism covered in a peculiarly unified way both the stages of laissez-faire and monopoly capitalism. This coexistence continued after W.W.II when finally the characteristics of the monopoly stage – and particularly those of its state-monopolist phase – predominated clearly. However, from the 1970s and onward most of the Greek peculiarities have been smoothen and the time lags eliminated. Hence, the processes giving birth to the new third stage emerged in Greece at the same time with the capitalist heartland of the West.

In Ioannides – Mavroudeas (2000) we have recognized the following sub-periods of Greek capitalist development:

(1) During the 1830-70 sub-period capitalist relations were consolidated and the signs of a first anemic development appeared. The first post-liberation economic activities centered mainly on agriculture, commerce and shipping. Industrialization was very limited and concerned basically processing of agricultural products (winery, soapmaking, tannage etc.). Active industrial policies were absent and the economy was export-orientated since a sufficiently developed internal market did not existed. Certain typically exportable agricultural products (tobacco, raisin etc.) constituted the backbone of this orientation towards exports. Although elements and relations of the stage of laissez-faire capitalism predominated during all that sub-period, they co-existed with suis generis and improvising policies that attempted to boost capitalist development.

(2) Important transformations accomplished during the 1870-80 sub-period strengthened the capitalist relations and led to a first phase of rapid development. The Trikoupi government policies bolstered systematically big capital and provided the necessary infrastructure for capitalist accumulation. At the same time, and despite the verbal adherence to liberal principles, elements of the monopolist stage (especially protectionist and interventionist regulations) were introduced because they were necessitated both by Greek peculiarities and general trends of the international economy.

(3) During the war sub-period (1880-1920) Greek capitalism achieved a high performance because of the demand created by the war effort but also the territorial expansion of the Greek state, which provided a wider vital space for capitalist accumulation.

(4) The 1920-30 sub-period was characterized by intensive restructuring and a second phase of rapid development. At the same time there was a significant increase of state interventionism and protectionist policies that led to the predominance of processes and features belonging to the monopoly stage.

(5) The 1930-1944 sub-period was, in a sense, a continuation of the previous one. However, W.W.II caused a significant disruption of the relations of capitalist reproduction for both internal and external reasons.

(6) During the 1944-50 sub-period the post-war reconstruction of capitalist relations was accomplished and were laid the foundations for the restructuring of the next sub-period.

(7) The 1950-60 sub-period was characterized by changes towards the state-monopolist phase of monopoly capitalism and prepared the ground for the next era of intensive development.

(8) The ‘golden era’ of Greek capitalism (1960-73) was characterized by extremely high rates of capitalist accumulation and profitability. It was characterized by state-monopolist relations mainly. One important Greek peculiarity was the lack of a development welfare system. Instead of that a number of suis generis Greek solutions were implemented (e.g. giving land in exchange for apartments) in order to create a large and at the same time cheap workforce.

(9) The1973-today sub-period is marked by the 1973 crisis and the subsequent restructurings. From that era and onwards the time-lags of Greek capitalism have been more or less eliminated.

In a nutshell, from 1830 till 1920 Greek capitalism was characterized by the co-existence of elements of both the first and the second stage of the capitalist mode of production. After 1920 the features of the second stage (monopoly capitalism) began to predominate there were the state-monopolist elements and features that assumed primacy. The 1973 crisis marked the beginning of a long and contradictory process of gestation of a new third stage surpassing the problems of the previous one.

This peculiar unified and contradictory co-existence of elements of both the two first stages is reflected in the two crucial sub-periods of 1870-80 and 1920-30. During the first one capitalism began to develop more rapidly. Foreign loan capitals, coming from both foreign nationals and Greeks from abroad, played a crucial role in this process. The endogenous tendency for the completion of the capitalist transition was bolstered by the need for outlets for the overaccumulated western capitals. The creation of stable and coherent foundations for capitalist accumulation in Greece coincided and was interwoven with the big crisis that led the already developed western capitalism to the transgression of the first stage and the construction of monopoly capitalism. The outcome was this peculiar co-existence of both the first two stages, without clear demarcation lines and with a contradictory – but sometimes functional – conjugation of features of both stages.

A typical example of these peculiar couplings is the case of the introduction of the tariff system by the liberalist Trikoupi government in 1884, which prevented imports and favored the development of domestic production. The liberal Trikoupis – facing the liberal anti-protectionist criticisms – claimed that the tariff system was not protectionist but simply increased state revenues. However, despite any intentions, the very fact was the introduction of protectionism in Greece. And, above all, the crucial role of the state in Greek capitalist development introduced – voluntarily or involuntarily – state monopolist elements even from the very first steps of Greek capitalism. Protectionism was further entrenched during the intra-war period, following the international trends, with the laws 2948/1922, the 1926 tariff system and its expansion to industry in 1931-32 and to agriculture in 1927. At the same time began the creation of special state economic organizations, such as the State Cotton Organisation, the Central Committee for the Protection of the Domestic Wheat crop etc.

The gradual manner through which elements of monopoly capitalism crept in and co-existed with laissez-faire capitalism can be seen also in the case of another crucial feature of the former: state’s productive activities. These began gradually from 1914 with the nationalization of the Greek Railways Company. After W.W.II state activity expanded in public works and social welfare. During the same period the sate assumed a weighty role in the financial system. Another indication of these Greek peculiarities and the mixing of features of both stages by the most disparate political administrators is the enactment of the eight hours work by the quasi-fascist Metaxa government.

Finally a critical issue is the development – particularly during the last part of that era – of imperialist activities by the Greek capital. This has been an extremely contested issue particularly by supporters of the underdevelopment and dependency theory. Contrary to their views Greek capitalism had developed imperialist activities quite early, by exporting capitals (commercial, financial and productive) and by struggling to control foreign economic (and sometimes political) areas. Leaving aside the case of the capitals by Greeks abroad, maritime capital was an extremely internationalized section. Similarly, during the 1960s construction capital played such a role with the creation of big corporations with activities in the Middle East and Northern Africa.

 

Greek capitalism, the new stage and trends in working time

This section focuses upon the Greek empirical evidence concerning the emergence of a new post-1973 stage. The emphasis is placed on the main criterion – that of the new configuration of absolute and relative surplus-value – and particularly on the hypothesis of the resurgence of absolute surplus-value. In brief, it is argued that there is convincing evidence that such a resurgence is taking place.

During the 1960’s (the golden era of Greek capitalism), the time lag between the Greek and the developed economies had already started to diminish and integration to the time cycles of the more developed capitalist West was enhanced. Thus Greek capitalism was part of the 1973 structural crisis and followed the same path of decreasing growth rates – although, usually with a better performance – with the West. Similarly, capitalist restructuring – capitalism’s contradictory, copious and heuristic process of surpassing its crisis – had, more or less, the same timing and took the same forms in Greece as in the West. Starting with the first right-wing Keynesian attempts and following with the even more conservative neo-liberal policies, capitalist restructuring searched for a new capitalist configuration that would overcome the structural crisis and establish a new stage of capitalist development. This is a long-run process that hasn’t ended yet.

 

1. Restructuring of the Production (and Labour) Process

This is the most important level and it affects directly the channels of extraction of surplus-value. In Greece, as in the West, the restructuring of the production process – helped by the introduction of the new information technologies – enhanced capital’s control over labour by capital, leading to intensification and a rise in exploitation. Of course, information technologies – contrary to the ‘New Economy’ wishful thinking – had a limited direct effect on capitalist profitability and it affected mainly circulation relations and activities. On the other hand, and at the same time, the relationship between mental and manual labour is differentiated. There is a marked trend for the reduction of the gap between them, since new technologies and capitalist restructuring demand a better educated and trained personnel. This is expressed by the doubling – during the last years – of the percentage of wage-earners that have a university degree. Additionally, there is also a tendency for the degradation of many labour job positions into routinized and lower status processes.

These changes in the production process transform the way relations of extraction of surplus-value function. For the first time in capitalist development there is a change in the balance between the extraction of relative and absolute surplus-value, to the benefit of the last. While the rate of increase of the relative surplus-value stumbles upon significant constraints – expressed in the fluctuations and slowdowns of productivity increases – there is an effort to increase absolute surplus value. Relative surplus-value remains primary, but the change in the balance between them is a very significant process.

 

2.Process of socialization of production

(a) Competition: The new development in the international level is the appearance of the Multinational-Multisectoral Monopolies (MMM). As the name reveals, their basic features are the multinational characteristics and their expansion in many different sectors of the economic activity. Their appearance is an intersection to the process of capital concentration. Even the counterbalancing procedure of the emerging of small dynamic capitals depends on them, through subcontracting that enforces MMMs’ control. MMMs’ appearance in Greece is realized under the idiosyncrasy of a relatively small capitalist economy. The multisectoral dimension has progressed in a great degree, with the creation of the well-known “groups” of the Greek big capitalists. The multi national features have two sides. The one is the connection of the Greek monopolistic capitals with capitals of the developed capitalist countries, through buying outs, strategic alliances and the stock market. The other is their expansion and connection with less developed capitals and new markets.

(b) Monetary relations: Credit money assumes primary importance and at the same time the stock market becomes a main lever for corporate finance, while banks are turning into new activities.

(c) State economic functions: the state is implementing a major change regarding its economic functions. On the one hand it is withdrawing from former public enterprises which are being privatised, in an attempt to increase exploitation in this previously immune sector and to bolster private capitalist profitability. On the other hand, it is strengthening its role as the ‘general staff’ of the capitalist economy as a whole.

 

3.Income distribution

From 1985 and onwards there is a continuous effort by Greek capital through government imposed schemes of austerity to reduce the wage share. This effort has a double goal: to lower the limit of the value of working force and through this to force workers to work more and thus increase the absolute surplus value. According Eurostat the mean real wage in Greece today is at the levels of 1980, while the lower wage in the European Union from 1984 to 1997 decreased at 17,5% (‘Enimerosi’ (1998)). At the same time, indirect wage is also curtailed through austerity measures and the implementation of market relations in welfare sectors. This negative redistribution sets a new level of the value of labour-power which is lower than the one existing in the previous capitalist stage.

 

4. International relations

Greek capital’s position within the international system is changing, following the new developments. The main characteristic is the participation in a regional integration, the European Union, combined with the intensive intertwining between Greek and European capitals. Additionally, there is a more dynamic participation in imperialistic formations and the propulsion of Greek’s own imperialistic interests, mainly in the Balkan and the Eastern European countries. This propulsion includes even army missions, apart from economical and political penetration. This effort is always under the umbrella and leads to a stronger interdependence with dominant international imperialistic formations.

 

Working time: empirical evidence and an econometric evaluation

There is a marked increase in actual working time in Greece. This tendency is particularly strong for wage-earners having a university degree, who are in many cases being labeled as ‘cadres’ that do not follow the usual work time regulations concerning eight hour work, weekends, overtime etc. It is also strong in more traditional categories of workers (manufacturing, construction etc.).

Official statistical data – both in Greece and internationally – have significant limitations regarding working time and other crucial aspects and indicators for the study of relative and absolute surplus-value. These constitute a drawback in testing our theory of periodization. Particularly regarding working time, these limitations lead to the underestimation of the actual working time. However, despite these drawbacks, even when using the available statistical data, there are significant indications supporting our approach.

The first problem with the data has to do with the change in the structure of employment. With more people working under part-time and part-year contingent contracts, with significant increase in moonlighting, and with substantial increases in overtime (at least in manufacturing), the movement toward ‘non-standard’ work-weeks and work-years is growing. Yet the standard statistics hardly measure this. In Greece, as elsewhere, the increase of working time is not always happening through the official channels (for example, the extra hours in the private sector are rarely reported in the purpose of saving the insurance charges), therefore it is usually underestimated by the official data.

Second, there is a marked increase of moonlighting in the recent years. These second jobs are usually underreported in order to avoid taxes and social insurance charges. Additionally, a great part of moonlighting takes place in the so-called ‘black economy’, which is notoriously big in Greece and of course it is not accounted for adequately. However, there is significant evidence that not only part-time work is increasing but also that moonlighting constitutes a great part of it. These moonlighting hours have to be added on top of the officially measured real working time.

A third problem arises from a basic feature of the Greek Economy, that is the existence of big sectors of economic activity, where self-employment is the main mode of employment. In fact this means that workers have to ‘buy’ their jobs. During the last years this mode of employment has expanded in new sectors of economic activity. Under this type of employment workers usually work more than average, under fully flexible work schedules. The expansion of this mode of employment indicates an increase on real working time, which is not usually accounted in official data. This Greek peculiarity is enhanced by the universal trend for increasingly blurring boundaries between work and non-work time. Capitalist restructuring (following both traditional and new technology paths) destroys the traditional division of work and family. This process –which affects also ‘typical’ workers – has even stronger repercussions on this stratum of self-employed workers who become the champions of working time increases.

Finally, one important fact is the growing participation of women in the labour market (see Table 1). This growing ‘feminisation’ of the work force has significant repercussions upon the Marxian notion of labour-power. Since the value of labour-power concerns the entire family of the worker, the increase of women’s work for the reproduction of the workers family means a major increase in the work time needed for the reproduction of the work force, namely, a major increase of absolute surplus-value.

 

TABLE 1: Employment changes for males and females in Greece

Year

1993

1993

1997

1997

% of change

% of change

Males

Females

Males

Females

Males

Females

Working age population

3258311

3474251

3260956

3530561

0,1%

1,6%

Workforce

2583993

1534386

2612004

1682401

1,1%

9,6%

Employed

 

2419472

1300707

2438980

1415075

0,8%

8,8%

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece

 

Setting aside all these problems of underestimation, a first glance indication for the role of absolute surplus-value processes is given by the legislation for the daily and weekly working time in combination with the statistics for the real working time per employee. Data about working time are being collected by the Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) from the 1974 and onward. However, there exist similar data from older types of survey of NSSG from the 1960s. From 1981, it is conducted according to the rules of EUROSTAT, which have been revised in 1983. EUROSTAT, ILO (International Labour Organization) and OECD estimations and studies are based on this set of data. NSSG’s Labour Force Survey is a household survey covering all the country and conducted yearly. Hours of work refer to the number of hours actually worked during the reference week in first job or business. This includes all hours including extra hours regardless of whether they were paid or not. Persons who have also worked at home (e.g. teachers preparing lessons) are asked to include the number of hours they have worked at home. Apprentices and trainees and other persons in vocational training are asked to exclude the time spent in school or other special training centres. According to these data (Table 2) there is an increase in actual weekly working time in Greek Economy, from 1983 till1998 (the last available data).

 

TABLE 2: Actual average work time in Greece

Years

Average weekly hours

1962

44,08

1963

43,38

1964

43,95

1965

43,78

1966

43,3

1967

43,55

1968

43,7

1969

43,8

1970

44,63

1971

44,13

1972

44,58

1973

43,73

1974

43,8

1975

42,7

1976

41,83

1977

41,05

1978

41,25

1979

41,18

1980

40,7

1981

39,53

1982

38,6

1983

38,53

1984

38,18

1985

39,25

1986

39,2

1987

39,25

1988

41,13

1989

41,1

1990

41,08

1991

41,08

1992

41,08

1993

41,09

1994

41,85

1995

41,13

1996

41,18

1997

40,87

1998

41,13

Source: OECD

 

ILO’s KEY INDICATORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET (KILM), using the same data set has estimated the actual annual hours worked per employee – broken by males and females – for the period 1990-94. Annual estimations, as explained before, can capture better the contemporary tendency towards flexible labour arrangements. Again, in the case of annual hours, the tendency of the real working time to increase is evident for both sexes.

 

TABLE 3: Annual hours worked per person

Years

Males

Females

1990

819.7

735.7

1991

830.1

738.7

1992

854.8

757.5

1993

860.7

759.8

1994

851.2

755.7

Source: ILO – KILM

 

Other, less extensive, surveys have similar findings For example, a survey conducted by the pollster company METRON ANALYSIS, commissioned by the Ministry of Labour found even more pronounced results. The survey – which covered the whole country, was conducted from 14/9/2000 till 29/9/2000, used a three-stage sampling process and had an effective sample of 2.473 persons – found that the average real working time for private sector workers is 44.3 hours, while for public sector workers is 37.8 – by far higher than the hours dictated by the 8 hours per day legal limit (METRON ANALYSIS (2000, p.3). A big section of the employees (42.9%) declared that they work more than what is legally provisioned in their main or sole occupation. Additionally, 30% of the employees declared that their overtime work is not paid, while only 13.6% declared that it is paid but not sufficiently enough.

 

An econometric evaluation of the working time trends

We assume that if the data exhibit a time trend this would be a deterministic rather than a stochastic one. This is because a great percentage of the driving forces of this process are external to the economic system and they are the outcome of a plan, usually made from governments and/or the employers associations (in high ‘correlation’ with the working class resistance). This assumption is not indisputable of course, since the trend could also be the outcome of cumulative distortions that take place at the level of every single enterprise.

Under the previous assumption we will show that there is a statically significant time trend in the working time series for Greece and there is also a structural change affecting the slope of the trend.

The data for working time are plotted in Figure 1. We can visually identify two possible break points, the first at the years 1972-1973 and the second between 1984 and 1985. These two possible break points are consistent with important events that affected the economy, such as the oil crisis in 1973 and the announcement of the new economic policy for Greece after the second electoral victory of PASOK in 1985. Since our point is to show a rise in working time during the last years we will check only for the second possible break point.

 

The equation we use is linear since it is the simplest and more intuitive specification and since we have no economic reason to assume a higher order polynomial. In addition to this is the form of the line graph of the data, plotted in figure1.

 

Yt= C(1) + C(3)*t + ε                                (1)

 

Where Yt is the work time

t is for time

εt is a white noise process and

C(1), C(3) are the constant term and the slope coefficient to be estimated.

 

To test for the possible structural change we will use a dummy variable (d) which equals zero for the years before 1985 and one thereafter. So the equation will take the form

 

Yt= C(1) + C(2)*d + C(3)*t + C(4)*t*d + εt       (2)

 

Where C(2) and C(4) are the coefficients associated with the dummy variable.

 

The sample we used is from 1972 to 1998. The reason for neglecting previous years is that we mainly want to check the behavior of the working time after the 1973 crisis, since the underlying assumption is that recent trends in working time are generated by the permanent effects and the attempt of overcoming this crisis. This assumption will also help us to use only one dummy variable in our equation, avoiding over specification problems.

In table 4 we can see the estimation output of equation (2).

 

TABLE 4        
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
         
C(1) 44.39714 0.280604 158.2199 0.0000
C(2) -6.394000 0.760432 -8.408381 0.0000
C(3) -0.532088 0.039683 -13.40832 0.0000
C(4) 0.672659 0.053241 12.63427 0.0000
         
R-squared 0.897070 Mean dependent var 40.96593
Adjusted R-squared 0.883644 S.D. dependent var 1.569459
S.E. of regression 0.535358 Akaike info criterion 1.724193
Sum squared resid 6.591998 Schwarz criterion 1.916169
Log likelihood -19.27661 Durbin-Watson stat 1.155560
         

 

As we can see, all coefficients are statistically different from zero, even at the 99% significance level. The first two terms (C(1), C(2)) represent the constant term and have no economic meaning. C(3), which is the slope of our linear equation until the structural change, is negative as we should expect after viewing the plotted data. Finally C(4) has to be added to C(3), to give the slope of the equation after the break point year of 1985. The ‘fit’ of the equation to the data is very good. Formally the estimation gives us the following equations describing the phenomenon before and after 1985:

 

Yt= 44,39714 – 0,532088*t + εt              (for t before 1985)          (3)

 

and

 

Yt= 38,00314 + 0,140571*t + εt                  (for t after 1985)              (4)

 

From equations (3) and (4) we can conclude that there was a statistically significant downward trend in working time from 1973 till the change of economic policy in 1985. After that year the trend changes sign (remaining significant), but the upward movement is now to a smaller degree. This was expected, since it is rather easier to reduce than to increase the working time due to political reasons. Besides, we estimate that the major part of the actual rise in working time is most of the times invisible by the official statistics and occurs also through other channels like second job, the rise of number of workers in each family etc.

All these findings confirm the hypothesis of the increasing working time and consequently the role of the absolute surplus-value in the Greek Economy. The exact percentage of the increase and the comparison with that of the relative surplus value, have to be studied thoroughly. In any case, the tendency of the absolute surplus-value to increase is a major change that is occurring the recent years.

 

 

VI. Conclusions

There are, according to our opinion, significant indications that the capitalist system is exploring the construction of a new stage. Its success is based on the achievement of a new configuration that would restore profitability (through the increase of labour exploitation) and at the same time incorporate – willingly or unwillingly – labour in the new pattern of capitalist accumulation. Whether it will succeed or not depends crucially on the labour movement and on whether a tendency of accommodation with capitalist prerogatives or a new revolutionary tendency would prevail. It looks that the ground for the first, given the realignment of all official parties around the directives of capitalist restructuring, is rather limited. However, a widespread defeatism in the Left – particularly after almost two decades of considerable setbacks – facilitates such an incorporation on the basis of the lesser bad; although it is obvious that this is miserably dismal even compared to the social-democratic policies of the previous stage. On the other hand, a new revolutionary movement requires not the reiteration of old articles of faith but the formulation of a bold new programme of organisation and struggle.

 

 

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Dumenil G. – Levy D. (1993), ‘The Economics of the Profit Rate’, Elgar

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annual update 2000’, EIRO, March

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Fine B. – Harris L. (1979), ‘Rereading Capital’, Columbia University Press

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perspectives’, Routledge

Green F. (2000), ‘Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense? Conjectures and Evidence

About Effort-Biased Technical Change and Other Stories’, UKC Studies in Economics

Green F. – McIntosh S. (2000), ‘Working on the Chain Gang? An Examination of Rising

Effort Levels in Europe in the 1990s’, Discussion Paper 465, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, August

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System’, Pluto

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Radical Political Economics vol.24 no.2

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ILO, Geneva

Ioannides A. – Mavroudeas S. (2000), ‘Stages of capitalist development in Greece: is there

a new stage in process?’ volume of the conference of the Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation on ‘Social Inequalities and Social Exclusion’, University of Macedonia, 27-29 November 1996 (in Greek)

Jessop B. (1982), ‘The Capitalist State’, Martin Robertson

Lash S. – Urry J. (1987), ‘The End of Organised Capitalism’, Oxford University Press

Lehndorff S. (2000), ‘Working time reduction in the European Union: a diversity of trends

and approaches’ in Golden – Figart (2000)

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[1]                     Wood (1986, p.62) has given a lucid account of the trajectory from structuralism to post-structuralism and of their common relation to the Althusserian tradition. Anderson (1988, p.40-55), also, explained the theoretical and personal continuity which links structuralism to post-structuralism.

[2]                     It is indicative that when Marx studied the Law of 1844 and the struggles concerning the duration of the working day, he considered them as concrete outcome of the law of capitalist accumulation and of the class struggle. For this reason he studied them at the abstract level of the mode of production rather than that of a particular social formation (i.e. the British).

[3]                     Hence, Marx was able to study the dialectical unity between appearance and essence whereas Ricardo resorted to “formal abstractions” and a rigid separation between appearance and essence. For Marx the movement from the essence to the concrete is continuous, so that in approaching the concrete forms in which the world exists we do not abandon the sphere of essence.

[4]                     It is worth mentioning that Poulantzas has changed partially his position in his last works. While in his main work he denied the existence of separate stages within the capitalist mode of production, later he recognised monopoly capitalism as a stage in the reproduction of the CMP. In this sense, he considered that there can be recognised within this “imperialist stage” of the CMP certain different phases which are not transformations of the CMP but the historical outcome of class struggle (Poulantzas (1978)).

[5]                     Marx (1982, vol.III, ch.47) distinguished three separate stages within the feudal mode of production and according to the form of appropriation of the surplus labour: rent paid in the form of labour, or in the form of product or, finally, in money form.

[6]                     Uno’s (1980) theory has a similar approach to the concept of the mode of production and to periodization.

[7]                     The newer middle-range theories exacerbate the autonomy of the political-form and resort to an institutionalist periodization of capitalism on the basis of the accordance of  institutional structures to the regimes of capital accumulation. Ultimately, institutional forms are put on an almost equal par with capital accumulation. The problems of such an autonomization and randomisation of politics (and history) have been accurately pointed out by Anderson (1988) and Wood (1986). The resultant periodization of capitalism is theoretically and empirically unsound (see Brenner-Glick (1991), Dumenil-Levy (1988), Mavroudeas (1990)),

[8]                     Contrary to the belief of the monopoly-theoretical tradition, the emergence of monopolies does not negate the predominance of the market mechanism as a fundamental mechanism of the capitalist system.

[9]                     The limitations of quantitative empirical analysis are well known. But, bearing in mind these limits, quantitative empirical analysis constitutes an essential supplement of theoretical analysis. A number of studies have touched upon the question of a new period after the mid-1970s. Some of them suggest caution since the quantitative empirical evidence is still inconclusive (see Dumenil-Levy (1993, ch.15)).

[10]                 Interestingly the Social Structures of Accumulation proponents are hesitant about the development of a post-fordist stage. Bowles-Gordon-Weisskopf (1989, 1990, 1991) maintain that despite the conservative attempts of the last decades, there has not been established a viable new social structure of accumulation. Houston (1992) has questioned this thesis – himself also deriving from the premises of the SSA approach – and argued the opposite on qualitative and methodological grounds.

[11]                 Most studies find a partial increase of the profit rate after several years of neo-conservative policies. For example, Moseley (1997) accepts such a partial restoration for the 1975-94 period, although his theory of crisis on the basis of productive-unproductive labour and his measure of the profit rate require caution.

[12]                 A characteristic example is the case of France where the introduction of 35 hours work-week was coupled with increased labour flexibility and working time reshuffling that led again to actual working time to surpass legal limits. (see EIRO (2001)). It is indicative that this process was stronger in the case of part-time work which was also increased.

[13]                 A typical example is the introduction of legislation that would lengthen the time period applied for the calculation of overtime pay from one to two weeks and allow substitution of compensatory time for money to pay workers overtime.

[14]                 For the intensification of work in Europe see Green – McIntosh (2000).

‘Social Structures of Accumulation, Regulation Approach and stages theory’

Conference:

‘Growth and Crises:

Social Structures of Accumulation Theory and Analysis’

 

National University of Ireland

Galway, Ireland

2-4 November 2006

 

 

‘Social Structures of Accumulation, Regulation Approach and stages theory’

 

 

Stavros D. Mavroudeas

 

Dept. of Economics

University of Macedonia

156, Egnatia

P.O.Box 1591

54006 Thessaloniki

Greece

e-mail: smavro@uom.gr

web page: http://macedonia.uom.gr/~smavro/

 

 

Published as

Mavroudeas S. (2006), ‘Social Structures of Accumulation, Regulation Approach and stages theory’, in the volume of the conference ‘Growth and Crises: Social Structures of Accumulation Theory and Analysis, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland.

 

 

Abstract

 

The similarities between the Social Structures of Accumulation perspective and the Regulation Theory are well known and established in the relevant literature. However, most of the comparisons focus on the founding texts of both approaches. During recent years there appear to be significant developments in both these two theories. This paper studies these developments. In particular, it focuses on the issue of periodisation of capitalism and how both the founding texts and recent developments perform in this field. Particular emphasis is given on the evolution of capitalist economies in the last twenty years and the ability of the aforementioned theories to grasp them.

 

 

I. Introduction

 

The Regulation Approach (RA) and the Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA) theory appeared in the 1980s as ambitious attempts to advance Marxist and Radical Political Economy. Their main common argument was that abstract theory is not sufficient and needs to be complemented with an intermediate level of analysis (e.g. Gordon, Edwards & Reich (1994, p.13)). They argued that the general analysis of capitalist accumulation is not sufficient to explain the concrete evolution of capitalism. Thus, it has to be escorted by a less abstract analysis of more historically contingent structures and processes.

This argumentation can hardly be rejected. It is obvious, at least from a Marxist point of view, that abstract theory provides the basis of the analysis but does not fulfill the whole task of explanation. In a nutshell, for Marx theoretical analysis should begin from the more abstract (and simpler) dimension, which establishes the essence (the basic sine qua non elements) of the subject at hand. Then it should move through a series of intermediate levels to lower levels of abstraction. Every such intermediate level is characterized with the addition to the abstract analysis of more concrete (historically specific) elements. In terms of Dialectical Materialism, this is a meticulous process of layering abstractions. Hence, for Marxist Political Economy the course of the analysis – as Marx has summarized it in the beginning of the Grundrisse – is a movement from the abstract tot the concrete[1].

Thus, both the SSA and the RA posed valid questions and pointed to a serious lacuna of the previous Marxist analyses. However, the way they attempted to answer these questions is fraught with difficulties and problems. They both maintained that this intermediate level of analysis should necessarily focus not only on economic structures and processes but also on the institutional environment of the economy.

Again this is a logical argument. Marxist Political Economy (but also the Classical Political Economy) – contrary to orthodox Economics – comprehends perfectly that the sphere of economic relations is not an autonomous one but it is part of the wider nexus of social relations. Moreover, these social relations are – for the types of society under study – class relations. Consequently, economic relations are social relations by definition and cannot be separated from the other types of social relations. Put it in a nutshell, economic relations together with the extra-economic social relations and the political relations form the basis of every socio-economic system. Economic analysis should necessarily refer to those two other spheres of social relations. Political relations – i.e. the structures and relations that organize the governance of the socio-economic system – are not alien elements for political economic analysis. On the other hand, for Marxism, the economic relations have a determining primacy within the whole nexus of social relations. This thesis about the organic unity of economic, extra-economic social and political relations is a common basis for every Marxist perspective. Of course, there exist well known differences on the way that the political economic analysis should fulfill this task. More primitive approaches (usually characterized as base – superstructure approach and, seldom unjustifiably ridiculed) maintained that the analysis of the economic sphere should come first and more independently from the analysis of the other social spheres. However more dialectically rigorous approaches do simultaneously retain the primacy of the economic relations and analyse them in relation to extra-economic social and political relations.

The SSA and the RA attempted to confront this problem by producing this intermediate level of analysis that intends to complement both the abstract theory of capitalist accumulation and the more concrete analyses of everyday life. In order to do so they emphasize the role of institutions. Capital accumulation cannot operate in a vacuum but it necessarily has an environment. This is its institutional underpinnings. Hence, both theories attempted to endogenize the institutional factors. i.e. instead of considering them as essential but external conditions of the accumulation process they posit them as crucial internal elements of capitalist accumulation. In other words, capitalist accumulation is not a simply economic process but it relates crucially upon a wide range of institution that are not only economic but political and ideological as well.

Apart from reference to political relations, this intermediate level of analysis should necessarily be more historically specific (i.e. more concrete and less abstract). The vehicle for this is the production of a periodisation or stages theory. That is a theory that creates criteria, terms and specialized analytical perspectives that facilitate the recognition of specific historical epochs within capitalism’s historical course. Again this is also a warranted thesis. Periodisation theory, as initiated by Lenin’s (1916) pioneering work, is the obvious vehicle for an intermediate level of analysis of capitalism.

However, the method that the SSA and the RA – explicitly or implicitly adopted in order to accomplish these tasks is extremely problematic and has led to serious problems that undermine their very founding thesis: i.e. the operationalisation of abstract theory through the creation of an intermediate level of less abstract and more concrete analysis. Instead of that they have, especially the RA, recoursed to a Mertonian type of middle-range analysis (see Merton (1968)) that has divorced itself from abstract general theory and strived to stand on its own. The results are rather disappointing and press the need for a reconsideration of course.

The next part of this essay will compare the SSA and the RA and argue that they both are newer non-orthodox middle-range theories. The third part will focus on the periodisation theory, its significance and the problems of the SSA’s and RA’s approach. It is argued that their main periodisation criterion – i.e. the interrelationship between economic and institutional factors is rather problematic. The fourth part will present an alternative perspective on periodisation theory, which focuses primarily on the relations of extraction of surplus-value. Then the role of other factors and relations – political and ideological factors among them – are derived from the more fundamental criterion and established at lower levels of abstraction. Finally, the part concludes.

 

 

II. The newer non-orthodox middle-range theories: RA vs. SSA

 

The SSA and the RA (and other similar approaches such as the Flexible Specialisation theory (Piore & Sabel (1984) etc. whose similarities are nowadays well-documented (see Boyer (1991), Jessop (1992)) were born in a precarious historical period. Radical Political Economy – this distinct trend born out of the university radicalism of the ‘70s – was exasperated by the retreat of the radicalism of the ‘70s. Much of this radicalism derived from an extremely reductionist conception of class and social structure which led to a simplistic and non-dialectical abstract theory. The answer to this problem was thought to be a dive into the concrete. The study of historical contingency was adopted as the cure for rigid abstract theory. This dive into the concrete had several common features for all the implicated theories. It was considered as more able to (a) capture better the historical specificities of different periods of capitalist development, (b) solve the structure-agent riddle and, (c) understand the significance of institutional forms. The two last features denote the impact of two other significant theoretical currents that were on the rise during that period.

The first influence comes from the structuralism vs. post-structuralism saga. This debate engulfed almost all of social sciences – and not only – with rather dubious results. Today it is clearer that, in the end, it is rather a shadow boxing. More or less, the same people alternate opposite positions as Anderson (1988) has accurately shown. First structuralists produced a rigid and undialectical version of structure (which was imposed on Marxism via Althusserianism) and then almost the very same people, this time as post-structuralists, demolished it in favour of agents. Moreover, the latter became more and more indeterminate and subject to ideological and, in the end, discursive influences. Their previous supposedly rigid and economistic determination by material (economic and class) factors was ceremoniously thrown to the fire. The end of this journey is well-known: post-modernist disintegration of every relation of determination and a plunge into the uncharted waters of analytical relativism and indeterminacy[2].

The second influence is more subtle. During the last decades of the 20th century institutionalism has reappeared as a significant theoretical trend. It is supposed to be able to grasp better – at least from orthodox theory – social relations and at the same time it is less controversial, within orthodox circles, than Marxism. Last, but not the least, during the previous decades capitalism has been characterized by vigorous institution-building. Thus, focusing on institutions was considered as a warranted step. However, this influence – which is also related to the previous one – is also problematic. Within orthodox theory neoclassical institutionalism represents an attempt to both overcome well-known deficiencies of neoclassical analysis (namely its inability to capture the social dimension of economic affairs) and expand the realm of neoclassical analysis to fields and areas previously forbidden to it. As such, neoclassical institutionalism – in all its variants from North and Williamson to Stiglitz – is a vehicle for what Fine (2000) has termed ‘economics’ imperialism’. As it has been argued elsewhere (Mavroudeas (2006)), it is simultaneously a sign of strength and of weakness of orthodox Economics. It is a sign of strength in the sense that they invade new territories. But it is also a sign of weakness because in order to do so they have to relax their analytical coherence[3] and to embed elements that are rather incompatible with the hard core of neoclassical theory. In radical and heterodox Economics, institutionalism – in its radical versions – is seen as a subtle and less controversial vehicle for the subversion of the suffocating dominance of neoclassical orthodoxy. It is less controversial than Marxist Political Economy per se and at the same time it can more easily – than the former – be employed for applied economic analysis. However, these merits come at a rather heavy cost. Institutionalism – radical or conformist – is a poor alternative for Marxist political economic analysis. It is a poor substitute for class analysis. And also it cannot comprehend properly a crucial feature of the capitalist system. The latter is a ‘free system’ in the sense that – contrary to its previous class socio-economic systems – it is not based primarily on violence (on power relations) but only on economic non-violent obligation. In capitalism, power relations (i.e. political relations) are a derivative of its economic relations. This determination process cannot be grasped satisfactorily by institutionalism whereas Marxist Political Economy exhibits a far superior record. Consequently, for Radical and Marxist Political Economy institutionalism surrenders more than those that it brings aboard. It brings alien influences that jeopardise their analyses and – as in the not-so-unusual case of theories that knowingly or unknowingly follow Agassi’s (1975) institutional individualism [4]– they open the gates to orthodox infiltrators.

The way the SSA and the RA attempted to accommodate historical specificity and to construct their intermediate analysis took, in the end, the form of middle-range theory (Mavroudeas (1999a), Sayer (1995)). This, as advocated by Merton (1968), is a particular type of intermediate analysis. Middle-range theories, in contrast to general theories – covering the whole spectrum, from the most abstract laws and concepts to the empirical analysis of the concrete, in a unified framework – reject abstract general laws and the necessity of an all-embracing theory which are deemed to be either redundant or a distant accessory. It substitutes both with intermediate concepts with an immediate identification with the most concrete phenomena. These concepts are not linked to a general theory but are based on empirical observations perceived as indisputable (stylised facts). These stylised facts are supposed to capture important facets of historical reality and, thus, to mark different epochs. This type of reasoning has significant problems. Stylised facts – in contrast to dialectical materialist abstractions from concrete historical reality – are supposed to be theory-free but also historically accurate. However, they are usually founded on theoretical influences and perceptions which are neither explicit not necessarily coherent and, therefore, represent an eclecticist reading of historical reality. The next step is the construction of a theory based on the intermediate concepts and the periodisation derived from the stylised facts. Consequently, both concepts and periodisation vindicate, in a circular way, the initiating empirical perceptions. Middle-range theories’ major weapon – their close identification with a particular historical epoch – gives them immense popularity during the course of the particular epoch (if and when it has been identified correctly) but, on the other hand, invalidates them when it ends. Then, more fundamental questions re-emerge, requiring a general theory. In this case, middle-range theory’s agnosticism and/or referential pluralism become a major weakness.

The RA and the SSA have followed – gradually and with contradictions – the path towards middle-range analysis. Thus their characterisation as the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories is not off the mark. In the case of the RA its very success was the recipe for its current stagnation. The more its middle-range analyses acquired popularity the more its linkages to a general theory were being severed. In the end, the middle-range analysis and its concepts (Fordism, post-Fordism etc.) acquired a life of their own and the initial task of providing an intermediate analysis for Marxist abstract theory was thrown to the dustbin.

Curiously enough, although SSA have been a less coherent and less popular approach than the RA it has not followed the latter in severing altogether its links with its foundational task. A number of studies (e.g. Jessop (1990), Kotz (1994)) have pinpointed the similarities and the differences between the SSA and the RA. Their differences can be summarised as follows.

In their beginning, as Jessop (1990) rightfully observes, the RA ascribed to Marxist Value Theory and this was reflected in Aglietta’s (1979) conceptual hierarchy[5]. On the contrary, the SSA adopted from the beginning a more price-theoretic perspective. This was coupled with RA’s emphasis on qualitative aspects (how the interplay between historically contingent economic structures and politico-economic instirutional structures affect the fundamental Marxist crisis tendencies) in contrast to the SSA’s emphasis on quantitative analysis (how institutions affect the profit rate and the speed of accumulation). However, the RA dropped quite soon its initial value-theoretic perspective and followed a course towards institutional analysis.

Their differences regarding their conceptual toolboxes are also significant. The RoA began with a strict adherence to Marxist general theory. Its first concept was the law of accumulation, which is an abstract economic concept denoting the general workings of the capitalist system irrespectively of historical epochs. This is followed by the Regime of Accumulation (RoA). This is a purely economic but historically contingent concept that denotes the distribution of the surplus-value between capital and labour which is required in each period in order to co-ordinate production with social demand. It covers the essential economic conditions for the operation of the productive system (technology, organisation of the labour-process, relations between the departments of production). The RoA is followed by the Mode of Regulation (MoR). The latter is economic and political concept that designates the necessary institutional forms and social compromises for the reproduction of the RoA. Hence, the MoR covers both economic and political aspects. In this sense it is equivalent to the concept of the SSA and particularly its inner boundary (Gordon, Edwards & Reich (1994, p.15)). The RoA is posited at the level of the compulsory economic structures, whereas the MoR is less determinate, since it relies on concrete, historically specific institutional forms. More than one MoR can be implemented in a certain RoA. Which will prevail is a question open to the indeterminacy of history. However, not every MoR is suitable for every RoA. Thus, in its initial version the RA attempted to construct a structured analysis of all the aspects of the capitalist system from the more abstract ones to the more concrete ones. This analysis upheld the determining primacy of the economic relations over the other social relations. The SSA does not have such an elaborate conceptual toolbox. As it has been shown in the relevant literature the institutional structure is very weakly linked to the process of capital accumulation. Additionally, the SSA overemphasises the linkage between power relations and profitability. However, the RA had quite soon dropped the law of accumulation as a working concept. It has also ‘parked’ the RoA since – after the competitive and the monopolist RoA – no new regime has been discovered and all its emphasis has focused on the MoR. It is not unwarranted to argue that for contemporary regulationist analyses the RoA has become an insignificant concept.

Apart from the differences regarding the concepts, there are also well known differences with reference to the way institutions affect capital accumulation. For the SSA institutions create stability and predictability and – given certain assumptions – they should induce rapid accumulation. This reflects a more Keynesian conception of accumulation given its emphasis on the capitalists’ investment decisions in an uncertain environment. On the other hand, the RA focuses on the character of accumulation and particular on how the relationship between accumulation and the institutional structure affect the profit rate and the realization of value. This reflects a more Marxian conception of accumulation given its emphasis on the profit rate. However, the Keynesian influences on the RA are not few[6]. The very definition of the RoA stresses the significance of social demand. Moreover, the crisis of the 1929 and the process that generated Fordism is posited as an underconsumptionist one.

Finally, the process of eruption of structural crises is theorised in a rather different way. For the RA crisis stems from the disarticulation between MoR and RoA. On the contrary, for the SSA crisis stems either from the collapse of the SSA and/or the change of the equilibrium of power relations between its main pillars.

It is evident that both the RA and the SSA have strived to achieve a precarious balance between the primacy of the fundamental capital accumulation processes and the role of the institutional environment. Thus, in the initial versions, the former is clearly posited as the primary. However, at least in the case of the RA, this theoretical architecture has led to a slippery path towards relativism and ultimately post-modernism. The emphasis on the middle-range analysis has facilitated this trajectory. The initial primacy of capital accumulation has been gradually downgraded up to the point where it has been equated with the institutional sphere.

Thus, Kotz (1994) may be right when pointing out that the SSA’s theoretical structure was less organised and less materialist than that of the RA. However, this today appears as a bygone feature. The RA has long ago shed its initial architecture and moved to the field of power and ultimately discursive relations. In this sense his call for a greater interchange between the RA (and its supposed emphasis on structural factors) and the SSA (and its emphasis on class struggle) as a cure for the deficiencies of each one sounds hollow. The RA, at least, has already moved out from structuralism.

The analysis presented above poses the following question: what went wrong with the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories? As already implied in the previous part, although they set valid questions their replies seem unsatisfactory. Their first main problem is the middle-range methodology which weakened their theoretical depth and – although purporting to the contrary – it ultimately limited their explanatory power. Once again it has been proved that without a firm grounding in abstract general theory you cannot perform satisfactory intermediate analysis. Their second main problem is the questionable prioritization of the relationship between capital accumulation processes and institutional framework as the main locus of intermediate analysis. As it will be argued below the institutional framework (and political relations in general) is not of equal importance with the economic relations. It follows as a consequence and it also exerts feedback effects but it is not equivalent.

 

 

III. Periodisation theory and the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories

 

It has already been argued that periodisation theory is an integral part of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories. This theoretical field has been initiated by Lenin’s (1916) pioneering work on imperialism (or more accurately on monopoly capitalism). As it is well known Lenin’s thesis was the culmination of a heated debate in the beginning of the 20th century on capitalism’s development and the new characteristics that it acquired at that period in comparison to its previous state of affairs. What distinguished Lenin’s analysis from the rest of his contemporary analyses in the ‘classical Marxist debate on imperialism’ is that – apart from its superior political impact – it stated clearly that capitalism passes through different stages and that Marxist theory has to study them and produce relevant analytical but also political conclusions. Thus, contrary to Hilferding, for example, he clearly posited the necessity for a periodisation theory. After Lenin periodisation theory became for a period a ‘hot subject’ in Marxist analysis till it reached an impasse in the 1950s and 1960s. Much of this impasse was caused by the very significance of Lenin’s thesis and also the political form (but not the analytical essence) of his argument. There was an intellectual ‘shyness’ to expand periodisation theory on Lenin’s steps (apart from either certain Soviet Marxist formalisations on state monopoly capitalism and Monthly Review’s theory of ‘monopoly capitalism’). This ‘shyness’ was further induced by Lenin’s political argument that imperialism (or more accurately monopoly capitalism) represented the highest stage of capitalism after which no other stage can follow and capitalism’s collapse is on the agenda. As a closer look at Lenin’s work can reveal, this was an argument put forward for political reasons, i.e. in order to push forward the revolutionary movement of his time and drive it away from reformist paths. As a recent editorial in Monthly Review (2004) shows Lenin’s original title of his book was referring to imperialism as the ‘latest stage of capitalism’, thus it did not precluded further developments in capitalism.

There was another significant lacuna in those first waves of periodisation theory. As Gordon (1980) accurately points out there was a certain lack of rigorousness in them. More specifically, there was not a complete and coherent theory for periodising capitalism, i.e. there were not clearly defined criteria for discerning different historical epochs. This was coupled with an emphasis on elements of the sphere of circulation, e.g. monopolisation. This theoretical architecture stands rather uneasily with the Marxist thesis of the primacy of the production sphere.

The newer non-orthodox middle-range theories – and the RA primarily among them – challenged these perceptions. They argued that capitalism’s evolution – however unpleasantly – is not a ‘finished job’. In this way – and this has to be credited to them – they have reinvigorated periodisation theory. They have also to be credited – particularly the RA – for focusing periodisation on the sphere of production as opposed to the previous focus on the intra-capitalist competition. It is the type of organisation of the labour process and the types of collective labourer that comes at the centre of attention.

However from this point and onwards start the problems in the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories. Faithful to their fundamental perspective they offer a periodization of capitalism on the basis of the interaction between capitalism’s purely economic processes and their economico-political counterparts. Thus, instead of using as a periodisation criterion the types of intra-capitalist competition, they use the interrelationship between capital accumulation and institutional structure. Whereas previous traditions periodised capitalism from within the framework of a general theory, on the basis of abstract general laws and tendencies, the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories opted for a more historically conjectural point of view. A typical way of doing this is by examining statistical data in order to discover phases of development of crucial economic variables (for example, the profit rate and/or the rate of productivity growth). Then, find the institutional structures that are associated with these developments and establish appropriate theoretical indicators. Finally, test statistically this relationship. This type of analysis, in the end, leaves aside any gearing to general theory and focuses solely on historical specificities. Thus it hinges mainly upon a number of stylised facts, i.e. pre-theoretical beliefs about historical facts. That is they reflect deep empiricist perceptions about specific historical periods which however have not been rigorously examined and thus their validity is far from certain. They usually stem from high profile events or facts (e.g. the mass private use of cars), which might not reflect accurately historical reality but can create strong impressions. The problem with this type of reasoning is that it actually presupposes what has to be proved. Intermediate concepts are being created in order to cope with these stylised facts and then, in a cyclical manner, these concepts and the concomitant analysis validate the initial stylised facts. This vicious circle can operate until reality rejects it irrefutably. The newer non-orthodox middle-range theories share the same, more or less, stylised facts. Their main object of study is the post World War II era. Subsequently, all previous and following eras are being theorised in relation to this benchmark period. The intermediate concepts that are created are very closely related to specific – correct or erroneous – features of that period. This in turn limits seriously their general applicability and makes them concepts of limited explanatory power and use.

There are well-known examples of the shortcomings of this periodisation approach which is based on the coupling of stylised facts with historically specific intermediate concepts. For example, it has been seriously disputed the regulationsit assertion that labour’s real subsumption under capital – and thus the systematic extraction of relative surplus-value – took place during the 1920s. Brenner and Glick (1991)) has indicated that this process took place quite earlier. capitalist mass production and labour’s real sumbsumption under capital were created long before the 1920s. Indeed, there cannot be a form of capitalism in which absolute surplus-value predominates; apart perhaps from its first primitive steps when it was not a fully organised socio-economic system. Apart from Brenner & Glick, Marx’s analysis of the capitalist labour process and the forms of extraction of surplus-value gives a similar picture. Another well-known case is the regulationist belief that during a quite lengthy historical period the lack of institutionally insured levels of consumption (the social norm of consumption) acted as a fetter to the scope and intensity of capitalist accumulation. This has been refuted by many studies. Additionally, it has been shown (see Mavroudeas (2003)) that – contrary to the regulationist empirical beliefs – capitalism dominates from its very beginning both production and consumption and transforms them both – to the extent that it is able to – according to its needs. More specifically, working-class’ consumption (and, thus, the reproduction of labour-power) was commodified from the very beginning of capitalism – not after World War II as the RA maintains – because this is a necessary condition for the creation of a class of wage labourers. From the very birth of capitalism, working-class’ consumption represented a market for capitalist commodities. This market was increasing, because both the size of the workforce and the real wage increased – although with irregularities and ups and downs. Furthermore, capitalist mass production was established long before the 1920s and mass consumption before the end of World War II. Thus, the regulationist interpretation of the 1929 as an underconsumption crisis is simply wrong.

In the case of the RA the middle-range periodisation methodology was coupled with an undue projection of developments in the labour and production process to the whole of the economy (see Brenner & Glick (1991), Mavroudeas (1999b)). Although periodisation analysis should focus on that field, it must not project its conclusions directly to the rest of the economic spheres. Moreover, the analysis of the labour and production process was done initially under the auspices of Marxist Value theory and, thus, focused correctly on the relationship between paid and unpaid labour-time. However, the abandonment of the value-theoretic perspective led to the inability to grasp this crucial for capitalist exploitation labour-time dimension. This, again in the case of the RA, facilitated abrupt and unprincipled theoretical changes. For example, the infamous – and yet to be defined – post-Fordism is mainly derived from the saturation of mass markets and the emergence of a new thirst for niche goods. In this argument the centrality of the production sphere is substituted by the changes in consumers’ tastes.

Setting aside specific issues, the main problem with the periodisation methodology of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories is exactly their main periodisation criterion. Why stages in capitalism depend on the articulation between the process of capital accumulation and the institutional structures? From a political activist perspective it sounds extremely logical and also functional to relate stages of capitalism to political factors. Certainly, a new capitalist stage is based on changes in the economy but it cannot be long-lived without an appropriate political and institutional framework. This, however, does not preclude the analytical question of why a stage depends on this articulation and not on something else. For example, it can convincingly be argued – and indeed the RA in its initial steps followed this argument – that the process of capital accumulation generates different stages and then, on the basis of these, appropriate political and institutional structures are being constructed. Additionally, the collapse of a stage does not depend on the disarticulation between capital accumulation and institutional structures – a well known problematic area of all newer non-orthodox middle-range theories – but stems primarily from the process of capital accumulation. Such an approach can – if it employs properly dialectics – avoid a crude juxtaposition of the economic relations on the rest of social relations and at the same time retain the determining primacy of the former.

The theses presented above touch upon an intriguing argument put forward by McDonough (1994). He argued – applauding Lenin’s insistence on the analytical and political necessity of periodisation theory – that the SSA cannot be a satisfactory theory of long swings given its problems but it may be a good periodisation theory and therefore it must focus on this latter area. It could be certainly agreed that an emphasis on periodisation can bring interesting insights. However, a serious obstacle remains. Almost any kind intermediate periodisation theory .without a solid reference to a general theory is destined to crash into serious difficulties. And the SSA, for the moment at least, lacks such a theory.

 

 

IV. An alternative periodisation theory

 

There is an alternative way to conduct periodisation analysis. Marx’s periodisation of feudalism on the basis of the forms of extraction of the surplus provides a significant intuition. This intuition is further developed in Capital when analysing the capitalist labour process and the two basic forms of extraction of surplus-value (absolute and relative surplus-value). The extraction of surplus-value is the main operating principle of the capitalist system. It is therefore appropriate to analyse changes in the modus operandi of the system is reference to this fundamental principle. In a sense, the RA had initially alluded to such a perspective with its definition of the RoA. However, as already argued, it soon moved its attention to other areas.

As it has been argued in length before (see Mavroudeas & Ioannides (2003)) the periodization of capitalism should be conducted at the level of the mode of production, (m.o.p.) from a capital-theoretical perspective and in close relation – at a lower level of abstraction – with its general theory (see Fine & Harris (1979)). Each m.o.p. is based on a specific set of class relations of production. Relations of production are directly class-determined, whereas forces of production are only indirectly class-determined as well. The existence of these relations of production requires a further constitution of social relations that are preconditions for economic reproduction (i.e. the integration of production-distribution-consumption). Moreover, this economic reproduction requires and necessitates the creation of social reproduction (comprising of political, ideological etc. relations with a particular structure of links between themselves and the economy). Thus, while m.o.p. are distinguished in terms of the fundamental relations of possession and control among producing and non-producing classes (not merely in their legal form, since this can be superficial and deceiving, but in their essential nature), stages in each mode are differentiated on the basis of the specific forms of these basic relations and their social reproduction. Therefore, the criterion for the periodisation of a class-divided social m.o.p. should be the evolution of the process of production and appropriation of surplus. This covers two crucial areas: 1) the way in which production is socialised (i.e. autonomous or separate individual production processes are related) and, 2) the method of appropriation of the surplus. In addition, the prerequisites of general social reproduction should be taken into account. In the capitalist m.o.p. the accumulation of capital and the class struggle associated with it are the basic forces transforming this mode and, thus, producing different stages. From a more general perspective, accumulation and class struggle within this mode determine not only changes within it but also the contradiction-ridden movement from this mode to another. The specific criterion for the periodisation of the capitalist m.o.p. should be the mode of producing, appropriating and controlling surplus-value and the associated mode of socialisation of production. This is so because its transformations are closely related with new forms of class struggle and are reflected in the transformations of the whole production process and, subsequently, to the whole economic reproduction. These, in turn, produce, and in many cases presuppose, changes in the social relations, in political relations and the state form of the state etc. The mode of appropriation of surplus-value is closely related to the modes of socialisation of production. Because the capitalist m.o.p. – contrary to most pre-capitalist m.o.p. – is fundamentally a ‘free’ decentralised system (private enterprises, competition, labour markets) the latter concern the way that all these decentralised private economic processes are compounded in a unified socio-economic system. In this way they express the specific mode of existence of (1) the fundamental contradiction (capital-labour) and, (2) the secondary contradictions (intra-capitalist competition). The socialisation of production is ultimately expressed in the form of the linkage of production-exchange-circulation-distribution. Since the capitalist m.o.p. appears as relations of exchange (despite its structuration as relations of production), its specific periods are expressed as different forms of exchange; which, however, arise out of different forms of production. Periodisation should cover this unity of essence and appearance.

On this basis we can rank, in terms of importance, the following categories of relations that characterise each stage of the capitalist m.o.p.:

 

1) Labour and Production Process

It constitutes the fundamental kernel of every socio-economic system since it through this that the latter’s means of reproduction are being produced. In the capitalist m.o.p. it imprints the mode under which labour is subsumed by capital. As such it reflects also the balance between the two ways of appropriating surplus-value (absolute and relative).

Several theories (Fine & Harris (1979), RA etc.) tend to periodise capitalism on the basis of the extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value. Additionally absolute surplus-value is identified almost exclusively with the predominance of the formal subsumption of labour by capital and relative surplus-value with the real subsumption. Then they periodise accordingly capitalism. For Fine & Harris (1979) absolute surplus-value and the formal subsumption prevailed during laissez-faire capitalism, which lasted till the end of the 19th century. The RA, on the other hand, posits their reign for the whole (abnormally long and rather vague) pre-fordist period, which lasted till the 1930s. As said before, this extremely clean cut connection is incorrect. The capitalist system, apart from its phase of birth, was characterised by the real subsumption of labour and the predominance of relative surplus-value.

This view is quite problematic since the very essence of capitalism consists in the continuous revolutionisation of the social and technical conditions of the labour-process so as to push back the initial natural limits of necessary labour-time and, hence, progressively to extend the domain of surplus labour. It is not thus absolute but relative surplus-value that, according to Marx (1981, p.769) constitutes the essential basis of the capitalist m.o.p. The processes of extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value co-exist and are interwoven from the first moments of capitalism. During its birth era – which however does not constitute a separate period – there was a predominance of absolute surplus-value and the formal subsumption of labour. However, as soon as capitalism completes its emergence its is relative surplus-value and the real subsumption that assume primacy.

What changes between different stages of capitalism is neither the predominance of absolute surplus-value nor formal subsumption. It is the balance between relations of extraction of absolute and relative surplus-value. This balance depends crucially upon the prevailing modes of organisation of the labour-process (always on the basis of the real subsumption of labour). This does not imply the separation of the production process from the rest of the economy. The sphere of production is the dominant one within the total circuit of capital (production-circulation-exchange-distribution). However, just because it is the dominant one but within a unified process, it cannot be separated from the rest of the process (Marx (1981), p.99-100)). In capitalism socio-economic relations – generated and founded exactly in the sphere of production – appear as a coherent social system mainly in the sphere of exchange: production for exchange. Therefore, the system appears as a social system mainly on the level of exchange relations: everything before is autonomous. The capital-labour relation is based on the individual relations between capitalists and workers at a social molecular basis. Of course, its general preconditions – and most of all the separation of labour from the means of production – are pre-given for the whole of society. But the specific and particular individual forms of these fundamental relations – the creation of an individual capitalist firm and the specific capital-labour relation expressed in it are ‘socially spontaneous’. They are regulated only at a second, subsequent level by labour laws and regulations governing intra-capital competition. Therefore, the extraction and appropriation of surplus-value and the socialisation of production refer the whole spectrum of the total circuit of capital. In this sense, there is neither radical autonomy nor special role of class struggle within the immediate production process. Furthermore, a proper theorisation and periodisation of capitalism must be based on the whole of the total circuit of capital and on the dialectical determination and unity of its different moments.

 

2) Process of socialisation of production

This covers:

(a) intra-capitalist competition (particularly its inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral dimension as well as tendencies with regard to the centralisation and concentration of production),

(b) money and credit (the formation of the general equivalent, types of money (commodity, fiat, credit money etc.) and their interrelationship, credit mechanisms)

(c) state’s economic functions

 

3) Process of income distribution

In the sphere of distribution two divisions are of particular importance: (1) the division between wages (depending crucially upon the value of labour-power and the relevant bundle of wage-goods) and profit, (2) the division of total surplus-value in (industrial) profit, interest and rent. Both these divisions are influenced by monetary intermediation, since it affects both the validation of the wage-goods bundle and the distribution between profit, interest and rent. In each stage of the capitalist m.o.p. the specific mechanisms of formation of these two fundamental divisions are transformed.

 

4) Forms of crisis

The capitalist m.o.p. is riddled with crises of overaccumulation deriving from the tendency of the rate to fall due to the increasing organic composition of capital. However, although this is the fundamental cause of crises, they are expressed in different forms and through different mechanisms (stock-market crises, collapses of exchange rate regimes etc.). Each stage exhibits considerable specificities with regard to crises.

 

5) Processes of political intermediation

The capitalist system – contrary to previous class systems – is characterised by the fetishist separation of socio-economic relations in the economy (which appears solely as exchange relations) and the political sphere (which appears as a socially-neutral management of common affairs). Thus the capital-relation is doubled in form in the domain of the economy (where inequality and class divisions predominate) and the domain of politics (where typical equality among members of the society prevails). The capitalist state – as the collective capitalist, the representative of the general interests of the bourgeoisie – has to appear as a neutral mediator between capital and labour as well as in conflicts between different fractions of capital. Hence the political-form is generated from the capital-relation, although it retains a degree of autonomy. Political intermediation, ideological hegemony and institutional structures – the main levers of the domain of politics – change also in accordance with transformations of the capital-relation.

 

6) International system

Capitalism is the first class system that acquired a global dimension. From its very first it created a system of international relations whose main characteristics are antagonism between capitalist blocs (backed by states) and relations of unequal exchange and exploitation between more and less developed countries. In sum, as implicitly suggested by Fine & Harris (1979), imperialism is not an exclusive feature of monopoly capitalism but the universal feature of capitalism’s international system. The structure of the international system  – and specifically its main factors (which of capital’s main fractions (productive, money or merchant capital) are internationalised and predominate, what means play the role of international money, what are the forms of international competition, what supra-national politico-economic structures exist etc.) – changes from stage to stage.

 

The process of transition from one stage to another

A crucial question is why and how there is a transition from one stage to another. The cause is a combination of the limits of capital accumulation and the subsequent limits set by class struggle. The capitalist m.o.p. is a system endogenously crisis-prone. The continuous production and appropriation of surplus-value and its accumulation leads to crises of overaccumulation. Its very success is what leads to its failure.

Capital’s desire for profits leads it to struggle against labour and other capitals. The struggle against labour is manifested in the increasing replacement of workers by machines through the mechanisation of production. Hence the type of technical change pertaining to capitalism is labour-saving. This increases both the productivity and the intensity of labour. His struggle of its individual capital against labour has meaning only if it is expressed, as a lower unit cost, in the (Intensified) competition with other capitals. Thus, intensified competition and the subsequent mechanisation of production lead to rising technical, organic and value composition of capital. This increased composition produces a downward shift in the rate of profit even when the rate of surplus-value is rising faster than the composition of capital. A crucial factor in this relation is that the worker has definite physical limits which fetter the continuous imposition of new combinations of increased productivity and intensity of labour, within a given technological pattern. Beyond these limits the increase of the rate of surplus-value (in its fundamental sense, as a change in the demarcation line between necessary and surplus labour-time) cannot continue and, consequently, it cannot counteract the increasing composition of capital. The decline of the rate of profit necessarily leads to a fall in the mass of profit signalling the beginning of a crisis. Crises of overaccumulation are surpassed through the devalorisation of capitals but above all through the deepening and the intensification of processes of labour exploitation. The latter is the crucial link in overcoming a capitalist crisis. The processes of labour exploitation – through the mechanisms of absolute and relative surplus-value – always have a historically concrete character and are expressed by the specific mode of organisation of the production process. As said before, every mode of organisation of the production process (technology, combination of absolute and relative surplus-value, processes of increasing labour productivity and intensifying labour) have definite limits beyond which the worker cannot be pressed. Surpassing these limits is destructive for the capitalist system as a whole – although each individual capital strives to overcome them – since it will destroy its very basis of operation, labour. On the ground of this struggle for the change of the demarcation line between necessary and surplus labour-time class struggle in production arises, The working-class – even in its more ‘molecular’ and less conscious form of struggle – strives against the deterioration (if not for the improvement) of the terms of sale of its labour-power and its conditions of work. When this resistance is combined with capital’s inability to successfully continue its accumulation then it becomes obvious that capitalism’s modus operandi has to be transformed. The successful implementation of such transformations implies an increased socialisation of production, since through this capitalist dynamics can be coordinated better and crisis-tendencies, although not avoided, can be managed easier.

Through this process of accumulation – class struggle – crisis – transformation is expressed the Marxian contradiction between production relations and productive forces. The very development of productive forces (even in their capitalistically determined form) is fettered by its own production relations and on this ground develops both working-class’ struggle as well as capitalism need to be transformed. Whether this outcome will be achieved depends crucially on the balance of class forces. The latter is at the same time ‘open’ and constrained. It is ‘open’ because the working-class’ conscious struggle can create history and lead to surpassing capitalism and open the process for socialist transition. It is constraint because this possibility is restricted by existing economic constraints (particularly the knowledge of collective labourer and its ability to direct the production process, development of productive forces etc.). The working-class can revolutionise these conditions but it cannot neglect them.

 

 

V. Conclusions

 

How valid empirically can be today a periodisation of capitalism based on the equilibrium between absolute and relative surplus-value? For many writers the relationship between absolute and relative surplus-value was an early capitalistic affair: it concerned only capitalism’s natal phase. After its establishment as a fully-blown and coherent system it has ceased to play any important role: relative surplus-value is dominant. Particularly, after the eight-hours movement and the imposition of the Factory Laws, the case of absolute surplus-value has been silently considered as a mere appendage, a residual of the main capitalist processes but not an important mechanism. This perception is disputed today. Capitalism, after the 1973 crisis, exhibits a trend towards the increase of real work-time. This is a rather new trend since till then actual work-time tended to decrease. It can easily be shown that this increase of real work-time is closely related to the increase of unpaid labour-time; that is to an increase of absolute surplus-value (as the real wage rate either decreases or lags behind).

There is indeed increasing evidence that from the 1980s and onwards, with the advent of ‘labour flexibility’ policies, the declining work-time trend not only ceased but it has been probably reversed. During the last years statutory and collectively bargained limits to the length of the workweek are increasingly either neglected or becoming irrelevant. The organization of work-time moves from the more or less synchronized hours of work and leisure to more multiple and widely differentiated patterns of flexible working time arrangements. The ‘standard’ workweek gives way to schemes of hours averaging over longer intervals of time and the eight hours workday is violated for increasing sections of the workforce. These trends bring forth the significance of actual work-time, as differentiated from the statutory one. Flexibility and destandardisation make statutory arrangements more or less ineffective. On the other hand actual work-time (which incorporates overtime, absenteeism, moonlighting etc.) becomes far more important since it can show the real trends in work-time (particularly in cases where a decline in statutory time can co-exist with an increase in actual work-time).

These developments have been picked up by a growing number of recent studies which cast doubts on the belief of a declining work-time. On the contrary, they argued that actual work-time appears to be rising in many countries and for increasing segments of the working class; whereas, at the same time, other segments become underemployed. However, the first seems to be the dominant trend. For example, there is significant evidence that actual weekly work hours are rising in the United States, Japan and most of the emerging and less developed market economies (see ILO-KILM (1999)). Particularly for the US, the case of overworking has been convincingly raised by many researchers (see Schor (2000), Bluestone & Rose (1998), Golden & Figart (2000a) etc.). There is, however, an ambiguity on what is happening in Europe, where the greater influence of trade unions and the stronger traditions of the welfare state (despite the recent decades’ reversals) have presented greater resistance to the trend of the increasing work hours. Most studies – influenced by the 35-hours movement and particularly its legislation by the Jospin government in France and similar demands by several European trade unions (e.g. the influential German IG-Metal) – assume that the postwar downward trend is still effective. However, it is usually neglected that statutory decrease can go hand in hand with actual increase in work-time. Furthermore, recent developments (e.g. certain deals in big German enterprises securing works at the cost of increased work-time with the same payment) dispute this picture. Particularly in Southern Europe the trend towards overworking appears to be more pronounced (see Mutari & Figart (2000)).

If this picture is true then a new situation appears where absolute surplus-value rises again significantly. This might signify that a new capitalist stage is in the process of creation.

 

 

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[1]           For a more detailed exposition of the Marxian methodology see Mavroudeas (1999a).

[2]           RA’s gradual slide towards post-modernism is analysed in Mavroudeas (1999a).

[3]           For example, with the invasion of foreign fields the coherence of neoclassical general equilibrium models becomes extremely strained and dubious.

[4]           For an analysis of the role of institutionalism within Radical Political Economy and its relation to post-modernism and neo-classical Economics see Mavroudeas (2006).

[5]           This value-theoretic perspective is even more evident in his initial thesis which had subsequently been removed in his first book.

[6]           For a more detailed exposition of the Keynesian elements in the RA see Mavroudeas (1999a).